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DIALOGUES

ON THE

HINDU PHILOSOPHY

COMPRISING

THE NYAYA, THE SANKHYA, THE VEDANT;

TO WHICH IS ADDED A DISCUSSION OF THE

AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS.

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TO

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LATE OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE,

WHO FOR A LONG SERIES OF YEARS

HAS CONTRIBUTED

BOTH BY HIS PURSE AND HIS PEN

TO THE VERY OBJECTS HEREIN AIMED AT,

THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED

AS A SMALL TRIBUTE

OF THE AUTHOR'S RESPECT AND ESTEEM.

PREFACE.

सत्यमेव जयते ॥

THE objects aimed at in the following dialogues are, *first*, to give a correct and authentic statement of the doctrines of Hindu philosophy, and, *secondly*, to suggest such modes of dealing with them as may prove most effective to the Hindu mind.

Our first object we have attempted to ensure by citing the original authorities, and letting the old Ṛishis speak for themselves. The second we have endeavoured to attain by availing ourselves in some measure of the arguments which the advocates of contending schools have used against each other. We have thus impressed Kaṇáda, Kapila, Rámánuja, to do battle for us against the Vedant, and taken advantage of S'ankaráchárya's powerful battery against the Nyáya and the Sánkhya.

There was a time, not full fifty years ago, when politicians and statesmen expressed the most extravagant admiration of the Hindu philosophy, both in official documents and in speeches delivered in the parliament of Great Britain. In defence of the policy of excluding Christian missions from the country, reference was made to "her philosophers, lawyers, and moralists who have left the oracles of political and ethical wisdom, to restrain

the passions and awe the vices which disturb the commonwealth[1]." The panegyrics passed on the Hindu systems by politicians are no doubt to be referred in part to the temporary excitement and consequent bias under which they were written or spoken. But writers are still not wanting who affect to be amazed at the transcendental excellency of the Hindu philosophy, and who do not hesitate to declare that however much the undoubted excellency of the system may be mixed up with possible errors, it would be impossible without profane violence to the one to refute the other.

The difficulty of the task we freely admit. But our endeavour has been candidly to recognize what we have found to be true, and courageously to condemn what we have discovered to be false.

What, it may be asked, is to be the test of truth and error in these discussions? We say, in the language of the Royal proclamation,—the only document through which the Queen has ever spoken to her Indian subjects and in Indian languages,—that "firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of Religion, we disclaim alike the Right and the Desire to impose our convictions," on any of our controversial opponents. The Christian religion itself, which recognizes "the work of the law written in the hearts" of men, forbids unfairness of argumentation in discussions, voluntarily undertaken, with the full understanding that the parties argued with are not Christians. We have no right therefore in this argument to appeal to that which we believe to be the pri-

1 Speech of Mr. Charles Marsh in the House of Commons in Capt. Kaye's *Christianity in India*, p. 280.

mary standard of truth, and the highest authority in all controversies to which it is applicable.

That authority, however, as we have just hinted, recognizes another authority—the authority of conscience—limited indeed in its range, but still a sufficient authority within its own province. Now the questions discussed in these pages certainly fall within that province. We have to deal with those who profess to discriminate between *dharma* and *adharma*, between right and wrong. Our test of truth and error in these discussions is accordingly the same which writers on moral philosophy and natural theology are in the habit of observing. It is substantially the very test to which the founders of the Hindu philosophy themselves appeal.

But do not the founders of the Hindu philosophy appeal also to the positive authority of the Vedas which they look upon as a revelation from God? This is only partially true, for most of the schools maintain that their doctrines are superior to the Vedas, and as to the few which profess to deduce their tenets from the authority of texts, they certainly do not say that the texts contain a revelation of God's will. Some of them say nothing at all about the existence of God, and all deny that the Vedas had any author, human or divine. (See below pp. 485, 486.) We have discussed their tenets on these points, and the final appeal remains therefore to *the work of the Law written in the hearts of men.* One of the staunchest of the defenders of the Vedas allows that even their authority could not sanction what involves an absurdity or a contradiction.

It is generally believed by the modern followers of Brahminism that the Vedas contain a revelation from God, and

under this impression they implicitly submit to their spiritual guides; whose authority they think may be traced to the teaching of the Vedas, and through them to the declaration of God's will. It is only justice to all parties to say that those founders of Brahminical systems who were considered must orthodox did not propound the Ṛich Yajush Sáman and Atharvan as given by God in any sense of the term.

It is also a popular belief among the Hindus that the great Ṛishis, who founded their schools, and whose teaching they consider to be infallible, were themselves men of superior sanctity that had laboured to counteract the atheistic teaching of the Buddhists by zealously and skilfully arguing for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, the Author and Governor of the universe. This is what living Pandits say, and their unlearned followers believe. That nothing can be a greater delusion will appear from the following pages. It is much to be regretted that the delusion has in some respects been sanctioned even by Christian authors writing on the Hindu philosophy. The accounts given by living Pandits and the representations contained in popular elementary treatises have been too unsuspectingly received. Perhaps we may say that no writer since the days of Colebrooke has endeavoured to test the correctness of the popular representations by a careful examination of the original Sútras themselves. The popular delusion has consequently been widely spreading without any thing to rectify it.

The following broad facts may be advanced without much fear of contradiction. Neither of the two Ṛishis of the Nyáya school, Gotama and Kaṇáda, has argued at all for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence as the

Author and Governor of the universe. Kaṇáda, again, positively accounts for the construction of the world without the intervention of any Supreme Intelligence[2], while the principles of Gotama with reference to life and emancipation are almost identically the same as those of the Buddhists. The principles on which Kapila (if indeed he was the author of the Sánkhya sutras) denied the existence of God, he held in common with all the other Ṛishis, and so far the elements of atheism exist in all the schools. Patanjali, the author of the Ses'wara or theistic Sánkhya, though he acknowledged a Supreme Being, did not declare Him to be the creator of the universe. Jaimini, the author of the Prior Mimánsá, has never argued for the existence of God, and if he ever said any thing of a Supreme Being, it was only to deny His providence and His moral government of the world. His description of the Veda, as a *s'abda* or infallible teaching without a teacher, involved atheism in the conception of some of his eminent followers; who have not hesitated to argue on his principles against the possibility of a God to create the world or teach the Veda. Vyása the author of the Vedant sutras did certainly argue for the existence of a God, but he taught that the universe

[2] To prevent misconceptions we feel it right to explain that the aphorism in which Kaṇáda asserts the authority of the Veda as HIS word, is considered by some succeeding writers as a proof of his theism. An author who could account for the origin of the universe without God, can hardly be called *theistic* for any thing he may say on other points. But the natural rendering of the aphorism would be, "The Veda is of authority, because it is ITS declaration," *(tadvachanát)*, the antecedent of "its" being *Dharma* mentioned in the previous aphorism. *It is of authority because it is the declaration of Dharma.* It is after the same fashion that most Brahminical writers have argued. We did not question the other rendering in Dialogue x, because the point at issue being the authority of the Veda, we were unwilling to clog the discussion with other matters.

is identical with Him, and consequently that there is no God above the world.

It is also believed among those who admire the transcendental doctrines of the popular Vedanta that the universe is but an illusion, a Máyá, a phantom. The discussion of this question will be found in the following pages. Here we would only ask the advocates of Máyávâda to remember that their favourite theory was first propounded by the founder of Buddhism, and that the Brahmins had probably learnt it from those very schools on which they continue to this day to affix the stigma of heresy.

We say that the Brahmins had probably borrowed their transcendental doctrine of Máyá from Buddhist schools, because, when they first settled on the fertile plains of Hindustan, they were far from pronouncing the world to be a phantom, or sensuous life to be an essential evil. In their earliest literature, the *Mantras* of the Vedas, we do not see any traces of such doctrine. Every thing is there natural—nothing transcendental. We see hymns and prayers addressed to divinities. The things prayed for are all such as belong to our common everyday life. Offspring, cattle, lands, houses,—such are the boons which the gods are requested to bestow on their votaries. No impatience of life, no description of the world as an assemblage of evils,—much less as a mere phantom or máyá,—no aspirations after release from corporeal existence, are found there.

Nor do we descry any decided advance toward the transcendentalism of the Shad-Darśanas in the *Bráhmaṇas* of the Vedas. Hindoo society was then regularly formed,—the institution of caste was matured,—the Brah-

mins were recognized as the repositories of learning, and ministers for the performance of rites and ceremonies. Rules had been formed for their initiation in theology. The learned among them were teachers of their order. Young Brahmins would be brought up in the houses, and under the watchful eyes, of their preceptors. They would take lessons on the Vedas. Clever pupils would be allowed to ask questions on speculative science, and the tutors would resolve their doubts. In these conferences between teachers and pupils, metaphysical questions would naturally be debated. The prospects of the soul after death would often become the subject of catechetical instruction. But these instructions and speculations, so far as appears from the Bráhmaṇas, had nothing decidedly transcendental in them. They were for the most part ethical and ritualistic. We do indeed see occasionally certain aspirations after union with the divinity, but these are rare and exceptional. We also notice a tendency toward identifying the universe and deified impersonations with the Supreme Brahma. But we do not see any marked condemnation of the world because of the evils of disease and death. We do not see it denounced as an assemblage of essential evils incapable of remedy. We do not find any impatience of life and embodied existence. We do not hear of the necessity of getting rid of transmigrations. We are not told that supreme felicity consists in the separation of the soul from body and mind, or that the functions of body and mind inevitably lead to misery. We do not learn that *pravṛitti* or activity is an evil in itself—or that our chief good can only be found in a state in which the soul will be deprived of its capacities of thought, feeling, and action.

The transcendental notions, now the fundamental principles of Hindu philosophy, had no existence in the Mantras and Bráhmaṇas. When, then, were they first broached, by whom, and how?

The Upanishads, as will be seen from the following pages, do not give a satisfactory account of the origin of the doctrine of Máyá. The Buddhists, on the other hand, do supply us with what must be admitted to be at any rate a plausible explanation of its origin. The incidents of their founder's life are all we require for this purpose. They say the father of S'ákya Muni had been apprized from the beginning that his son would soon take to the life of an ascetic. When the boy was twelve years old, the king assembled his Brahmins and asked them to state the cause for which the prince would renounce his home and his kindred. They told him that the boy would see four things—decrepitude, disease, a dead body, and a recluse, which would induce him to leave the palace and retire to the forest. The king commanded that those four sights should always be kept at a distance from him, and that care should be taken to prevent his ever coming across them. But these precautions were all in vain. The gods themselves were impatiently waiting for the happy moment when Siddhártha would enter on his high calling. One day therefore when he was resolved to go out on a drive—and when by the king's orders all unseemly sights had been removed from the town, the gods exhibited in his way the appearance of a decrepid old man, humpbacked, with broken teeth, grey locks, wrinkled, leaning on a staff, and walking slowly with tremulous steps. Wondering, aghast, at the wretched spectacle, the prince

inquired of the coachman, who the person was? "An old man, my Lord, answered the coachman, bent down by age, his strength and energy gone, his senses worn out, and he himself destitute and disabled." Struck by the coachman's answer, the prince asked again, "Is such a wretched existence peculiar to the race or tribe of which this unhappy person is a member, or is that the common lot of the whole world? Do tell me the truth quickly."

The coachman replied: "It is not a peculiar misfortune, my Lord, of this poor man—or of his family, or country. Youth and old age are incident to all, nor can your highness expect to be free from it. No one can escape decrepitude."

The prince was so overwhelmed with the conception of the world's misery, that he immediately ordered the coachman to turn the carriage homeward, and he came back in a most melancholy mood of mind.

When the prince on another occasion was driving out with a large retinue, a leper, full of sores, unable to move, and breathing with difficulty, fell in his sight—and from the enquiries he made of the coachman, he concluded that *disease* was another evil to which all were subject. A third drive brought him the sight of *death* in a similar manner, and another addition again was made to his knowledge of the evils of life. A fourth drive revealed the sight of a mendicant Brahmachári, absorbed in meditation with subdued mind and senses. Buddha was at once convinced that this was the only mode of living by which earthly perils could be avoided.

The dreaded sights produced the effects which the Brahmins had foretold. The prince began to cry *shame*

on life and existence. "Fie on youth," said he, "almost in the very grasp of decrepitude! Fie on health, soon to be overpowered by disease! Fie on life, running headlong into the jaws of death[3]."

This legend is found in the traditions of all Buddhists, whether of China, Nepaul, or Ceylon. Divested of the romantic ornaments, the story means that certain sights of woe had produced in young Buddha a feeling of disgust with life and earthly existence, which he characterized as an assemblage of decrepitude, disease, and death, a máyá, a mirage. The Brahminical philosophers use the very same expressions with reference to the evils of life, but they cannot produce a hero, as the original teacher of the doctrine. When they say this doctrine was taught by the Creator to the Sun, by the Sun to Manu &c., it is simply a confession that they know not how to account for it,—for their own Vedas show that the doctrine was unknown in the period of the Mantras, and they themselves declare that the doctrine was *lost* by the lapse of time, until it was restored in the *Bhagavad-gitá*[4]. But the Bhagavad-gitá is clearly a *post-Buddhistic* work, and we cannot admit Kṛishṇa's claim to the doctrine taught by Śákya. It is singular that, on Kṛishṇa's own confession, the transcendental doctrine should have remained with the *kings*, instead of Brahmins.

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[3] Lalita Vistara.

[4] इमं विवस्वते योगं प्रोक्तवानहमव्ययं। विवस्वान् मनवे प्राह मनुरिक्ष्वाकवेब्रवीत्॥ एवं परम्पराप्राप्तमिमं राजर्षयो विदुः। स कालेनेह महता योगोनष्टः परन्तपः॥ स एवायं मया तेद्य योगः प्रोक्तः पुरातनः॥

We have in the following pages suggested a historical consideration of the relation between the Brahminical philosophy and Buddhism. What appears to us most strange is the occurrence of two names, Gotama and Kapila, in the Buddhist tradition of the origin of the race from which their leader sprang. The following is the Tibetan version of a tradition held in common by all Buddhists:

Sakya, is the name of that tribe or family of Sakya Muni, belonging to the Kshatria caste. According to Buddhist traditions, this race descends from *Ikswaku*, a prince of the solar line and founder of the royal race of Ayodhya, or Oude. The name however does not appear in the genealogical lists of Hindus, as that either of a tribe or of a people. * * He had two sons, Gotama and Bharadhwaja. The former took the religious character, but *Gotama* being afterwards accused of the murder of a harlot, was unjustly impaled at *Potala*, and the latter succeeded to his father. He dying without issue, the two sons of Gotama inherit, who were born in a præternatural manner; from the circumstances of their birth, they and their descendants are called by several names; as, *Yan-lag-s,kyes;* (S. Angiras,) *Nyi-mahignyen,* (S. Surya Vansa,) Gautama, *Bu-ram shing-pa,* (S. Ikshwaku.) One of the two brothers dies without issue, the other reigns under the name of Ikshwaku.

"To him succeeds his son, whose descendants (one hundred) afterwards successively reign at *potala Gru-hadsin.* The last of whom was Ikshwaku Virudhaka, (or Videhaka.) He has four sons, and after the death of his first wife, he marries again. He obtains the daughter of a king, under the condition that he shall give the throne to the son that shall be born of that princess. By the contrivance of the chief officers, to make room for the young prince to succession, the king orders the expulsion of his four sons.

"They taking their own sisters with them, and accompanied by a great multitude, leave *Potala,* go towards the Himalaya, and reaching the bank of the *Bhagirathi* river settle there, not far from the hermitage of Capila the *Rishi,* and live in huts made of the branches of the trees. They live there on hunting; and sometimes they visit the hermitage of Capila

the Rishi. He observing them to look very ill, asks them why they were so pale. They tell him how much they suffer on account of their restraint or continence. He advises them to leave their own uterine sisters, and to take themselves (to wife) such as are not born of the same mother with them. O great Rishi! said the princes, is it convenient for us to do this? Yes, Sirs, answered the Rishi, banished princes may act in this way. Therefore, taking for a rule the advice of the Rishi, they do accordingly, and cohabit with their non-uterine sisters, and have many children by them. The noise of them being inconvenient to the Rishi in his meditation, he wishes to change his habitation. But they beg him to remain in his own place, and to design for them any other ground. He therefore marks them out the place where they should build a town; since the ground was given to them by Capila, they called the new city *Capilavastu*. They multiply there exceedingly. The gods seeing their great number, show them another place for their settlement. They build there a town, and call it by the name of *Lhas*-b*stan*, (shown by a god.)

"Remembering the cause of their banishment, they make it a law, that no one of them hereafter shall marry a second wife of the same tribe, but that he shall be contented with one wife.

"At *Potala* the king Ikshwaku Virudhaka, recollecting that he had four sons, asks his officers, what has become of them. They tell him, how for some offence His Majesty had expelled them, and how they had settled in the neighbourhood of the *Himalaya*, and that they have taken their own sisters for their wives, and have been much multiplied. The king, being much surprised on hearing this, exclaims several times: *Shakya! Shakya!* Is it possible! Is it possible! (or O daring! O daring!) *phod-pa*, and this is the origin of the *Shakya* name[5].

The Singalese legend is more circumstantial as to names and personalities. The Ikshwaku Virudhaka of Tibet is Okkaka the third of the Singalese, otherwise called Amba. He had five principal queens, one of whom Hastá bore him four sons and five daughters.

After the death of Hasta, the king promoted one of her maids to the rank of queen and was by her persuaded to send Hasta's sons out of the kingdom—who accordingly went away, as exiles, accompanied by their

[5] Notes, in the Pilgrimage of Fa Hian.

five sisters. Wandering in quest of a site to build a new City, they fall in with the Rishi Kapila, who was the Bodhisat of the age, and who was afterwards to become Gotama Buddha. Kapila had his habitation on a charmed spot where hares over-awed the jackal, and frogs struck terror into the naya or snake. This site he presented to the princes for the building of a town which he requested them to name after him. This was built according to the advice they received, and was called after the name of the sage. The princes then said to each other, "If we send to any of the inferior kings to ask their daughters in marriage, it will be a dishonour to the Okkaka race; and if we give our sisters to their princes it will be an equal dishonour; it will therefore be better to stain the purity of our relationship than that of our race." The eldest sister was therefore appointed as the queen-mother and each of the brothers took one of the other sisters as his wife. In the course of time each of the queens had eight sons and eight daughters, or sixty-four children in all. When their father heard in what manner the princes had acted he thrice exclaimed, the princes are indeed *able* (Sakya), the princesses are indeed *very able* (Sakya)[6]!

Such is the Buddhistic account of the origin of Kapilavastu and of the tribe of Śákya. It is singular that the Buddhists should cherish a legend which assigns an incestuous origin to the race from which their leader was descended, and that they should perpetuate, in the surname of Śákya Sinha, the very term which was derived from the daring moral impurity by means of which that tribe had sprung. And it is not the less remarkable that the person who took the lead in protesting against the pride of caste, should himself bear an appellation expressive of the extreme jealousy of *clan* and family dignity, to which his progenitors did not scruple to sacrifice all other ideas of domestic virtue and propriety.

Whether there is any connection between the character Kapila, mentioned in the above legend, and that to

[6] Hardy's Manual of Buddhism.

which the S'ánkhya sutras are attributed, it is impossible to determine with any accuracy. There is nothing improbable in the idea of Buddhists claiming the name of an old Ṛishi as a friend and adviser of the progenitors of their founder, nor is it unlikely, on the other hand, that the Brahmins would deeply resent such a proceeding, and claim him in their turn as the founder of one of their great schools.

But whatever be the historical relation between the two, the intelligent Hindu can scarcely fail to recognize the analogy in point of doctrine between the conflicting systems. Their difference is only in name and in the personalities of the two parties. If the Hindu philosophy be true, Buddhism cannot be far in the wrong; and if Buddhism be false, Hinduism cannot have much truth. This consideration alone ought to stimulate the inquiry whether there is saving truth in either of the systems? and, if both be found equally barren in this respect, the question must follow, WHERE IS SUCH TRUTH TO BE LOOKED FOR?

BISHOP'S COLLEGE:
29th June, 1861.

*** The author must here acknowledge his obligations to his senior in office, the REVD. DR. KAY, to whose remarks and suggestions, while the work was passing through the press, is mainly owing any merit that may be accorded to the following pages.

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Corrigenda.

Page 50, line 5, *for* "its sixteen topics," *substitute* "the six categories of the Vais'eshika."

Page 63, last line, *for* "scarcely justify an elaborate exposition of their theistical character," *substitute* "scarcely justify our explicitly assigning to them a theistical character."

Page 141, line 7, *for* "adoption of another" *substitute* "reception into another."

Page 342, lines 18, 19, *for* "debating on what is good," *substitute* "each contending for superiority."

Page 343, line 7, Make the same correction.

Page 343, line 17, *for* "excellency," *substitute* "superiority."

DIALOGUE I.

FROM A BRAHMIN TO A BRAHMIN.

You wonder at the doings of the Kali Yuga. The late mutiny in the Bengal army gives a plausible appearance to your wonder. You quote the S'ástra that the Kali Yuga will be followed by the return of the Satya Yuga ; you say the terrible scenes you have witnessed are only a prelude to the Mahâpralaya, for which you are now looking. But the mutiny is over, and there are no signs of a Pralaya.

How do you know that the renovation is not to be brought about by the gradual progress of opinion without any violent catastrophe? The manifestation of Vishṇu, which the Brahmins expect at the end of the Yuga, may prove to be nothing more than the general dissemination of truth and knowledge. That circumstances are tending toward a new order of things cannot be doubted by the most superficial observer.

You say that your fellow S'ástris in the holy city show now-a-days a freedom of speculation which would have surprized Gotama and Kapila. You may consider *that* as one of the signs of the times. But such plain speaking is not confined to the city of S'iva. I have witnessed occasional instances of it in lower Bengal.

After my departure from the North-West, on the breaking out of the rebellion, I had many a narrow escape from the violence of the soldiery, and at last arrived safe in Bengal. Some time after finding lodgings in this town, I paid a visit, in the cool of a lovely morning, to my old friend Satyakáma. I found him standing at the gate on the side of the road. You have no doubt heard of the movement in his mind. He no longer bows to the high-sounding names of your Ṛishis. Notwithstanding the tender cry of the Veda against being subjected to the arguments of heretics, he feels no hesitation in controverting some of its fondest doctrines. "Quarter," says he, "must indeed be given to parties when they ask for mercy, *provided they submit at discretion*;—but while a party continues rampant, and issues orders that you must not attack him, the mandate is a threat, not capitulation."

While the Tilangas have been so fiercely plying their *S'astra* (weapons) in the North-West, the pundits in Bengal have been equally zealous in the exercise of their Śástra —some of the latter manifesting no greater fidelity to the systems of their order, than did the Sepoys to the Government which so long protected and patronized them. Of the Sepoys' doings you have had enough in your own province. I will tell you something of the Pundits' doings here.

I have already said I paid a visit to Satyakáma. We were talking on the events of the day, when two middle-aged persons, from whose neat appearance I concluded they were Brahmins, even before I saw their thread, approached the house. They were both *nearly* as devoid of artificial decorations as the poet represents the peasants of Oude[1], perhaps with this difference, that they

[1] आहार्य्यशोभारहितैरमायैरैक्षिष्ट पुंभिः प्रचितान् स गोष्ठान् ॥

took pains religiously to wash and clean themselves every morning, which was more than your rustics care to do.

If there be any truth in the common saying, that externals form an index of the internal[2], one of the new comers was certainly a guileless candid Brahmin, though the physiognomy of the other was somewhat ominous.

While they were yet at a distance, Satyakáma appeared to eye them very intently, paying little or no attention for the moment to what I said. As soon as they were near enough to be spoken to, "Obeisance, A'gamika," said he, "Obeisance, Tarkakáma! What an unexpected pleasure to see you both together after so long a separation. It is like the nectareous moonbeams on the thirsty Chakar!"

While uttering these words, he beckoned to them with his hands to enter the house. In his eagerness to show attention to his new (as I then thought, but, as I afterwards learnt, his old) friends, he almost forgot that I was in the company. I followed them however into the house, curious to know who the new comers were. As we were walking in, one of them, A'gamika, pleasantly remarked, "I am glad to find, Satyakáma, you can refer in such good humour to our sacred adages. I, too, am delighted to see you, as indeed I am, to see all who were the companions of my youth under the happy roof of our common preceptor."

I soon learnt who the new arrivals were. They were old friends of our host—no way pleased with his recent change of opinion, but very kind and respectful. In the course of conversation, A'gamika, though naturally cheerful, said with an air of melancholy; "The only painful reflection which crosses my mind whenever I think of you,

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[2] आकारैरिङ्गितै र्गत्या चेष्टया भाषणेन च। नेत्रवक्त्रविकाराभ्यां ज्ञायतेऽन्तर्गतं मनः। (Hitop.)

Satyakáma, (and believe me it does so, with the sharpness, no less than the swiftness, of an arrow,) is, that after all the instruction you had received from our venerable A'chárya, and the various tokens of affection he had heaped on his pupils, you should, by embracing foreign opinions, have frustrated the hopes once entertained of you. Never did a father contemplate, more joyously, the birth of his first-born, procuring him *absolution from the debt*[3] *he owed to his ancestors,* than did our holy tutor, the gradual development of our minds under the discipline of the Vedas and other S'ástras. His benevolence and love of literature had persuaded him, that besides the obligations which the S'ástras entailed on the whole of the *twice-born* order, there was a fourth debt[4] which he owed to posterity. The success with which he had mastered the oracles of inspiration, and had traversed all the arcana of a philosophy, which had exercised the minds of countless sages, anxious for liberation from the bonds of transmigration, called upon him to communicate what he had learned to intelligent pupils, that, through their instrumentality, myriads, yet unborn, might be supplied with the treasures of knowledge, and thus a recurrence of that fearful catastrophe, the loss of the Veda, which had once rendered

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3 एष वा अनृणो यः पुत्रीति श्रुतेः *He who has begotten a son is absolved from his debt. Veda in Mallinátha.* The Hindus are of opinion that the happiness of those who have departed to another world depends in a great measure on the performance of certain ceremonies by their descendants. A man is accordingly considered to be in debt to his forefathers as long as he has no son—the hope of the family,—as of the living so also of the dead.

4 The Vedas speak of three debts in which the Brahmin is involved from his birth.

जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणैर्ऋणवान् जायते ब्रह्मचर्य्येण ऋषिभ्यो यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः प्रजया पितृभ्यः ॥

"A Brahmin is born to three debts—he owes student-ship to the Rishis, sacrifices to the gods, and offspring to his forefathers." Veda quoted in the Nyáya Sutra Vritti.

necessary an incarnation of the divine Vishṇu, might be averted. He was accordingly overjoyed at the prospect of discharging what he owed to succeeding generations, by bequeathing, through his pupils, those invaluable remedies for the perils of our nature, which had come down from the age, when the four heads of Brahmá produced the Ṛich, Yajus, Sáman, and Atharvan. Oh what a disappointment have you inflicted on him! Have all his labours come to this, that you should become a scoffer at the Vedas, renounce the Sandhya[5], forsake that which the illustrious son of Vasudeva said, was the *most excellent* for you, and adopt a foreign system, which the same sacred authority emphatically pronounced to be fraught with TERROR[6]. Who could have imagined that you would bring on your preceptor the disgrace of betraying divine learning to a future enemy, notwithstanding its tender appeals for protection[7]. Why even the Mahometan impostor Feizi, a very type of the demon who had made

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5 The prayers which the Brahmins have to repeat three times a day are called the Sandhya. They are generally free from references to the more recent legends of a directly idolatrous nature. They are held in the highest estimation. A Brahmin forfeits his position, not only by practically neglecting, but even by theoretically disregarding them. "Whosoever," says Satatapa, does not honor it, is not esteemed a Brahmin" यस्य नास्त्यादरस्तत्र न स ब्राह्मण उच्यते ।

The Puranas are full of eulogies of the Sandhya. I shall give only one passage from the *Brahma-Vaivarta* यावज्जीवनपर्य्यन्तं यस्त्रिसन्ध्यं करोति च । स च सूर्य्यसमो विप्रस्तेजसा तपसा सदा ॥ तत्पादपद्मरजसा सद्यः पूता वसुन्धरा । जीवन्मुक्तः स तेजस्वी सन्ध्यापूतो हि यो द्विजः ॥

6 श्रेयान् स्वधर्म्मो विगुणः परधर्म्मात् स्वनुष्ठितात् । स्वधर्म्मे निधनं श्रेयः परधर्म्मो भयावहः ॥ Bhagavat Gita III. 35.

7 It is said in the Vedas that Divine Learning went to a Brahmin begging protection against unworthy candidates for instruction. विद्या हवै ब्राह्मणमाजगाम तवाहमस्मि त्वं मां पालय अनर्हते मानिने नैव मादा गोपाय मां श्रेयसी तेहमस्मि ।

off with the churned-nectar in disguise, turned to a better use the Vedic learning he had unblushingly stolen[8]. But perhaps you could not help it; there was no contending against *Adrishṭa* (fate)!"

The Brahmin paused—evidently overcome by conflicting feelings. But scarcely had he stopped, when his companion broke forth in a tone which presented a remarkable contrast to the melancholy gravity of A′gamika.

"Yes," said he, "if idiosyncrasy be Fate!" "Our friend," continued Tarkakáma, "has so strong a predilection for what is singular, that he must needs forsake every thing that accords with the common sense of his countrymen."

Satyakáma had listened very attentively to A′gamika, but he was vexed at the sneers of his other friend.

"My beloved friend A′gamika," said he, "has greatly misapprehended my doctrines and practice. I hope to explain both before we part. I cannot help meanwhile expressing my surprise at Tarkakáma's taxing me with singularity, and rebuking me for my deviation from the

8 "Not all the authority of Akbar could prevail with the Brahmins to reveal "the principles of their faith. He was therefore obliged to have recourse to artifice "to obtain the information which he so much desired. The Emperor, for this "purpose, concerted a plan with his chief Secretary, Abul Fazil, to impose Feizi, "then a boy, upon the Brahmins, in the character of a poor orphan of their tribe. "Feizi, being instructed in his part, was privately sent to Benares, the principal "seat of learning among the Hindoos. In that city the fraud was practised on a "learned Brahmin, who received the boy into his house and educated him as his own "son."—*Dow's History of Hindustan.* While Feizi was carrying on his studies in disguise, a secret attachment grew up between the preceptor's daughter and himself. The Brahmin was easily persuaded to make him his son-in-law. But Feizi's conscience smote him. He could not any longer practise the deception without incurring the guilt of swindling. He discovered himself to his benefactor, and craved pardon for what he had done. The Brahmin was thunderstruck. From the mortification he felt in communicating the Vedas to an unclean barbarian, he could think of no other relief than instant death. He drew his knife to stab himself. Feizi fell down at his feet, beseeching him not to lay violent hands on himself. The Brahmin consented to live only on the Mahometan's solemnly promising not to translate the Vedas, nor to reveal the Brahminical creed to his fraternity.

track marked out by the common sense of our countrymen. Such a censure might have been expected from the poetical Kálidása, who never allowed his mind to be distracted with the intricacies of science and philosophy, and who lauded the king and people of Ayodhia, for *not* deviating from the path chalked out ever since the days of Manu[9]. But I must confess I was not prepared for such a lecture from my philosophical friend Tarkakáma. One who never for himself pretends to bow to common sense, but is always in chase of *bright* ideas, dazzling to ordinary intellects, should not condemn another on the score of *singularity*. Nothing satisfies this A'chárya that is not transcendental. Nothing is of any value that is not above popular sense. The teaching of the Veda fails to come up to his mark. The whole town talks of the eloquence with which he repeats and expounds Kapila's and Is'warakṛishṇa's open declarations of the shortcomings[10] of the Veda. Human society is to be improved, and its highest interests secured, not by the application of means which are open to ordinary men, but by something that even the majority of the learned fail to apprehend; not by adherence to the precepts and injunctions of the Vedas, but by something which will be above the Vedas—something of which Madhuchhand, Vis'wámitra, and other old sages were all equally ignorant,—which it was reserved for a Gotama or Kapila to expound for the edification of the wise. To

[9] रेखामात्रमपि क्षुण्णादामनोर्वर्त्मनः परं । न व्यतीयुः प्रजास्तस्य नियन्तुर्नेमिवृत्तयः ॥ Raghuvansa.

[10] Sankhya Sutra I. 83. नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वं ॥

Karika, II. दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

be taxed with singularity by one who is so regardless of established systems, is itself most singular."

Tarkakáma seemed somewhat uncomfortable under the rebuke which his own sneers had provoked. He was anxious to drop a subject he had indiscreetly introduced, and yet he was unwilling to appear vanquished by allowing his opponent to have the last word.

"My friend Satyakáma," said he, "is eager to take every thing wrong. May it not be allowable in a person to speculate on grand truths, so long as he does not practically deviate from the duties of his class? I do not blame you for *thinking* above the level of ordinary intellects. A philosophic mind cannot help doing so.. Nor do I cavil at your diverging in thought from Vedic teaching, which certainly has not exhausted the topics of rational inquiry. I am not charging you with *mental* heresy. What I find fault with you for is your *practice*. You do not tell the Sandhyá. You mix and fraternize with barbarians. You are for placing the unholy on the same level with the holy, the race that proceeded from the feet, with that which issued from the mouth of the Creator[1]. Already has our discipline been sadly relaxed by the ascendancy of barbarian rulers. Already are the worst anticipations of ancient sages realized in the insolence of the lower classes, and the depression of the sacerdotal office. But if your principles prevail, there will be an end to whatever still remains of peace and order. Social anarchy, added to political humiliation, will fill the cup of our misery up to the brim. The family will share the fate of the state. Vile S'udras and apostate barbarians, still under the ban of maledictions that cannot fail, will

[1] The S'ástras speak of the Brahmins having been produced from the mouth, and the Sudras from the feet of Brahma.

arrogate equality with gods-of-the-earth[2]. Nay matrimonial alliances will be unblushingly proposed without distinction of high and low. Our females, now scarcely accessible to the solar rays, will be exposed to the gaze of barbarian eyes; and consequences, still worse than those which were so graphically depicted by the son of Kunti[3], will be the result of disregarding the honor and dignity of our race."

The debate now grew warm. Principles and practices were called in question, and though the parties were never forgetful of the respect they owed to one another, each was eager to defend his own point.

"I hope to satisfy you by and bye," replied Satyakáma, "that neither my practice nor my principles are justly chargeable with any evil tendency. But allow me to express my wonder at the distinction you have drawn between your innocent speculations and my noxious example. If I understand you rightly, your philosophy treats with perfect contempt the very institutions which you blame my practice for ignoring. You laugh at the rites and ceremonies to which our countrymen are so much attached. The pride of caste stands neither the test of your dialectics, nor of your most favourite texts of the Vedas. You claim for your system the moral dignity of inculcating sympathy with all God's creatures. But it appears your maxims are intended only for fine essays and eloquent speeches. It is not your purpose that they should be

[2] भूसुराः भूदेवाः ॥ So the Brahmins are called.

[3] कुलक्षये प्रणश्यन्ति कुलधर्म्माः सनातनाः। धर्म्मे नष्टे कुलं कृत्स्नमधर्म्मोऽभिभवत्युत। अधर्म्माभिभवात् कृष्ण प्रदुष्यन्ति कुलस्त्रियः। स्त्रीषु दुष्टाषु वार्ष्णेय जायते वर्णसंकरः। संकरो नरकायैव कुलघ्नानां कुलस्य च। पतन्ति पितरो ह्येषां लुप्तपिण्डोदकक्रियाः ॥ Bhagavat Gita, I. 35—37.

realized in practice. This is a nice discrimination in which I must confess my inability to follow you. I am accustomed to believe that what is really good in theory cannot be evil in practice. If you admit the maxim that one should look on all creatures as on himself[4], then do not find fault with your more consistent neighbour, for *placing the race that proceeded from the feet on the same level with that which issued from the mouth of the Creator.*

"I might go further and say, that such censure is the more inconsistent on the part of those who are fond of saying, not only that the rites and ceremonies of the Vedas do not, as remedies, sufficiently meet the disease with which mankind is afflicted, but that they are *impure*—because they enjoin sacrifices involving injury to the animal creation. *From pain can only proceed pain, nor is a feeling of chillness removed by the affusion of water*[5]; how then can the shedding of blood, while it makes the victim writhe with pain, procure blessings for the slaughterer? Such is the reasoning of some of your philosophers. Do you not see that they are animated by the very spirit of Buddhism which they profess to detest? What more needs an open enemy say to throw discredit on the whole Brahminical system. Whatever the origin of the Vedas may be, it is easy to see the inconsistency of calling them the word of God, and at the same time charging them with encouraging impure practices. If the Vedas were really revealed as the way to supreme felicity, they cannot be superseded by the mere theory of a mortal. If on the other hand the Vedas do not teach what is necessary for our lasting interests, let them not be paraded as

[4] आत्मवत् सर्व्वभूतेषु यः पश्यति स पण्डितः ॥

[5] दुःखाद्दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोक्षः ॥ Kapila Sútra, I. 84.

eternal repositories of truth. Let their high pretensions in such a case be at once and for ever repudiated. There is something not only irreverent, but immoral, surely, in saying that the Veda contains a revelation of God's will, and yet that the means of salvation, therein propounded, are futile—and I appeal to Ágamika himself, whether my open disregard of the Veda is not at least more consistent, than the professed allegiance of one, who nominally acknowledges its authority, but in reality laughs at the provisions it has made for final emancipation."

Tarkakáma betrayed many tokens of uneasiness while listening to this plain-spoken address. But he patiently heard it out, and replied in a somewhat subdued and faltering voice: "I do not see any inconsistency in the position that the Vedas exhibit an inferior, but nevertheless, a real road to felicity. The felicity to which that road leads may fall short of reaching the utmost limits of human capacity and human aspiration; but still it is felicity. There may be two ways, both real, but differing in character, and suited to men of different abilities. The Vedas do not ignore the disparity which exists in the capacities of men. Some persons there are, capable of greater mental abstraction, and fitted for higher roads than others, to whom every passage that does not keep to the level of their gross sensibilities, appears uphill work."

"Oh," rejoined Satyakáma, "then there are exceptions to the dogma that *pain proceeds from pain*! You think the aphorism is not of universal application. But be that as it may, since the candidates for this transcendental knowledge are manifestly few, it does not appear to me particularly modest to condemn the largest portion even of learned Brahmins, to a state of deplorable ignorance of the more excellent way. But do you really mean to adopt this distinction? The Vedas you say

teach a real but an inferior way, suited to men of small capacities. Yet these Vedas in fact constitute the peculiar inheritance of the twice-born classes. The Brahmin is especially enjoined to study them, while the servile order, in common with the female sex, is excluded from the privilege of even hearing them read[6]. The Vedic ritual can only be used by the higher classes. Whom then do you mean by the persons of gross sensibilities for whom the Vedas are intended? It can be no other than the Brahmins themselves. What becomes now of the dignity of the exalted race, that sprang from the noblest member of Brahma's body? Their high pretensions can have no solidity, if their class privileges turn out to be of such questionable worth. Their especial inheritance, the right to read and expound the Vedas, has after all but a nominal value. To obtain a real superiority, they must still qualify themselves as disciples of Gotama and Kaṇáda. They must, by a more successful cultivation of their intellects, exhibit a higher proof of their second birth than the mere possession of their sacred thread, or they will be left in a position scarcely more to be coveted than that of barbarians and *once-born* Śúdras. They will still be excluded from the beatitude which awaits the adepts in the Nyáya and Sánkhya. They must know how to define terms and classify ideas. They must enter the lists and choose their sides in the philosophical controversies which have divided Gotama, Kapila, Kaṇáda, and Vyása. They must decide whether sound is eternal or not, whether proofs, or *instruments of right knowledge*, are in number four, three, two, or one. Failing in these and other like distinctions, they must find themselves—in company with barbarians and Śúdras, as aliens from the society of emancipated

[6] स्त्रीशूद्रद्विजबन्धूनां त्रयी न श्रुतिगोचरा ॥

saints. And so, alas! Tarkakáma, you too bring down the exalted race that proceeded from the mouth, to the same level with those that issued from the feet, of Brahmá.

"But I have yet weightier matters against you. What right have your philosophers to assert that fallible men can teach a way which Śástras of God cannot teach? Can the teaching of finite minds be superior to that of the Infinite? Supposing you can surmount this (to me insurmountable) difficulty, another at once presents itself. These your guides are not only *fallible*, they are *discordant*. How then am I to choose? I should still require an infallible monitor to teach me which of these fallible guides (if any) is to be followed."

Tarkakáma.—"The infallible monitor you require is provided for you in the Veda. The Veda may not teach the highest way to felicity. It is nevertheless an infallible touchstone of truth—and herein consists its dignity. Whenever great Ṛishis are discordant, the Veda steps in and reconciles them. The final appeal with all of them is to the *Śruti.* You can easily understand what an elevated position I am allotting to the Veda, when I am declaring it to be the highest authority in the decision of controversies. It is our Sudder Court of appeal in philosophical disputes—"

Satyakáma.—"And a pretty Sudder Court you make of it! I suppose Gotama, Kapila, and others, are your Moonsifs and Deputy-Magistrates. Your Sudder Court is so obliging that it upholds all their decisions, however discordant and mutually conflicting. But what do you think would be the fate of a Moonsif that set at naught a construction of the Sudder Court, by maintaining that justice could not flow from its decisions, any more than the *relief of chillness from the application of cold water?*

An English philosopher said that while man has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems, he has also a monopoly of the *privilege of absurdity*, to which no other living creature is subject. *And of men*, he added, *those are of all the most subject to it that profess philosophy.* Excuse my presumption, but it strikes me that in India this monopoly is in the hands of those who profess to adhere to the Dars'anas. All these systems are right in their eyes, notwithstanding their mutual inconsistencies[7]. Whichever system they happen to take up is for the time supreme. This is your philosophy. The fact is you hardly know your own minds. You care little for the objects of science, and you have no hearty belief in the Vedas. You cannot persuade yourselves that offerings of twigs, steeped in butter, and thrown over a blazing fire, will really procure heaven, and yet the fear of being branded as heretics deters you from expressing your contempt for the Mantras. Nor have you the courage to test the correctness of philosophic results, which may have been arrived at by teachers of established reputation. And you virtually set the Veda at naught, when you receive with admiration the aphorisms of your sages. It is chiefly when an honest thinker, who candidly speaks

7 "The pundits of the Benares College were once asked the following questions: "As the three systems of philosophy which you have studied in the College profess- "edly dispute each other's positions, and cannot therefore all be entirely in the right, "tell me whether you adopt any one of them to the exclusion of the others: or, pro- "vided you really have formed any opinion of your own at all, whether you adopt, "eclectically, something from each? The answers were generally to the effect that all "the three systems were reconcileable with Scripture, and that what appeared in any "of them to be a deviation from the truth, was, in reality, only an accommodation to "the weakness of the human understanding, which renders it necessary in the first "instance to communicate the truth under the garb of error, just as a mother, in "pointing out the moon to her child, speaks of it as the shining circle at the end of "her finger, which is intelligible to the child, while the mention of its being distant "by thousands of leagues would have hopelessly bewildered him."—*Synopsis of Science*, vol. I, pp. vii, viii.

and follows out his sentiments, is to be rebuked, that you fall into a paroxysm of loyalty for the Śástras."

While this animated conversation was going on, Ágamika appeared to be labouring under great perturbation of mind. Attached as he was, devotedly, to the ritual system of Brahmanism, he had much clearness of mental perception and great honesty of purpose. He observed with unexampled candour; "In justice to Satyakáma I must say that he has reason to inveigh against your positions, Tarkakáma. I quite agree with the English philosopher's remark. After the Vedas have laid down your duties, it is highly arrogant in you to speculate on a more excellent way. I do not question your liberty to expound, illustrate, and declare the sense of the Vedas. That is in truth the study and peculiar privilege of our class. Jaimini, in his Sútras of the Mimánsá, has indeed conferred a benefit alike on learning and theology. I do not deny that, in his eagerness to defend the institutions of the Veda, he has made use of expressions, at least seemingly at variance with the reverence due to Him who *breathed* it out. But I am very jealous of Gotama, Kaṇáda, and even Vyása, though the latter professes to base his system almost exclusively on the authority of the Śruti. What respect could Gotama entertain for the Vedas when he introduces terms and definitions on which the sacred oracles are wholly silent, and declares their investigation to be necessary for emancipation? The Vedas then must fall short of securing that object. The wisdom inspired by Brahmá must then be inferior to that of the husband of Ahalyá! And as to your Kapila, though I can never deny the tribute of veneration to a name honourably mentioned in the Vedas[8], yet I consider his system as

[8] ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्त्ति जायमानञ्च पश्येत् ॥

Śwetaśwatara Upanishad.

scarcely disguised Buddhism. If you can go the length of Kapila, I really cannot see how you may not go further. If you can be justified in openly declaring that the means of salvation revealed in the Vedas are insufficient, how can I blame Satyakáma for reducing your maxims to practice? You are both impugners of the Vedas. If we tolerate the one, while we exclude the other, we shall be following neither Menu nor reason. You may differ ever so much from each other, what have we to do with that? If the supreme authority of the Vedas be attacked, it matters little what particular line of approach the rebels adopt. As to the distinction attempted to be drawn between theory and practice, if there be any difference, it is rather to the credit than the discredit of Satyakáma."

Tarkakáma appeared quite amazed at the tone in which his friend spoke. He never expected such a rebuke from that quarter. He was at a loss what to say in reply. After a short pause—

"What," said he, "is it all the same to you whether a person follows a system that originated in the country itself, the Aryávarta of Menu, called also Punyabhumi by the lexicographer, or whether he becomes an adherent of foreign novelties hatched in the defiled land of Mletchas?"

The remark was accompanied by a misanthropic sneer which certainly did not enlist my sympathy in its behalf. Satyakáma however only observed, good humouredly—

"It seems as if the spirit of your philosophy ceases to inspire you directly you begin to think of the poor Mletchas. Does not your admired aphorist say that time and place[9] cannot affect the *eternal* soul. Truth cannot

[9] न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्व्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १२ ॥
न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥ Sánkhya Sútra:

suffer from the place where it is recognized, any more than the sun[10] from the disorders of the eye that beholds it. What is right in itself is right in all places, and at all times. Truth may confer a distinction on a site otherwise of no importance, but it is impossible for any place, however unholy, to cast a slur on truth. If what you call a Mletcha region has received the light which truth sheds, you must not say that the truth is thereby defiled. You should, on the contrary, correct your vocabulary, and find a better term for such a country."

To A'gamika the turn which the discussion had taken did not seem to augur well at all. He was trembling lest his polemical friend might, in the heat of the debate, take up positions which would do no credit to his order. He was hardly more anxious that the controversy should be dropped, than that Tarkakáma himself should renounce his attachment to logic and metaphysics.

"You see, Tarkakáma," said he, "your dialectics will not do. You had better submit with becoming humility to the teaching of the Vedas, without affecting wisdom superior to Brahma's. Unlearn, as fast as you can, the restlessness which probably the aphorisms of Gotama and Kapila have produced in you. Remember an unsettled state of mind is not the characteristic of a wise man, nor is there any moral dignity in continually seeking to split straws. Keep to the duties enjoined in the Veda, and eschew your philosophy. Remember how hopeless it is to arrive at truth by means of controversy. Listen to what S'ankaráchárya says: 'Arguments, founded on 'human speculation alone, and not derived from the S'ástra, 'are interminable, because there can be no limits to

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10 सूर्य्यो यथा सर्व्वलोकस्य चक्षुर्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्वाह्यदोषैः ॥

Kaṭhopanishad.

'mere speculation. The arguments which some clever 'disputants may bring forward, after much thought, may 'be refuted by others broached by cleverer heads; those 'again may be cut up by still sharper intellects. It is 'impossible to bring a discussion to a close, because of the 'diversity of human thought. Nor can one hope for 'finality in a discussion, by resting on arguments, approved 'by some eminent teacher of established reputation, such 'as Kapila; because we see that the opinions even of 'Kapila, Kaṇáda, and other *saintly* sectaries of acknow-'ledged eminence, are mutually conflicting.'[1] Thus said S'ankarácharya. I hope this will satisfy you how dangerous it is to depend on the precarious results of human philosophy."

Satyakáma.—"Though it is not directed against any of *my* positions, I must not allow your sweeping attack against philosophy to pass without a remark. It is but just that we should hear what S'ankarácharya says on the other side of the question :—'It cannot be urged that no argu-'ment is allowable. Even where the sense of the Vedas 'is opposed, it is only by logically refuting such false 'interpretation that the true sense can be made out. 'Manu, too, thought on this wise.' The Commentator of the Vedanta then quotes the author of the Institutes

[1] निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिताः सम्भवन्ति उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात् तथाहि कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षितास्तदन्यैराभास्यन्त इति न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यं समाश्रयितुं पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात् अथ कस्यचित् प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यस्य कपिलस्य अन्यस्य वा संमतस्तर्कः प्रतिष्ठित इत्याश्रीयेत एवमपि अप्रतिष्ठितत्वमेव प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्याभिमतानामपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्।

Commentary on Vedanta, II. i. 11.

to uphold the lawfulness of argumentation[2]. Of course neither Vyása nor S'ankaráchárya will on the whole tolerate an argument on matters revealed in the S'ástra *(A'gama.)* But what if we be disagreed (as indeed *you* and I are,) which is the real *A'gama*—the true record of God's will? You cannot expect me to be silenced by the authority of that which I do not allow to be an authentic statement of the Divine law. The question necessarily admits of fair discussion. Then again, though I believe with you that God has spoken, it may yet be possible that there are provinces of thought in which scientific speculation is not only allowable, but highly laudable. Human philosophy cannot of course, as I have contended, teach a more excellent way than Divine revelation. But there are various questions, connected with our earthly improvement, on which the Divine law is silent, because they fall within the range of human investigation. Whatever it is within the power of reason to discover, does not need the assistance of revelation. Such questions are left to be determined by the light of nature. Though not necessarily connected with the well-being of the soul in another world, they are subjects justly demanding our attention.

"Such philosophy, it must be remembered, can never be opposed to God's will; for one fact can never contradict another fact, the book of nature cannot contradict the book of revelation—nor the works of God be otherwise

[2] नहि प्रतिष्ठित स्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुं। श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते मनुरपि चैवमेव मन्यते प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च शास्त्रञ्च विविधागमं त्रयं सुविहितं कार्य्यं धर्म्मशुद्धिमभीप्सतेति आर्षं धर्म्मोपदेशञ्च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते सधर्म्मं वेद नेतर इति च ब्रुवन्।

Com. Vedant. II. i. 11.

than conformable to His word. The primary duty of man is to inform himself of what is required of him in the Word; and, that he may do so as intelligently as possible, his next duty is to cultivate his mind to the utmost extent of his opportunities and capacities. It is not the least of a man's privileges to read, as deeply as he can, the book of nature, so full in its delineation of the power and wisdom of his heavenly Father. The Bhâsha′ poet[3] gives a description, as true as it is beautiful, of the influence of material vestiges on human sensibility, when he represents Bharata as deriving, from the foot-prints of an absent brother, all the joy of a personal interview in the charming forests of Chitrakuta. The pious heart may in like manner derive the unalloyed delight of a communion with his unseen Maker, by recognizing the vestiges of His wisdom and beneficence in the creation around him.

"The success which has manifestly attended the cultivation of natural and experimental science in Europe, is a sufficient index of God's will in this respect. Is it possible that the Supreme Being had created the elements, and adapted their properties in such a manner, that water should, by the application of heat, produce a power capable of propelling vessels on the great deep, and dragging trains of carriages on the dry land, without wishing that man should, by the exercise of his intellect, discover the secret? Can a cultivated mind treat with scorn the science which, by the agency of steam, has connected the very antipodes of the globe, as if they were no further off from each other than Calcutta and Agra—and which will one of these

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[3] हर्षहिं निरखि रामपद अङ्का। मानहुं पारस पायेउ रंका॥ रज शिर धरि हियनयनन्हलावहिं। रघुवर मिलन सरिस सुख पावहिं॥
Toolsedass's Rámáyaṇa, Ayodhia Káṇḍa.

days turn Purushottama itself into a single *manzal* from Kási? Is it possible that the application of certain acids to certain metals should generate a power by which men, separated by hundreds of miles, might communicate with one another as if they were conversing in the same room; by which the priests of Vis'wes'wara can ask a question, and get the reply in a minute from the Pandas of Jagannath; and the Creator of the Universe not will that men should avail themselves of such a power? The most rapid communication, which the poetical genius of Kálidása could conceive, was by the flight of a cloud from the verdant peak of Rámagiri to the genial atmosphere of Alaká; but he put forth the idea only to condemn it as the reverie of a mad sentimentalist[4], smarting under sentence of separation from the wife of his bosom. Science has however carried facts beyond the fictions of poetic imagination. What would Kálidása have said to a line of electric telegraphs connecting Bengal with England, and carrying messages with a velocity that may anticipate the very steeds of the sun? Is it possible to decry the study of science after such triumphs?

"Of course the systems of philosophy which have prevailed among us for centuries justify much of your apprehensions. They have produced no results on which the mind can dwell with complacency. The misfortune is that our leading Ṛishis, instead of patiently investigating facts, and thence deducing general principles, laid down certain dogmatic aphorisms, to be received without controversy, or, if discussed at all, to be discussed after the manner of a paid advocate. The way again in which

[4] धूमज्योतिःसलिलमरुतां सन्निपातः क्व मेघः सन्देशार्थाः क्व पटुकरणैः प्राणिभिः प्रापणीयाः। इत्यौत्सुक्यादपरिगणयन् गुह्यकस्तं ययाचे कामार्ता हि प्रकृतिकृपणाश्चेतनाचेतनेषु। Meghaduta.

physics, ethics, and theology were blended (or rather, confounded) did service to none of those sciences, but propagated and confirmed errors in them all. Such a process is apt to alarm all inquirers after truth.

"But, because a Gotama or Kaṇáda has staked the soul's salvation on a precise knowledge of his own categories, and imposed his aphorisms on posterity, with the understanding that they were to be received, not reasoned against; it is not necessary that every teacher of science should follow the example. S'ankaráchárya says, 'there is no reason whatever that one should himself be a fool, merely because an elder was a fool.'[5]

"It must also be remembered, in justice to the founders of our philosophy, that their eminence in learning, and intellectual activity, necessarily earned for their writings an authority to which their successors implicitly submitted. They could not help their own greatness.

"The rules of philosophical investigation which Gotama and Kaṇáda, more especially the latter, propounded, were no doubt fundamentally correct. If they had followed out those rules themselves, and encouraged their followers to do the same, we could not have had much to complain of. The pity is that they hastily entertained, and dogmatically inculcated, principles, which cannot stand the tests of their own logic.

"Still though a man may, without endangering his soul's welfare, remain ignorant, not only of Gotama's own ideas of the properties of water or air, but also of the real facts, as unravelled by the patience and industry of experimental philosophers in Europe, yet human society has undoubtedly benefitted much by philosophical

[5] नहि पूर्व्वजो मूढ़ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढ़ेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणं ।

investigations of physical and mental phenomena, in the East no less than the West. The definitions of our predecessors have unquestionably contributed to precise expressions of truth.

"As to scientific speculations in general, you cannot refuse assent to the maxim of you own Veda, that the ignorant are *murderers of their souls.*[6] Those who wilfully throw away opportunities of mental improvement, and of philosophical investigation, certainly do great injustice to themselves."

A′gamika was a good deal affected by the above speech. He on his part had not calculated on hearing the names of Gotama and Kaṇáda mentioned with any degree of approbation by Satyakáma. "It is impossible for me," said he, "to make a hasty statement on all the points that you have advanced. I can only promise to think on them. But, Satyakáma, you said a little while ago—that I greatly misapprehended your doctrines and practices, and that you would explain both before we parted. I am ready to hear you now."

Our host had now a delicate task to perform. He had to satisfy his guests that the cry raised against himself had no foundation. When men differ in opinion on points of practical philosophy or theology, it is no easy work for them to understand each other. Satyakáma endeavoured to make out that men who freely speculated among themselves, regardless of the authority of the Vedas, had no just ground of complaint against him—and that his guests

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[6] असूर्य्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः तांस्ते प्रत्यभिगच्छन्ति ये के चात्महनोजनाः । Isopanishad.

आत्मानं घ्नन्तीति आत्महनः के ते येऽविद्वांसः कथं ते आत्मानं नित्यं हिंसन्ति अविद्यादोषेण विद्यमानस्यात्मनस्तिरस्करणात् ।

S′ankara's Commentary on Ditto.

had no more right to find fault with him than with one another.

"The regrets you have expressed," said he, "at my disappointing expectations formed of me, I accept, not as reproaches, but as compliments—not as tokens of disregard, but as proofs of kindness and affection. I fear, however, I am in your estimation a godless person, without those tender sensibilities, which you think are not compatible with the rejection of the Vedas, and neglect of the duties they enjoin on Brahmins. The pictures, which a large portion of our literature has drawn, of the doctrines and practices of those, who, in former times, impugned the Vedas, readily present themselves to your imagination. You cannot believe that one can reject the Vedas, without being a Bauddha, Jain, or Chárvaka, or a demon incarnate, such as Kansa or Rávaṇa was. Now will you allow me to say that, whilst I pronounce no opinion at present as to the correctness of the portraits that S'ankaráchárya and Vyása have given of their heretical opponents, I do most unhesitatingly repudiate (and with no less depth of feeling than you yourself, A'gamika, would,) the supposition that I hold any thing akin to the atheistical and sensual doctrines attributed to Bauddhas and Chárvakas. Let me assure you that, although my opinions have changed since I was young, I have not unlearnt a particle of the horror which we all entertained for God-denying and voluptuous principles. You are astonished at this? and yet is it not possible that two things may differ from a third, and yet be very far from identical with each other? This is all that I have any right to demand of you now:—but so much I may without impertinence demand.

"I must embrace another opportunity of explaining in full the doctrines which at present guide my conduct.

But allow me, once for all, to relieve your anxiety on my behalf, by satisfying you that not one of the doctrines and practices which haunt your imagination, when you think of me, has any countenance from myself. You charge me with forgetfulness of spiritual duties, because I have ceased to tell the Sandhyá three times a day. It is not from thoughtless indolence that I have given up that form of devotional exercise. My maxim still is—'*Evening, and morning, and at noon-day, will I pray.*' It is only because I have found a more excellent way that I do not make use of the *Sandhyá*. I do not indeed invoke blessings from the *waters of dry and marshy lands, from natural and artificial pools*[7], nor call upon the sun, and the elements, *to take away in the morning sins committed in the night*; but it is my practice to call daily upon Him, who made the waters, the sun, and the elements, to confess before Him, morning and evening, both what I have done and what I have left undone, and to ask His pardon for sins, of *thought, word, and deed,* whether committed at night or in the day.

"You have also charged me with abandonment of my Swadharma. Now do not consider it a mere cavil, if I ask you, what do you mean by *Swadharma?*"

"Why, *your own religion,*" said Tarkakáma, rather impatiently.

"Pardon me," said Satyakáma, "if I repeat the question—What is *my own religion?*"

[7] शन्न आपो धन्वन्याः शमनः सन्तु नूप्याः शन्नः समुद्रिया आपः शमनः सन्तु कूप्याः * * * * सूर्य्यश्च मामन्युश्च मन्युपतयश्च मन्युकृतेभ्यः पापेभ्यो रक्षन्तां यद्रात्र्या पापमकार्षं मनसा वाचा हस्ताभ्यां पद्भ्यामुदरेण शिश्ना अहस्तदवलंपतु ॥ Sandhyá.

"The Hindu religion to which you were born—the religion of the people of India. That is plain enough as a definition."

"The Hindu religion! does such a term or idea occur in any Śástra. Will you cite a passage of Śruti or Smṛiti, giving such a definition of Swadharma?"

Tarkakáma paused for a moment—when Ágamika remarked, "Yes! it is singular the term *Hindu* is not found in our sacred language, and yet we speak of the Hindu religion. I wonder how we got such a term. I fancy we got it from the Mohammedans."

Satyakáma.—"The oldest writing in which the word, or something very like it, occurs, is a portion of the Hebrew scriptures[8]. The Greeks appear to have got it from some eastern country, and rendered it '*India*,' and the Arabians and Persians '*Hind.*' We received it no doubt from the Mohammedans."

"Whatever the origin of the word may be," said Tarkakáma, "here we have it—and by the Hindu religion we mean the religion of the inhabitants of this country. I mean the rightful inhabitants of our Punyabhumi, excepting of course such men as the Mohammedans, Parsees, and other foreigners who have recently settled here."

Satyakáma.—"But where do you find the religion of the rightful inhabitants of the country?"

Tarkakáma.—"You are putting questions after the manner of Vakeels in the courts;—of course, in the Veda and other Śástras."

"Pardon me again," said Satyakáma, "I mean no offence; but I am not aware of any system inculcated in the Śruti and the Smṛiti which may be called the religion of the rightful inhabitants of this country. Nor is

[8] הֹדּוּ, Esther.

it easy to determine who *are* the rightful inhabitants of our Punyabhumi. The Vedas speak of the *A'ryas,* and it is supposed by many learned persons that the A'ryas were emigrants from the other side of the Indus. But whether they were emigrants or aborigines, they certainly did not form one community with the Dasyus, spoken of also as inhabitants of the country—and there could be no system which might be called their common religion. And there were Rákshases, also inhabiting the country, whose *Swadharma,* or religion, as you have expounded the term, consisted in acts which it would not be safe in us to encourage, though Ráma Chandra himself did not deny it was their *Dharma*[9]."

"But the Rákshases never pretended to be any other than enemies of Brahmins."

"Very true—but they were nevertheless rightful inhabitants of the country. All I contend for, is that there is no system in the S'ástras, which may be called the common religion of all Hindus."

"But the Rákshases were not *Hindus.*"

"I do not know that you can deny them the right of occupation in the country. But I will not dispute that point with you. You acknowledge the S'údras as Hindus—do you not?"

"Certainly. It we were to discard the S'údras, *twelve annas* or more of our community would be lopped off—The Rajah, our own Zemindar, would himself be excluded. And we should lose almost all patrons of our religion."

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[9] अद्मो द्विजान् देवयजीन्निहन्मः कुर्म्मः पुरं प्रेतनराधिवासं । धर्म्मो-ह्ययं दाशरथे निजो नो नैवाध्यकारिष्महि वेदवृत्ते ॥ धर्म्मोऽस्ति सत्यं तव राक्षसायमन्यो व्यतिस्ते तु ममापि धर्म्मः । ब्रह्मद्विषस्ते प्रणिहन्मि येन राजन्यवृत्तिर्धृतकार्म्मुकेषुः ॥ Bhatti.

"Well:—do the S'ástras inculcate any common *Dharma* for Brahmins and S'údras? I suppose you cannot answer the question in the affirmative. The Brahmins have to study and meditate on the Vedas—S'údras only to do service to the twice-born 'Only one duty,' says Menu, 'has the Creator ordained to the S'údra—to serve the three superior orders.' And this is his *swadharma.*

"Granted—what then?"

"Swadharma, then, means the duties proper for one's class. I only wish to understand the precise nature of the charge against me. I suppose I may expect that you will not encourage the vulgar clamour in this respect. People ignorant of the S'ástra think that all Hindus have a community of Dharma—a word by which they understand religion, when, as we have just seen, it more properly means class-duty. The word Hindu is unknown in the *S'ruti* and *Smṛiti,* and there is no other term by which the whole body of *rightful* occupiers of our *punyabhumi* may be designated. If there were a community of religion, there would surely be a name whereby to designate it."

Tarkakáma.—"A'ryávarta is synonymous with Punyabhumi. I should say the word *A'rya* would be a common designation."

"But," said Satyakáma, "A'rya cannot possibly include Dasyu, with which it is plainly contrasted in the Vedas, and I believe it excludes S'údra. 'The Brahmin is a caste divine; the S'údra from *Asuras* or demons[10].' You would hardly be disposed to call the S'údra an A'rya."

"But why all this discussion? Granted, Swadharma means the peculiar duties of one's own class. Can its observance be the less binding for that?"

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[10] दैव्यो वै वर्णो ब्राह्मणः असुर्यः शूद्रः । Taittiriya Brahmana.

"Let it be understood then, that I am to be put on my trial on a charge of deviating from the duties of my class. Will you tell me what those duties are?"

"Manu's summary," said Tarkakáma, "is no doubt the best. 'To Brahmins he assigned the duties of reading 'the Veda, teaching it, of sacrificing, of alluring others 'to sacrifice, of giving alms (if they be rich), and, if indi- 'gent, of receiving gifts [1].'"

"You cannot easily convict me," said Satyakáma, "of habitual neglect of all these duties, unless I voluntarily plead guilty of doubting the inspiration of the Veda."

"Well," said Tarkakáma, "there can be no difficulty in showing that you have not been particularly careful in abstaining from acts forbidden in numerous texts of the Śástras, such as the following: 'The Brahmin is not to dine with the Śúdra [2].'"

"You have not given the full meaning of that text, as expounded by Ṛishis. The Brahmin is not to take any food supplied by a Śúdra. Even raw materials [3] such as ghee, and unprepared rice, given personally by a Śúdra, are forbidden to him. Is that not the teaching of the Śástras?

"It is," said Ágamika. "There can be no doubt about it."

"Well then," said Satyakáma, "although on my trial, allow me to suggest another rule, which may further strengthen the cause of the prosecution, whenever a Brahmin is arraigned before you for breach of duty. *The*

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[1] अध्यापनमध्ययनं यजनं याजनन्तथा दानम्प्रतिग्रहञ्चैव ब्राह्मणानामकल्पयत् ।

[2] नाद्यात् शूद्रस्य विप्रोन्नं ।

[3] शूद्रान्नं तदपि स्मृतं । अपि शूद्रात् साक्षाद्दत्तघृततण्डुलादि ।

Brahmin is prohibited to cook for the Śúdra,—to perform religious offices for him—to follow the profession of arms—or to live by his pen or by selling his learning. Is that not the dictum of the Śástras[4] ?"

"There can be no doubt about it," said Ágamika.

"Hear now my defence"—said Satyakáma. "You have lamented over me as an apostate from my Swadharma. We have seen that the observance of our Swadharma means the observance of all the rules we have just cited, and many others which we have not cited. Do you not see that if I am to be lamented over as an apostate, there are myriads of others who are as fitting objects of your compassion. If my friend Tarkakáma condemns me, I find myself condemned in very good company. Whosoever, being a Brahmin, follows the occupation of a paid professor of our sacred language, in a College or School, whosoever officiates as a village priest, or at poojahs in the houses of Śúdras, whosoever accepts from Śúdras offerings of any thing eatable, whosoever enlists in an army, or works for his livelihood as secretary or clerk, is as much an object of your compassion, as one that may have given up the Sandhyá, or renounced his Dharma, as the vulgar would say. How many Brahmins do you think there are who can stand a searching investigation on these points? You have no doubt heard of a society called the Dharma Sabha; you will recollect who its president was—a Raja of the Śúdra caste, while the Secretary was a Brahmin."

"What could we do under the circumstances?" said Tarkakáma. "No Brahmin could be found possessing sufficient influence to be fit for the President's office.

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[4] शूद्राणां सूपकारी च शूद्रयाजी च यो द्विजः। असिजीवी मसीजीवी विषहीनो यथोरगः। यो विद्याविक्रयी विप्रो विषहीनो यथोरगः।

We were glad to accept the assistance which the Rajah rendered, though a Śúdra. We have no longer Kshetriya princes. There would be none to defend our Dharma, if we did not allow Śúdra zemindars to support it."

"They support your Dharma by really *destroying* it. It is like the visit of congratulation which Śani paid on the birth of Ganeśa—*the infant's head dropping off from his neck, the moment the visitor's eyes fell on it*[5]. The Śúdra that puts himself at the head of a society, having Brahmins for its members, breaks through his *Swadharma*, by placing himself in such a position—and the Brahmins, who are members, break through *theirs*, by humbling themselves before those who ought to be their servants. What they then defend is neither the spirit nor the letter—but the *carcase* of their Dharma, strangled to death by the Sabha itself."

Tarkakáma.—"It would be impossible to maintain our real position over the Śúdras at a time when we have no Kshetriyas to defend our Dharma, or to make public provision for our maintenance, and the Śúdras have risen to such power as Rajahs and landholders."

Satyakáma.—"I am rather surprized Tarkakáma at your defending deviations from *Swadharma* on the part of men, like the domestic priest of our Śúdra zemindar, while you are still eagerly condemning me for *my* departures. You say, there are no Kshetriya patrons of Brahmins—no provisions for them from the public revenue—how are they to maintain themselves? They are compelled to accept service from Śúdra patrons. I do not wish to contradict your position. Let me however remind you of what the Śri Bhágavat says: 'While there is the

[5] सव्यलोचनकोणेन ददर्श च शिशोर्मुखं। शनिश्च दृष्टिमात्रेण चिच्छेद मस्तकं मुने ॥ Brahma Vaivarta.

'bare ground, why labour for beds? While there is your 'own arm, why labour for a pillow? While the palms 'of your hands may be joined, why trouble yourself 'for dishes and platters? While there are barks on 'trees, why labour for raiment? And—are rags never 'found on the high way? Do not hospitable trees give 'alms? Are rivers dried up? Are caves closed up? 'Besides—does not the Lord support all who seek his 'protection? Why then do the wise serve those who are 'blinded by the pride of wealth[6]?" You may admit this reasoning if it please you. But if you persist in saying that hard necessity has driven the stipendiary professors of our Colleges, the domestic priests of our Śúdra nobility, the Brahmin clerks of our public offices, to a deviation from the rules of *Swadharma*, then it is a confession, that the observance of *our own religion* is impossible in these days. Do not then insist on its observance, since it is impossible to maintain it in its integrity. Scarcely a single Brahmin keeps to the prescribed rules of his class. You confess it would be impossible to observe them all in these days. But Kapila says rightly, *what is impossible is no rule—though enjoined, it is no injunction*[7]."

A'gamika here heaved a deep sigh, and said, "Alas for the humiliation of our Sanátana (eternal) Dharma in this Kali Yuga!"

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[6] सत्यां क्षितौ किं कशिपोः प्रयासैर्बाहौ स्वसिद्धे ह्युपबर्हणैः किं। सत्यञ्जलौ किं पुरुधान्नपात्र्या दिग्वल्कलादौ सति किं दुकूलैः। चीराणि किं पथि न सन्ति दिशन्ति भिक्षां नैवाङ्घ्रिपाः परभृतः सरितोऽप्यशुष्यन् रुद्धा गुहाः किमजितोऽवति नोपपन्नान् कस्माद्भजन्ति कवयो धनदुर्मदान्धान्। II, 2.

[7] नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः। 1. 9.

"You need not grieve, friend A'gamika," said Satyakáma, "for there is no such thing as an *eternal* Dharma to be deduced from the S'ástras. Class rules, now called *swadharma,* do not seem to have existed from the commencement of Indian society. There are no traces of them in the oldest Mantras of the Vedas. And it is said in the Mahábhárata itself, that *there was at first no distinction—the whole universe was of Brahma*[8], *the distinction arose subsequently from different occupations.* The caste rules, then, could not have existed at that time. They were formed long after in the age of the Puráṇas—and if they are not strictly observed in the present day, it is because the castes have been much modified under new influences. Surely there is no *sanátana,* or eternal, Dharma in all this. Our *swadharma,* as we have been speaking of it, may have existed in the mediæval period of Hinduism—but certainly it had no existence in the Mantra period, and, as you see, it has very much changed in the present era of foreign domination."

Tarkakáma.—"But I cannot allow that one becomes an apostate by officiating for S'údras, or accepting gifts of eatables from them. A Brahmin's dignity may be somewhat compromised thereby, but he does not cease to be a Brahmin."

Satyakáma.—"Many texts inveigh as strongly against such degrading acts, as they do against any other delinquency which you may call more heinous. While other texts again speak of the indelible character of the Brahmin's sanctity, so that he can never forfeit his superior station, how gross soever his delinquency may

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[8] न विशेषोस्ति वर्णानां सर्व्वं ब्राह्ममिदं जगत्। ब्रह्मणा पूर्व्वसृष्टं हि कर्म्मभिर्वर्णतां गतं॥

be. But you will not deny, Tarkakáma, that some of the S'ástras, at least, not only tolerate, but highly applaud a total renunciation of caste, or, in other words, our *own Dharma*."

Tarkakáma.—"What do you mean?

Satyakáma.—"I mean when a person joins any of the sects[9], and devotes himself to some peculiar *ishṭa devatá*, whether it be a form of Vishṇu or of S'iva."

Tarkakáma.—"Ah, but then, he renounces the world for his *ishṭa devatá*, and, with the world, all its occupations and pleasures—every thing appertaining to it—and, consequently, its DUTIES also."

Satyakáma.—"So may one, for aught you know to the contrary, that gives up his *swadharma* for the sake of some other *ishṭa devatá*. At any rate the renunciation of the world by a sectary does not mean that he may not marry and keep house. For such persons are not unfrequently *exhorted*[10] to lead 'household' lives, and yet they are absolved from the bondage of *swadharma*. Nor are shortcomings in point of personal character considered a disqualification for such liberty, for, it is added, that if a person, giving up caste from religious motives, *fails* in attaining his end, he suffers no harm thereby."

A'gamika—"That is only when one gives up caste for Hari, *i. e.* Vishṇu."

Satyakáma,—"Very true, but the principle of abandoning *one's own religion* (as the vulgar understand by Swadharma) for something more excellent—some

[9] त्यक्का स्वधर्म्मं चरणाम्बुजं हरेर्भजन्नपक्कोथ पतेत् ततो यदि। यत्र क्क वाभद्रमभूदमुष्य किं कोवार्थं आप्तो भजतां स्वधर्म्मतः॥

[10] भयं प्रमत्तस्य वनेष्वपि स्यात् यतः स आस्ते सहषट्सपत्नः। जितेन्द्रियस्यात्मरतेर्बुधस्य गृहाश्रमं किं नु करोत्यवद्यं॥

ishta devatá to which the mind is devoted, is recognized, nay applauded, in the *S'ástra.* Whether I have found a more excellent way to justify my act, is a point on which I will not offer evidence now;—and, indeed, according to Indian custom, one ought not to *pry* into another's *ishta devatá*, that being a pure question of conscience with him. But if occasion should offer, and you desire it, I, for my part, shall have no scruple in laying before you the grounds on which I adhere to my Lord and Master."

Tarkakáma.—"But to what extent soever a person may deviate from his *Swadharma*, we have never heard him say he does not reverence the Vedas. All Hindus, including S'údras and Sectaries, bow to the authority of those oracles of inspiration."

Satyakáma.—"The S'údras *cannot* know any thing of the Vedas, because they are not allowed even to hear them read—and there can be no *real* reverence for a Scripture without knowing something about it. As to the sectaries, they are glad enough to seize on any passage that may be tortured into an approval of their opinions, but it is evident they care little for texts of the Vedas when opposed to their sentiments. And it is notorious they have fabricated many Upanishads in order to beguile the unwary. Such a vague and questionable reverence, producing the most opposite doctrines and practices, cannot be recognized as a bond of union in Hinduism, for even the Jesuits of Madura exhibited some *such* reverence. You may have heard of their forgeries."

Tarkakáma.—"The sectaries are a set of ignorant fanatics—dupes of cunning and ambitious leaders. If their minds had been enlightened by the teaching of Gotama, Kapila, and others, they would not have been so unsteady."

Satyakáma.—"Some of the sectaries have ideas of Divine love, and are animated by sentiments of devotion to the Supreme Being, which they would fast unlearn, under the teaching of Gotama and Kaṇáda. And as to Swadharma, those doctors would make quick work of it."

Tarkakáma.—"You must be greatly mistaken. I wonder the more at your mistake, because even foreign scholars profess the greatest respect for the schools of philosophy, though they despise our rites and ceremonies. I should like to disabuse your mind by pointing out in detail the excellencies of those systems, and refuting your objections."

Satyakáma.—"I shall be very happy to listen to your explanations."

Tarkakáma was going to commence his explanations, when A'gamika, having no great relish for them, and perceiving that the son of Kasyapa had already driven the solar car nearly over our heads, proposed that we should stop this intellectual repast, however pleasant, and look for something more material, which, whatever his philosophical friends might say to the contrary, he, for his part, particularly felt the need of at that moment; promising, if it pleased the company, to come some other morning to listen to Tarkakáma's explanations. All assenting to the proposal, the meeting was adjourned to Monday week.

Such, my learned friend, was the conversation I witnessed between the parties I have already named. The whole occurrence was so novel—almost startling—that I could not forbear sending you this full account. If any thoughts strike you after reading it, pray let me have the benefit of them.

DIALOGUE II.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Pursuant to the arrangement of the previous week, I went to Satyakáma's as early as I could on Monday, hoping, though not sanguinely expecting, to witness the conference proposed by Tarkakáma. We had all made a grand mistake in appointing that morning for the discussion. On the day of the first conference, we did not remember that our almanacs held out the threat of an eclipse to the beautiful moon, which had been waxing for several nights past. The giant was right earnest in verifying the threat. Nearly a third of the splendid orb which rose in the evening, shedding its nectareous beams on a delighted world, was in the ruthless demon's grasp for more than two hours after midnight. The excitement produced by the event turned night into day. Every lane and alley was crowded by men, women, and children, some begging, others giving alms, and all in breathless haste moving towards the river. For A'gamika to think of rest in such a night was impossible. The ceremonies, usual on such occasions, occupied him nearly till the close of the third watch. He could hardly have any sleep after that. It was not to be expected that he could take part in a conference on speculative subjects after the

fatigue and excitement of a sleepless night. He did not make his appearance at all.

Nor was Tarkakáma punctual in coming. It is not probable that a mere lunar eclipse could have disturbed the repose of an admirer of Bháshkarácharya, but he did not wish to appear singular in his practice, and was resolved not to show any disrespect to the institutions which governed the conduct of his countrymen.

"Our friends are not yet arrived," said Satyakáma, "perhaps they find it inconvenient to come this morning, because of last night's eclipse."

"I have no doubt," said I, "that is the cause of their absence. But I am not sorry your conference is postponed. As I never paid much attention to the dogmas of the schools, the discussion will not be the less interesting to me, if meanwhile I can revive my knowledge of the Sútras. The fact is we generally receive our ideas of the Nyáya and other systems at second or third hand. Few of us ever read the Sútras themselves. The Bháshápárichchheda and the Vedánta Sára are text books with most of us. The Sútras of Gotama are indeed studied to some extent. But how few have read even the Vedánta Sútras. How still fewer are those who have seen, (to say nothing of *reading*) the Sútras of Kaṇáda, Kapila, Pátanjala and Jaimini. And yet we all talk of the Vaiséshiḳa, Mimánsa, and Sánkhya, as if we were quite familiar with them. I should be glad to know something definitely of them. But what puzzles me most is that the different schools are supposed to discuss one another's views. We hear of Gotama replying to Kapila, and Kapila to Gotama; of Vyása assailing Kaṇáda, and Kaṇáda Vyása. How could the earlier philosopher reply to the later? or are we to suppose that they knew one another's opinions by supernatural vision, and that the earlier sage replied to the later

by *anticipation*? A mystery seems to hang over the whole question. Is it quite impossible to trace the gradual formation of the various schools?"

Satyakáma.—"It is perfectly true, as you have said, that Brahmins often talk of the opinions of Gotama and Kaṇáda without caring to read their Sútras for themselves. They thereby give circulation to erroneous opinions on the subject. It is commonly believed, is it not? that while Kapila discarded the idea of a Supreme Intelligence creating the universe, Gotama and Kaṇáda repudiated such atheistical views, and laboured hard to prove the existence of an Almighty and Intelligent efficient cause who arranged the universe."

"Of course" said I, "that is the traditional account we have of those eminent Ṛishis' doctrines."

"The Sútras do not bear out the tradition," said Satyakáma. "I will show you the Sútras on some future occasion. With reference to the order in which the various schools were formed,—that is a question which has often exercised my thoughts. Last night I put some ideas on paper on the subject, which I would have read to you, but that I fear they are very crude and undigested."

"You have no doubt studied the subject," said I, "though it seems you have not drawn the right conclusions. Such, however, is my desire to enlarge my general knowledge of the question, that I shall gladly hear what you have written. Do therefore read your paper."

Satyakáma accordingly read as follows:—

"It is very difficult to trace the origin of Hindu philosophy. Our ancient writers have left no records which can be properly called historical. The charms of poetry, by which their minds were captivated at an early period, maintained their power to the last. Not only in the department of subjective theology (where the facilities which

poetry lends to devotion cannot be denied), but in historical narratives, in science and philosophy also, the genius of poetry had absolute sway. The metaphysics of Is'wara Kṛishṇa, and the astronomy of Bháskarácárya are both in verse. Pleasant reading it was, no doubt, to have the fascinations of poetry along with the dry facts of history, and the stern principles of science. But nothing can be had in the world without a price. If history and science were made to contribute pleasures and amusements which they were not bound to supply, it has been at the expense of their proper tributes—truth and exactitude. The exchange has been no benefit, but rather the reverse. When the annals of kingdoms, and the definitions of science, are given in poetry, it is obvious that the labour required for conducting critical and inductive investigations will be in constant danger of being supplanted by the comparatively more agreeable exercise of the imagination and fancy.

"And as to chronology nothing can be a more heterogeneous compound of *possibilities* and *impossibilities.* You have the same Viswámitra, putting Haris'chandra to the trial of his faith, and afterwards conducting Rama Chandra to the palace of Janaka. You have the same Vas'ishṭha at the courts of Dilipa and Dasaratha.

"Accordingly we are left to grope our way in the dark as we best may. All our writers were poets. Facts are so blended in their compositions with fictions, that it is impossible to disintegrate them."

"But," added he, folding his paper with some diffidence, "I am afraid what I am reading is irrelevant to your question. You probably do not care about the early history of the Brahminical intellect, nor the way in which the various schools of philosophy arose." "Pray go on," said I—"Let me hear what you have written.

I feel much interested in the question how these several systems originated;—which was the earliest, and which the most recent."

"I do not pretend to unravel that mystery, but perhaps some light will be thrown by a consideration of the Sútras themselves." Satyakáma then continued to read: "In the midst of the obscurities in which the want of historical records has left us, one thing we may assume as certain, that the Brahminical mind was formed in the mould of the Vedas. Indian scholars were from the earliest times possessed with the highest notions of reverence for those writings. In all questions, whether political or religious, dogmatic or philosophical, the authority of the Vedas was conclusive. None dared to contradict what *they* inculcated. No appeal to reason or experience lay from their verdict.

"But the Vedas are for the most part known to our countrymen, now, by name only. Probably not one of our contemporaries has read the whole of them—or even seen them in their integrity. European enterprise has given portions of them to the world, but few of us think it worth our while to procure or peruse them. The small tracts, distinguished by the name of Upanishads, are alone familiarly known to any of us. Nay it appears that our standard authors on theology and physics confined their attention to those tracts, for it is but seldom we meet with Vedic passages, quoted in their writings, which may not be traced to some Upanishad or other.

"The division of our Vedas, it is well-known, is twofold, into Mantras and Bráhmaṇas. The former may generally be considered devotional, the latter ceremonial and dogmatic. As for the short treatises called Upanishads, they are, with a few exceptions, appendices to the dogmatic parts, and, like codicils of wills, are held to be the most

recent, and therefore the most matured, expositions of the authors' minds. They profess to be repositories of *pará-vidyá*, or superior knowledge, and look down on the great bulk of the Vedas, as *apará*, or inferior. They contain some rude indications of philosophic thought, and, like the twinklings of stars in a dark night, may occasionally serve as guides in a history of Hindu philosophy. They do not however exhibit any great attempt at method, arrangement, classification, or argument. Even there the poetry predominates over the logic. Bold ideas abruptly strike your fancy, but you find no clue to the associations which called them forth in the author's mind, and search in vain for the reasons on which they were based. Sublime thoughts are not wanting, but they resemble sudden flashes, at which you may gaze for a moment, but are, immediately after, left in deeper darkness than ever. Nor are they free from those irregular flights of the imagination in which poets, with vitiated tastes, delight to indulge, setting at defiance all rules of decency and morality[1].

"The Upanishads appear from their language and style to have been the latest, and the Mantras, the earliest of Vedic compositions. It may be a delicate question, but it is one which ought not to be unfairly suppressed, whether the authors of the earliest compositions, the Mantras, profess to have written them down as inspired records. You are fond of saying that they were breathed out by Brahmá at the time of the creation, and yet you speak of the *Ṛishi* of each *Mantra*. The *Mantra* itself is such that its *Ṛishi* may well be supposed to have

[1] Thus: योषा वा अग्नि र्गौतम तस्या उपस्थ एव समिल्लोमानि धूमो योनि रर्चिर्यदन्तः करोति तेऽङ्गारा अभिनन्दा विस्फुलिङ्गा स्तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा रेतो जुह्वति तस्या आहुत्याः पुरुषः सम्भवति।

Brihadáraṇyaka.

composed and chanted it, and there is nothing as to matter and style which could possibly require divine illumination.

"That our ancestors looked on the Vedas with such reverence is no marvel. The Vedas were the first national efforts in the department of literature. In the infancy of literature, the ignorant, who did not know how to read or write, would naturally look upon those mysterious talents as divine endowments, as especial instances of Saraswati's grace. They would accordingly feel a sort of religious veneration for such gifted and highly favoured persons, and consider their writings as divine inspirations.

"The Mantras again were hymns. Those who could not read, would listen to their recital with the greater devotion, and learn to rehearse them in moments of leisure. And those, who could read, would go over them as religious exercises.

"Rhythmical phraseology is always favourable to the sentiment of devotion. The fine versification of the Mantras, their excellent adaptation for chanting and music, were charms which could not fail to impress both readers and hearers. They accordingly considered them as the voice of God. No wonder that in the language of poets even birds and beasts should be subject to the spell of Vedic recitations.

"The reverence, first accorded to the Mantras, was easily extended to the whole Vedas. Their interpretation was held a secondary point. It was received as tradition handed it down. No one dared to expound the Veda in a novel way. The faith and practice of one generation were quietly followed by that which succeeded it. Indeed the question with the generality of men in all countries has been, not, What says the law? but, What says practice?

"The Vedas formed from the first the peculiar inheritance of the learned, who were honoured under the title of Brahmins. Originally all who could, were allowed to read them. This appears to be the meaning of the tradition in the Mahábhárata, that there was no distinction of castes in the beginning, and that the distinction arose subsequently from diversities of occupations—and, it may be added, of talents. The learned were then classed in a separate order—the Brahmins—who became the priests of the whole nation, charged with the duty, and endowed with the privilege of *tapasyá*, or divine meditation, for the benefit of themselves and of the whole community. The fact is attested by the Rámáyaṇa, the oldest of epic or Pouranic poems, which says that, in the Satya-yuga, devotional exercises were not allowed to any but Brahmins[2]. And indeed some such spiritual privilege must have been the monopoly of the priestly order, when Vis'wámitra and Janaka, excluded therefrom by their birth, made such strenuous efforts to partake of it.

"That the right of engaging personally in hard religious exercises was not considered an empty privilege, will appear from a story, related in the oldest epic poem, just named[3]. After Ráma had returned home from

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[2] पुरा कृतयुगे राजन् ब्राह्मणा वै तपस्विनः। अब्राह्मणस्तदा राजन् न तपस्वी कथञ्चन ॥ Uttara.

[3] तस्मिन् सरसि तप्यन्तं तापसं सुमहत्तपः। ददर्श राघवः श्रीमान् लम्बमानमधोमुखं ॥ राघवस्तमुपागम्य तप्यन्तं तप उत्तमं। उवाच च नृपो वाक्यं धन्यस्त्वमसि सुव्रत ॥ कस्यां योन्यां तपोवृद्ध वर्त्तसे दृढविक्रम। * * * शूद्रयोन्यां प्रजातोस्मि तप उग्रं समाश्रितः ॥ न मिथ्याहं वदे राम देवलोकजिगीषया ॥ भाषतस्तस्य शूद्रस्य खड्गं सुरुचिरप्रभं। निष्कृष्य कोशाद्विमलं शिरश्चिच्छेद राघवः ॥ सुप्रीता स्त्वाब्रुवन् रामं देवाः सत्य

his expedition to Lanká, and commenced a happy and prosperous reign in Oudh, a Brahmin came to his door, bitterly complaining of the untimely death of a child, only five years old, and attributing the tragical event to some curse under which the kingdom lay, owing to the king's want of watchfulness. Ráma, listened to the Brahmin's invectives with self-reproach, and could not, with such a humiliating fact before him, gainsay the Brahmin's conclusion. Advised by ministers and Ṛishis, he proceeded, sword in hand, to search out the unknown cause of the national sin. By the side of a tank he discovered a man absorbed in deep and austere devotion. Challenged by the king, the devotee gave his name (Sámbuca), and confessed his race (S'údra). For a servile man to seek admission to the society of gods by such religious exercises, was an iniquity, which sufficiently accounted for the national calamity. With one stroke of his sword, the king severed the S'údra's head from his body. Indra and the other gods fell into ecstacies of delight at the promptness with which the son of Dasaratha exterminated such a crying evil, and immediately sent down a perfumed shower of celestial flowers, acknowledging at the same time that the stop, so effectually put to the aspiring S'údra's attempt to obtain a footing in heaven, was a service done to themselves. And Ráma was then assured that the moment the wretched man's head dropped from his neck, life was restored to the Brahmin's son.

पराक्रमं ॥ सुरकार्य्यमिदं देव सुकृतं ते महामते। स्वर्गभाक् न हि शूद्रोयं त्वत् कृते रघुनन्दन ॥ * * * यदि देवा प्रसन्ना मे द्विजपुत्त्रः स जीवतु। * * * यस्मिन मुहूर्त्ते काकुत्स्थ शूद्रोयं विनिपातितः। तस्मिन्मुहूर्त्ते बालोसौ जीवने समयुज्यत ॥ Uttara. 75.

"Although the Kshetriyas were afterwards (in Tretá-yuga, says the Rámayana[4]) admitted to the privilege of devotional exercises, they were only allowed to read the Vedas for themselves. They were forbidden to teach or expound them. That still remained the exclusive privilege of Brahminical scholars, to whom implicit obedience was paid when they laid down any doctrine.

"This implicit obedience appears to have been cheerfully accorded to them in the Vedic period. The whole community entertained such high notions of their learning and sanctity, that none dared to dispute their authority. Between that period and the age of the Dars'anas, however, a tremendous revolution had taken place in the opinions of men.

"From extreme credulity to extreme infidelity the transition is easy. Those who were called upon to render implicit obedience to the Brahminical college, began to question the very foundations of sacerdotal authority. The Brahminical hierarchy had become so powerful, as to set the sovereignty of kings and princes at defiance. The fear of incurring their malediction—an anathema, the effects of which would be felt for countless generations,—would haunt the priest-ridden minds of Kshetriyas by day and by night, if ever they set themselves in opposition to Brahmins. The legend of Haris'chandra, who consented to sell his queen and his only son, and submitted to the vilest of servitudes, rather than incur the consequences of a Brahmin's resentment, bears conclusive evidence of the fact. At length, however, a prince arose in the royal line of Ikshwáku, (to which Haris'chandra himself belonged,) determined to dissolve the charm by which

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[4] ततस्त्रेतायुगं नाम मानवानां वपुष्मतां। क्षत्रिया यत्र जायन्ते पूर्वेण तपसान्विताः॥

the minds of men were held in servitude to the Brahmins. S'ákya Muni imposed on himself the task of reforming the religion of his country. He cared not, like Vis'wámitra, for promotion to the Brahminical College—nor, like Janaka, for occasional participation in their exclusive privileges—nor yet for inflicting such temporary humiliation on the priestly order, as was implied in Rámachandra's triumph over Parus'aráma. Disgusted, when young, with the evils of disease and death, he renounced the pleasures of dignity and royalty, and went about preaching every where on the necessity of seeking for Nirváṇa, or release from transmigrations, as the only remedy for the evils of life. He pronounced the rites and ceremonies of the Veda to be idle sports, and the exclusive privileges arrogated by the Brahmins, to be empty pretensions. He assailed the authority of the very books on which those pretensions were founded. He declared that the division of castes was a mere human invention, and invited all ranks to assemble under his banners on a footing of equality. The Brahmins add that he also denied the immortality of the soul, and pronounced the expectation of a future world to be a vain reverie.[5] Whether Buddhism was really liable to the charge of materialism preferred against it by the Brahmins, or not, it certainly had no divine revelation to plead for its support, nor could it appeal to any tradition in its favor. It could only stand on its *rational* pretensions. The study of philosophy and metaphysics was therefore absolutely needed for its very existence. So long as men believed in the infallibility of the Veda, they could appeal to its texts for the decision of

[5] न स्वर्गो नापवर्गोवा नैवात्मा पारलौकिकः नैव वर्णाश्रमादीनां क्रियाश्च फलदायिकाः अग्निहोत्रं त्रयोवेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्ठनम् ।

Sarvadars'ana Sangraha.

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controversies and the solution of doubts. But when revelation was ignored, disputes could only be settled by the verdict of *reason.* The necessities of Buddhism rendered the cultivation of logic and metaphysics absolutely indispensable, and thus were the first attempts at philosophy called forth in India. Hence it was that the terms *Haituka* and *Hetu-Śástra* were applied to the heretical systems.

"Buddhism however failed to maintain its ground against the Brahmins. It was driven to seek refuge in regions whither the Brahmins did not care to pursue it, and where it found as firm a footing as Brahminism itself had on the plains of Hindustan.

"But though expelled from India, Buddhism left strong traces of its anti-Vedic rationalism on the field it abandoned. It had infected the Brahminical mind itself. It had sown the seeds of heresy in the very camp of orthodoxy, and fostered among the champions of the Śástra themselves, a spirit of discontent with its ritual. Hence it is that so little of reverence for the Veda is found in the systems of philosophers. All the Darśanas are branded in the Padma Puráṇa as equally pernicious with Buddhism, and equally destructive of the rites and ceremonies of the Veda. Śiva openly confesses to his wife Párvati that he had himself taught those doctrines of *darkness,* in the forms of Kaṇáda and others, with a view to bring about the destruction of the world[6].

[6] शृणु देवि प्रवक्ष्यामि तामसानि यथाक्रमम्। येषां श्रवणमात्रेण पातित्यं ज्ञानिनामपि॥ प्रथमं हि मयैवोक्तं शैवंपाशुपतादिकम्। मच्छक्त्यावेशितैर्विप्रैः सम्प्रोक्तानि ततः परम्॥ कणादेन तु सम्प्रोक्तं शास्त्रं वैशेषिकं महत्। गौतमेन तथा न्यायं साङ्ख्यं तु कपिलेन वै॥ द्विजन्मना जैमिनिना पूर्व्वं वेदमयार्थतः। निरीश्वरेण वादेन कृतं शास्त्रं महत्तरम्॥ धिषणेन तथा प्रोक्तं चार्वाकमतिगर्हितम्। दैत्यानां

"Of our six Dars'anas, or schools of philosophy, two, however, those of Jaimini and Vyása, are generally considered orthodox—while the other four are looked upon with great suspicion by the Brahmins themselves[7]. I think that the Dars'anas of Jaimini and Vyása, (called the Former and Latter Mimánsas, or deciders,) were written with a view to correct the errors of their predecessors, and were of more recent dates than the rest.

"The Nyáya and the Sánkhya are in fact a sort of compromise between Brahminism and Buddhism. They contain as much of the Buddhist element, as could be held without danger to Brahminical supremacy. The authors *profess* to uphold the Veda, because experience had taught them that the dignity of their order could not be maintained without the Veda—and they inculcate the reality of future states of life against the Buddhists. But the spirit of their teaching is quite as hostile to the ritual of the Veda as that of Buddhism.

"I believe therefore that the Nyáya and Sánkhya were among the first fruits of the Brahminical intellect, when

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नाशनार्थाय विष्णुना बुद्धरूपिणा॥ बौद्धशास्त्रमसत् प्रोक्तं नग्ननीलपटादिकम्। मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमेव च॥ मयैव कथितं देवि कलौ ब्राह्मणरूपिणा। अपार्थं श्रुतिवाक्यानां दर्शयल्लोकगर्हितम्॥ कर्मस्वरूपत्याज्यत्वमत्र च प्रतिपाद्यते। सर्वकर्मपरिभ्रंशान्नैष्कर्म्यं तत्र चोच्यते॥ परात्मजीवयोरैक्यं मयात्र प्रतिपाद्यते। ब्रह्मणोऽस्य परं रूपं निर्गुणं दर्शितं मया॥ सर्वस्य जगतोऽप्यस्य नाशनार्थं कलौ युगे। वेदार्थवन्महाशास्त्रं मायावादमवैदिकम्॥ मयैव कथितं देवि जगतां नाशकारणात्। Cited by Vijnána Bhikshu.

[7] अक्षपादप्रणीते च काणादे साङ्ख्ययोगयोः। त्याज्यः श्रुतिविरुद्धोंऽशः श्रुत्येकशरणैर्नृभिः॥ जैमिनीये च वैयासे विरुद्धांशो न कश्चन। श्रुत्या वेदार्थविज्ञाने श्रुतिपारं गतौ हि तौ॥ Ibid.

it sought to enlist the aid of rationalism in the service of the Brahminical order. As to the question of priority between the two systems themselves, the fact of one of the Sánkhya Sútras making plain reference to the Nyáya, and speaking of its *sixteen* topics, may be considered as decisive proof in favor of the Nyáya. Such evidence, it is true, is far from being conclusive, because there have been many interpolations;—but the Nyáya is the least controversial among the systems, and there is no reason of any cogency for rejecting the authenticity of the Sánkhya Sútra in question. The Nyáya may therefore be considered the first production of Brahminical philosophy after the overthrow of Buddhism in India.

"The prevalence of Buddhism had convinced the Brahmins of the use of metaphysics in conducting controversies, and especially in refuting objections—and of the risks, they ran, of incurring the contempt of the community by confining their attention to the simple ritual of the Vedas. The Nyáya with its orderly array of scientific terms, its physics, logic, and metaphysics, *was manifestly fitted to train and quicken* the intellectual powers.

"While heresy had been rampant, the vast majority of the Brahminical order were unable to think for themselves, or unlearn prejudices already instilled into their minds. The reasons for which Śúdras were relieved from the task of intellectual exercises, were becoming more and more applicable to the twice-born classes. Traditional teaching, and the prescribed ritual, received with implicit submission, were fast incapacitating them for vigorous mental labour. If the servile tribes had a routine of duties made ready for them, the higher grades had also *their* routine, not indeed of servile attendance on human superiors, but of endless rites and ceremonies, no less enslaving to the mind. As far as intellectual

activity was concerned, the distinction between Brahmins and Śúdras had become almost nominal.

"The author of the Nyáya would no doubt have the satisfaction of believing that his new system would arrest the progress of heresy, and prevent the gradual decline of the orthodox intellect. If the Brahmin's mind continued to be stinted by the discipline of the Vedas, in the same manner as the Śúdra's was by the authority of the twice-born, what real difference would there remain in point of mental freedom between the highest and the lowest tribes? Implicit submission of intellect was exacted from both. Was it at all wonderful then that heresy stalked abroad, and that many Brahmins had themselves fallen into the snare? Could minds of any activity acquiesce in the above restrictions? Must they not meditate on the wonders of the creation, except as the antiquated Vedas directed them? And must they always interpret the Vedas in the *monotonous* way taught by the old Ṛishis?

"Orthodox philosophers accordingly came forward to supply the craving of the Brahminical mind, without endangering the stability of the Brahminical order. They did not seem to think very highly of the Vedas, but were unwilling to renounce those time-honoured compositions. The Vedas had indeed charms to which Gotama and Kapila themselves, however sceptically inclined, could not be insensible. And besides the real interest they might take in the fine hymns of the Sáman, and in the theological enigmas of the Upanishads, there was another point to be considered. A slur cast on the Vedas might prove dangerous to the Brahminical order, and would be enjoyed as a triumph by the vanquished Buddhists. It might also lead to radical changes in the constitution of society. The improvement of the Brahminical intellect could not indeed be safely attempted, unless revolutionary

agitations among the Śúdras were at the same time jealously guarded against, and unless the twice-born themselves maintained inviolate their respect for authority.

"To conservative considerations, such as the above, we may fairly attribute the notable fact, that, in most of the systems of Brahminical philosophy, we find the authors not only addressing a select few, by means of enigmatical Sútras, instead of the public at large, in language understood by all,—but also maintaining the authority of the Veda, without caring much for its doctrine and ritual, and, while introducing mere physical and metaphysical subjects, promising to their pupils nothing less than the final emancipation of the soul as the reward of their intellectual labour.

"That the Brahminical philosophers taught initiated scholars only, and that their systems were thoroughly esoteric, is evident, not only from the jealousy with which they excluded the inferior castes, but also from the mode in which they committed their lectures to writing. It is related of the great Alexander, who invaded our country more than two thousand years ago, that when his tutor Aristotle published his physical lectures, the monarch wrote him to the following effect: "You have not done "well in publishing these lectures; for how shall we, "your pupils, excel other men, if you make that public to "all which we learnt from you." To this Aristotle is said to have replied, "My lectures are published and not pub-"lished; they will be intelligible to those who heard them "and to none beside[8]." The authenticity of this anecdote may be reasonably questioned, but the very fabrication of it would show the difficulty which the world experienced in comprehending the lectures of Aristotle. Now if lectures which, however abstruse, had their sentences complete, and their subjects and predicates expressed,

[8] Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences.

could still be so obscure that their publication was held to be no publication, how little was the chance of an uninitiated mind's understanding the Sútras of *our* philosophers! Their sense was couched in sentences often incomplete, with subjects or predicates in the minds, not in the language, of the authors, with arbitrary *anuvrittis*, or ellipses,—and the reasoning but obscurely hinted at. Sútras, without commentaries, are proverbially sealed books.

"The peculiar construction of these sentences could not have been accidental. We cannot suppose that Gotama and Kapila were not competent to write more intelligibly, nor can we entertain the idea that they would, without a motive, write what no one could read. The obvious inference is, that they were unwilling to speak but to a select body of pupils, for the edification of whom, and of none others, the Sútras were composed. They were not intended for the public. The S'údras certainly had no right to them.

"Nor does it appear that our philosophers had a real belief in the Vedas. A'gamika was not far in the wrong the other day, in saying that Gotama and Kaṇáda could not entertain much respect for the Vedas, when they set forth categories and topics, wholly unknown to those S'ástras, as absolutely necessary for Emancipation. And yet they never formally denied their authority. On the contrary, they professed the highest reverence for them as oracles of truth, as if they really constituted (to use the homely illustration of Tarkakáma), a Sudder Court of Appeal. This appears still more clearly from the way in which some have endeavoured to reconcile these inconsistencies. They divide the Veda into the *Karma Káṇḍa*, or the Chapter on Works, and the *Jnán Káṇḍa*, or the Chapter on Knowledge. The former, they say, were intended for the ignorant, the latter, for

the enlightened. We might have known how to understand them, if they had maintained that the *Chapter on Works* was revealed in the infancy of human society, when the minds of men were not prepared for a higher knowledge of divine things, and that the Chapter on Knowledge was communicated in a more enlightened age. But their theory is, that the Vedas were, in their entire form, produced before the origin of human society. And the division into the chapters on works and knowledge is altogether arbitrary. For the *Jnán Kánḍa* itself contains directions for ritual observances!

"The most striking instance of such spasmodic fits of reverence for the Veda is found in Kapila. In the 82nd Sútra of the 1st Chapter, he maintains that the provisions in the *S'ruti* are insufficient for the final cure of the threefold evils of life, and in the 83rd Sútra, he appeals to the Veda itself for the truth of that assertion, thus citing it as a witness against its own incompetency, and extorting a confession of its own imbecility. The fact is that while our philosophers were glad enough to make a convenience of the Veda, they entertained little or no respect for it absolutely.

"Probably they conceived that, as some external respect for the Vedas was necessary to conciliate the feelings, and command the attention of even their own pupils, the division mentioned above, would be the most sagacious device for inculcating a more rational doctrine than that of mere ritualism. The Brahmins were far too devoutly attached to those writings to listen to teachers who openly attacked them. Of course this mode of teaching involved a sort of *chhala*, or deceit, which did no credit to the teachers; but if Gotama and Kapila did not act altogether innocently in adapting their doctrine to the prejudices of their contemporaries, the spirit of

the age in which they lived would be some palliation of their conduct.

"The same desire of humouring the prejudices of the times led them to promise supreme felicity as the reward of philosophical speculation. Nothing short of the *summum bonum* was considered a sufficient recompense for the trouble it imposed. That the sentiment of religion predominated in the minds of our ancestors is evident from the spirit of our ancient literature. It indicates a feeling of dependance on supernatural powers, which is equalled only by the contempt the authors expressed for the perishable objects of the world. Philosophers perhaps imagined that whether they treated on the highest truths which could concern human nature, or merely speculated on the qualities of earth and water, they could never find an audience, unless they held out hopes of everlasting welfare as the *prayojana*, or end, of their investigations. In the estimation of their contemporaries, no inferior boon was worth the trouble.

"The offer of such spiritual rewards on the part of philosophers, for investigations chiefly physical, at best metaphysical, though it must be accepted as a pleasing testimony to the religious feelings of our predecessors, was productive of consequences very much to be regretted. Physics, metaphysics, and theology, were confounded in one mass. While the most trifling points of inquiry (whether, for instance, *upamána*, or "comparison," was a distinct class of proof, and, whether the body was a compound of one, three, or five elements,) were prosecuted with some feeling of religious awe, questions of really vital importance, which regarded the existence and attributes of God, and the permanent interests of the soul, were necessarily robbed of their due solemnity. Theology and physics being placed on the same level, the former

could challengé no greater degree of attention than was accorded to the latter. The degradation of the one, and the undue exaltation of the other, were the natural consequences"—

"I do not quite comprehend the drift of your observations—" said I, interrupting the essayist.

"I mean," said Satyakáma, "our philosophers considered the investigation of the elements of which the body was composed, and the inquiry into the source whence the world was produced, and into duties on which our everlasting welfare depends, as of equal importance, thus unduly exalting the one, and virtually degrading the other branch of human inquiry. If we did not know the precise nature of our corporeal composition, we could not lose much by our ignorance; but we might be in eternal peril by our ignorance of the duties we owe to our Maker. Things of time were placed on the same level with things of eternity. That which might be called the one needful thing for all persons, and which might therefore *justly* engross our chief attention, was set on a footing of equality with other questions of far less importance."

Satyakáma continued; "Gotama appears to me to have led the way in the career of Brahminical philosophy. The name must be familiarly known to all students of Vedas and Puráṇas. My namesake in the Chhandogya Upanishad, the son of Jabalá, had a *Gotama* for his patron and preceptor. It was a *Gotama* too (I cannot determine whether he was identical with the son of Haridrumat of the Chhandogya,) whose domestic happiness was marred by the lascivious prince of the gods, himself punished with the natural consequences of the Brahmin's indignation. Various other Gotamas are also celebrated in the Sástras. There was one of that designation, the spiritual preceptor of the Paṇḍavas. There was another

too, famous in the legends of the Buddhists, and corrupted in extra-Gangetic India into Gaudma. Which of these, or whether any of them, was the author of the Sútras, which claim the same name for their author, is more than I can say.

"The author of the Nyáya Sútras has been otherwise called Akshapáda. The *Sarvadars'ana-Sangraha* styles him so. Vijnána Bhikshu, the commentator of the Sánkhya, gives him the same appellation. There are various stories current among the learned as to the reason for which this surname was given him. One of those stories has been thus communicated to me. Gotama, they say, used to go about in such a state of abstraction, pondering the figments of his system, that his ordinary eyes quite forgot their office, on which Vishṇu was so good as to plant a pair of optics in his feet, hence Akshapáda or *eye-footed*. Hemchandra however gives the word Naiyáyika as synonymous with Akshapáda, the etymology of which is given differently in a manuscript lexicon, the *S'abda-muktá-mahárṇava*[9].

"Gotama aimed at the promotion of scientific and metaphysical researches, as the best mental discipline for the Brahmins. An idle dependance on the authority of the Veda, and a blind adherence to the ritual therein enjoined, had not proved a sufficient protection against heresy. When Buddhists made their appeals from the authority of the Vedas to that of reason and conscience, Brahmins were almost silenced. Many were even converted, to the no small triumph of the enemy[10]. It was

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[9] अक्षेण ज्ञानविशेषेण व्यवहारेण वा पद्यते ज्ञायत इति अक्षपादः ॥

[10] The following text in Manu could not be a gratuitous hypothesis of an improbable contingency: योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयो द्विजः। स साधुभिर्बहिष्कार्यो नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ॥

high time that Brahmins should know how to wield the weapons of logic, and not allow their opponents to make a monopoly of *hetu*, or argument.

"Gotama accordingly directed the attention of the Brahmins to the several branches of human knowledge, which he thought were calculated to strengthen the intellect, and enable it to conduct polemical discussions with advantage. He classified them under sixteen topics, which he enumerates in his first aphorism. It is singular that, unlike Brahminical authors in general, he commences his work without any *mangalácharaṇa*, or auspicious introduction. The aphorisms of all the other schools commence with the word *atha*, supposed to be an auspicious particle. The sixteen topics proposed by him certainly embrace a wide range of human research and speculation; but as the Brahmins in general cared little for intellectual and physical inquiries, not founded on the Veda, he endeavoured to gain them over by proclaiming that the final liberation of the soul depended on the study of his topics.

"I have supposed Gotama to be the earliest of Brahminical philosophers. My reason for doing so is that his system, while it combats many opinions advanced by teachers of heresy, contains nothing that may be considered as levelled against doctors of other orthodox schools. He notices and answers numerous objections, (some of a most fanciful description,) which cannot be traced to any work or system now known; but there is no evidence of his contending against Vedantism, or even the Sánkhya. The commentator recognizes a few skirmishes against Kapila in some of the Sútras, but in no Sútra does any characteristic doctrine of the Sánkhya school appear to be the point of attack.

"Gotama appears, as I have said, to have laboured to introduce among the Brahmins the study of logic and

physics, and although in consequence of the great variety of topics which he undertook to discuss simultaneously, he did not arrive at any great results, the rules he laid down for correct reasoning, and especially for the detection of fallacies, have done great service to posterity. He taught in its elementary form the very method of syllogism with which the name of Aristotle is associated in Europe—a name which many of us have heard from the Omla of our courts, and from others who have carefully studied the literature of the Mohammedans. If Gotama's system of logic were amended by succeeding scholars, not bound by the authority of their immediate teachers, we might expect the same success in India which has crowned the efforts of philosophers in Europe.

"But in order to ensure that success it would be necessary to allow fair discussion—unrestrained by the dictum of authority, and unhampered by the dread of incurring popular obloquy, when errors and defects required to be corrected by careful experiment and investigation. To perpetuate those errors and defects, instead of rectifying them by the light of new discoveries, is in reality not reverence to the memory of that eminent philosopher, but injustice to the truths with which the errors are mixed up. It was a great thing that he taught the rules of correct reasoning, and a system *capable of improvement*—and if he did not succeed in rightly applying those rules in many points, it is incumbent on his successors to follow them up, and supply the deficiency. But to perpetuate the errors alongside the truths, is like an obstinate refusal to wipe off the mildew on a beautiful picture, and like wilfully thrusting a great piece of art on the notice of posterity in an unclean and disfigured state."

Satyakáma paused for a moment here to decipher some scrawls in his paper. I took the opportunity of

asking what he meant by errors in the system of Gotama. "Ṛishis," said I, "cannot err. We must have very cogent reasons, indeed, if we be called upon to abandon that long-cherished maxim." "I will not enter now," said Satyakáma, "into the question of the specific errors of Gotama. We must have a conference on the subject sooner or later. But the fact of the various Ṛishis, who founded schools of philosophy, having disagreed among themselves, is sufficient evidence against your long cherished maxim. Where two persons hold conflicting opinions, one must be in the wrong—because truths cannot be conflicting."

"But perhaps," said I, "they only misunderstood each other—perhaps their opinions were only *seemingly* conflicting."

"S'ankaráchárya," replied Satyakáma, "understood them to be *really* conflicting. A'gamika cited a passage to that effect the other day. But even if they misunderstood each other, the misunderstanding itself was an error."

Satyakáma resumed his discourse :—"I should be inclined on general grounds to place Kapila as the immediate successor of Gotama, but the express mention of the *six categories*, and 'the Vais'eshikas' in the 25th Sánkhya Sútra presents a difficulty. A comparison of the Sánkhya and Vais'eshika does not countenance the supposition of that Sútra being an interpolation. I must therefore name Kaṇáda as our second philosopher in order of succession.

"Kaṇáda's system is considered a branch of the Nyáya. His theory is what we call the Atomic—a theory which was simply hinted at by Gotama. The founder of the Vais'eshika school took up "the less than the least," as the author of the Nyáya Sútras had defined an atom,

and produced the theory, which has earned for him and his followers the nickname of *feeders on small particles.* The name Kaṇáda itself has that meaning, and was evidently given him by his enemies. His real name appears to be unknown.

"His first three Sútras form an extraordinary introduction to his work. As if by way of making a mere confession of faith, he begins by defining Dharma[1], and declaring the authority of the Vedas, though we hear nothing on religion or ethics in the first chapter, and but very little in any other part. His categories and his classification of causes bear a singular resemblance to those of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, while his mode of accounting for the origin of the world, by the combination of atoms, is almost identical with that of a sect of ancient European philosophers, the Epicureans, as represented by Lucretius. He does not indeed betray the diffidence with which the Latin poet asserts the necessity of a small, the smallest possible, inclination in the motion of falling atoms, nor is he afraid of introducing the theory of oblique motions[2], but he boldly attributes to *adṛishṭa,* *four* things, which he conceived to be necessary for the first start of his world, viz. the upward course which heat takes when emitted by fire, *the oblique motion of the air, and the primal action of atoms and of the mind*[3]. He does not seem to have entertained the idea of a Self-existent Supreme Intelligence creating the world."

[1] अथातो धर्म्मं व्याख्यास्यामः ॥१॥ यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्म्मः ॥२॥ तद्वचनादाम्नायप्रामाण्यं ॥ ३ ॥ वैं सूं ॥

[2] Quare etiam atque etiam paullum clinare necesse est
Corpora, nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, et id res vera refutet.

[3] अग्ने रूर्द्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्य्यक्पतनमणूनां मनसश्चाद्यं कर्म्मादृष्टकारितं ।

I could not help interrupting my friend again. "Do you mean," said I, "to maintain that Kaṇáda did not allow the existence of God, or that his system is *niríśwara* ?"

"I have no knowledge of him," answered Satyakáma "except from his Sútras, and I can safely say he makes no *mention* of God in any of them—and that he ascribes the primal action of his eternal atoms to *adṛishṭa*. Atoms combine by actions and impulses. These are imparted by combinations already formed, and thereby fresh combinations are produced. In tracing these actions and impulses to their *origin*, he could not find any cause for the *first* impulse, except in *adṛishṭa*. If this implies that he did not admit the existence of a God, I am sorry for it, but I cannot help it."

"Does not Śankaráchárya say, and is it not universally believed, even among the opponents of Brahminism, that the Nyáya, including the Vaiśeshika, considers atoms as the *material*, but God as the *efficient* cause of the world[4] ?"

"Śankaráchárya certainly attributes that doctrine to the *followers* of Kaṇáda, and many of them indeed maintain it, but there is no trace of it in the Sútras of their original teacher; and Śankara thus represents *his* doctrine: 'At the creation also, an operation is produced in aerial atoms, which is dependant on *adṛishṭa*. 'That operation joins its own atom with another. Then 'from binaries, by gradual steps, is produced the air. 'The same is the case with fire. The same with water. 'The same with earth. The same with organized bodies. 'Thus is the whole universe produced from atoms. The 'form and other qualities of binaries and other compounds

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[4] काणादास्त्वेतेभ्य एव वाक्येभ्य ईश्वरं निमित्तकारणमनुमिमते अणुंश्च समवायिकारणं । I. 1. 4.

'are derived from those of the atoms themselves[5].' As to the opponents of Brahminism—if thereby you mean Europeans, they have for the most part drawn their information from Colebrooke, the most learned of foreign scholars—and the very few that may have consulted native authorities, probably attended solely to modern manuals, or confided in their pundits, and did not care to verify what they read or heard by a reference to the Sútras.

"Colebrooke makes no mention of the above Sútra, but he evidently refers to it when he speaks of the Nyáya theory of the original combination of atoms[6]. As he did not *discuss* the meaning of *adṛishṭa,* those that followed him, without a knowledge of the Sútra itself, did not perhaps pay especial attention to all the expressions which he used, and so missed his *real* meaning. Whether *adṛishṭa* means destiny, or some unseen virtue in the material atoms themselves, is a question which we shall discuss afterwards. I shall for the present content myself with having given you Kaṇáda's own words, which scarcely justify an elaborate exposition of their theistical

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5 ततः सर्गकाले च वायवीयेष्वणुष्वदृष्टापेक्षं कर्म्मोत्पद्यते तत्कर्म्म स्वाश्रयमणुमणवन्तरेण संयुनक्ति ततो द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण वायुरुत्पद्यते एवमग्निः एवमापः एवं पृथिवी एवं शरीरं सेन्द्रियमित्येवं सर्व्वमिदं जगदणुभ्यः सम्भवति अणुगतेभ्यश्च रूपादिभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिगतानि रूपादीनि सम्भवन्ति ॥

6 "Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creative will of God, or time, or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth; and, by concourse of three binary atoms, a tertiary atom is produced; and, by concourse of four triple atoms, a quaternary atom; and so on, to a gross, grosser, or grossest mass of earth: thus great earth is produced; and in like manner, great water, from aqueous atoms; great light, from luminous; and great air, from aerial. The qualities that belong to the effect are those which appertained to the integrant part, or primary particle, as its material cause: and conversely, the qualities which belong to the cause are found in the effect." Colebrooke's Essays.

character[7], nor is there any thing in Gotama calling for the same."

I was much surprized by what Satyakáma represented to be the teaching of Kaṇáda, but, reserving further discussion for a future occasion, I begged him to resume his paper. He continued; "Kapila came forward next with his remedy for the *three-fold evils* of life, which neither the Vedas nor the common sense of mankind had been able to remove. Who this Kapila was, or when he lived, is equally uncertain with the age and personality of Gotama. There is a Kapila mentioned in the Swetáswatara, a son of Brahmá, but some commentators explain it away by taking the word as an adjective, not a substantive. Kapila is also reckoned in the Puráṇas as an incarnation

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7 "The Nyáya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes; for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them to a subject which exists, which has knowledge, &c. He is not the supreme soul of the Védánta which is the whole universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but altogether different from nature, and self-existent. He is also not, as appears to be Pátanjali's opinion, a merely omniscient being; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist independent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, without God, remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference; of themselves they have no action, produce no effects, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, not the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development, and without a final end, for they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are connected with the world, among themselves and with the Creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially theological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter." Dr. Röer—Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. ix.

One cannot help wishing that the learned expositor had added definite references to the passages of Gotama or Kaṇáda on which these remarks are based.

of Vishṇu, by whom the Sánkhya system was revealed for the salvation of the world. He is identified with the sage, represented in the Rámáyaṇa, as the destroyer of the unhappy sons of Sagara, who were disturbing the world in search of their stolen horse. Sagara had all but completed the wonderful sacrifice, As'wamedha, when an envious god interrupted it by stealing the steed consecrated for the altar. Commissioned by their father, the princes, sixty thousand in number, went in all directions to trace the course of the missing animal, and when it could not be found on the *surface* of the earth, they dug out a passage to the lower regions, where the consecrated horse was seen by the side of the divine Kapila absorbed in religious contemplation. Not doubting that the apparent devotee was in reality but a thief, the princes, meditating revenge, set up a yell, which roused him from the lethargy of his devotion. Directly the sage's eyes, glowing with fury at the uncalled-for disturbance, fell on the vociferating princes, they were reduced to a heap of ashes. A nephew of the ill-fated youths afterwards recovered the sacrificial horse, and was advised to make supplications for the descent of the Gangá from heaven, with a view to the future salvation of his uncles. At Gangá Saugor, or the mouth of the river Hooghly, there is still a shrine dedicated to Kapila, and that is supposed to be the spot where the tragical event took place, though Saugor in central India corresponds better to the geography of the site where the sacrifice is said to have been celebrated. The S'ri Bhágavata expresses its doubt as to the correctness of this legend, which, it says, ill accords with the excellence of a character that was at the same time an incarnation of Vishṇu and the founder of the Sánkhya.

"Kapila went the length of denying, outright, the existence of the Deity. The wonder is, that he is still ranked

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among orthodox philosophers, and not denounced as a teacher of heresy like the Buddhists. But the Brahmins are very forgiving, if one will humour them in their notions of superiority as *gods of the earth,* and conform to the authority of the Vedas. The 92nd and two following Sútras of the first chapter of Kapila, may be characterized as *black aphorisms,* since therein he not only declares that the existence of a Supreme Being is not proved, but asserts it impossible for such a Being to be the Creator of the World[8].

"With Kapila there could be no real freedom if a person were subject to a desire or motive. The soul, being essentially free, is, according to his theory, incapable of volition. It is *udásin,* or perfectly unmindful of the external. It is a simple witness. He accordingly argues that, since no thinking agent performs an action without a *motive,* the Soul could not be supposed to be the Creator without being subject to a motive or desire. Such subjection however would imply a *bondage,* and detract from its freedom, and, by necessary consequence, from its *power.* If it had the *desire,* it would be wanting in the *power*—and if it had the *power,* that is to say perfect freedom, it would not have the *will.* Hence a thinking agent *would* not, if he could, and *could* not, if he would, create the universe. The acuteness displayed in this argument is indisputable, but subtlety and profundity are not synonymous.

"The system of Kapila is more metaphysical than that of Gotama or Kaṇáda, and deals as much more with mere subtleties, as the latter two, with the realities of psychology and physics. But Kapila has in many respects

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[8] ईश्वरासिद्धेः। मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः। उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वं॥

influenced the popular mind more than Gotama or Kaṇáda. The title Sánkhya, accorded to his system, signifies *numeral*, implying its precision in the enumeration of first principles. It stands also for discriminative knowledge, or judgment. Although plainly denying the existence of a Supreme Being, and therefore styled *Niris'wara*, neither he nor his system has incurred the odium which had fallen to the lot of Buddha and *his* system. The Puráṇas and Tantras, those undoubted exponents of the popular mind, have borrowed more from Kapila's, than from any other philosopher's, system. It is a common saying that there is no knowledge equal to the *Sánkhya*, nor any power equal to the *Yoga*[9].

"Kapila maintained that the true remedy for the perils of life is to be found in discriminative knowledge. The instruments of that knowledge are three, perception, inference, and *s'abda*, which may be rendered, the word. Gotama also had acknowledged those sources of knowledge, and had added a fourth, *upamána*, or analogy, while Kaṇáda had reduced the number to two, by contending that the *word* was implied in Inference.

"It does not clearly appear what Gotama, Kaṇáda, and Kapila meant by S'abda, or the *word*. They defined it to be the language of *unerring authority*; but was it unerring *de jure*, or simply *de facto?* If, as is more probable, they meant the former, then by *S'abda* they understood simply the authority of the *S'ástra*—ignoring that important branch of evidence for truth, which is founded on human testimony. According to the rules of those philosophers, it would in that case be impossible *to prove* to a Bengali, that the sepoys of the Bengal army mutinied at Meerut and Delhi.

[9] नास्ति सांख्यसमं ज्ञानं नास्ति योगसमं बलं ॥

"The *objects* of knowledge are, according to Kapila's arrangement, twenty-five. *Prakriti*, or nature, defined to be the equipoise of the three qualities of *excellence, foulness.* and *darkness*, is the first, as *Purusha*, or soul, is the last. The intervening twenty-three are *mahat*, or intelligence, *ahankára*, or self-consciousness, the five *tanmátra*, or subtle elements, eleven organs, inclusive of the mind, and the five gross elements. Of these Prakriti, the *rootless root*, is the first cause of all things—while Purusha, or soul, is a simple witness. Both are eternal: but the former, inanimate and non-sentient, is prolific and active;—the latter, intelligent and sentient, is non-productive, because free and indifferent. Prakriti however creates *for* the soul, and in its vicinity.

"The atheistic part of Kapila's system was rectified by a mystic Ṛishi of the name of Pátanjala, who unmistakeably inculcated the existence of Is'wara or God, and whose system has consequently been called *Ses'wara*, or theistical. It must however be confessed, in justice to Kapila, that Pátanjala does not attribute the *creation* to his Is'wara. His definition of Is'wara corresponds exactly to Kapila's idea of the soul—viz. "untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts[10]." The only difference is that Pátanjala considers him to be the *guru*, or master, of "even the elder beings[1],"—thereby acknowledging one spirit as supreme over the rest. The non-acknowledgment of some such Supreme Being was a glaring inconsistency in Kapila, when nevertheless he contended for the authority of the Vedas. Who could have inspired the Vedas if there were no Supreme Being?

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[10] क्लेशकर्म्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टपुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥

[1] स एष पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥

"Pátanjala's is thoroughly a mystical system. It consists mainly of some vague rules of *yoga*, or a sort of mental and corporeal discipline, which cannot be considered as other than chimerical. His references to *Is'wara praṇidhána*, or divine contemplation, we must accept as a pleasing witness to that religious sentiment, which God has implanted in human nature, and which is indeed the most satisfactory evidence of His existence. But we cannot set much value on the rules he has laid down for Yoga. They are only *negatives*[2]. The internal and external senses must be abstracted from the out-side world. Except the vague idea involved in the expression *Is'wara praṇidhána*, he suggests no realities on which the mind is to exercise itself—nothing about the doings of Is'wara, or his perfections.

"The rules again for the performance of Yoga, not only relate to various kinds of mental abstraction, but embrace peculiar corporeal practices, such as the suppression of breath, the twisting of limbs, and certain prescribed postures of the body. The system is in fact a motley compound of mental and corporeal exercises. To these exercises, extraordinary physical and intellectual powers are ascribed. By abstracting the corporeal senses from their ordinary media of communication, the Yogi is endowed with *heavenly* senses. He may not see or hear what passes around,—he may be insensible to external impressions—but he has intuition of things which his neighbours cannot see or hear. He becomes so buoyant, or rather so *sublimated* by his Yoga, that, gravitation, or, as Bháskarácharya calls it, the *attractive power of the earth*[3], has no influence on him. He can walk and ascend

[2] योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ।

[3] आकृष्टशक्तिश्च मही तया यत् खस्थं गुरु स्वाभिमुखं स्वशक्त्या। आकृष्यते तत्पततीव भाति समे समन्तात् क्व पतत्वियं खे। Siddhánta S'iromaṇi.

in the sky, as if he were suspended under a balloon. He can, by this intuitive process, inform himself of the mysteries of astronomy and anatomy—of all things in fact that may be found in any of the different worlds. He may call to recollection the events of a previous life. He may understand the language of the brute creation. He may obtain an insight into the past and future. He may discern the thoughts of others, himself vanish at pleasure, and, if he chose to do so, enter into his neighbour's body, and thus take possession of his living skin[4]!

"Before I introduce the names of the two remaining leaders of Brahminical philosophy, a few remarks may not be irrelevant, on the effects produced by the dogmas of the schools already named. I am not now speaking of those dogmas in detail. But, from the open avowal, or unmistakeable insinuation, that the Vedas were not competent guides to inquirers after saving truth, and from the promise of emancipation to a mere knowledge of physics or metaphysics, it will perhaps be acknowledged that their speculations did not contribute much, either to the growth of the religious sentiment, or to any real advancement in human science. When men prescribed means for attaining supreme felicity other than the teaching of what was conceded to

[4] परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानं। शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानामितरेतराध्यासात्सङ्करस्तत्प्रविभागसंयमात्सर्वभूतरुतज्ञानं। संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानं। प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानं। बन्धकारणशैथिल्यात्प्रचारसंवेदनाच्चित्तस्य परशरीरप्रवेशः। कायरूपसंयमात्तद्ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुप्रकाशासंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानं। भुवनज्ञानं सूर्य्ये संयमात्। चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानं। ध्रुवेतद्गतिज्ञानं। नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानं। श्रोत्राकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाद्दिव्यं श्रोत्रं। कायाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाल्लघुतूलसमापत्तेश्चाकाशगमनं। Pántanjala, Sútra III.

be a revelation from God, especially when those remedies were trumpeted forth as superior to and purer than what was "heard,"—the tendency of the doctrine must have been to foster a spirit of infidelity and of self-willed philosophy, far worse, because more insidious, than that of Buddhism; at which A'gamika's indignation, the other day, was only consistent with his avowed principles as a Vedic Brahmin. The desultory passages in which our philosophers contended for the authority of the Vedas were probably dictated by prudential motives. They were mere manifestoes of faith, unconnected with the arguments of the Sútras, and could not be intended for the conviction of intelligent inquirers.

"The results of philosophical speculations, which, professing to include theology, ignored every consideration calculated to magnify the glory of Him, from whom the science of theology derives its title, were not unlike the effects produced elsewhere by the writings of the earlier sages of Greece. There are but few educated Indians who have not heard of Socrates and Plato. The philosophers who preceded them had in some respects speculated, like Gotama and Kapila, on the properties of matter and mind. They were also classified into schools, such as the Ionic, the Eleatic, the Pythagorean. They propounded many theories on the origin of the world, the nature of God, the properties of matter and mind. Water, air, fire, had each its claims recognized as the primary element. Some thought that the world was evolved by the disjunction or decomposition of an infinite mass, the reverse process of the Nyáya; others, like Kaṇáda, taught that it was formed by the combination of small particles.

"The effects produced by such speculations were the unsettling of men's minds, and the mere disturbance of existing institutions. Nothing was established, every

thing was shaken. Sciences, distinct in themselves, were blended together. Objects, which surpassed the limits of the human understanding, were pursued with the same confidence and eagerness with which the easiest questions were investigated. The philosophers professed to have solved problems, really out of the range of our knowledge, while they threw doubts on matters which every body believed, and which none could deny without belying his nature.

"The speculations of the Nyáya and Sánkhya bore a striking resemblance to those of the Grecian schools, and the results were not unlike. The topics of Gotama, the categories of Kaṇáda, and the twenty-five principles of Kapila, though they included some important points of human knowledge, proved nevertheless a failure. The authors began to dogmatize in the very infancy of philosophical speculation. They drew general conclusions before they had collected facts. They worked up their own ideas, without sufficient attention to external phenomena. They delivered obscure Sútras to exercise the ingenuity of their followers. Their disciples were reduced to the necessity of exhausting their talents in servile commentatorial work, without the liberty of rectifying what was wrong.

"Neither did they stop to consider the true range of human capacity, and the limits which mark off things *comprehensible*, from those that are incomprehensible. While they boldly speculated on points which man can never determine by the exercise of reason, they did not deal fairly with those inquiries for which they were really competent. No wonder that their researches were unsatisfactory.

"In justice to the founders of our schools, we must confess that the opinions which they embodied in their systems

had probably long been floating in the popular mind. The Buddhist defection had no doubt produced a spirit of scepticism, from which the authors of the Sútras were not altogether free. And they perhaps laboured to give such a shape to those sceptical opinions as might be consistent with the supremacy of the Brahminical order. Two things, they thought, were necessary for the maintenance of that supremacy; the toleration of the Vedas, and the substitution of metaphysical speculations for the too frequent performance of the Vedic ritual. Without the first, the foundation of Brahminical supremacy would be cut away. Without the second, the Brahminical mind would be doomed to a state of perpetual imbecility, familiar only with ceremonial observances, and utterly unable to meet the challenges put forth by sceptical heretics on the arena of controversy.

"Not that there was much essential difference in point of doctrine between the heretical and some of the orthodox schools. If Kapila could assert the non-existence of a Supreme Being, and if Kaṇáda could attribute the primal action of eternal atoms to *adrishṭa*, I cannot see how there could be a marked difference of opinion between them and the heretics. And so, instead of repulsing and discouraging the enemy, they armed him with stronger weapons."

Scarcely had Satyakáma read the last words when Tarkakáma came in. After the customary salutations, "Whom were you comparing," said he, "with the heretics, and what is that long file of papers about?"

Satyakáma.—"I said that I failed to see a marked difference of opinion between Kapila, Gotama, and Kaṇáda on one side, and the heretics on the other."

Tarkakáma.—"Indeed! Then does it seem to you that the distinction between those who revere, and those who

despise, the Vedas, is so extremely impalpable? To my mind it involves something like down-right antagonism?"

Satyakáma.—"I have really failed to see much devotedness to the Vedas in Kapila and others. But that was not what I meant. I meant that the opinions of the one party were very much like those of the other party on the *being and attributes of God.*"

Tarkakáma.—"Then, again, the practices of the heretics, they are unclean and unholy."

Satyakáma.—"I was not talking of practice either. In practice, the Buddhists are of course anti-Brahminical. Their deviation from Brahminical practice is no doubt an act which you cannot easily forget. If Buddhists had only kept up your external observances, you would not have treated them as heretics."

"But what did you mean," said I, "by asserting that the teaching of Kapila has influenced the popular mind more than that of any other philosopher?"

"I meant," replied Satyakáma, "that the cosmogony of the most popular Puráṇas is founded on the basis of the Sánkhya. Kapila taught that *prakriti*, or nature, produced the world *for* Purusha, or soul—but without any interference on the part of soul. This is the Niris'wara or atheistic Sánkhya. The Ses'wara, or theistic, Sánkhya of Pátanjala did not correct Kapila's theory of the creation. But other popular teachers took up the ideas of Prakriti and Purusha from the Sánkhya, and, rejecting the doctrine of Purusha's inactivity and unproductiveness, attributed the creation of the world to the *union* of the two eternal principles enunciated by Kapila. This was a sort of philosophical amendment on the Niris'wara theory of Kapila,—and it originally implied nothing more than that the creation was the joint operation of God and nature, or, in other words, that God and matter were concurrent

causes of all things—a doctrine not essentially different from that of the modern Naiyáyikas. But poetic imagination found something in the ideas of Prakriti and Purusha, which it did not in God and Atoms—and therefore, leaving the system of the Nyáya to its own initiated adherents, allegorized the philosophical amendment on the Sánkhya; and mystic theology turned Prakriti and Purusha into divine personifications. Prakriti was held, in the philosophic conception, to be the *passive* or material cause of the world, and Purusha the *active* or efficient. The one was accordingly represented in popular theology as the *female*, and the other, the *male* energy; and to the union of the two was attributed the production of the universe. Hence perhaps originated the mythological representations of male and female divinities. The Purusha, or male creator, was identified either with S'iva or Vishṇu, according as the mystic theologian was himself a follower of the one or the other—while Prakriti, or the female power, was considered to be no other than the wife of either of those gods—Párvati, otherwise called S'acti, or Lakshmi. And it is in this sense that Kálidása called S'iva and Párvati the *parents of the universe*[5].

"To this compound of metaphysical and mythological ideas is owing the reverence with which the legendary accounts of S'iva's and Kṛishṇa's sensual indulgences are received by their respective adherents. The extent to which Kapila's theory has in this way affected the popular mind can hardly be exaggerated."

"I do not understand," said Tarkakàma, "the drift of all this. But let me not interrupt your discourse."

Satyakáma resumed his paper—"When Jaimini came forward with his *Mimánsá*, or decider, he was probably

[5] जगतां पितरौ वन्दे पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ ॥

desirous of mediating between the controversialists that preceded him, and hoped to determine questions which had so long agitated the Brahminical mind. He could not fail to see that neither the Vedas, nor the institutions they supported, could stand long, if the Nyáya and the Sánkhya were to direct the Indian intellect. Barren speculations, he thought, had been abundantly indulged. Topics, categories, and principles, had been sufficiently discussed. What was the result? They had introduced some technical terms, and taught some controversial tactics. But they gave little or no assistance in the discovery of the truth which those terms and tactics were intended to guard. The patient was supplied with scales and weights, mortar and pestle, but the medicines to be weighed and compounded were not forthcoming. Poisons and noxious weeds were alone at hand. Jaimini stepped in to give a practical turn to what was before mere speculation. He commenced his *Mimánsá* with the enunciation of *Duty*[6], the only topic he had to propound."

Tarkakáma.—"Kaṇáda, too, commenced his system in the same way—did he not?"

Satyakáma.—"He did, but, as I have already remarked, after the second Sútra you hear nothing more of Dharma until you come to the sixth chapter—and then the only ethical instruction given is on the kind of Brahmins among whom you are to distribute alms, and the sort of men whose properties you may accept, as well as the extent to which you may attack your neighbour in self-defence. The author throws but little light on what we absolutely owe to God and man."

Satyakáma continued; "If Jaimini had carried out his proposal of considering the nature of *duty* in a truly

[6] अथातो धर्म्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥ मीं सूं ॥

philosophical spirit, he might have greatly contributed to the improvement of the Indian mind. The wisest philosopher of ancient Europe had undertaken to correct the wild speculations of his predecessors in a similar way, and it is universally confessed that he created an epoch in the history of the human mind. The measure of success which crowned his efforts was doubtless owing to his powerful appeals to 'what is fixed and indestructible in man, his moral convictions.' He referred men to those ethical principles which lay within the range of their own consciousness. This was certainly treating man as his Maker intended he should be treated. Had Jaimini laboured in a similar way to strengthen those moral principles which the Almighty had implanted in the human mind, he might have met with a success honourable to himself and beneficial to the nation. But a servile adherence to the Vedic ritual had unfitted his mind for such speculations. Jaimini had no other idea of duty than as *an injunction of the S'ruti;* and that, apart from any notion of its Inspirer, or his Will. We have seen previously how Kapila could admit the Veda as an authority, without a Supreme Intelligence to inspire it. We observe a similar anomaly in Jaimini. He urges the consideration of DUTY, without caring for any to whom it may be *due.* He contends for the authorized Veda without an *authorizer,* for a law without a *law-giver,* a revelation without GOD. He detaches the idea of duty, not only from moral convictions, but also from the sovereign will of a Supreme Governor. It has no existence save in the texts of the Mantras and Bráhmaṇas. Bent on the vindication of the Vedas, and anxious to avoid the rock on which metaphysical authors before him had struck, he felt no scruple in devastating the province of reason, and contended for the paramount authority of the Veda,

without any reference to Him from whom alone such authority could be derived. He enforced the observance of Dharma as the highest duty of Brahmans. But no term in our language is liable to greater misconceptions than Dharma. While it means duty, it means also religious merit, and hence the desert derived from the doings of a previous life. In this last sense it implies the same idea as *adṛishṭa.* Now, while enforcing Dharma in the sense of duty, or works, he has taken no precaution to magnify Him from whose will alone the idea of *duty* could receive its highest sanction. To say that Dharma signifies an injunction of the Veda, can only be intelligible in the sense of its involving the will of the AUTHOR of the Veda. Jaimini however, has said nothing as to its AUTHOR, nor while talking of its *eternity,* as Sábda or the word, has he made mention of any co-eternal Intelligence, uttering or revealing it. His Sútras are so vague on this point, and on the existence and providence of God, that for any thing which may be adduced to the contrary, he may be called a *second* Kapila, maintaining the authority of the Veda, without admitting HIS existence without whom no composition can be pronounced to be inspired. His system has accordingly been understood by many in a *niris'wara* sense. It is expressly stigmatized by that name in the Padma Puráṇa[7]—and the *Vidwanmoda-tarangiṇi* attributes sheer atheistic opinions to his follower, the Mimánsaka, who is made to say *there is no God the creator or preserver of the world*[8]. Some

[7] See the passage cited in page 48.

[8] देवो न कश्चिद्भुवनस्य कर्त्ता भर्त्ता न हर्त्तापि च कश्चिदास्ते ।
कर्म्मानुरूपाणि शुभाशुभानि प्राप्नोति सर्व्वो हि जनः फलानि १ ॥
वेदस्य कर्त्ता नच कश्चिदास्ते नित्या हि शब्दा रचना हि नित्या ।
प्रामाण्यमस्मिन् स्वतएव सिद्धमनादिसिद्धेः परतः कथं तत् ॥ २ ॥

of Jaimini's eminent disciples also took his lectures in the same sense, and taught atheistic doctrines under the title of the Mimánsá. S'ankaráchárya too, whose fairness in representing the opinions of orthodox schools is above suspicion, puts the following language into the mouth of Jaimini: 'If the Veda be authority, the relation of 'works and fruits (or effects), ought to be received just 'as it may be proved from that source. That God gives 'the fruit (or effect), is not deducible, because various 'kinds of effects cannot proceed from a cause in which 'there is no variableness, and because [if an intelligent 'author were allowed] he would be subject to a charge 'of injustice and cruelty, by reason of inequalities in the 'creation. Such a theory would render the observance 'of ceremonies futile. Wherefore fruits (or effects) are 'from Dharma (or works) alone[9].'

"The opinions of Jaimini are still more startling than those of Kapila—for Jaimini is the the great champion of Dharma and the Veda. It is impossible to imagine how Dharma or the Veda could stand without God.

"That the Mimánsá of Jaimini met with no success in settling the questions so long controverted, is no marvel. Men who had learned the arts and tactics of Gotama and Kapila were not to be silenced by the *eternity of Sound.*

आद्यन्तशून्येऽत्र जगत् प्रवाहे क्रिया भवेत् कर्म्मत एव सर्व्वदा ।
कर्म्मापि पुंसां भवति क्रियातो वीजाङ्कुरन्यायतया न दोषः ॥ ३ ॥
यागादिकार्य्याङ्गतिभागभाजो मन्त्रात्मका देवगणा निरुक्ताः ।
ब्रह्मादयः कर्म्मवशेन भोगं कुर्व्वन्ति सर्व्वेऽपि चराचरस्य ॥ ४ ॥

[9] श्रुतिश्चेत् प्रमाणं यथायं कर्म्मफलसम्बन्धः श्रुत उपपद्यते तथा कल्पयितव्यः । **ईश्वरस्तु फलं ददातीत्यनुपपन्नं अविचित्रस्य कारणस्य विचित्रकार्य्यानुपपत्तेः वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गादनुष्ठानवैयर्थापत्तेश्च तस्मा-द्धर्मादेव फलं । III. 2. 40.

The human mind wanted something more substantial than the offerings and oblations of the Vedas—the authority of which was contended for without an Intelligent Author. Dharma was set forth; but there was no one in the system to whom it could be *due*, if it meant duty,—nor any who could be trusted for its fruits, or reward, if it meant works.

"Vyása, the well-known compiler of the Vedas, accordingly put forth a second *decider*, the Uttara Mimánsá, or Vedánta, in which the old pantheistic doctrine of the Upanishads was reproduced. Not to give an uncertain sound like Jaimini on such a cardinal point in Theology as the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, the Creator and Governor of the universe, he propounded that as the most prominent, and the only great, idea pervading his system. But if there can be no mistake as to the idea of a God in his doctrine, it is neutralized, if not nullified, by the identity of that God with every thing else—with the whole visible world. He inculcated the existence of one *sole essence*—manifesting or producing itself in the form of the universe before our eyes. If Brahma is the efficient cause or Creator of the world, he is also its *substance*—as the gold is of the bracelet. This identity of the universe with God precludes the idea of *duty* on the part of the creature towards the Creator, quite as effectually as does Jaimini's theory.

"Tradition will have it that Jaimini was a disciple of Vyása. Their Sútras certainly show that they were contemporaries, for they refer to one another by name[10].

10 Dr. Ballantyne says in a foot-note to the 1st Part of his "Aphorisms of the Mimánsá"—"The mention of the name of 'Bádárayana' (or Vyása) in the Aphorisms "goes to prove that Jaimini's work, the 'Purva-mimánsá,' was not antecedent in "time to Vyása, the author of the 'Uttara-mimánsá'. Mr. Colebrooke's rendering 'of the terms *Purva* and Uttara by 'prior' and 'later' (see Essays, vol. 1, pp. 227, "and 295,) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that Jaimini's system was

"The very first aphorism of the Vedánta proves that its object was to substitute *Brahma* for the *Dharma*, or "Duty," of the first *Mimánsá*. Of the peculiar doctrines of the Vedánta philosophy I need not now speak more in detail. The analogy between the first and the second Mimánsás ought however to be noticed. One grand feature is common to them. Both profess to be founded on the Vedas, the texts of which their authors labour to expound. Both repudiate arguments and assertions unsanctioned in, or militating against, the S'ruti. But here the similarity ceases. Jaimini is of opinion that the end of the Vedas is to enforce certain practices[1]: Vyása thinks their ultimate object is intellectual apprehension—even the knowledge of Brahma. His effort accordingly is to discover the occult signification of passages whose obvious meaning had satisfied his pupil, and to deduce a consistent theory from conflicting texts. Jaimini takes up the sense of the Veda as he finds it on the surface; Vyása must dive into the depths, and collect its tenets from the bottom. He will not allow that the sentences of the Vedas are to be blindly followed. Their sense must be logically arrived at. He therefore admits deductive reasoning as a legitimate source of knowledge,

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"the earlier in point of time. He says, (at p. 376, Vol. IV of his History of Philo-"sophy,—Morrison's version) that "according to Colebrooke, the adherents of this "School may be divided into the earlier and the later,"—and then he goes on to "speak of "the older and genuine Vedánta:"—but in fact the terms 'prior' and "'later' refer to the divisions of the Veda which Jaimini and Vyasa respectively "expound, the latter confining himself to the Upanishads, or theological sections, "which stand last in order."

Colebrooke, and after him Ritter, were not wrong in considering Jaimini's as the earlier work. At any rate it is certain that Vyása speaks frequently of Jaimini *by name*. (See Vedánta Sútras I. 2. 28, 31. I. 3. 31. I. 4. 18. III. 2. 40. III. 4. 2. IV. 3. 12). The master and pupil must have revised their works after seeing one another's productions. From the nature of the subject, Jaimini's would appear to be the "prior" work.

[1] आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानां ॥ जै. सू. ॥ II. 1.

so long as it is consistent with the dictates of the Vedas.' He necessarily claims greater latitude in interpreting the oracles of inspiration than Jaimini thought it proper to allow to himself. Śankara gives an ingenious reason for this claim; and that reason is itself a good index to the character of the second Mimánsá: 'In the inquiry after 'Brahma, the Vedas alone are not authority, as is the case 'in the inquiry after Dharma, or Duty. But here deduction 'too, is, as far as possible, proof; because the knowledge 'of Brahma is to be collected by deduction, and because 'it concerns an existent substance. In *duties* to be per-'formed, there is no room for deduction; hence the 'Vedas alone may be the proofs. That which is to be 'done depends on the man for its accomplishment. A 'duty, whether secular or Vedic, may be (at the doer's 'pleasure) performed, or omitted, or gone through in 'a modified manner. As one may go on horseback, 'on foot, or in another way, or not go at all; so it is 'possible for one (to fulfil opposite injunctions of the 'Veda) and to receive a particular utensil in a particular 'ceremony, and also not to receive it; to sacrifice at 'sunrise, and to sacrifice before sunrise.* * * * But one 'cannot say alternately in the same way that a substance 'is thus and not thus, is and is not.* * * Therefore proofs 'concerning an existent substance depend on the sub-'stance itself[2]."

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[2] न धर्म्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां किन्तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथा सम्भवमिह प्रमाणं अनुभवावसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मविज्ञानस्य कर्त्तव्ये हि विषये नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात् पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्त्तव्यस्य कर्त्तुमकर्त्तुमन्यथा वा कर्त्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकञ्च कर्म्म यथा अश्वेन गच्छति पद्भ्यामन्यथा वा न गच्छतीति तथा अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति

"The doctrine which Vyása brought to light from the depths of the Veda is no other than the teaching of the Upanishad, that this universe is God—that the things made and their Maker are identical—that the human soul is one and the same with the Divine Spirit. The doctrine is held in two different ways[3]. One way is the *Pariṇáma Váda*, which, acknowledging the reality of the visible universe, while it identifies it with God, pronounces it to be a formation or development of Himself. The other is the *Vivarta Váda*, which, maintaining that the one eternal essence, Brahma, manifests himself in various illusory forms, denies the *real* existence of any substance which is not God, and holds the visible world to be a mere shadow, or Máyá, such as the reflections of the sun and moon in waters. Both these views are condemned in the passage, to which I have already made reference, in the Padma Puráṇa[4]. The first is said to have been inculcated for the *destruction of the world*—and the second is stigmatized as *Buddhism in disguise*.

"All ideas of duty and responsibility are openly repudiated in the Vedantism of Vyása. The human soul and the Divine Spirit, being identical, how can there be an obligation on the part of the one to the other? How or whom

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नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति उदिते जुहोति अनुदितेजुहोति नतुवस्त्वेवं नैवमस्तिनास्तीति वा विकल्पते एवम्भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम् ॥

[3] This is well expressed by Viśwanátha, the commentator on the Nyáya,

वदन्ति तथाहि ब्रह्मैव नामरूपप्रपञ्चभेदेन विपरिणमते मृत्तिकेवो-दञ्चनादिभावेन अतएव प्राकृतरूपस्य सत्त्वस्यापरित्यागः प्रपञ्चेषु उदञ्च-नादाविव मृत्तिकात्वस्येति परिणामवादः ब्रह्मैव चानाद्यनिर्व्वचनीयाऽविद्यावशान्नानारूपेण विवर्त्तते मुखमिव तत्तज्जलाद्यालम्बनभेदादिति विवर्त्तवादः ॥

[4] See the passage cited in pages 48 and 49.

can one mind or despise[5]? 'Here, says Śankara, there is no admission of even a smell of works[6].' Good manners and good works are however declared to be *useful* for the attainment of true knowledge.

"To this rapid survey of the schools of Brahminical philosophy, I shall only add, that the mistakes in their various theories of the creation, were owing to a notion in which they all participated, that since every human fabric before us had a pre-existent material cause—since no architect can make a house without bricks or bricks without earth—the same necessity must be supposed in the case of the universe at the creation. Waiving therefore the question *by whom*, they confined their attention to the question *of what* the world was made. The pre-existent material must be such as to preclude the recurrence of the question, *And that matter whence?* The Upanishads had inculcated that Brahma or God was himself the substance of which the world is made. The Nyáya and the Sánkhya, rightly judging that a *spirit* could not be the *matter* of a world, nor a pure intelligence the substance of a universe full of impurities, rejected that pantheistic theory, and introduced materialistic hypotheses. The Nyáya propounded a theory of atoms less than the least, and, in their disconnected state, incapable of forming any magnitude cognizable by the senses; and the Sánkhya found the material of the universe in Prakriti, or inanimate and unintelligent Nature. Neither school however properly discussed the question of an intelligent efficient Cause, to whose creative power the harmony, observable in the world, might be attributed. The Vedánta, justly condemning this omission, reproduced the theory of the

[5] केन कमभिवदेत् केन कं मन्वीत ॥

[6] तस्मात् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्ता क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ॥

Upanishads, and maintained that Brahma was at the same time both the material (call it substantial, if you will,) and efficient cause of the universe, which it produced from itself—after the manner of a spider forming his web from his own substance. In the controversy between the three schools, we find the Nyáya and Sánkhya strongly inveighing against the doctrine of a spirit being the substratum of a material world, and the Vedánta equally ardent in condemning the theory of such a beautiful and harmonious world coming into existence without the agency of a Supreme Intelligence. They were all right and all wrong—right in their exposure of opposite errors, wrong in their adherence to their favourite tenets. The controversy does not appear to have been entirely fruitless in its effects on posterity. The followers of the Nyáya subsequently brought in their existing theory of atoms as the material, and God as the efficient cause of the world. The Sánkhya was amended, (as I have just mentioned), by the theory of Prakriti and Purusha jointly creating the world—and the Vedánta modified its pantheism by the doctrine of Máyá, pronouncing the world to be a mere reflection—a shadow—an illusion."

Satyakáma having read thus far, placed his paper on the carpet, when Tarkakáma remarked that he must protest against many points asserted in the essay, which, to say the least, would admit of much discussion.

"I have no doubt of that," said the essayist. "We hoped to see you earlier. It was the eclipse that prevented your coming in time?"

"That was the reason of my being late this morning. Will you have any objection to handing me your paper?—and then let us meet, say on Thursday morning, to discuss the points you have raised. I will undertake to inform Ágamika, if you approve of my proposal." Satyakáma

cheerfully gave up his paper, and we, readily assenting to what Tarkakáma suggested, parted as good friends.

You see, my learned friend, what we are about. I will not fail to communicate to you from time to time how the discussion goes on. I hope you will also send your comments on the topics contained in Satyakáma's essay.

DIALOGUE III.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

I told you in my last that Tarkakáma took away the discourse which Satyakáma had read. He came to the appointed place of meeting on Thursday, accompanied by A'gamika. After some conversation on the events of the day, "I have read your paper, Satyakáma," said he, "but cannot report that it has convinced me of the correctness of your strictures. You evidently wrote it in a spirit of hostility to all the orthodox schools: which again you endeavoured to embroil in mutual disputes. You have studied to damage the reputations of their founders and leaders. Well, I do not regret your attempt,—and I do not charge you with artifice or unfairness; but I am confident that the honoured names of Gotama, Kaṇáda, and the other great characters will outlive your attack:—and that their memories will be all the dearer to posterity for this onslaught. They will shine the more brilliantly for all you have said against them; just as a mirror[1], to use the poet's illustration, becomes the clearer by the very action of the dusty hand

[1] हस्त इव भूतिमलिनो यथा यथा लङ्घयति खलः सुजनं। दर्पणमिव तं कुरुते तथा तथा निर्मलच्छायं॥ Vásavadattá.

that rudely brushes it. Two simple points, which you seem to have ignored, might have explained all the difficulties that you have found in the Sútras, and dissolved the evil phantoms that your imagination has conjured up. You seem to have forgot that our philosophers were devising remedies by which the necessity of future births might be obviated, and the bonds of Dharma, or works, be broken. And you appear to have ignored the fact that, since *nothing can be produced out of nothing*, our Ṛishis were constrained to look for a material cause of the universe in their theory of the creation. The Nyáya pronounced pre-existing atoms to be the materials of which the world was made—the Sánkhya would not acquiesce in the theory of an infinite number of eternal entities of diverse kinds, and therefore declared Prakriti or nature to be itself the cause of all things—while the Vedánta magnified the ineffable glory of God, by teaching that He was the sole cause—the maker and substance of the universe. There is in all this nothing that should provoke criticism, much less hostile declamations; and there is certainly a great deal to call forth our admiration."

Satyakáma.—"Confining myself to your *first* point for the present, may I ask you what you mean by the bonds of works, and the necessity of future births."

Tarkakáma.—"The necessity of future births arises from the events of previous births, which were also the causes of our bonds—the bonds of works. Every man that you see in the world is by birth in a state of bondage. He *must* satisfy the requirements of adṛishṭa. He *must* undergo those troubles which are the necessary consequences—the legitimate fruits—of his previous works. His deeds in the present life, again, lay the foundation of future sufferings in his next scene of existence. Philosophers have therefore mercifully come forward to rescue

them from that bondage. There is nothing in all this which it can be difficult to appreciate."

Satyakáma.—"You are assuming that we have all passed through a previous state of existence before the present life."

Tarkakáma.—"I am not assuming it without high authority. Have not all the schools consentiently held that doctrine as proved? And does not the experience of the world bear testimony to it?"

Satyakáma.—"I have not observed any such testimony in nature—nor have I noticed any reasoning on the subject which may not be called *Sádhya-sama*, or identical with the thing to be proved—in foreign words, a *petitio principii*."

Tarkakáma.—"Do you mean to assert that the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence is a gratuitous tenet, for which our philosophers had no authority, and of which they adduced no proofs?"

Satyakáma.—"They certainly had no right to receive or assert such a doctrine. The proofs they adduced were no better than arbitrary assumptions. That there are reasons for not considering this as the only scene of our existence, I am far from denying. Eternity will open before us as soon as we escape from the bonds of time and sense. But no one can prove that we existed in a previous state before we were born: much less ought such a theory to be made the basis of those startling conclusions which our philosophers have drawn from it."

Tarkakáma.—"Do not the inequalities in birth, position, tastes, and enjoyments, observable in human life, prove such a prior existence? Some are very happy, namely the gods and other residents of the upper regions; some are very miserable, namely, the brute creation; while others have a middle state between the two, such as men.

S'ankaráchárya reasons most justly in attributing these inequalities of birth to works performed in a prior state, and requited in this.

"The incidents of life, again," continued Tarkakáma, "are so irregularly diversified, that the only way to reconcile them with rule or order, is by supposing them to be the consequences of past works. In the same family you will often find one member clever and sharp, a second dull and stupid, a third self-denying and virtuous, a fourth sensual and voluptuous, a fifth in the enjoyment of wealth and plenty, a sixth in penury and misery. Do not such facts prove a by-gone state of life, in which certain habits were formed, by which tastes and dispositions are influenced in this world, and certain merit or demerit acquired, regulating the present distribution of pleasure and pain, —especially when you often see the wicked prospering and the righteous suffering?"

Satyakáma.—"They do not prove your theory. As to S'ankarácharya's argument, we shall presently examine it. You will then see in what different tones he speaks in two different places. And with reference to the inequalities of birth to which you have alluded, they do not necessarily imply a disproportion of happiness or misery. How often do we find the high-born man in greater misery than the low-born! A Persian poet has well said[2], 'While a poor man has only to seek a morsel for himself, and, when he has got that, sleeps as soundly as if he were an emperor, a prince is troubled with the concerns of a whole world.'

"As to diversities in intellectual and moral habits, they do not require to be accounted for by the supposition of a

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[2] تهي دست تشويش ناني خورد   جهان بان بقدر جهاني خورد
گدا را چو حاصل شود نان شام   چنان خوش بخسپد که سلطان شام

previous life. Man is in a state of probation. The development of his character depends on the way in which he makes use of his *opportunities*, and profits by his external circumstances.

"Diversities of enjoyments and sufferings, again, may in a great measure be traced to virtuous or vicious conduct in *this very world*. 'Virtue, as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice 'as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience and 'even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. 'The immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the mind 'and temper are to be mentioned as instances of it. 'Vice, as such, is naturally attended with some sort of 'uneasiness, and, not uncommonly with great distur-'bance and apprehension[3].' Our success in life also is much dependent on ourselves. You will frequently find that the man whom the world calls fortunate, has made a better use of his time, his talents, and his abilities, than he who has proved unfortunate. The fortunate man has perhaps been industrious, attentive, honest, courteous; the unfortunate, on the contrary, may have been inactive, lazy, imprudent, dishonest, ill-mannered, or rash. 'Public honors too, and advantages, are the 'natural consequences, are sometimes at least the conse-'quences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice, 'fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the 'view of being virtuous. And sometimes even death 'itself, often infamy, and external inconveniences, are 'the public consequences of vice as vice[4].'

"The facts to which you have adverted, Tarkakáma, in order to prove a prior existence, may be, in a great measure, accounted for by differences observable in the world itself, in the actions of men.

[3] Butler. [4] Butler.

"It is not necessary for any to blame Destiny, after the fashion of the *ignorant*[5], for what his *own* acts bring on himself; neither is it philosophical to seek an *unseen* cause in 'adrishṭa,' where there are visible causes before you to explain the mystery. I do not of course mean that all the inequalities in life can be accounted for in this way. I admit that you will find a large residuum which, after you have solved the far greater portion in the manner suggested above, will still continue a difficulty in one's way."

Tarkakáma.—"I admire your candour. I was going to say you could not in that ingenious way explain away all the inequalities in the world. Well, how can you account for the residuum without admitting a previous life?"

Satyakáma.—"That, Tarkakáma, only shows that we cannot consider this as our only stage of life. It forces us to look forward to another. It does not however necessarily force our eyes *backward* to a previous state."

Tarkakáma.—"So you wish to get rid of what you call an arbitrary assumption of our Ṛishis, in order to make room for *an arbitrary assumption* of your own?"

Satyakáma.—"I am not contending for any arbitrary assumption. But I can safely say that the doctrine of a prior existence is the very worst way of accounting for inequalities in life. You say they are the results of peculiar habits and works in a previous scene of existence. But you thereby only remove your difficulty one single step, for the question will recur, *Whence those peculiar habits and works*,—and, Whence the inequalities *in that life?* You will say with your philosophers that those inequalities were owing to the acts of *another*

[5] विषमां हि दशां प्राप्य दैवं गर्हयते नरः। आत्मनः कर्मदोषांस्तु नैव जानात्यपण्डितः। Hitopades'a.

previous life. You will then refer to *another still older*, and so on, until you are forced to conclude, as indeed the Ṛishis before you did conclude, that the world had in reality no beginning! Thus your theory involves difficulties far greater than any it is intended to remove. Your remedy proves worse than the disease. One obvious disadvantage is the false security on the one hand, and the despair on the other, which it is calculated to produce. And it precludes that wholesome discipline which hopes and fears of *a future retribution* must exercise on the mind."

Tarkakáma.—"How can our theory preclude the wholesome discipline of hopes and fears? We do not say that man has no control over his future lot. Why should there be any false security or despair? We only account for his present *condition* in life by a reference to his prior existence, and to *adrishṭa.* He has still the power of self-determination, and there is every room for hope and fear. Indeed the actual experience of the effects of his previous acts will add strength to his hopes and fears, and so deter him from repeating wicked deeds. He will *feel* that there is such a thing as retribution in the world."

Satyakáma.—"But you do say—I mean philosophers, and authors of Śástras, have said in several places—that no one can resist the power of Destiny, or adrishṭa, which not only determines the conditions, but also guides the actions, of men, and imparts the motions under which the body and its members perform their functions[6]. The condition itself often influences actions, and affects the interests of futurity. Eminent sages have

[6] अदृष्टाकृष्टैरेव शरीरेन्द्रियादिभिस्तद्भोगजननात्। Haridása Bhaṭṭa's Commentary on the Kusumánjali.

also frequently excused heinous acts of their own perpetration, by laying them at the door of *daiva* or *adṛishṭa* —that is to say, Destiny[7]. Some have also extenuated offences committed by their neighbours by attributing them to the same influence[8]; which others, again, have held as a good reason for not putting forth any efforts for the improvement of their circumstances[9]. These views of your doctrine can exercise no good moral influence on men—nor give rise to salutary motives. Why then introduce a gratuitous theory so replete with evil?"

"Of such inequalities as may not be explained by men's virtuous or vicious conduct in this very world, a simpler, and far more satisfactory, account may be found in the doctrine of a *future* state of final rewards and punishments; for which the present is a mere preparation. Are you puzzled on seeing honest men suffering in the world without any fault of their own? Do not aggravate the infliction by telling them that it is the consequence of vicious acts done in a former life, and for which there is now no remedy! The suffering may be intended as a discipline, only to enhance their future happiness. Have you not heard, Tarkakáma, of king Haris'chandra? The story may be a mere fable, but it beautifully illustrates what I mean. You see there a good man and a great

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[7] दैवमत्र परं मन्ये धिक् पौरुषमनर्थकं। अकार्य्यं कारितो येन बलादहमचिन्तितं॥ Márcaṇḍeya Puráṇa.

[8] अपराधः स दैवस्य न पुनर्मन्त्रिणामयं कार्य्यं सुघटितं यत्नात् दैवयोगाद्विनश्यति। Hitopades'a.

[9] सम्पत्तेश्च विपत्तेश्च दैवमेव हि कारणं। इति दैवपरो ध्यायन् नात्मानमपि चेष्टयेत्। Hitopades'a.

सुखदुःखहेतुस्त्वदृष्टं। Probhákara Mímánsá.

man reduced to a condition, the very recollection of which floods your eyes with tears. Must you say he suffered for his previous crimes? Do you not see what the end was? How it compensated for his past sufferings! Think you that the good king regretted what he had undergone when he had received the fruition of the glory that awaited him? He did not. Thus it is that 'virtue is 'often militant here; and various untoward accidents 'contribute to its being often overborne: but it may 'combat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail 'completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards in some 'future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, 'perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may be 'scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other 'way adapted to afford it a sufficient sphere of action; 'and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of 'it to follow in fact[10].'"

Tarkakáma was for a moment silent, when Ágamika interposed a remark—"What you say, my long-tried friend, suggests a most important consideration. That I will not fail to give to the question. But is it not true, (I have at least heard so from many friends learned in Mohammedan lore,) that the most eminent philosophers among the Yavanas held the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence? Is it fair, is it modest, so summarily to condemn a doctrine that has approved itself to the reasons and consciences of so many races of men?"

Satyakáma.—"Had that doctrine not been productive of so much undeniable mischief in our country, I could not have denounced it in strong terms. It is truth which constrains me to say that this is a question on which philosophers had for a long time groped in the dark, even

10 Butler.

in Europe. That the soul was immaterial, and distinct from the body which it animated, they understood easily enough; not indeed from the necessity of thinking charitably of those who performed pious offices toward the dead, as Gotama would have it[1], but from its peculiar independent functions, of which each individual was conscious in himself. That the soul was unaffected by those causes of decay to which the body was subject, they also comprehended. But, like our own ancestors, they had (apparently, without discussion) adopted a maxim, that whatever had a beginning must have an end. Those who could not allow that the soul died with the body were driven to the conclusion that it had no beginning. Until nearly two thousand years ago, when *life and immortality were brought to light by One* who *spake as never man spake*, (of whose teaching I shall embrace an opportunity on some future day of saying something), men could not understand that the soul could be immortal without being also uncreated. They accordingly pronounced it to be eternal. They stopped not to reflect on the consequences involved in such a theory; they did not consider that it robbed the Supreme Being of some of His most glorious titles which even their own poets had accorded to Him, in common with other writers of more than human authority. If all souls were eternal, then there could be no *Creator* of souls, no *Father of spirits*, no πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε. As most of those philosophers also held that matter, too, was eternal in some shape or other, their doctrine obviously involved the denial of a real creation, and consequently of a Creator."

"You refer to the philosophers of Greece. Your Mohammadan friends are right in saying they held the

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[1] शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात्। Nyáya Sútra, III. 4.

theory of the soul's pre-existence. We should however consider how they deduced it, before attaching much value to their conclusion.

"Among the arguments which Plato uses in his celebrated dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul, one is the deduction of its eternity from its past and future existence. Its past existence is deduced from his well-known dogma, that all learning is reminiscence. He proves this point by assuming that a spectator often associates a truth he had never before soon or perceived with some fact just presented to his senses. From this mental association, which is carefully explained in another dialogue (the 'Meno'), as well as from his theory of general ideas, the philosopher deduced his maxim, that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence;—which of course involved the pre-existence of the soul[2]."

Tarkakáma.—"Plato's argument is almost identical with Gotama's, and that is what I meant by the experience of the world. I wonder how you can still resist the doctrine. You may account for the unequal distribution of pleasure and pain, by the supposition of a future state of retribution, but how can you account for peculiar capacities and habits in men equally circumstanced. Gotama's argument is unanswerable."

Satyakáma.—"Is it so? Will you state the argument in detail."

Tarkakáma.—"Gotama, you must remember, was demonstrating the eternity of the soul, and so he proves that it never began, nor shall ever cease, to be. The former point,

[2] ἐαν τις τι ἑτερον η ιδων η ακουσας η τινα αλλην αισθησιν λαβων μη μονον εκεινο γνῳ αλλα και ἑτερον εννοησῃ οὑ μη ἡ αυτη επιστημη αλλ᾿ αλλη· αρ᾿ ουχι τουτο δικαιως λεγομεν ὁτι ανεμνησθη οὑ την εννοιαν ελαβεν;

from which the latter followed as a matter of course, he thus attempts to make good. He says (III. 19.) 'Be-'cause of the manifestation of joy, fear, and grief, in him 'that is born, from the memory of previous habits.' The commentator expounds the meaning of the Sútra in the following words: 'The rise of joy and other feelings 'in the infant that is born, while the occasions of 'those feelings are yet not apprehended in this birth, 'can only be accounted for by his recollection of previ-'ous apprehensions. Thus the successive prior stages of 'the present soul being shown, it is proved to be without 'beginning. And what is without beginning can have 'no destruction. Thus is its eternity demonstrated[3].' Can any one conceive a possible objection to this argument?"

Satyakáma.—"It seems Gotama himself could conceive an objection to his argument; at least he notices one in the next Sútra.—'The changes (on the child's face) may 'be like the opening and closing of the lotus.' (III. 20.) The commentator thus expounds the objection. 'Joy 'and other feelings in the infant are inferred from changes 'on his face. They may be produced by some especial 'unseen virtue, as in the opening and closing of the lotus'[4]."

Tarkakáma.—"But Gotama furnished a ready reply to the objection. 'No! for causes of changes in things

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[3] पूर्व्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥
जातस्य बालस्य एतज्जन्माननुभूतेष्वपि हर्षादिहेतुषु सत्सु हर्षादीनां सम्प्रतिपत्तिः उत्पत्तिस्तस्याः पूर्व्वपूर्वानुभवाधीनस्मृतिसम्बन्धादेव सम्भवात् इत्थञ्चेदानीन्तनस्यात्मनः पूर्वपूर्वसिद्धौ तस्यानादित्वमनादेश्च भावस्य न नाश इति नित्यत्वसिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

[4] पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः ॥ २० ॥
बालस्य हर्षादयो मुखविकासादनुमेया न च तत्सम्भवः पद्मादीनां प्रबोधादिवददृष्टविशेषाधीनक्रियावशादेव तदुपपत्तेरिति भावः ॥

'composed of the five elements, are heat, cold, rain, 'season[5].'"

Satyakáma.—"The reply is not satisfactory. The objection is neither worded nor expounded as clearly as it might have been. It may fairly be thus paraphrased. Gotama says that certain internal emotions are indicated by changes on the child's face, and that those emotions are proofs of a prior existence. The objector does not disallow the premises, but he disputes the conclusion. He admits the existence of the internal emotions, but he contends they are occasioned by external impressions *after* birth. He contends that the *first* instances of joy and fear are owing to outward causes surrounding the child. Of the changes on its face, those emotions may be the *proximate* causes; but the external impressions, by which the emotions themselves were excited, must be recognized as their *remote* causes. The changes on the child's face may accordingly be compared with the expansion and contraction of the lotus. You say the expansion and contraction of the lotus are caused by heat and moisture. Granted. But it would be more accurate to say that the heat and moisture are neither their *immediate,* nor *only* causes; that the expansion and contraction have the flower's *own organism* as their proximate cause, and that the external heat and moisture are *remoter* causes acting on that organism: for without the intervention of that organism the flower would no more be affected by the atmosphere, than the wax or light-wood lotus which your children value so much as a toy. The analogy between the child and the lotus, therefore, stands good. External circumstances act on something internal in each case, and *thereby* occasion certain visible changes. That

[5] नोष्णशीतवर्षाकालनिमित्तत्वात् पञ्चात्मकविकाराणां ॥

the organism is in the one case only physical, in the other both physical and intellectual, does not affect the analogy.

"It cannot therefore be said, in reply, that the changes on the child's face are independent of external causes. That would be a begging of the question. The child is exposed to certain outside impressions from its very birth, and these impressions excite certain mental emotions which are indicated by change of countenance. The case of the lotus is an example in point. The child has a mental constitution by virtue of which external circumstances are able to call into action certain internal feelings. The lotus, too, has an organism of its own, by virtue of which the action of the atmosphere occasions the expansion and contraction of the flower. In both cases certain effects are produced by virtue of internal organisms, through the action of external impressions. The child may be *afterwards* capable of pure internal impulses, not depending immediately on the external. But you cannot prove that, previously to the reception of its *first* impressions from without, any of its internal capacities are in active exercise; much less that such exercise is conscious and deliberate. The indications of joy and sorrow on the infant's face do not, therefore, demonstrate the fact of previous habits acquired in a prior state of life, but are simply proofs of the *capacities*, in the mental constitution of human nature, for certain emotions which are *put in exercise* by impressions from without; and the analogy of the lotus stands good, inasmuch as the lotus has also an organism in its tender stalk, by virtue of which its flowers open and shut when acted upon by heat and moisture."

Tarkakáma.—"I am not convinced that Gotama's argument is invalid. But that is not his only argument. He has another:—'From the desire for milk, after dying,

caused by the habit of taking food.' (III. 22.) The commentator gives the following scholium on it—'After 'dying, or rather having died, means being just born, 'after the dissolution of the previous body[6].'"

Satyakáma.—"Neither is this argument above the possibility of asault in the author's estimation, for he anticipates an objection. 'The child's spontaneous approach 'to the mother's breast may be like that of the iron to 'the magnet.'" (III. 23).

Tarkakáma.—"That only shows the author's candour. But see how he repels the objection. 'No! because there is no motive, elsewhere.' (III. 24). That is to say, as the scholiast renders it, 'the child is moved only to suck the 'milk. The rule does not hold good in the other case. 'Why? Because there is in reality no motive in the other 'case *i. e.,* in that of the iron. Motive is deduced from 'effort, not from a mere act[7]. Hence the argument is 'not vitiated.'"

Satyakáma.—"I do not deny that the child, being endowed with intellectual and active powers, is capable of an effort of which inanimate iron is incapable. But this fact does not proves the soul's pre-existence. But as Gotama has another argument yet, let us hear it before we discuss the reasons he has adduced for and against his doctrine."

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[6] प्रेत्याहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्तन्याभिलाषात् ॥

प्रेत्य मृत्वा जातमात्रस्य । Scholia.

[7] अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणं ।

नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात् ॥

स्तनपान एव बालः प्रवर्त्तते नत्वन्यत्रेतिनियमः कथं स्यात् वस्तुतस्तु अन्यत्र अयसि प्रवृत्त्यभावात् प्रवृत्तिर्हि चेष्टानुमितालिङ्गं नतुक्रियामात्रमतो न व्यभिचार इति भावः ॥

Tarkakáma.—"'From not seeing any one, born without desire[8].' The innate affections of human nature are proofs of a previous state of existence, in which their germs were planted."

Satyakáma.—"The author is again candid enough to anticipate an objection. 'Its birth is like the production of a substance with inherent qualities[9].'"

Tarkakáma.—"He refutes it too. 'No! for desire and other affections are occasioned by intelligence,' *i. e.*, deliberation[10]."

Satyakáma.—"I say again the answer is not to the point. With reference to the second argument, facts do not warrant the conclusion that the infant, previous to after-birth experience, is moved, or makes a deliberate effort, to approach the breast. All that you can say is, that when the breast is applied, it sucks. But it will suck any thing that is presented to it. It sucks its own fingers. The fact only proves that it has a capacity and an inclination for sucking, just as the magnet has the capacity of attracting iron. If the infant *afterwards* indicates a discriminative knowledge on the subject, *that* is owing to *its experience after birth*. The three arguments of Gotama may be compressed into one. He contends that men exhibit from their infancy certain habits and inclinations, passions and affections, which cannot be accounted for without assuming a previous state of existence; and, as that state, again, must, for the same reasons, have another antecedent to it, you must carry the argument successively backwards, and pronounce the soul to be eternal. Is not this his argument?"

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8 वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ 9 सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥

10 न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनां ॥

Tarkakáma.—"I do not object to your construction of his argument; but what can you say in reply?"

Satyakáma.—"I can say something by quoting one of his own texts, by opposing Gotama to Gotama. He had asserted in his definition of the soul, that 'Desire, Aversion, Volition, Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are its characteristics. (i. 10)[1].' If then the infant exhibits external indications of those mental operations, *the phenomenon simply proves the existence of a soul in him.* Those characteristics have nothing to do with the soul's pre-existence. The examples cited in the objections, are not fairly met by his answers. It is a characteristic of the soul to think, feel, desire, shun; to desire that which imparts pleasure, to avoid that which communicates pain. If the infant spontaneously takes to sucking, it is because that is an effort natural and agreeable to him; and indeed every effort is then agreeable, which affords exercise to his physical or mental capacities, without actually imparting pain. There is not the slightest necessity for assuming that his involuntary motions are the results of habits acquired in a previous state of existence, or that they are reminiscences of past associations."

Tarkakáma.—"The argument is not merely that the infant evinces desire and inclination, but that he evinces inclination for *particular* objects, as if known by previous experience to be agreeable to the taste; and hence Gotama contends that it is proof of a previous life."

Satyakáma.—"Here the premise is incorrect. It is not true in fact that the infant evinces a taste for particular objects, *prior to experience in his existing state.* It makes an effort to suck whatever is presented to its mouth. Among some nations it is usual to give the oil of *Reṇḍi*

[1] इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनोलिङ्गं ॥ १० ॥

(castor-oil) as the first food for an infant when it is born—and it takes the oil as promptly as it does milk. And it would suck either liquid with the same readiness, even if it contained arsenic. You cannot say it had found oil and arsenic to be so agreeable in a previous life.

"These involuntary efforts in the infant are exactly what you would expect from human nature. You need not form a theory of pre-existence in order to account for them. Since light and heat are characteristics of fire, if you make a piece of iron red-hot, it will naturally both shine and burn. Would you say it is owing to habits of a previous state? Of course you would not. You would simply recognize the natural property of fire already ascertained. So, when the child only manifests the characteristics of the soul that animates his body, you have simply to accept the fact as a verification of your own aphorism on the nature of that soul. You have no room for bringing in a new theory. You cannot do so without stultifying your own *Sútra*. The child does what you would expect from his soul. If the case were otherwise, if the child gave no more indication of internal sensibility than a wooden doll, you should have to revise your aphorism. You have no phenomenon before you, but what is fully explained by your previous premises. Your argument is redundant, and your theory of a pre-existence unnecessary."

Tarkakáma.—"Even if Gotama's argument were inconsistent with his definition of the soul, still how would you account for such natural dispositions in the infant? Who taught him the way to take food at an age when he is incapable of learning from those around him?"

Satyakáma.—"The natural dispositions of the infant are to be accounted for in the same way in which you might account for the natural properties of other substances. Who gave the *champá* its fragrance, the lion its

courage, and the sun its refulgence? Answer my query, and, I warrant you, the same answer will explain who taught the way of taking food at an age when the infant is incapable of communicating with his neighbours. The same great Being, Tarkakáma, is the giver and the teacher in both instances. His Maker instructed the infant to desire food, to take it in the way best suited to his state, to give forth signs of pain when he misses his sustenance. Do not stare at what I say, as if it were something uncommon. The natural law which instructs and guides the infant governs the whole of the animal and vegetable creation. The same fiat which bestowed on the peacock its beauty, the swan its gloss, the *kokila* its voice, the *chakwa* its sentiment, the elephant its strength, conferred on man the nature he exhibits even in infancy. The babe is taught how to suck, by Him who instructs the bird how to build her nest when the comforts of her offspring require it; who commands the *málati* to entwine itself round the tree that supports it, the lotus to open by day, and the *kumuda* by night; who admonishes trees, herbs, and creepers to germinate in the way best suited to their organism, and animals to seek the nourishment best adapted for their constitution."

Tarkakáma.—"What you say may be a fine theory in itself. But it does not *disprove* Gotama's doctrine. The phenomena you have mentioned may be accounted for equally well on the supposition of a previous existence."

Satyakáma.—"Neither do the reasons adduced by Gotama *prove his theory;* which indeed reaches much further back than simple pre-existence. He contends that the various stages of previous lives may in like manner be proved from those immediately succeeding them, and thus the soul demonstrated to be uncreated and eternal, and that not merely in a spiritual state, unconnected

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with body and mind, but in an embodied and intellectual state. See then the length to which the argument carries you. If man has existed without beginning, sucked milk, taken food, there must have been vegetable life, co-existent with him. How could he otherwise be sustained? Even if he lived on nothing but animal matter, still the animals which supplied that matter must have required vegetable sustenance. And if animal and vegetable life be uncreated and eternal, so must inorganic matter be too; for it is from inorganic matter that vegetables draw the sap which sustains them, the gas which supports them, and the heat which vivifies them. If you allow the validity of Gotama's argument for the pre-existence of the soul, and extend it, as he has done, to times without beginning, you must then maintain the eternity of every thing around you; and that, not in an atomic state, but collected in masses. And if the universe be uncreated and eternal in a perfect state of development, how can you, on your own theory, contend for the existence of God? Since the theory of a previous life, and the principles of Gotama drive us to this extremity, how can you say that the supposition of a pre-existence explains the facts before us, *equally well* with that for which I am contending?"

Tarkakáma.—"But granting that the argument, based on the infant's spontaneous efforts, is inconclusive, because there is nothing to preclude the supposition of their being natural to him; how can you, still, get over the *moral* argument, or withhold your assent from the doctrine, when you consider the marked inequalities in the circumstances and positions of men? How can you reconcile with the justice and equity of God the fact of some men being in the enjoyment of honor and wealth, others pining in penury and misery,—except by considering their various

conditions as the consequences of their own works in a past world? Human happiness or misery, you said, may be traced to virtuous or vicious conduct in this very world. I do not deny it may be so in some cases—but surely you do not mean to stigmatize every poor man as a monster of wickedness. To vindicate the justice of God, and to save the credit of men, it is necessary to look to the events of a prior existence for an explanation of the difficulty, especially when you consider that many are born with disease and infirmity which they could not have brought on themselves by their own acts, but which nevertheless render them miserable for life."

Satyakáma.—"That a portion of our happiness or misery is owing to our actions in this life, you seem to admit.

"So far then we are agreed. As regards differences in race and birth they are not, (I have already said,) necessarily connected with corresponding diversities in enjoyment or suffering. The elephant is of a different species from the lion, the peacock from the deer, the bull from the horse. Does it necessarily follow that the deer is less happy than the lion, or the horse than the elephant? By no means. Is it then impossible to vindicate the justice of God without supposing a prior existence regulating the differences in their species? Each may be amply endowed in its own way, and each bears testimony to the wisdom and beneficence of the Creator. The same may be predicated of races of mankind. There is a variety in the creation which, while it indicates the inexhaustible riches of the Divine intelligence and goodness, does not for a moment suggest a want of equity in the Author of our being. No one had an antecedent right to be created in a particular manner, or of a particular race. He that was free to

create in His own way, has so performed his work that there should be symmetry, variety, and happiness, in the universe. And that there is. The smallest insect that crawls on the ground contributes to the beauty and harmony of the world in its own way, as the lofty elephant does in *his* way. How could there be order if there were no variety? Is that symmetry, or that harmony worthy of the name, where there is no plurality of different, but proportional, substances? Inequalities are in themselves no proofs of injustice, or culpable partiality.

"I will not deny, what I have already admitted, that there is a large residuum of worldly inequalities which may still remain to be accounted for. That account, however, is found more satisfactorily in my theory than in yours—I mean, in the supposition that this is a state of probation and trial preparatory to another and a better world. Probation itself demands difficulties. The gold cannot be tried without being placed in the heated crucible. The child is not trained for the purposes of life without passing through the ordeal of a school. This world may be to us a preparation for a better. There is nothing in this idea which is derogatory to the justice and goodness of God."

Tarkakáma.—"You called the doctrine of a prior state an arbitrary assumption. Is your doctrine of probation and trial, preparatory to a better world yet to come, any thing better? You cannot prove it either."

Satyakáma.—"Strong presumptive evidence you know is proof in cases which do not admit of mathematical demonstration. The theory I propose accounts for our difficulties, without giving the lie to our moral convictions. Your theory, on the contrary, is nullified by its own vagueness, and, instead of justifying the ways of God, has a tendency to cast doubts on His very existence. Witness

the argument of Śankaráchárya; 'What is the want 'of equity (on the part of God)? He makes a dis-'tinction between souls, high, low, middling. Hence 'exhibiting partiality and prejudice, and other infirmities, 'he might be proved to be like ourselves, and therefore 'no God[2]." The question is accordingly one of vital importance in theology. Śankara, I may say, has given two solutions of the problem which are apparently inconsistent with each other. In one place, at least, he strongly inveighs against the way in which you propose to account for it.

'If it be said,' he continues, 'that the above distinctions 'are owing to the past works of the souls themselves, and 'that consequently there can be nothing wrong in the 'existing inequalities; the solution will not stand: for 'works being motions, and God the mover, there will 'still be the fault of [cause and effect resting on] reci-'procal support [as in a vicious circle]. If you say 'there has been a series of works without a beginning, 'then, as in the present world, so also in past states, the 'same fault must be found of reciprocal support, [each 'cause producing, and also being produced by, its own 'effect] and it will be after the manner of a troop of blind 'leading the blind[3].'

"I do not cite Śankara approvingly, but I wish simply to remind you that he does not here countenance your

[2] किं पुनरसामञ्जस्यं हीनमध्यमोत्तमभावेन हि प्राणिभेदान् विदधत ईश्वरस्य रागद्वेषादिदोषप्रसक्तेरस्मदादिवदनीश्वरत्वं प्रसज्येत।

Commentary on Vedánta Sútra II. ii. 37.

[3] प्राणिकर्म्मापेक्षत्वाददोष इतिचेन्न कर्म्मेश्वरयोः प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्त्तयितृत्वे इतरेतराश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् अनादित्वादितिचेन्न वर्त्तमानकालवदतीतेष्वपि कालेष्वितरेतराश्रयदोषाविशेषादन्धपरम्परान्यायापत्तेः। Ibid.

theory of past works justifying present distinctions. It will drive us from one world to a second, from that again to its predecessor, until, as in Gotama's theory, you are compelled to hold the eternity of the world before us."

A'gamika.—"But if so many philosophers of the west and east held the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, is it, I ask again, modest to treat it as a mischievous theory?"

Satyakáma.—"I have myself only said that our philosophers have drawn from it the most startling conclusions. It would hardly be worth one's while to combat the doctrine, if it were held as a mere opinion, and if no inferences, subversive of the interests of religion and morality, were deduced from it.

"In Plato's system the theory of the soul's pre-existence holds a very subordinate place. It is not pushed to any extreme conclusion, destructive of religion or morals. The doctrine appears to have had a feeble hold on his mind. In the arguments brought forward there is nothing which corresponds to the force usually attached to Socratic sayings. The immortality of the soul is his great theme. Its past existence is insisted on for the purpose of demonstrating that theme. As your Arabic and Persian scholars constantly parade the name of Plato in connection with the doctrine under consideration, let us, once more, consider that philosopher's reasoning.

"Plato's opinion of the soul's pre-existence appears somewhat abruptly in the conversation which Socrates last held with his friends before his death. The philosopher was there joyously contemplating the happiness that awaited his submission to the cruel sentence of his countrymen. He did not grieve at a prospect which to his friends appeared so melancholy, but looked without the least concern for the fatal cup preparing for him. As a reason for this indifference, he stated his belief that he

was going to a happier world, where he should find a better community. The scepticism of his friends leads him to a philosophical discussion of his hope of immortality. He assumes as an axiom, what his friends admit without difficulty, that in all things which are produced, the process is no otherwise than opposites issuing out of opposites[4]. So that when a thing becomes greater, it is from having been less. Life proceeds out of death, and death out of life. Thus he concludes that souls exist in Hades after death. The pre-existence of the soul is involved in this reasoning, which is founded on the gratuitous assumption, so frequently observed in our Indian Śástras—that whatsoever is born must necessarily die, and whatsoever dies must as necessarily be generated again[5]. Birth succeeds death, no less than death birth. The soul when it is born is only re-manifested after a previous death—and consequently after an anterior existence. In the course of the above reasoning, he refers to an old tradition, that souls, dying, go to Hades, and, being born, return from the dead. That this old saying had influenced Plato more than any reasons by which the doctrine itself was supported, would appear from the assertion of Aristotle that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent. To say that the soul was created would of course involve the dreaded predicament.

"Then again Plato's opinion of knowledge being mere reminiscence, necessitated the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence. Socrates calls up an untaught slave boy, and, by a string of leading questions, makes him enunciate

[4] *ουκ αλλοθεν η εκ των εναντιων τα εναντια.* Phædo.

[5] जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्यु र्ध्रुवं जन्म मृतस्य च। Bhagavat Gitá.

the rule for the duplication of a square. I am not sure that any catechizer, short of a Socrates, would succeed in drawing, from the lips of an uninstructed clown, a statement of the truth, that in a square, the square of "what professors of science call the diagonal" is equal to twice that of one of the sides. But even if every teacher of youth had the tact and ability with which that great philosopher catechized the boy, just referred to, what would the fact prove? Nothing more than this, that the human mind was so constituted that some ideas should be suggestive of others. The truths of geometry have been successively deduced by that very mind. What wonder then that a clown, under the tuition of such an interrogator, should gather some of those truths, though never before instructed. The notions which, from the constitution of our minds, are generated within us by external sensation and internal reflection need not be considered as stamps of previously existing ideas. Whatever those ideas be in Plato's system, there is no reason why we may not at once assume the present as a world of reality in which our ideas are for the first time learnt.

"Plato likewise concluded that the soul was uncreated and immortal from its being an independent ever-moving principle. 'Every soul is immortal, for that which is 'in ceaseless motion is immortal. But that which moves 'another, and is moved by another, as it stops in 'motion, stops in life. * * * If then there be nothing 'which moves itself but the soul, it necessarily follows 'that the soul is a thing uncreated and immortal[6].'

"Plato you will observe did not deduce or persist in any conclusions from that doctrine opposed to the glory

[6] ει δε εστι τουτο οὑτως εχον, μη αλλο τι ειναι το αυτο ἑαυτο κινουν η ψυχην, εξ αναγκης αγενητον τε και αθανατον ψυχη αν ειη.

Phaedrus, C. 24.

of God or the interests of man. In truth Socrates himself propounds it with diffidence in the *Meno.* He positively refuses to make any other use of it than that of encouraging men to persevere in intellectual pursuits. He thought people would be more manly and less idle, if they were persuaded they were once endowed with knowledge, and could consequently regain it with facility, than if they believed they were never blessed with knowledge, and that what they had never known, it was neither possible nor necessary to inquire after. If you were once possessed of ideas, now forgotten, it is evident you may recall them without difficulty. You should not then indulge in idleness as if it were impossible for you to improve your mind. This is the sort of exhortation in which that philosopher delighted. But it is evident there was no necessity for postulating the pre-existence of the soul with a view to this. It were quite sufficient to say the soul is naturally capable of intellectual acquisitions, and that therefore earnest endeavours after knowledge must be successful.

"If he made any other practical use of his doctrine, it was to enforce the observance of morals, by holding out the terrors of a future world to the wicked and ungodly. 'Whosoever passes his life justly, afterwards obtains a 'better lot, but who unjustly a worse one. Those who 'are timid and unjust are changed into women in their 'second generation.'"

Tarkakáma.—"What other conclusions could *our* philosophers, either, have drawn from the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence? They too insisted on good behaviour as a necessary qualification for future happiness."

Satyakáma.—"I see I have not yet succeeded in explaining my views to you, notwithstanding several attempts. I think it is not too severe a remark to say that

they have all drawn from it conclusions which militate against our conceptions of the divine attributes, and which tend to the subversion of good manners. Such conclusions may be called mischievous, may they not, Tarkakáma?"

"Of course, if they really involved notions such as you describe."

"Well, then, one great conclusion that our philosophers have drawn from the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence is that this world is a scene of reward or punishment according to works performed in a previous state. Whatever happens now is owing to *adṛishṭa,* or the 'unseen' merit or demerit of past works, otherwise called *daiva*[7]. Our thoughts, feelings, and actions are all fettered by the events of a life already passed. It is impossible even for God to help us except as far as *adṛishṭa* will allow. He cannot get over this difficulty any more than he can produce rice out of wheat seed, as Śankaráchárya says. On the immoral consequences of such a doctrine of necessity, I need not expatiate."

Tarkakáma.—"But adṛishṭa simply regulates our *condition* in life as the reward or punishment of past works. I repeat, it does not diminish our control over ourselves."

Satyakáma.—"The *condition* itself is in your system almost every thing. If a person is degraded by adṛishṭa to a Śúdra's condition, he is precluded from every aspiration which may be called noble—for according to the Śástra he should be engaged solely in doing service to the *twice-born.* He may, by a lucky stroke of *daiva,* get up to the surface again, but he cannot calculate on such a chance, nor guide himself by such a hope.

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[7] स्वमेव कर्म्म दैवाख्यं विद्धि देहान्तरार्जितं । Matsya Puráṇa.

"Then, again, although some parts of the Śástra, with a view no doubt to stimulate human efforts, limit the operation of adṛishṭa[8], and magnify man's freedom of will and action, thereby enhancing his responsibility, there are other parts equally,—I may say, more,—decisive in establishing the paramount influence of *daiva,* and extending it without bounds to all actions and events[9]. The very exceptions that are solemnly mentioned prove its absolute sovereignty as a rule. Philosophers maintain that by true knowledge one can cast off the bonds of works, and sectarians contend that by devotion to their *ishṭa devatá*[10], or favourite god, one can get over the effects of *daiva,* or Fate; both thereby admitting its uncontrolled potency in ordinary cases. And it is not denied by those who would limit the influence of *daiva* that it extends over every event—only that it requires the concurrence of human efforts."

"But I do not see," said Tarkakáma, "what great evil would arise from the doctrine of *adṛishṭa* or *daiva,* supposing that it does imply a restriction on men's actions."

Satyakáma.—"If you admit the extreme view of its power, by which for instance the Brahmin, already adverted to[1], excused an unnatural act of severity against

[8] दैवमेव विजानन्ति नराः पौरुषवर्जिताः | Mastya Puráṇa.

[9] दैवाधीनं जगत् सर्व्वं जन्म कर्म्म शुभाशुभं। संयोगाश्च वियोगाश्च न च दैवात् परं बलं ॥ Brahma Vaivarta.

अरक्षितं तिष्ठति दैवरक्षितं सुरक्षितं दैवहतं विनश्यति। जीवत्यनाथोपि वने विसर्जितं कृतप्रयत्नोपि गृहे न जीवति ॥ Hitopadeśa.

[10] दैवं वर्द्धयितुं शक्तः क्षयं कर्तुं स्वलीलया। न दैववद्ध स्तद्भक्तस्त्वविनाशी च निर्गुणः ॥ Matsya Puráṇa.

[1] See Foot note 7, page 94.

his own sons, it amounts to a doctrine of fatalism. Now 'suppose a fatalist to educate any one from his youth up, 'in his own principles; that the child should reason upon 'them; and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave 'otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame or 'commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded for, or 'punished: imagine him to eradicate the very percep-'tions of blame and commendation out of his mind, by 'means of the system; to form his temper and character 'and behaviour to it; and from it to judge of the treat-'ment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon 'his coming abroad into the world, as the fatalist judges 'from this system, what he is to expect from the Author 'of nature, and with regard to a future state. I cannot 'forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of common 'sense would think fit that a child should be put upon 'these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. 'And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not 'sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this 'kind. However the child would doubtless be highly 'delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear 'and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered 'and embarrassed; and highly conceited in his superior 'knowledge so far beyond his years. But conceit and 'vanity would be the least bad part of the influence 'which these principles must have, when thus reasoned 'and acted upon, during the course of his education. 'He must either be allowed to go on and be the plague 'of all about him, and himself too, even to his own des-'truction: or else correction must be continually made 'use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions 'of blame and commendation which we have supposed 'to be removed; and to give him a practical impression 'of what he had reasoned himself out of the belief of,

'that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be pun-'ished for doing what he was forbid[2].'

"Our best security against this mischievous theory of *adrishṭa* is in those principles of conscious responsibility which the Supreme Being has implanted in our minds, and which we cannot wholly unlearn, notwithstanding all that philosophers may say to the contrary. Hence it is that poets have often censured an idle dependence on *daiva*, and inculcated a firm resistance of its power. But the *power itself is not denied*[3]."

Tarkakáma.—"What is *daiva* but the inscrutable will of God? Is it not right that man should not presume too much on his power or freedom, but be constantly reminded of his dependence on the will of God?"

Satyakáma.—"Certainly. If *daiva* or adrishṭa signified the inscrutable will of God, there could be no objection to extending the range of its operation. The impression that we are under the power of God's will, can never discourage efforts in the right direction, nor diminish our sense of responsibility. Indeed it would rather heighten both. But neither *daiva* nor its synonymes *disṭa, adrishṭa, bhágya*, can be so construed. They are defined by philosophers, poets, and lexicographers, all, to mean the luck, desert, habit, or disposition which depends on, and is derived from, one's own acts in a previous life[4].

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[2] Butler.

[3] न दैवमपि सञ्चिन्त्य त्यजेदुद्योगमात्मनः। अनुद्योगेन तैलानि तिलेभ्यो नाप्तुमर्हति॥ उद्योगिनं पुरुषसिंहमुपैति लक्ष्मी दैवेन देयमिति कापुरुषा वदन्ति। दैवं निहत्य कुरु पौरुषमात्मशक्त्या यत्ने कृते यदि न सिध्यति कोऽत्र दोष॥ Hitopadeśa.

[4] अदृष्टं जन्मान्तरीयसंस्कारे। Śabda-muktá-mahárṇava.

तत्र दैवमभिव्यक्तं पौरुषं पूर्व्वदेहिकं। Mátsya in Ditto.

To be under the influence of such luck is not to be under the guidance of an all-wise and beneficent Intelligence—but to continue subject to a blind influence, the nature and extent of which are obscure and indefinite. I do not wonder at men's impatience under such a supposed bondage, and their eagerness to escape from its trammels.

"The theological errors deduced from this theory of the soul's pre-existence are equally grave. How does Gotama for instance account for the creation? He introduces a *purvapaksha*, or a primâ facie opinion, different from his own, to the effect, that 'God is the cause (of the universe) for the (previous) works of men are found to be unfruitful.' (iv. 19) He then replies, 'No; for there can be no fruit without (previous) works.' (iv. 20.) The *obvious* meaning here is that the works of a previous life, not God, *produced the world.* The scholiast does his best to explain away this apparent denial of God, by contending that the author only denies the material, or *sole*, causality of God, teaching thereby that God and adṛishṭa were joint causes of the Universe[5]. Even if this explanation were accepted, it would still, by associating Him with Fate or Luck, be an avowed abridgment of the Creator's power, already curtailed by the admission of atoms. But this is not all. How could there be a Fate or Luck, dependent on prior works, at the *original* creation? If then, there could be *no fruit without such works,* the world could never have been really created. That

अदृष्टस्य प्राक्तनशुभाशुभकर्म्मणः। Premachandra on the Naishadha.

पूर्व्वजन्मकृतं कर्म्म तद्दैवमिति कथ्यते। Hitopadesa.

[5] ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्म्माफल्यदर्शनात्। न पुरुषकर्म्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः। पुरुषकर्म्मणोऽपि सहकारितावश्यकी॥

this is not a mere speculative inference drawn by myself from his principles, but expresses his real opinion, is evident from his argument for the Soul's pre-existence and eternity already considered[6].

"The Vais'eshika leader Kaṇáda, too, drew a similar inference from the theory of pre-existence and adṛishṭa. He boldly asserted that the primal action of atoms is caused by 'adṛishṭa,' to which was also owing the *first act of mind* (manasas'cha.) So that if there be a Supreme Being, still He cannot have moved without adṛishṭa.

"In Jaimini's system, again, every thing is *works*, that is to say, works in the sense of adṛishṭa. It is by virtue of 'works' that the affairs of the world are conducted. Works procure merit, and merit regulates events. This succession of works, and their consequent events, has gone on from eternity like seed and plant. The seed produces the plant, and the plant again yields the seed. Works regulate events, and events lead to works. They thus form a chain of inter-dependent links.

"It is adṛishṭa, too, which affords refuge to the atheistic Sánkhya. The arrangement of the world and the regulation of human affairs might have driven him to the necessity of acknowledging a Supreme Intelligence, but the doctrine of adṛishṭa furnished him with an escape. 'The distribution of fruits could not be by a divine 'cause, for it is determined by works[7].' This, as we have seen, was likewise the opinion of Jaimini, S'ankará-chárya being witness[8].

[6] It must be confessed that a few commentators, of no great celebrity, take a different view of the *sûtras* quoted above. The question will be again mooted in the next Dialogue.

[7] नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्म्मणा तत्सिद्धेः । Kapila Sútra, v. 1.

[8] See page79.

"As to the Vedánta, although, as I have shown before, it does not consider the doctrine of previous works as a sufficient explanation of the diversity observable in human condition, yet it draws in other places conclusions equally subversive of the Creator's independent agency. As S'ankaráchárya always states his opinion with great perspicuity, I shall read his words in full. Commenting on Sútra II. i. 34, the object of which is to show that God creates the world out of regard to human works, 'It may be objected,' he says, 'God is then proved not to be 'the cause of the universe. Why? From the visible instan-'ces of injustice and cruelty. Some he makes very happy, '*i. e.*, the gods; some very miserable, the brutes, &c.; 'some middling, men, &c. As the author of such an 'unequitable creation, He is proved to be subject to pas-'sions like other persons, that is to say, to partiality and 'prejudice, and therefore His nature is found wanting in 'the spotlessness which is set forth in the S'ruti and 'Smṛiti. And by dispensing pain and the ruin of all 'creatures, He is chargeable with a malicious cruelty, 'deemed culpable even among the wicked. Hence, because 'of the visible instances of injustice and cruelty, God can-'not be the cause of the universe.' 'To this,' continues S'ankara, we thus reply: 'Injustice and cruelty cannot be 'charged upon God. Why? Because he did not act in-'dependently. If God, alone, had, independently, created 'the world of inequalities, then these faults of injustice 'and cruelty might indeed be attributed to Him. But one, 'who is not independent, cannot be charged with the act 'of creation. God, being dependent, creates this world 'of inequalities. If you ask on what is He dependent? 'We reply, He is dependent on Merit and Demerit. That 'there should be an unequal creation, dependent on the 'Merit and Demerit of the souls created, is no fault of

'God. God is to be looked upon as the rain. As 'the rain is the common cause of the production of 'rice and wheat, but of their specific distinctions as 'rice and wheat, the causes are the varying powers of 'their respective seeds; so is God the common cause, in 'the creation of men, gods, and others, but of the distinc- 'tions between gods, men, and others, the causes are the 'varying works, inherent in their respective souls. Thus 'God, being dependent (on works), cannot be charged 'with injustice and cruelty[9].'

"Śankaráchárya then shows that the Vedas inculcate the same view, and proceeds to expound the next Sútra, in which is answered the objection, how could there be

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[9] नेश्वरो जगतः कारणमुपपद्यते कुतः वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गात् कांश्चिदत्यन्तसुखभाजः करोति देवादीन् कांश्चिदत्यन्तदुःखभाजः करोति पश्वादीन् कांश्चिन्मध्यमभाजो मनुष्यादीनित्येवं विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमाणस्येश्वरस्य पृथग् जनस्येव रागद्वेषोपपत्तेः श्रुतिस्मृत्यवधारितस्वच्छत्वादीश्वरस्वभाव विप्रलोपः प्रसज्येत तथा खलजनैरपि जुगुप्सितं निर्घृणत्वमतिक्रूरत्वं दुःखयोगविधानात् सर्व्वप्रजोपसंहरणाच्च प्रसज्येत तस्माद्वैषम्यनैर्घृण्य प्रसङ्गान्नेश्वरः कारणमित्येवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये नेश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते कस्मात् सापेक्षत्वात् यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीत स्यातामेतौ दोषौ वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यञ्च न तु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते किमपेक्षत इति चेत् धर्म्माधर्म्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः अतः सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्म्माधर्म्मापेक्षा विषमासृष्टिरिति नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः ईश्वरस्तुपर्ज्जन्यवद्द्रष्टव्यः यथा हि पर्ज्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणम्भवति व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्म्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति एवमीश्वरः सापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याभ्यां दुष्यति ॥

previous works at the original creation? The objection itself is thus represented: 'This, beloved, was one, without a second, at the beginning. Hence, as there could 'be no distinctions before the creation, there could be no 'works, in dependence on which inequalities might be 'created. *After the creation* there may be works dependent on corporeal distinctions, and corporeal distinctions 'dependent on works: this reciprocal inter-action may *then* 'be made out. God may be dependent on works *after* the 'distinctions are made. But before those distinctions 'are made, there could be no works caused by varying 'instruments, and therefore we ought to find a uniform 'creation.'

'If this objection be urged,' continues Śankara, 'it does 'not vitiate our doctrine, because THE WORLD IS WITHOUT 'BEGINNING. It would vitiate our theory, if the world 'had a beginning. But the world being without beginning, nothing can prevent works and unequal creations 'continuing in the states of cause and effect, like the seed 'and its plant[10].'

"Consider, friend Tarkakáma, the mischievous consequences that have resulted from the theory of the soul's pre-existence. Our philosophers resort to *adṛishṭa* in order to account for certain difficulties in the world, and

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10 सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयमिति प्राक् सृष्टेरविभागावधारणान्नास्ति कर्म यदपेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिः स्यात् सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं हि शरीरादिविभागापेक्षं कर्म कर्मापेक्षश्च शरीरादिविभाग इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वं प्रसज्येत अतो विभागादूर्ध्वं कर्मापेक्ष ईश्वरः प्रवर्त्ततां नाम प्राक् तु विभागाद्वैचित्र्यनिमित्तस्य कर्मणोऽभावात्तुल्यैवाद्या सृष्टिः प्राप्नोतीति चेन्नैष दोषः अनादित्वात् संसारस्य भवेदेष दोषो यद्यादिमानयं संसारः स्यात् अनादौ तु संसारे बीजाङ्कुरवद्धेतुहेतुमद्भावेन कर्मणः सर्गवैषम्यस्य च प्रवृत्तिर्न विरुध्यते ॥

adṛishṭa compels them to fly from stage to stage, until they are forced to declare, that the world was never created—that it is without beginning, that it is eternal. And that which is eternal, is, in their conception, again, not dependent on a cause[1]. How can our philosophers, consistently find fault with the Chárvacas who deny the necessity of an intelligent First Cause, when they themselves pronounce the world to be without beginning?"

While this conversation was going on between Satyakáma and Tarkakáma, A'gamika and myself behaved with exemplary patience. We did not once interrupt the disputants. But I was now irresistibly led to express my wonder how S'ankarácharya could hold such an opinion after ridiculing the idea of an eternal succession of works and creations, as a troop of blind leaders of blind.

"Both passages are before you," said Satyakáma, "you can judge for yourselves. If I were to hazard a conjecture, I should say that his object, in the passage I quoted first, was to uphold the material causality of God against a whole host of antagonistic philosophers, such as the Vais'eshikas, the Máhes'waras, the followers of the Sánkhya and the Yoga. He maintained against them all that it was necessary, no less from moral considerations than from regard to the authority of the Veda, to acknowledge God to be both the material, or substantial, and the efficient cause of the universe, and consequently to be identical with the world. Without that supposition, he thought the inequalities in the world could not be satisfactorily accounted for. Unless God and the world were identical, how could He escape a charge of injustice and

[1] सदकारणवन्नित्यं ॥ Kaṇáda.

cruelty, when manifestly there are so many inequalities in the creation? The idea of an eternal succession of works and worlds depending on each other, he ridiculed by comparing it with a troop of blind leaders of blind. But in the passage I have just read, he is facing the question of inequalities in opposition to the atheistic followers of Jaimini, who had on that ground argued for the non-existence of a Creator; and he takes refuge in the very supposition of an eternal succession of works and worlds, which he elsewhere ridicules."

"Very strange self-contradiction!" said I. "Is it not possible to reconcile the two passages?"

"That," replied Satyakáma, "must be left to the diplomatic abilities of friend Tarkakáma."

Tarkakáma said nothing. We waited a minute or two to hear how he would reconcile such a seeming contradiction. At length A'gamika asked, whether by arguing against the soul's pre-existence, his friend meant to deny its eternity *both ways*, and pronounce it to be perishable with the body. "Most certainly, *not*," replied Satyakáma. "The soul, though it had a beginning, as indeed all *creatures* must have, is imperishable. That whatever had a beginning must have an end, may be a favourite theory with some philosophers; but they can never prove it. The soul may be immortal without being eternal. The Greek philosopher who argued for its pre-existence, in order to prove its immortality, had given reasons for the latter which did not depend on the former, and which human nature cannot gainsay. 'Good hope have I,' said he, 'that something is in reserve for the dead, and that (as I said long ago) the good shall fare far better than the bad.'"

"This," continued Satyakáma, "together with the soul's essential independence of the body, which he also asserts

afterwards, ought to convince the incredulous that there is another and a better world reserved for us, where our souls' aspirations will find their corresponding objects, and where that which we now but partially understand will be clearly apprehended. Do not think, A'gamika, that I deny the future glories of the soul. I have reasons for believing in them, still higher than the teaching of mere philosophy,—on which we may converse some other day. I believe that the righteous will meet with rewards in another state of which the present world can afford but faintest fore-shadowings. It is the supposition of a previous life, and the consequences deduced from it, that I protest against. Those consequences I have already mentioned in detail, and I may add that as a further corollary from the theory of the soul's pre-existence, our philosophers also held the doctrine of its successive transmigrations. The Nyáya, Sánkhya, and Vedánta equally teach that the souls of the deceased remove for a time to heaven or hell, to receive the due rewards of their actions. Those rewards do not however exhaust their merit or demerit, which still adheres to them, 'as greasy substances stick to the pot, even after it has been emptied'[2]. They accordingly return, and are again born with such bodies as are suitable to their previous lives. The new circumstances in which they appear, and the new works which are developed in them, influence their destinies in the next succeeding age. In this manner their souls transmigrate as gods, men, or animals, until the dissolution of the world, which again is followed by a second creation and by their re-appearance

[2] स्वर्गार्थस्य कर्मणो भुक्तफलस्यावशेषः कश्चिदनुशयोनाम भांडानुसारिस्नेहवत् यथा हि स्नेहभाण्डं रिच्यमानं न सर्वात्मना रिच्यते भांडानुसार्य्येव कश्चित् स्नेहशेषोवतिष्ठते तथानुशयोपीति। Vedánta Sútra, Com. III. i. 8.

agreeably to their previous works. This succession of creations and births, in which the events of each cycle are regulated by those of its predecessor, is considered by our philosophers an intolerable evil. They were thoroughly disgusted with this idea of a puppet life, in which rational beings were irrevocably committed to conditions and impulses, not according to their own will, but as they were, by the verdict of adṛishṭa, declared to have merited them, by reason of works of which they were not themselves conscious; and hence they looked upon existence as a burden, and enjoyment itself as a task. To a certain extent I cannot help sympathising with them. If indeed we were subject to the sort of transmigrations taught in the Brahminical philosophy: if our circumstances were so fixed by the events of a previous life, that we were mere toys for the sport of Fate; if a hard, unsympathising, impersonal, *adṛishṭa* must necessarily govern our deliberations, and, in a manner, supersede our judgments, then no man of any energy could submit to such an infliction. Bitter complaints would escape the lips of the most forbearing. All would naturally wish they had never been born. No wonder, then, that existence should be considered an evil, and that men should pant for *mukti*, or release from this servile bondage to *adṛishṭa*."

A'gamika,—"Well, Satyakáma, you have spoken out your mind. We are glad at least to have some insight into the mental process you have gone through. We can only promise to think on these points."

Tarkakáma.—"Yes, thinking is man's great prerogative. We must think on what our friend has said. But (turning to Satyakáma) you have overlooked one main point. In your essay you condemned the theories of all the schools about creation. Is it possible that the universe

could proceed *out of nothing*? Every effect must have a cause."

Satyakáma.—"I do not deny that every effect must have a cause. But we probably assent to the maxim in very different senses. Let us see how the theory of causation is treated in the schools. It is commonly understood that the Nyáya philosophy acknowledges three sorts of causes, substantial or inherent, non-substantial or exterior, and a third which might, perhaps, be conveniently styled the *operative* cause. The modern followers of the school do indeed entertain such a view, as is evident from the *Bháshá parichheda* in which we find a neat expression of that view[3]. The founder of the system, however, does not clearly inculcate that doctrine. In truth, the most prominent, if not the only, idea of causation which pervades his Sútras, is that of a material or substantial cause. This, possibly, was the reason of his abridging God's act in the work of creation. Kaṇáda indeed speaks of a multiplicity of causes, and may be considered as an authority to which the Naiyáyikas may appeal for their theory of a threefold causality. But while his ideas coincide with those of the moderns as to the first two, his view of the third cause does not quite correspond to that of an intelligent efficient agent, such as the potter is of the jar, a favourite example with the school in our days. His operative cause implies simply an action *tending* to a result, but not the

[3] अन्यथा सिद्धिशून्यस्य नियता पूर्व्ववर्त्तिता। कारणत्वं भवेत्तस्य त्रैविध्यं परिकीर्त्तितं॥ समवायिकारणत्वं ज्ञेयमथाप्यसमवायिहेतुत्वं। एवं न्यायनयज्ञैस्तृतीयमुक्तं निमित्तहेतुत्वम्॥ यत् समवेतं कार्य्यं भवति ज्ञेयन्तु समवायि जनकं तत्। तत्रासन्नं जनकं द्वितीयमाभ्यां परं तृतीयं स्यात्॥

action of an intelligent agent *aiming* at a certain end; and the examples given by his commentator are those of heat in the process of decoction or cremation, and of texts of the Vedas inducing the observance of sacrifices[4]. Neither of the great authorities of the Nyáya appears to have taught the idea of an intelligent *efficient* cause of any thing.

"The Sánkhya school, too, presents little or no trace of the idea of efficient causation. The material or substantial cause is what it mainly, if not exclusively, recognized. The 79th Sútra states plainly that a substance cannot be made of no substance[5]. (Ex nihilo nihil fit.) The author repeats in another Sútra that there must be a material for every thing[6]. But while so careful in his recognition of the material cause, he says scarcely any thing, even by implication, of an efficient cause. He adds in his definition of destruction that it is mere resolution into the cause[7], and maintains that production is nothing else than the manifestation of that which pre-exists in the cause[8]. The statue, already existent in its cause, the stone, is only *manifested* by sculpture. The oil,

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[4] संयुक्तसमवायादग्नेर्वैशेषिकम्। Sútra.

अग्नेर्वैशेषिकं विशेषगुणं औष्ण्यं संयुक्तसमवायात् पाकजेषु निमित्तकारणं। S'ankara Mis'ra.

[5] नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः। I. 79.

[6] उपादाननियमात्। I. 116.

[7] नाशः कारणलयः। I. 122.

[8] नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ। I. 121.

कार्य्योत्पत्तेर्व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ कार्य्याभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तकौ अभिव्यक्तित उत्पत्तिव्यवहारोऽभिव्यक्त्यभावाच्चोत्पत्तिव्यवहाराभावो नत्वसतः सत्त्वेत्यर्थः॥

already existent in its cause, the *sesamum*, is only *brought out to view* by pressing. The rice, already existent in its cause, the paddy, is only *educed* by beating[9]. Cause and effect stand to each other like the seed and its germ[10]. Hence arose the godless conclusion that since the created universe consists only of inanimate and irrational substances, (the rational principle, or soul, being uncreated and eternal)—it could have no other than an unintelligent cause such as nature; her products having as common characteristics, 'the three qualities, and want of thought and animation[1].'

"The Vedànta did certainly *not* ignore the theory of an intelligent efficient cause; but the idea of a material cause, which it received from the Upanishads and held in common with the other Schools, completely vitiated its philosophy, and, what is still more unfortunate, its theology.

"While reasoning against the Sánkhya, S'ankaráchárya does not fail to expatiate on the intelligence of the First Cause; and, without committing himself to a decided assertion of the necessity of an efficient agent, points out the impropriety of hunting for a material cause to the exclusion of an efficient agent. 'There is no necessity, says he, for seeking an original, such as earth or 'other material of the same substance (as the effect,) 'instead of an exterior cause such as the potter or 'other artificer different from it. The idea of cause and 'effect is founded on the skill with which beds, chairs, 'and other articles are manufactured. Nor is it possible

[9] यथा शिलामध्यस्थप्रतिमाया लैङ्गिकव्यापारेणाभिव्यक्तिमात्रं तिलस्थतैलस्य च निष्पीडनेन धान्यस्थतण्डुलस्य चावघातेनेति ॥

[10] पारम्पर्य्यतोऽन्वेषणाद्बीजाङ्कुरवत् ॥

[1] त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः । I. 127.

'to deduce from the idea of cause and effect a common 'irrational substratum of external and internal diversi- 'ties[2].' The prominence here given to intelligent agency stands in marked contrast to the examples elsewhere made use of to express God's causality of the universe. He is to the external world what the yarn is to the cloth, what milk is to curds, the earth to a jar, the gold to a bracelet, the iron to a nail-parer. The very passage of the Upanishad, (the basis of the 2nd Sútra,) which declares the universe to be the product of God, presents the cause *(Yatas)* in the ablative case; which, says Śankara, is alone sufficient to show that the creator is spoken of as the substantial cause *out of which*, not the efficient cause *by which*, the universe was formed[3]. This proves that the idea of material causation was uppermost in Śankara's mind."

Tarkakáma.—"But where is the error, and where the danger, in this idea of causation? Gotama, Kapila, and Śankara may not have thought it necessary to expatiate on the efficient cause. Will you not allow an author to choose his own subject? Can you show that they have not accurately represented what they *did* undertake to explain?"

Satyakáma.—"A fair issue. I say, they did not. It is not quite philosophical prominently to connect the idea

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[2] नच मृदाद्युपादानस्वरूपव्यपाश्रयेणैव धर्म्मेण मूलकारणमवधारणीयं न वाह्यकुम्भकारादिव्यपाश्रयेणेति किञ्चिन्नियामकमस्ति। कार्य्यकारणभावस्तु प्रेक्षापूर्व्वनिर्मितानां शयनासनादीनां दृष्टः। न कार्य्यकारणभावाद्वाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानामचेतनपूर्व्वकत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुं।

Com. Vedánt Sútra II. ii. 1.

[3] यत इतीयमपि पञ्चमी यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्त इत्यत्र जनिकर्त्तुः प्रकृतिरिति विशेषस्मरणात् प्रकृतिलक्षणएवोपादाने द्रष्टव्या।

Com. Vedánt Sútra I. iv. 23.

of causality with the *material of a thing*. That is the *substance* OF which, not the *cause* BY which, an article is made. It would sound rather strange to say that the rim of your spectacles has *gold* for its *cause*. The idea of substance is to my mind very different from that of causality. Would it not be a truism to connect cause and effect in this way? Kapila virtually confesses this when he says a product is identical with the cause[4]. And S'ankara, I have shown, admits that the radical idea of causation is that of intelligent agency."

Tarkakáma—"I suppose you mean to read a lecture to our philosophers on Grammar and Rhetoric:—they have not chosen the best term for the substance of a thing. If that be all, it is a small offence, hardly deserving of criticism, except from unrazored lips within the walls of a school, though even there, neither Pánini nor Vopadeva will assist you in deriving an intelligent efficient agent from the word *Cáraṇam* (cause). And a most celebrated philosopher of ancient Europe, I am told, held exactly the same view of causality as the Naiyáyikas."

Satyakáma.—"You mean Aristotle. He did not hold exactly the same view, but one very analogous to it. He inculcated a quadruple causality. The fourth or 'final' cause does not appear in the list of *cáraṇas* in the Brahminical philosophy. I would not object to the use of the term, *material* or substantial cause, in a secondary sense of the word cause, and in reference to works of human art; but when we come to the grand question about the universe I do object to its use. Human agents cannot work without materials. The carpenter wants his wood, the weaver his yarn, the jeweller his

[4] कारणभावाच्च। I. 119.

gold. But we have no reason for thinking that the great Artificer of the universe stood in similar need. It is by no means philosophical to attribute to One, whom we acknowledge to be Omnipotent, the imperfections and weaknesses of agents of limited capacities. S'ankará-chárya[5] himself acknowledges that the work of creation is not to be classed in the same category as human acts in the world. The prominence given to the material cause has a tendency to make men forget this distinction, and hence my jealousy of it.

"As for Aristotle, I would remark that he employed his fourfold division of cause chiefly as a guide to the inquiries of the *physical* philosopher; who was thus directed to inquire into (1) The internal physiological character of a thing: (2) Its form, or logical definition as a species: (3) Its history: (4) Its uses. He did not profess to rescue men from misery by discovering to them the cause of the Universe; he only proposed to investigate the nature of things, because man's nature urged him to pursue "THE TRUE;"—and since in the course of this investigation man's own nature came to be examined, and on examination turned out to be pre-eminently *moral*, he taught men to seek for happiness by the practice of virtue.

"With reference to the grammatical formation of the word *cáraṇam*, of course the affix *anat*, as Vopadeva calls it, does not indicate the agent. Neither does it signify the *substance* of which a thing is made. It properly means the instrument by which an action is done. But the custom of philosophers of making it the correlative of *cárya* (act) does certainly point to the agency of the efficient, as the most important of the

[5] न लोकवदिह भवितव्यं। Com. Vedánt Sútra I. 4. 27.

causes. Now tell me candidly, Tarkakáma, what did you admire most, when you saw a watch for the first time; the metal, the combinations, or the inventor's skill?"

Tarkakáma stared.—The question seemed to throw some new light on the theory of causation. The metal, the combinations, and the inventor's skill were of course the substantial, the non-substantial, and the operative causes of the watch in the vocabulary of the Nyáya.

Tarkakáma said, not without changing colour, "Of course I admired the inventor's skill the most."

"The idea foremost in your mind as to the causality of the watch was the inventor's skill, was it not?"

"I should think so."

"The metal was quite a secondary idea. Your admiration of its excellence as a *time-piece* would hardly lead you to ask what the particular metal was. You would think chiefly, if not solely, of the inventor's skill as regards its causality. Would you not?"

"Very probably I should."

"You would at once conclude that an intelligent architect must be the *cáraṇam* of such a *cárya*."

"I suppose I should."

"Well; you have passed sentence yourself on the theory of causation in the Brahminical philosophy. You would think first of a cause which Gotama and Kapila do not recognize at all, which Kaṇáda speaks of somewhat obscurely as the last in the series, and which the Vedánta strangely mixes up with the substance of the manufacture."

Tarkakáma.—"What do you mean by saying that Gotama and Kapila do not recognize the cause which, in the case of the watch, would be foremost in my mind?"

Satyakáma.—"An intelligent efficient cause is not found in Gotama's and Kapila's lists. The latter certainly

ignored the necessity, in the formation of the world, of such an Agent directing the operation of *prakriti*, or nature, *the rootless root of all things*, which acted independently, 'like milk turning into curds;' though the example was singularly inappropriate, since milk would never turn into curds without the action of the atmosphere. You would not say, would you, that gold or silver turned into a watch, like milk into curds."

Tarkakáma gave no answer, but put a question; "Admitting that the term material or substantial cause is an unfortunate expression, and that it ought not to have been put forth prominently in the theory of causation, what are those dangerous consequences of which the theory is productive? Why this appeal to our fears?"

Satyakáma.—"I have already answered this question. By calling the substance of a thing its *cause*, our philosophers introduced the most dangerous theological errors. Whatever has a direct tendency to obscure the majesty of God, and curtail our sense of His power, may well be denominated dangerous. The theory which makes the material the most important of the causes, led people to rest satisfied with speculating on the *material* cause of the Universe. That no man can work without materials is denied by none, simply because man is not omnipotent, and has not creative power. But when one looks at an exquisite production of art, he is so lost in admiration at the skill of the artist, that he almost forgets the minor question of the material. And yet so banefully has the theory of material causality worked among us that the mental energy of our philosophers has found most active exercise NOT *in the exclamation*, How wonderful is the arrangement of the universe! BUT *in the interrogation*, Of what pre-existing substance is all this made? Nay they have been so lost in that worse than

useless question, as to forget that a Creator of infinite power and perfection needs not, like weak and imperfect man, to stop for materials, but can make materials by the mere fiat of His will. If the natural instincts of the human soul lead us to believe in the existence of an All-powerful and Perfect Being, if the irresistible arguments of the Vedánta itself drive us to the conclusion that the Universe was created by a God, infinite in wisdom and contrivance; then there can be no possible necessity for speculating on the *material* of the world: then the most philosophical course is to consider the objects originally created by such a God as at once the *matter and form* of the world. To assume the eternity of some gross material, existing side by side with an intelligent and all-perfect God, is not only unnecessary, (and therefore unphilosophical,) in as much as it assumes two principles, where one is amply sufficient to account for all we see; but it is inconsistent with the idea of perfection which we must attribute to the Deity. If He had some material to work upon, previously existing independent of Him, then there was nothing peculiar in His agency; then it was of the same species as that of a human architect; then He was our creator in no higher sense than that in which a potter is the maker of a jar. The Vedántist, on the other hand, placed himself in a false position, by seeking in a spiritual essence, the substance of such a world consisting of pure and impure, intelligent and unintelligent, rational and irrational, animated and inanimate creatures.

"The fact is that if the Supreme Being could not really create this world without pre-existent materials, it would be no easy task to answer the arguments of the godless Sánkhya. Since then, this peculiar theory of causation has driven our philosophers to the sad strait of virtually abridging the power of God, and, in some cases, of even

ignoring His operation and denying His existence altogether, I suppose I am justified in stigmatizing it as a dangerous error.

"It was," continued Satyakáma, "these two cardinal errors, that of the soul's pre-existence and this of material causality, which betrayed the Brahminical intellect into gross mistakes in philosophy and theology. Few philosophers in any country were possessed of the acuteness, the patience, and the industry which distinguished our ancestors; but, under the baneful influence of those two errors, the excellent qualities of their minds produced much evil, and little good.

"You seem to contend, Tarkakáma, that the conclusions of our philosophers are based on the two theories we have been discussing[6]. *This fact I concede to you once for all.* Granted that many of their conclusions are deducible from those theories; what then? Are we tamely to submit to such startling conclusions because of those gratuitous assumptions? By no means. We are rather to be the more jealous of them because of their leading to those conclusions. Let us not resist our moral intuitions, nor, because of arbitrary hypotheses hastily adopted, run headlong into errors that would limit the range of Almighty power, and deprive the world of the only Being to whom the mind spontaneously betakes itself for help and refuge when appalled by danger and difficulty.

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[6] See page 88.

DIALOGUE IV.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

After long expectation I have at last received your letter of the 20th Chaitra, commenting on the conferences that are going on here. You say ‘it is a great pity that, life being short in the Kali Yuga, Brahmins can now-a-days scarcely read one-twentieth of what they ought to study, and that is the reason why so few are familiar with the texts and aphorisms on which our philosophy and theology are based. We begin our course of study early enough, and we certainly keep it up as long as we can, but it is a drop only from the inexhaustible ocean that we are able to sip. As soon as a boy attains the age of five, we *put the chalk* into his hand, and guide it to form letters. The smartest lad must be allowed two or three years for learning to read and write in the vernacular. When he is seven or eight, he commences his education in the Śástras. He takes a year or two to commit the Sútras, or rules, of Grammar to memory. Then the rules are explained to him. The study of the Grammar with the *Gaṇa,* or list of verbs, and the lexicon, or list of nouns, must occupy him, perhaps, till he is sixteen. He must then learn some of the poems in order to perfect his knowledge of the language. He can hardly be

'expected to take up theology or philosophy before he 'is eighteen or twenty. If he commences the Nyáya, he 'goes cursorily over a manual such as the *Bháshá parichh-'eda,* with or without its commentary the *Muktávali,* 'and then he takes up works treating on Anumána, or 'deduction. A careful study of these occupies him for 'many years, and then he can no longer continue in the 'state of a student. He has by that time perhaps become 'a father, and the duties of a house-holder, the second 'stage in his life, press upon him. He has studied the '*Anumána Khaṇḍa,* or the Chapter on deduction, and 'made himself familiar with the rules of syllogism, but he 'has learnt nothing else. *Pramáṇa,* or proof, is but one 'of Gotama's sixteen topics, and *Anumána,* or deduction, is 'but one of the four sub-divisions of proof. So that he 'has mastered but $\frac{1}{64}$ of Gotama's teaching when he quits 'College for the cares and anxieties of a house-holder. 'And as to the Sútras, or aphorisms, of either of our 'leading teachers, he has not in all likelihood even 'seen them. A controversy on the Sútras must therefore 'be something foreign to his habits and study. This 'appears to be the secret of your friend Satyakáma's 'success in some of his attacks against Tarkakáma.

'Satyakáma', you continue to remark, 'represents a 'new school of Brahmins altogether. These are raised in 'the Colleges established by the English—and their course 'of study is regulated by the maxim, *something of every 'thing,* without caring for *every thing of* anything. They 'learn the Sútras; they read foreign literature too; and 'they obtain in a short time a general survey of all the 'systems. They are up to all kinds of discussion, and it 'requires more than ordinary tact to deal with them.'

Your remarks, my learned friend! perfectly coincide with my experience. To what a low ebb is divine learning

now reduced! If Nárada had to confess he had no knowledge of the soul, notwithstanding his vast learning, how pitifully small must our knowledge be in these days!

With reference to your remarks on Kaṇáda's theory about creation, you will see what use I made of them when you hear of a conference which took place yesterday on the Nyáya.

It was the *Váruṇi* (a holy day) and the conjuncture for bathing early in the morning, so the bank of the river was more than usually crowded. Many had come from distant villages to obtain the merit of a bath in the Gangá on such a holy occasion. Tarkakáma met several of his learned friends, and related to them the discussions he had with Satyakáma. After our ablutions were over, we all came into Satyakáma's house. We formed a pretty large circle, all deeply interested in scholastic disputations. There were some versed more particularly in the Nyáya, and among them was one who had, by his extensive reading, earned the appellation of *Nyáya-ratna.* There were others, though but few in number, whose studies had been directed to the Sánkhya. They too had one, more eminent than the rest, who rejoiced in the surname of Kápila. Others again there were of various acquirements who held opinions more or less different from one another, but all entertained the highest reverence for the founders of the several schools. One of them, named Vaiyásika, knew the Vedánta Sútras and S'ankara's commentary almost word for word by heart.

The conversation at my suggestion turned on Kaṇáda's theory of the Creation to which reference was made in Satyakáma's discourse. I began with reading your remarks on that point. 'Satyakáma certainly read the 'Sútra right. Kaṇáda does attribute the primal action 'of Atoms to adṛishṭa, and the primal action certainly

'means the impulse by which the first combination took 'place, and that was of course the operative cause of the 'creation. The scholium of Śankara Miśra is to the same 'effect. 'The *primal* means *before the creation.* At that "time there could be no such thing as an impulse or a "stroke[1].' But the question is what is adṛishṭa? Literally, 'it means *unseen,* and is an adjective. Technically, in the 'usage of philosophers, it is a substantive, and means a 'power or influence inhering in things both animate and 'inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies an 'unseen power, both intellectual and active; as inherent in 'the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly 'the effect of previous combinations and motions. In 'souls embodied, it influences both thoughts and actions. 'Thus the poet Śriharsha[2] says a person often dreams by 'the power of *adṛishṭa* of things he had never seen in life. 'And Kalidasa[3] says that when Párvati commenced her 'studies, all her learning of a former life flocked into 'her mind, just as a swarm of cranes flocks into the 'Gangá in autumn, or the spontaneous brilliancy of cer-'tain drugs comes into them at night.

'And with reference to its impulses as an active power, 'the commentator on the Kusumánjali[4] says that in the 'performance of ceremonies on which the enjoyment of 'heaven depends, the body and the organs are moved by 'adṛishṭa. This unseen moving power in men is again the 'consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence

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[1] आद्यमिति सर्गाद्यकालीनमित्यर्थः ॥

[2] अदृष्टमप्यर्थमदृष्टवैभवात् करोति सुप्तिर्जनदर्शनातिथिं ।

Naishadha, I. 39.

[3] तां हंसमालाः शरदीव गङ्गां महौषधिं नक्तमिवात्मभासः । स्थिरोप-देशामुपदेशकाले प्रपेदिरे प्राक्तनजन्मविद्याः ॥ Kumára Sambhava.

[4] See page 93 Foot note.

'it stands sometimes for *Dharma* and *Adharma* (virtue 'and vice) and *Karma* (works). Thus the origin of the 'world is attributed by the scholiast on Kaṇáda's Sútras 'to *Dharma* and *Adharma*[5], after he had himself de-'clared adṛishṭa to be the cause of the Creation. And 'Kaṇáda attributes the soul's departure from one body 'and adoption of another, to the agency of *Adṛishṭa*[6], 'while Gotama ascribes it to *Karma*[7], both evidently 'meaning the same thing. In inanimate objects it simply 'signifies a material property or virtue, perhaps a sort 'of velocity or attraction—as in the (magnetic ?) motion 'of stones and needles which Kaṇáda expressly attributes 'to adṛishṭa[8].

'Now the point to be decided is whether Kaṇáda, who 'simply undertook to explain the phenomena of the world, 'as far as possible, by natural causes, that is to say, who 'would not unnecessarily obtrude a supernatural cause, 'excluded the divine operation, when he declared that the 'primal action of Atoms was owing to a power or virtue 'inhering in them. What can debar the supposition that 'he held the power itself to be a gift of God, who was con-'sequently the original operative cause of the Universe, the 'adṛishṭa itself being dependent on His Will ? Adṛishṭa 'was a mere *yantra* or instrument, while the Supreme 'Being was the *yantri*, or the user of the instrument.'

Tarkakáma.—"This is an excellent solution of the difficulty raised by Satyakáma, and I trust we shall

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[5] संसारमूलकारणयो र्धर्म्माधर्म्मयोः परीक्षा ॥

[6] अपसर्पणमुपसर्पणमशितपीतसंयोगाः कार्य्यान्तरसंयोगाश्चेत्यदृष्टकारितानि । V. ii.

[7] पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः । III. 132.

[8] मणिगमनं सूच्यभिसर्पणमित्यदृष्टकारणकं । V. i.

hear no more of great men's names being subjected to charges of atheism—for it is a sin to be even a hearer of such charges[9]."

Satyakáma.—"I wish I could report myself satisfied with this explanation, but it is not in my power to do so. We seem to be pretty well agreed as to *one* meaning of adṛishṭa. It is a power, influence, or habit based on the acts or relations of a previous existence. It is inherent in men, animals, and inorganic matter. But it has another meaning. It is not only an inherent power or habit. It is also a destiny that acts externally. The adṛishṭa, inherent in one man, will often influence others with a view to bring about consequences which that man's merit or demerit calls for. It is with reference to this sense of Adṛishṭa that men often excuse their neighbour's delinquencies, as well as their own, by attributing them to its influence[10].

"We have not discussed in which sense Kaṇáda used the word when he attributed the creation to adṛishṭa. Was it an inherent power in Atoms, or an external influence?"

Nyáyaratna.—"In whichever sense the word may have been used, I suppose you may admit the explanation suggested by our Benares friend in defence of Kaṇáda's theism."

Satyakáma.—"I do not see how the explanation *can* be applicable, if adṛishṭa be taken in the sense of destiny, or

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[9] न केवलं यो महतोपभाषते शृणोति तस्मादपि यः स पाकभाक् ।
Kumára Sambhava.

[10] एवं प्राप्ता स्म भगवन् पित्रा दैववशात् पुरा । Márcan. Pu.
सेयमुच्चतरता दुरितानामन्यजन्मनि मयैव कृतानां ।
युष्मदीयमपि या महिमानं जेतुमिच्छति कथापथपारं ॥ Naishadha.

a moving power, exterior to the Atoms. You must therefore make up your mind as to the meaning of the term in Kaṇáda's Sútra."

Tarkakáma.—"Well, suppose we take it in the sense of an inherent power in Atoms, with which they were endowed by the will of God."

Satyakáma.—"You wish me to try, by the process of exhaustion, if, on either supposition, I can bring myself to accept the explanation above referred to. I must frankly say, I am not satisfied on either view of the meaning of Adṛishṭa. Taking it in the sense of an inherent power, I am constrained to say, that the explanation not only fails at the very outset in its object of defending the theism of Kaṇáda's system; but is in itself vague and almost unintelligible. It fails as a defence of Kaṇáda, because Kaṇáda has never in any of his Sútras spoken of God as the ultimate cause of all things. In truth, the word God never occurs in his work. The only aphorisms in which he may be supposed to make a remote reference to Him are those (and they are only two) in which he asserts the authority of the Veda. But we know, as in the case of Kapila, that our philosophers had a way of their own of asserting the authority of the Śástra without acknowledging a Supreme Intelligence as the Creator of all things. To maintain that a writer, who has never spoken of God as the author of the universe, and was yet all the time accounting for the origin of that universe by a concourse of Atoms, caused by a certain power or virtue of their own, was all the time meaning that the power was communicated by God, and was therefore himself a theistic teacher, is, to say the least of it, mere *Sáhasa* (boldness)."

Nyáyaratna.—"Are you not aware that *Kaṇada's* system was only a supplement to Gotama's, and, therefore,

many things, expressly asserted by his predecessor, are *implied* in his aphorisms."

Tarkakáma.—"You yourself acknowledged, Satyakáma, in your essay, that the Vais'eshika was a branch of the Nyáya."

Satyakáma.—"I do so still. And I am quite ready to concede that whatever is expressly asserted in the Nyáya, belongs impliedly to the Vais'eshika as well. But where has Gotama said any thing expressly *for* God?"

Tarkakáma.—"What do you mean by laying the emphasis on *for*?"

Satyakáma.—"Simply this, that the word Is'wara, or God, is certainly found in Gotama, but it requires commentatorial ingenuity to make out that it is used in a *theistic* sense."

Tarkakáma.—"You are mystifying still."

Satyakáma.—"Pardon me, Tarkakáma. I said something to you the other day on the same subject, and so I thought a bare reference would be sufficient. Gotama does introduce the name of God, but only to maintain that he was not the cause of the universe—that works of a previous world, (or, in other words, Adṛishṭa) were the cause. The popular scholiast Vis'wanátha says that the aphorist simply meant that God was not the *sole* cause, and that the co-operation of adṛishṭa was necessary. Supposing we accept the commentary, we can only allow that the Nyáya *hinted at* a theistic doctrine, and that, still more obscurely, than at the atomic theory. If the Vais'eshika intended to confirm and develop that theistic doctrine, as it really did the atomic, it would only be natural to expect from it an explanation of the former, at least somewhat corresponding to its exposition of the latter. But far from expounding Gotama's implied idea

of God, as *an associate creator with* adrishṭa, Kaṇáda says nothing at all about an Intelligent Creator, and only re-iterates, what Gotama had himself expressly stated, the agency of adrishṭa in the creation. How then can we allow the Vais'eshika any credit for theism based on the Nyáya? The rules of fair criticism would rather lead us the other way, to make Kaṇáda responsible for not expatiating on that which his predecessor had so obscurely taught; if indeed we are to admit the popular commentary of the scholiast Vis'wanátha."

Tarkakáma.—"Your '*if indeed*' is a very discreet addition, Satyakáma; for the 'three aphorisms' are differently explained by other commentators, of whom you have thought proper to say nothing."

Satyakáma.—"If I have said nothing of them it was because we have all along been talking of Gotama's Sútras, as expounded by the *popular* scholiast Vis'wanátha. You refer now to such commentators as Udyotakara Mis'ra. I did not speak of this author simply because he is so little countenanced any where. I doubt whether there are four copies of his work in all Bengal, while Vis'wanátha's commentary is circulated every where in print and received by every student. Besides, we are discussing the *Sútras*, not their modern paraphrases and commentaries, which I have repeatedly admitted are theistic. We have been referring to Vis'wanátha for no other reason than because he is a scholiast rather than a commentator—and is generally intent more on the literal interpretation of the words in the Sútras than on any exposition of his own views. Udyotakara, on the contrary, gives you little help in construing the aphorisms, and writes his own discourse after citing a Sútra, only adding in conclusion, *such is its meaning.* But I have no objection to your calling him in as a witness—and I

grant to you (what I have all along been saying with reference to modern commentators) that he understands the 'three Sútras' in a theistic sense. But you must remember that if he is a more favourable witness for Gotama than Vis'wanátha, he is a dangerous one for Kaṇáda—because in writing against the theory of the fortuitous concourse of Atoms, he evidently levels his remarks against the very aphorism of Kaṇáda now under discussion. He will allow no such explanation as has been suggested by your Benares friend. 'As to those,' says he, 'who maintain that atoms are the cause of the 'universe, by virtue of the works of embodied souls, '(which is synonymous with Kaṇáda's adṛishṭa) we tell 'them in reply that, if atoms are moved in that way, 'they ought to move incessantly; but they move dependent on especial causes and occasions[1]'. 'If you rejoin,' he says again, 'that inanimate matter may move like 'milk; and that, just as for the nourishment of the 'infant, the mother's milk, though itself inanimate, comes 'up spontaneously, even so may atoms, though inanimate, move for the objects of animated creatures: 'such a rejoinder is illogical, for its involves a Sádhya-'sama (petitio principii). When you have to prove that 'atoms can move independently, you assign as a reason, 'that milk, though inanimate, moves independently! If

[1] ये परमाणुं पुरुषकर्म्माधिष्ठितत्वात् जगत्कारणत्वेन वर्णयन्ति तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते परमाणवः प्रवर्त्तन्त इति सततं प्रवृत्त्या भवितव्यं अथ विशेषापेक्षाः प्रवर्त्तन्ते। * * * क्षीरादिवदचेतनस्यापि प्रवृत्ति रिति चेत् यथापत्यभरणार्थं क्षीरादेरचेतनस्यापि प्रवृत्तिरेवं परमाणवोऽचेतनाः पुरुषार्थं प्रवर्त्तिष्यन्त इति तन्न युक्तं साध्यसमत्वात् यथैव परमाणवः स्वतन्त्राः प्रवर्त्तन्त इति साध्यं तथा क्षीराद्यचेतनं स्वतन्त्रं प्रवर्त्तत इति यदि स्वतन्त्रं क्षीरादि प्रवर्त्तेत स्तनेष्वपि प्रवर्त्तेत न तु प्रवर्त्तते। Gotama-bháshya.

'milk moved independently, then it would do so in 'carcasses too, but it does not.' If therefore you wish to save Gotama, you must sacrifice Kaṇáda by the verdict of this chosen champion of the Nyáya himself.

"And you must also consider that your new witness discards the agency of Adṛishṭa. He interprets Gotama's Sútra IV. 21 to mean that *because of God's causing it, works (i. e.,* Adṛishṭa) are no cause. Since Kaṇáda then brings in Adṛishṭa as the cause, without any mention of God, he is, according to the rendering of Udyotakara, *in conflict* with Gotama, and cannot receive any credit on the score of his opponent. The wordings of Gotama IV. 21 and Kaṇáda V. ii. 12 are singularly analogous. Both used *Kárita* for caused—Kaṇáda gave Adṛishṭa as the agent, Gotama *tat* or 'it.' If Udyotakara's comment is to be received, the *tat* of Gotama means God. If the *tat* be God, then *ahetu,* or *no cause* (next following), must refer to adṛishṭa—which is therefore discarded—and Kaṇáda, by re-asserting it, must be deliberately opposing the theistic theory."

Tarkakáma.—"You say Kaṇáda makes no mention of God. You forget what he says on the *naming* and *operation* of the five elements. He attributes them directly to God. He says that the air, invisible in itself, is a matter of revelation, and that its name and operation are owing to God's agency."

Satyakáma.—"Is that not an over-statement of the fact? Kaṇáda himself attributes them, neither directly nor indirectly, to God. All he says is that naming and action are signs of *our betters*[2]. Commentatorial ingenuity discovers in these last words the occult meaning

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[2] वायुसन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावात् दृष्टंलिङ्गं न विद्यते। तस्मादागमिकं। संज्ञाकर्म्म त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गं॥

of *God and the great Ṛishis*[3]. You must excuse my obtuseness if I fail to find any thing decidedly theistic in the phrase *our betters*. Even atheism may admit that there are higher orders of beings in the world than man, and use those words without self-inconsistency. Kaṇáda says that names must have been given to things by certain intelligent beings, more eminent than the class to which he himself belonged; but there is nothing in this assertion to warrant the conclusion that 'the giver of names and the Author of the universe are identical'[4] in his estimation, or that by referring to the one, he necessarily admitted the other. But the most singular point is that Kaṇáda speaks, not of One being, superior to himself, as THE originator of names, but of givers of names in the plural, *i. e.*, his betters. And the commentator is obliged to confess that he speaks of 'God AND the great Ṛishis.' He does indeed speak of certain persons who gave names to certain things, and perhaps invented human language, but he makes mention neither of *God*, nor of *great Ṛishis* either. And if he had heard of foreign, or as you would say, *barbarian* languages, it may well be doubted whether he would include the authors of *those* languages among 'God and the great Ṛishis.'"

Tarkakáma.—"Will you not allow that language is of divine origin, and that Kaṇáda, when he was speaking on the subject, would not exclude the divine agency in the matter? To the great Ṛishis he attributed the giving of such names as they were competent to give, and to God, those that none but He was competent to invent. Even the names which were of human creation

3 अस्मद्विशिष्टानां ईश्वरमहर्षीणां सत्वे लिङ्गं ॥ S'ankar Mis'ra.

4 संज्ञाकर्तुर्जगत्कर्तुश्चाभेदसूचनार्थं ।
यः शब्दो यत्रेश्वरेण सङ्केतितः स तत्र साधुः ॥ Ibid.

were owing to God's act, for He laid down the law that the *father should give a name* to his son *on the twelfth day*[5]."

Satyakáma.—"As we are now conferring on Kaṇáda's theory about creation, we need not enter into the wide question of the origin of languages. The origin of language cannot supply a stronger argument for the existence of God, than is presented by the origin of the universe itself; unless indeed you accept the Buddhist dogma that the letters of the alphabet *are seeds of the universe*[6]. While we are discussing Kaṇáda's teaching on the greater question of the creation, we cannot be fairly called upon to admit his theism on the lesser point without decided evidence. His use of the phrase *our betters* cannot be a decided proof of theism, even if the commentator's scholium *God and the great Ṛishis* were found in the text itself; for Kapila also admitted an inferior god although he denied his creative power[7].

"But we are flying off from our point,—which is your Benares friend's comment on the sútra of Kaṇáda under discussion. What does he mean by suggesting, that adṛishṭa was a power inherent in atoms *as a gift from God.* When was it given? I suppose he would not say it was *originally* given by God, for atoms are, in Kaṇáda's system, eternal and uncreated, and therefore they *could* have no origin. The inherent power then must have been imparted to them at some definite period, when they commenced action. If so, then the communication of that power was itself a stroke or impulse. If that was Kaṇáda's meaning, it is impossible to conceive

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[5] यापि * * सापि द्वादशेऽहनि पिता नाम कुर्य्यादित्यादि विधिनानूनमीश्वरप्रयुक्तेव ॥

[6] See Hodgson's Illustrations, p. 60.

[7] ईश्वरासिद्धेः सिद्धा । III. 57.

why he should attribute the primal act to adṛishṭa, and not to the divinely imparted impulse itself.

"The explanation under review, again, is opposed to the interpretation, which the scholiast of Kaṇáda put on his theory, notwithstanding his discovery of God in the phrase *our betters*. In the passage already cited, Śankara Miśra says, that Merit and Demerit, or in other words, adṛishṭa, were the *original cause* of the world[8], thereby excluding a remoter cause.

"But what appears to me conclusive against the explanation suggested by your learned friend, is, that it is directly opposed to Śankaráchárya's view of the Sútra. That eminent scholar understood the aphorism of Kaṇáda in a very different sense. Here are his words[9]:

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[8] See page 141, Note 5.

[9] विभागावस्थानां तावदणूनां संयोगः कर्म्मापेक्षोभ्युपगन्तव्यः कर्म्मवतां तन्त्वादीनां संयोगदर्शनात् कर्म्मणश्च कार्य्यत्वान्निमित्तं किमप्यभ्युपगन्तव्यं अनभ्युपगमे निमित्ताभावान्नाणुष्वाद्यङ्कर्म्म स्यात् अभ्युपगमेपि यदि प्रयत्नोभिघातादिर्वा यथा दृष्टं किमपि कर्म्मणो निमित्तमभ्युपगम्येत तस्यासंभवान्नैवाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म्म स्यात् न हि तस्यामवस्थायामात्मगुणः प्रयत्नः संभवति शरीराभावात् शरीरप्रतिष्ठे हि मनस्यात्ममनःसंयोगे सत्यात्मगुणः प्रयत्नो जायते एतेनाभिघाताद्यपि दृष्टं निमित्तं प्रत्याख्यातव्यं सर्गोत्तरकालं हि तत् सर्व्वं नाद्यस्य कर्म्मणो निमित्तं संवभति अथादृष्टमाद्यस्य कर्म्मणो निमित्तमित्युच्येत तत्पुनरात्मसमावायि वा स्यादणुसमवायि वा उभयथापि नादृष्टं निमित्तमणुषु कर्म्मावकल्पेत अदृष्टस्याचेतनत्वात् न ह्यचेतनं चेतनेनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं प्रवर्त्तते प्रवर्त्तयति वेति साङ्ख्यपरीक्षायामभिहितं आत्मनश्चानुत्पन्नचैतन्यस्य तस्यामवस्थायामचेतनत्वात् आत्मसमवायित्वाभ्युपगमाच्च नादृष्टमणुषु कर्म्मणो निमित्तं स्यात् असंबन्धात् अदृष्टवता पुरुषेणास्त्यणूनां सबन्ध इतिचेत् संबन्धसातत्यात् प्रवृत्तिसातत्यप्रसङ्गः नियामकान्तराभावात् तदेवं नियतस्य कस्यचित्कर्म्मनिमित्त-

'The combining of atoms, while they are in a state 'of separation, must be allowed to require an action; 'for we see that the conjunction of yarn requires action '(in the manufacture of clothes). But since an action 'involves an effect, an efficient cause must be acknow- 'ledged. If an efficient cause be not acknowledged, then 'there cannot be the primal action of atoms for want of 'an agent. And even if, being acknowledged, it implies 'an effort or a visible cause, such as a stroke, the primal 'action of atoms would still be impracticable, because 'of the impossibility of such effort or stroke. In that 'state (*i. e.*, before the creation) there could not be an effort 'which is a quality of the soul, because of the absence 'of a body. When there is a mind residing in a body, 'the connection of the soul with the mind may bring 'about an effort which is a quality of the former. The 'same may be said of a stroke, or other visible cause. 'All these come in after the creation; they cannot be 'the cause of the primal act. If it be said, let adṛishṭa 'or destiny be the cause of the primal act; that must 'be inherent either in the soul or in atoms. But on 'neither supposition can the action of atoms be attri- 'buted to destiny, for destiny is inanimate. We have 'already said, while examining the opinions of the 'Sánkhya, that an inanimate thing, unconnected with an 'animated one, can neither be self-moved nor move 'another.

'The soul too, continues S'ankara, is at that time it- 'self *inanimate*, for its animation is not then yet pro- 'duced. Nor can the supposition of a destiny, inhering

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स्याभावान्नाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म्म स्यात् कर्म्माभावात् तन्निबन्धनः संयोगो न स्यात् संयोगाभावाच्च तन्निबन्धनं द्व्यणुकादिकार्य्यजातं न स्यात्।

Com. Vedánta Sútra, II. ii. 12.

'in the soul, turn it into a cause of atomic action, for 'there is no relation (between the two). If you say, 'there is a relation between the soul endowed with 'destiny, and atoms, that relation being permanent, there 'would be permanent motion too, because of the want of 'a separate governor. Therefore from the want of a 'directing efficient cause, there could be no primal 'action in atoms, and without such action there could be 'no combination; nor without combination, the produc- 'tion of binaries &c.'

"You see here S'ankaráchárya fails to discover in Kaṇáda's system any being of supreme and absolute intelligence to whose operation, in the absence of any other soul, endowed with body and mind, the primal action of atoms might be attributed. Kaṇáda left no room for such a God. S'ankara at least saw none."

Nyáyaratna.—"The argument appears to me to be quite irrelevant, Satyakáma. Whatever Udyotakara's ideas of the Vais'eshika theory may be, and in whatever sense S'ankaráchárya may have received the words of Kaṇáda, certain it is that we, Naiyáyikas, do *not* hold that the universe was constructed by the mere action of Atoms impelled by a blind necessity. Nor can I allow, notwithstanding the evidence you have adduced to the contrary, that Kaṇáda really taught such a theory. I do not wish now to discuss the meaning of his Sútras, but our immemorial tradition ought to determine the question. It is a fact that we do not teach any atheistic doctrine, and we have always been followers of Gotama and Kaṇáda. You say we have modified and improved on their doctrines. How could we dare do so? Can you point to any especial act of ours by which we could have introduced the theistic element into our system, if we did not receive it from our primitive Ṛishis?"

Satyakáma.—"I think I can. Gotama and Kaṇáda, when they introduced *atmá*, or spirit, into their list of substances, did not discriminate between any two *orders* of *atmá*. Later writers of your School, finding that the original teachers said nothing of a Deity or His attributes, made room for Is'wara, or God, by classifying atmá as two-fold; *jivatmá*, or ordinary soul, and *paramatmá*, or Supreme spirit, that is God. This was a classification which your leading doctors never thought of, or we cannot conceive how they could have omitted it, when they were so particular in their divisions and classifications, elsewhere, even on common topics."

Nyáyaratna.—"I am sure you will not consider me too sensitive if I protest against this free use of the names of our holy Ṛishis."

Tarkakáma.—"You have yourself maintained in your essay that our original teachers spoke to initiated pupils only, and that Sútras without commentaries are sleaed books. Why then do you wish to break the *seal*? You must receive our commentary. We protest we do not receive Kaṇáda's teaching in a *niris'wara*, or godless, sense. You must not therefore think that Kaṇáda was as atheistic as Kapila."

Scarcely had Tarkakáma uttered these last words, when the Sánkhya s'ástri, who was listening to the conversation with deep interest, ejaculated, "Oh this Kali yuga!" Tarkakáma instantly felt as if he had given some real cause of offence, and immediately apologized for the use he had inadvertently made of Kapila's name. "No offence, Sir," answered Kápila. "Never mind it. Kapila has left behind him too venerated a name to be soiled by your handling. I know you did not intend any offence. I only wish you had employed a little of your generous ingenuity in favour of the Sánkhya.

You might then have easily made out that it is no more atheistic than the Nyáya."

"For what" continued the Sánkhya philosopher, "was Kapila's difficulty? Was it not simply this—that intelligent agency would be inconceivable without an effort, and an effort would imply a motive. The supposition of a motive in the case of a creator, would in other words be a supposition of incompetency. One could not have a motive without yielding to a desire. The same difficulty I see in the Nyáya. The founder of this system classifies *pravritti*, or effort, with *dukha*, or pain, *dosha*, or fault, and other hindrances to the soul's emancipation. And he expressly defines *fault* to be a cause or effect of *effort*. How *could* he then consistently inculcate the existence of an Intelligent Creator? The author of the Vedánta and S'ankaráchárya argue for their pantheism on this very ground. They say that if the world were not identical with God, and if He created it as a substance, separate from Himself, then, on the very principles of the Nyáya, He would be chargeable with the fault of making efforts under motives, and thus be proved to be *no God* at all[10]. The only difference between Kapila and your teachers consists in the one's frankly acknowledging his difficulty, and the other *covertly* teaching the same doctrine."

Nyáyaratna.—"As we are discussing certain points which Satyakáma had urged against the Nyáya, you will excuse us, learned Kápila, if we decline a controversy with you on the present occasion. You have allowed, and I am sure you have done so heartily, that

[10] अपिच प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा दोषा इति न्यायवित्समयः नहि कश्चिददोषप्रयुक्तः स्वार्थे परार्थे वा प्रवर्त्तमानो दृश्यते। * * स्वार्थवत्त्वादीश्वरस्यानीश्वरप्रसङ्गात्। S'ankara. Com. Ved. II. ii. 37.

Tarkakáma meant no disrespect to the venerable founder of your school, and my friend has also expressed regret for the lapse of his tongue.

"But now, Satyakáma, you must not go on with your own fancies about the teaching of great Ṛishis. You must allow us to interpret our own doctrine. We say that Atoms are the material, and God the efficient cause of the world. This doctrine I understand is much admired even in Europe. Philosophers have in all ages had recourse to it in order to account for the physical phenomena which the world presents. Even Sir Isaac Newton I am told was in this respect a follower of our Kaṇáda.

"Our doctrine, continued Nyáyaratna, is the same which Gotama held and Kaṇáda taught. We have no fancy of our own, no new theory. We keep to the old paths of our primitive Achâryas. The doctrine is simply this; that God constructed the world by combining an infinite number of hard, indivisible, eternal, and indestructible particles. The primary combination was of two atoms, which we call *dwyaṇuka*, or a binary. The combination however does not become, what geometers would call, a *magnitude*, before a *trasareṇu* (tertiary), or a compound of three *dwyaṇukas* is formed.

"It is necessary to believe that matter is not divisible beyond a certain point. The point where it is no further divisible we call an atom. If infinite divisibility were allowed, than might a mustard seed be pronounced to be equal to Mount Meru[1], for it is a simple mathematical truth that all things, which are divided by *infinite*, are equal. Now unless you are prepared to combat this great theory, thus explained, you must not assail the time-honoured system of the Nyáya.

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[1] सर्वेषामनवस्थितावयवत्वे मेरुसर्षपयोस्तुल्यपरिमाणत्वापत्तिः ॥

Satyakáma.—"I shall most willingly accept your own interpretation of your scholastic theory. I will give up further criticism on your original Sútras by simply remarking that the history of philosophy requires, that there should be a discrimination between your modern explanations and the opinions of the founders of your school. We are all bound to contribute our mite to the discovery of historic truth. But I admit that the Naiyáyika doctrine of our day does not ignore an intelligent Framer of the world. Still you hold that your Atoms are uncreated and eternal, do you not?"

"Of course," said the Naiyáyika, "that is the peculiar teaching of our School, and I may say I glory in following it."

"How came they into existence?"

"We say they are eternal. They never *began* to exist."

"You maintain," said Satyakáma, "that souls are eternal, and matter is eternal. Your School then teaches that God created nothing in reality. He merely combined the Atoms and constructed the universe."

"What more *could* he do? How could he *make* Atoms? Can the artificer make his bricks if he has no earth?"

"The artificer, said Satyakáma, is a frail mortal.—He is not omnipotent. But God is. You cannot account for the wonderful arrangement which the world exhibits without assuming the existence of an Independent and Eternal Being, all sufficient and all powerful, of infinite goodness and wisdom. The supposition of dead matter, co-eternal and independent, must militate against His perfection. 'If without something distinct wholly from 'Himself He cannot produce any thing, then must He 'want some thing external; and whosoever wanteth any 'thing is not all-sufficient[2].'

[2] Bp. Pearson.

"The theory of a co-eternal and independent material substance," continued Satyakáma, "is opposed both to our *moral convictions* and to the fundamental principles of sound philosophy. A rightly constituted mind attributes all perfection to the Deity. It is among our religious intuitions. Is it not, Nyáyaratna?"

"Of course it is."

"The mind you pronounce to be an organ of internal sensation. It must then have the same claim to our confidence as the external organs. In fact without the mind you could not have a complete perception of any object of even external sensation. In a matter of pure mental intuition, the testimony of the mind is quite as strong as the testimony of other senses in matters of external sensation. Now the mind intuitively bears testimony to a Supreme Intelligence of all perfection, the author of the universe. This testimony is as valid as the testimony of your other senses to the existence of the river Gangá, from the banks of which you have just returned after your morning ablution."

"I do not in the least doubt what you say."

"You cannot then without violence to the religious intuitions of your mind allow a rival material cause, existing beside God from eternity."

Naiyáyika.—"Would you say that the great Newton offered violence to our moral convictions and religious intuitions, by inculcating the Atomic theory?"

Satyakáma.—"Certainly, *not.* He did not hold the Atomic theory after your manner. He did not allow that any thing could be uncreated and eternal, but God. This one omnipotent and all-knowing Creator was sufficient in his estimation for making every thing that exists. Listen to his own words. At the close of his Opticks, he says; 'All these things being considered, it seems

'probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter 'in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, 'of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties 'and in such proportions to space, as most conduced to 'the end for which He formed them, and that these pri-'mitive particles, being solids, are incomparably harder 'than any porous bodies compounded of them, even so 'very hard as never to wear or break in pieces, no ordi-'nary power being able to divide what God had made 'one in the first creation. While the particles continue 'entire, they may compose bodies of one and the same 'nature and texture in all ages: but should they wear 'away or break in pieces, the nature of things depending 'on them would be changed. Water and Earth composed 'of old worn particles and fragments of particles would 'not be of the same nature and texture now with water 'and earth composed of entire particles in the beginning. 'And therefore that nature may be lasting, the changes 'of corporeal things are to be placed only in the various 'separations and new associations and motions of these per-'manent particles; compounded bodies being apt to break, 'not in the midst of solid particles, but where those parti-'cles are laid together, and only touch in a few points.[3]'"

Naiyáyika.—"How could a substance be made out of nothing?"

Satyakáma.—"What can be impossible for the omnipotent?"

"We never see any thing made out of nothing," rejoined Nyáyaratna.

"Neither do you see particles without magnitude, said Satyakáma, producing by combination substances possessed of magnitude. Your atoms have no length,

[3] Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.

breadth, or thickness, and yet you allow they produce all three by combination.

"See how S'ankara[4] criticises your theory—which indeed is as unphilosophical, as it is repugnant to religious intuition. You say that the universe was formed by the combination of eternal atoms which are endowed with colour, but are, like mathematical points, without dimension. The measure of an atom you express by a word, which, again, you cannot explain but by the word *atomic!*[5] When two atoms combine and form a binary, you attribute to the compound a measure which you call *hraswa*, or short. You do not call it *dirgha*, or long. And it is not until the compound you call *mahat* (great), or a magnitude, is formed, that you attribute to it the property of sensible matter. Without pronouncing any opinion on S'ankara's criticism, may I simply ask you, whether it can be more difficult to conceive that the universe was created, both in matter and form, by a Supreme and all-sufficient Intelligence, than that material length, breadth, and thickness arose

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[4] परमाणवः किल कञ्चित् कालमनारब्धकार्य्या यथायोगं रूपादिमन्तः पारिमाण्डल्यपरिमाणास्तिष्ठन्ति। ते च पश्चाददृष्टादिपुरःसराः संयोगसचिवाश्च सन्तो द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण कृत्स्नं कार्य्यजातमारभन्ते कारणगुणाश्च कार्य्ये गुणान्तरं। यदा द्वौ परमाणू द्व्यणुकमारभेते तदा परमाणुगता रूपादिगुणविशेषाः शुक्लादयो द्व्यणुके शुक्लादीनपरानारभन्ते। परमाणुगुणविशेषस्तु पारिमाण्डल्यं न द्व्यणुके पारिमाण्डल्यमपरमारभते द्व्यणुकस्य परिमाणान्तरयोगाभ्युपगमात्। अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे हि द्व्यणुकवर्त्तिनी परिमाणे वर्णयन्ति। यदापि द्वे द्व्यणुके चतुरणुकमारभेते तदापि समानं द्व्यणुकसमवायिनां शुक्लादीनामारम्भकत्वं। अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे तु द्व्यणुकसमवायिनी अपि नैवारभेते चतुरणुकस्य महत्त्वदीर्घत्वपरिमाणयोगाभ्युपगमात्॥

[5] पारिमाण्डल्यं अणुपरिमाणं॥

naturally from invisible particles devoid of those properties? And whether it is not far more philosophical to recognize One Supreme Being alone as existing, independently, by and of himself, and to attribute to HIS creative power the existence of whatever else has any sort of being, than to maintain a theory of innumerable eternal entities, of which you can form no conception but by detaching from them your conception of all things that you know, or have any idea of? If God could produce magnitudes out of *no magnitude*, why could he not also call into existence that hypothetical entity of *no magnitude* out of a state of absolute non entity?

"The original creation, Sir, under the agency of an omnipotent Supreme cause, is not to be compared with mere human manufacture. I must again refer to S'ankaráchárya's excellent remark[6]. You must not expect divine perfection in human weakness, nor ought you to attribute human deficiency to the divine sufficiency.

"To prevent mistakes, however, let me say that I have no wish to censure Kaṇáda's doctrine of *atoms*, as such. It is simply with his doctrine of *eternal* atoms that I quarrel. European science is obliged to own that we cannot speak otherwise than conjecturally about the ultimate constitution of matter.

"That the Vais'eshika view, however, has its difficulties, is evident from the notion of *Panchikaraṇa* broached by some of our philosophers, and from certain other strictures of S'ankaráchárya on your doctrine.

"The proces of *Panchicaraṇa* is the formation of a specific Atom of one element by the combination of parts of those of others. A specific earthy Atom, for instance, is made up of $\frac{1}{2}$ of a general earthy Atom,

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[6] See foot note page 132.

and $\frac{1}{8}$ of each of the other elementary atoms[7]. This process pre-supposes the *divisibility* of what you have assumed as indivisible.

"The Atomic theory involves another difficulty which is thus represented by our ingenious S'ankarácharya: 'The combination of one Atom with another must either 'be by entire amalgamation or by partial contact. If it 'be an entire amalgamation, then because of the impossi-'bility of collective increase[8], the compound will still 'be an *Atom*, and an invisible substance; for it is the 'combination of one spacious substance with another that 'is visible. If on the other hand the combination be a 'partial contact, then the question is (virtually conceded 'to be) one of aggregates, (*i. e.* it is no longer a combination of *indivisible* Atoms)[9].'

I do not however mean to say that I agree with S'ankarácharya in his objection. I think the whole matter is one that science cannot properly deal with. You may

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[7] द्विधाविधाय चैकैकं चतुर्द्धा प्रथमं पुनः स्वस्वेतरद्वितीयांशैर्योजनात् पञ्च पञ्च ते। Panchadas'i.

[8] S'ankara alludes to the dogma of the Naiyáyikas themselves that the measures of Atoms, each being infinitely small, cannot increase by addition. If the dimension of a binary Atom were supposed to be the aggregate measure of the parts, it would, on their theory, be *still more infinitely small* as a compound: thus,

पारिमाण्डल्यभिन्नानां कारणत्वमुदाहृतं। Bháshápárichchheda.

पारिमाण्डल्यं अणुपरिमाणं कारणत्वं तद्भिन्नानामित्यर्थः अणुपरिमाणं न तु कस्यापि कारणं परिमाणस्य स्वसमानजातीयोत्कृष्टपरिमाणजनकत्वात् महत्त्वारब्धस्य महत्तरत्ववत् अणुजन्यस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च।

Siddhánta muktávali.

[9] संयोगस्याणोरण्वन्तरेण सर्व्वात्मना वा स्यादेकदेशेन वा सर्व्वात्मना चेदुपचयानुपपत्तेरणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गोदृष्टविपर्य्ययप्रसङ्गश्च प्रदेशवतोद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशवता द्रव्यान्तरेण संयोगस्य दृष्टत्वात् एकदेशेनचेत् सावयवत्वप्रसङ्गः॥

Com. II. ii. 12.

form *convenient hypotheses* about it, but nothing more. The Brahminical philosopher has the same liberty to try to account for facts by hypotheses as any other. But our question is an entirely different one, with which experimental science has nothing whatever to do. Granted the *existence* of Atoms; *how* came they into existence?

"I must hope that as you have apparently modified your theory, so far as to introduce the idea of a supreme Intelligence as the efficient cause of the Universe, by subdividing the *atmá,* or spirit, of your original teachers into the *jivatmá,* or ordinary soul, and *paramatmá,* or supreme Spirit,—you will continue to improve that idea until you arrive at the conclusion, which alone is consistent with sound philosophy, that having deduced the existence of an Omnipotent and absolutely independent eternal Intelligence, as the author of all things, you have no room left for the conception of any other eternal and independent principle."

Nyáyaratna.—"Your argument, Satyakáma, has, I cannot deny, some force in it, but it appears to me to prove too much. If you will not allow more than one eternal principle, how will you dispose of the human soul? Will you throw yourself into the arms of Vedántism, and pronounce human souls to be identical with the Divine Spirit? If you do not, I cannot see how you can deny a separate eternal existence to the human soul. You cannot therefore persist in your doctrine of one eternal essence. You must acknowledge at least a second, even the human soul. Your theory will otherwise be confounded with the teaching of such Vedántic texts (I mean as they are interpreted by Vedántists) as the following; 'This was in 'the beginning a spirit like a male. He looked but found 'nothing else beside himself. This was in the beginning

'a spirit even one. All these become one here. This 'was in the beginning one without a second[10].'"

Satyakáma.—"There is no fear of my falling back on Vedántism; but I do maintain,—NOT that this Universe was a *spirit* in the beginning, or that human souls were identical with the Supreme Being, BUT—that there was only ONE spirit (including, doubtless, in His own infinite nature, mysterious depths that we can never fathom, but still *one),* and *nothing else* before the origin of things. As I have already said, I allow one eternal principle alone, and that is, the Supreme Author of all things. As to human souls I cannot admit their eternity. It is easy to say the soul is eternal, but it is not so easy to define what you mean by that saying. I am afraid you are somewhat affected by Vedantism yourself when you speak in that way. What can you mean by the soul collectively? The soul has no collective existence, no *Samashṭi*, except in Vedántic vocabulary. Human souls have each an individual existence. How many souls do you call eternal. Every human soul?"

Tarkakáma.—"And what if we did say so?"

Satyakáma.—"How many souls then do you reckon to be eternal?"

Tarkakáma.—"As many as there are human beings."

Satyakáma.—"Whether in human form or not? For your mythology speaks of souls passing through the bodies of beasts."

Tarkakáma.—"All souls, those in brute forms included."

"And in the forms of gods?"

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10 आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीत् पुरुषविधः सोऽनुवीक्ष्य नान्यदात्मनोऽपश्यत् अत्र हि एते सर्व्वे एकं भवन्ति।

Brihadáraṇyaka. The other passages will be found elsewhere.

"Yes, all spiritual essences, men, beasts, gods."

"Anddemons?"

"Yes, demons."

"But souls pass through vegetable forms too," said Satykáma. "For, says the Veda, 'some souls enter the 'womb for embodiment; some into immoveable bodies, '(or trees)[1].' Witness the case of the two trees plucked up from their roots by the infant Kṛishṇa. Are the souls of trees too eternal?"

"Well, suppose I say, trees too."

"So then, said Satyakáma, men, brutes, gods, demons, trees are all eternal. Can you give an estimate of the number of your eternal essences?"

"I have no doubt our Ṛishis could have given it."

"But to cut short such a *s'ushka tarka* (dry and unprofitable debate), I appeal to you Nyáyaratna, said Satyakáma, if it be not perfectly unphilosophical, because absolutely unnecessary, and egregiously extravagant, to assume such an indefinite number of eternal essences, when one supreme essence is sufficient to account for all things, visible or invisible, material or spiritual.

"Consider again the bad morals and the bad theology which such a theory is calculated to teach. What would you say, learned Nyáyaratna, to a man who denied that God was his Maker and heavenly Father?"

Nyáyaratna.—"I should say he was exceedingly impious."

"Much more so, than if he denied his earthly parents, though that is sufficiently heinous."

"Certainly."

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[1] योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः स्थाणुमन्येऽनुसंयन्ति यथा कर्म्म यथा श्रुतं ॥

"Well," said Satyakáma, "I am sure you will appreciate the argument with which I mean to support my assertion that your theory of the eternity of souls teaches bad morals and bad theology. If all souls are eternal, they must be uncreated too, for, says Kaṇáda, that which is eternal is not dependent on a cause; and if uncreated, and, yet in existence, they must be self-existent. To say they are self-existent is to say they have independent existence. They need not then acknowledge God as their Maker or heavenly Father. If they are independent essences, possessed of absolute existence, they cannot be rightfully called upon to acknowledge a Supreme Being as the Moral Governor of the universe. They are themselves a sort of miniature gods. Nor can any Supreme Being be especially entitled to the epithet of *Swayambhu*, or self-existent. You see the impiety to which the doctrine leads?"

Nyáyaratna.—"To confess the truth, Satyakáma, when we received our scholastic doctrine of the eternity of the soul, we never stopped to calculate its consequences. We received it as a deduction from our received tenets. But I now see that it involves, in its turn, another deduction, which is certainly absurd and impious, that every creature must have independent existence. Without countenancing Vedántism, we cannot speak abstractedly of the soul's existence. The soul, you have truly remarked, can have no *samashṭi*, or collective reality. We may indeed speak collectively of the soul's characteristics, but that will imply that the characteristics are distributive, that is to say, applicable to all individual souls. I must thank you for suggesting a consideration which imparts a new aspect to our theory. If my venerable preceptor were now living I would submit my doubts, and ask him, how the soul could be eternal without being also self-existent and absolutely independent."

Satyakáma.—"I commend your candour, Nyáyaratna. But since your preceptor is no more, is it not your duty to consider and determine the question yourself? To the world you are his representative, and to God you are responsible for what you teach. You may yet save your school from the odium of inculcating a doctrine, which as you justly say, borders on impiety, and saps the foundation both of philosophy and theology. The object of philosophy is to narrow as much as possible the range of first principles and first causes. To acknowledge countless millions of eternal principles, when one supreme Author can account for them all, is a *gaurava*, a needless multiplication of causes, which is as unphilosophical as it is irreligious. It is a violence to our moral convictions and religious intuitions. The glory and perfections of God can leave no room for a second eternal and independent principle. What must be thought then of your countless millions of eternal beings, material and spiritual, standing, as it were, in rivalry with God?"

The apparent surrender on the part of Nyáyaratna of a peculiar tenet of the Brahminical philosophy struck us all with a painful sentiment. A'gamika seemed absorbed in melancholy thoughtfulness. Tarkakáma, too, already vexed with himself for having inadvertently given offence to Kápila, maintained a sullen silence. Not a voice was heard for some minutes. Then the meeting broke up, rather abruptly, by the company rising spontaneously, and separating with the customary civilities and salutations.

DIALOGUE V.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Our last conference had an abrupt termination. The regrets which Nyáyaratna expressed for having all this time been holding a doctrine from which it followed, as a legitimate inference, that every soul, and consequently every man, might claim the title of *Swayambhu,* or self-existent, produced a strong impression on us all. No one felt disposed to keep up the discussion at the time. Even Tarkakáma seemed for a moment to lose his presence of mind. So after some desultory conversation of a purely social nature, and the customary civilities, we returned each to his own home. The next morning the same party met again on the banks of the river; and when the prescribed ablutions were over, all went in a body to the scene of the conference. Nyáyaratna alone was not there. He had returned to his native village after the conference the same evening.

A'gamika began the conversation by avowing that he had been thinking all night on the consequences, which, according to Satyakáma's showing, might follow from the doctrine of the soul's eternity. "But," said he, turning to Satyakáma, "your ingenious remark against a doctrine in which all our schools are agreed admits of a conclusive

reply, though it did not occur to me at the time. We say the soul is uncreated and eternal, but we do not say it can perform any functions before it is joined with body and mind. That junction is properly speaking its *creation*, and the beginning of its existence. Its previous existence is more nominal than real, because it is not competent at that time for thought or action, not having as yet obtained a body and mind. It cannot therefore be properly called self-existent, for its *real existence* is derived from something *outside itself*."

Satyakáma.—"You say the soul's existence before it is endowed with body and mind is more nominal than real. That is not however the consentient opinion of your philosophers. The Bhagavat Gita expressly magnifies that existence, when it says that the soul is 'neither born at any time, nor does it ever die[1].' And is it not also that very existence, without body and mind, which your doctors consider the *summum bonum*, or chief good? Do they not say that the soul's connection with body and mind is its greatest misery? Do they not teach you that *nis'reyasa*, or your best interest, consists in emancipation from the bondage of births? Does not Gotama classify *birth* with *pain* and *fault* and the other hindrances to emancipation? Is it not separation from body and mind to which you are taught to look up as your supreme felicity? Is it not return to the original state of the soul that philosophers pronounce to be the end and object of their speculations? If God be your Creator, *only* because he caused the connection of the soul with body and mind,—the very connection which you condemn as an evil,—then He cannot have conferred any great

[1] न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचिन्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः। अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे।

benefit on you; nor do you show much piety when you look forward to the time when you may be able *to cast off* that benefit, and return to the state in which you were before the 'primal action of atoms and of mind.' I do not see, A'gamika, how the explanation suggested by you can exhibit the theology of the Nyáya in a more favourable light."

Tarkakáma.—"It appears to me, my dear friends, you are proceeding too fast in your discussions. Will you allow me to suggest a doubt, (I have a strong opinion myself on the point), whether you are not mistaking the province of the Nyáya? It does not profess to be a *theological* system."

A'gamika.—"I am very much of the same opinion with yourself; but the inquiries of philosophers bear *some* relation,—do they not, Tarkakáma? to the highest of all problems."

Satyakáma.—"It is only so far as the Dars'anas tend to impede the right view of divine truth, that we are concerned with them, at least for the present. However, as you, Tarkakáma, have a strong opinion, perhaps you will throw some light on the point."

Tarkakáma.—"Let us estimate every thing by the degree in which it attains its professed object."

Satyakáma.—"Certainly; its *professed* object."

Tarkakáma.—"And what is the manifest aim of the Nyáya, but to afford us an account of the methods of attaining knowledge? Its object was to teach the art of reasoning; and, as all reasoning depended on *proof,* Gotama very properly laid the greatest stress on *that,* and propounded rules which have gained the admiration even of Mletcha philosophers. He tells you that proof is four-fold—*Pratyaksha*, or Perception, *Anumána,* or Inference, *Upamána,* or Analogy, and *S'abda,* or Affirmation.

"Perception he defined to be the knowledge derived from the contact of the senses with their objects. It includes internal perception, or intuition, but excludes the errors that may be based on unsound sensation. Inference is grounded on perception[2], and is subdivided into three classes, *Purvavat*, on à priori, *S'eshavat*, or à Posteriori, and *sámányato dṛishtam*, or *mixed*. *Anumána* includes both induction and deduction. As this branch of evidence involves the art of reasoning, and the least flaw may induce serious errors, minute details are given of sound and unsound inferences, so that fallacies may be at once detected, and the truth recognized, even when mixed up with error. Analogy is defined to be that which helps you to arrive at the unknown by means of that which is known; and Affirmation is the teaching of unerring authority.

"With a view to promote the detection of error and the discovery of truth, the eminent founder of this great School enters into an explanation of the true nature of *doubt*, of *example*, of *demonstration*, of *argument*, direct and indirect, of *controversy*, of *objection*, of *fallacies*, of *reason*, of *confutation*—in fact of every thing which can claim a place in a system of logic.

"Men do not generally err much in their perception and sensation. It is seldom that we mistake land for water, or a house for a tank. Well has it been said in the Veda that *the eye is truth*, although *words and thoughts may be untrue*. Hence when a traveller relates a story and *affirms he has seen it*, we believe *it to be true*[3]. But

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[2] अथ तत्पूर्व्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्व्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टञ्च।

[3] अनृतं वै वाचा वदति। अनृतं मनसा ध्यायति। चक्षु वै सत्यं। अद्राक्षमित्याह। अदर्शमिति। तत्सत्यं। Taittiriya Bráhmaṇa.

we are always liable to make mistaken inferences and draw false conclusions. Gotama therefore considered the subject of *Inference* as the most important. He divided the process into five *avayava*, or members—1st. *Pratijná*, or the statement of the question, 2nd. *Hetu*, or reason, 3rd. *Udáharaṇa*, or example, 4th. *Upanaya*, or application, 5th. *Nigamana* or conclusion.

"*Anumána* is defined to be the instrument of *anumiti*, which means the knowledge derived from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property which is *pervaded*, or constantly attended, by another property. The knowledge, that such a mountain is fiery, is *anumiti;* the instrument, whereby that knowledge is produced, is the ascertainment of the fact, that the mountain has *smoke*, and that *smoke* is universally attended by *fire*. *Anumána* is therefore further explained as the contemplation of the sign by which the facts of the pervading and pervaded properties may be ascertained[4].

"I should be unwilling to repeat the well known illustration of the *five members* by the mountain and fire. But I have heard it objected against Gotama that his division of an argument is unnecessarily prolix, and that the Grecian syllogism is simpler. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that Gotama's anumána is not identically the same with the Aristotelian syllogism. *Anumána* is classed among *Pramáṇas*, or instruments of *pramá*, which signifies accurate knowledge, and accuracy consists in *attributing to a thing that which is in it*[5]. The object of anumána, therefore, is not merely to

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[4] तत्र व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिस्तत्करणमनुमानं तच्च लिङ्गपरामर्शः। Anumána Khaṇḍa of Tattwa Chintámaṇi.

[5] प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणं। प्रमा च यथार्थानुभवः। तद्वति तद-वगाहित्वं यथार्थं। Siddhánta Manjari.

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test the logical correctness of the conclusion, but to investigate the *major* and *minor* premises themselves. Nor must we forget that the author was writing at a time when the minds of men were still infected with the heresies that had threatened the stability of Brahminical institutions before his age. He was accordingly desirous of teaching the most efficacious way of dealing with error, without caring for what the ignorant might choose to condemn as *tautology.* He had shown in his defence of the Vedas[6] that the charge of tautology, preferred against them, was founded in popular error, that there was, in reality, no fault in the tautology of the sacred writings, and that what some people called tautology, was only a fuller explanation of truth in condescension to human weakness, and a more powerful enforcement of precepts in consideration of human callousness. And so he taught that anumána consisted of five members. The first two, or the statement and reason, form what the Yavanas called an *enthymeme. The mountain is fiery; because it has smoke.* It is a convenient and concise way of stating an argument, and is generally followed by controversial writers where there is no *living* disputation. No other form is made use of in Sutras and commentaries. But when you may have to convince an adversary before yourself, the three remaining members will be found practically useful. After you have given the statement and the reason, you may be called upon to *justify* your reason. So you have the third member, or *example* illustrating the minor premiss; thus, *whatsoever has smoke has fire, such as a culinary hearth.* The fourth member is the application of the rule to your subject; *now the mountain has the same:* the

[6] अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च। II. 60. न पौनरुक्त्यं निष्प्रयोजनत्वे हि पौनरुक्त्यं दोषः उक्तस्थले त्वनुवादस्य उपपत्तेः प्रयोजनस्य सम्भवात्। Viswanátha.

fifth is the inevitable conclusion, *therefore it is fiery*. The fourth and fifth are repetitions of the second and first, calculated to carry conviction into your adversary's mind, and preclude the possibility of doubt.

"It may be said that the first, or the Proposition, is itself no part of the argument[7], being, at the time of the statement, a mere assumption without proof; and that the second, or Reason, should have been placed as the first member. But the first is simply a statement of the question under discussion, and, prior to its enunciation, the appeal to Reason would be like the production of a witness before the plaint or plea is filed. In a disputation, too, you may properly anticipate your adversary's challenge to prove a certain point, as for instance (if you have a *Mimánsaka* before you), that sound is not eternal; and in such cases it is necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, that you begin with laying down the proposition which you intend to prove.

"It has been objected against the third member that a solitary example cannot lead to a universal rule. It is never pretended that the rule *relies* on the example. We say distinctly that no examples, how numerous soever they may be, no observations, how often soever they may be repeated, can *of themselves* establish a universal rule. A hundred observations may err, and therefore fail in this respect[8]. And if we ever speak of one example in point,

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[7] ननु प्रतिज्ञा न साधनाङ्गं विप्रतिपत्तेः पक्षपरिग्रहे तत्र प्रमाणाकाङ्क्षायां हेत्वभिधानस्य प्राथम्यादिति चेन्न विप्रतिपत्त्यग्रे समयबन्धानन्तरं शब्दानित्यत्वं साधयेति मध्यस्थस्य वादिनो वाकाङ्क्षायां शब्दानित्यत्वं साध्यं नच साध्यनिर्देशं विना हेतुवाक्यं निष्प्रतियोगिकमन्वयं बोधयितुमीष्टे।

Anumána Khaṇḍa.

[8] सेयं व्याप्तिर्न भूयोदर्शनगमा दर्शनानां प्रत्येकमहेतुत्वात् आशु विनाशिनां क्रमिकाणां मेलकाभावात्। * * शतशोदर्शनेपि व्याप्त्यग्रहात्।

where counter examples are not found, it is practically to illustrate, not logically to establish, the *vyápti*, or universality of the rule.

"The fourth and fifth members again have been objected to on the ground of their not being necessary. It is said that since the third gives the universal rule, and the second the particular fact, the question is *ipso facto* demonstrated. The second however only gives the reason (*smoke*) for the inference (of fire). It is not intended, like the fourth, solemnly to identify a particular mountain as containing smoke *de facto*[9]. And with reference to the fifth member you cannot say it is useless, or that the fact is already demonstrated and the argument completed in the first four[10]; for as you are talking of a particular mountain, the argument is not really complete before you have formally concluded, without the possibility of an opposite error, whether it be one of rule or fact, that it—even the mountain you are pointing to—is, and cannot but be, FIERY.

"This is but a meagre statement of Gotama's excellencies as a teacher of mankind, but it may serve as a specimen of what I conceive to be the true point of view from which his merits should be canvassed."

Satyakáma.—"I concur with you, Tarkakáma, in thinking that the logical principles laid down by Gotama and

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* * सहचारदर्शनव्यभिचारादर्शनसहकृतः स एव व्याप्तिग्राहकोऽस्तु आवश्यकत्वात् किं भूयोदर्शनेन नच तेन विना तर्क एव नावतरति प्रथमदर्शने व्युत्पन्नस्य तर्कसम्भवात्। Anumána Khanda

[9] नच हेतुवचनादेव तदवगमः तस्य को हेतुरित्याकाङ्क्षायां प्रवृत्तत्वेन हेतुस्वरूपोपस्थापकस्यातत्परत्वात्। Anumána Khanda.

[10] नच व्याप्तिपक्षधर्म्मतायाश्चतुर्भिरेवावयवैः प्रख्यापितैः किं तेनेति वाच्यं अबाधितासत्प्रतिपक्षत्वयोरलाभे चतुर्णामप्यपर्य्यवसानात्। Ibid.

Kaṇáda, the rules they have enunciated for the detection of error, the ideas they have broached on the origin of human knowledge (excepting, of course, their theory of the soul's pre-existence) are radically sound, and, in some points, unimproveably good. I will not undertake to decide that Gotama's four-fold classification of *pramánas*, as instruments of true knowledge, is not unnecessarily prolix, or that Kapila's and Kaṇada's abridgements are not improvements; nor can I confess that his five-membered syllogism, as expounded by eminent writers on the Nyáya, is *not at all* liable to the charge which has been preferred against it. I must, however, acknowledge that there is great force in the concise explanation, which the author of the Tarka-Sangraha, has given, of that form of syllogism, though I can find nothing in Gotama corresponding to the discrimination between *swártha* and *parártha*—for *oneself* and for *another*[1].

"I may add that Gotama has also done essential service to the cause of truth by exposing the quibbles of those who had denied the possibility of attaining any knowledge

[1] "An induction is of two kinds, [inasmuch as it may be employed] for oneself, and for another. That which is for oneself is the cause of a private conclusion [in one's own mind]. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having gathered the invariable attendedness [of smoke by fire], having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., 'where there is smoke there is fire.' Thereupon the knowledge arises that 'this mountain has smoke, which is constantly accompanied by fire.' This is called the 'pondering of a sign' *(linga-paramars'a)*. Thence results the knowledge that 'the mountain is fiery,' which is the conclusion *(anumiti)*. This is the process of inference for oneself.

"But, after having, for oneself, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition, with a view to the information of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example: (1) The mountain has fire in it; (2) because it has smoke; (3) whatever has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth; (4) and so this has; (5) therefore it is as aforesaid. By this [exposition], in consequence of the sign [or token] here rendered, the other also admits that there is fire." *Ballantyne's translation.*

by perception or inference[2]; who maintained that Perception could neither be supposed anterior nor posterior to its object, nor again simultaneous with it,—for, if anterior, it would involve the absurdity of proving an object before its existence, if posterior, it could not really be a proving of the object, and if simultaneous, there would be wanting the idea of succession between proof and its object;—who would, also, either give no room whatever for *doubt*, or open the door to universal scepticism[3]; who would further insist on having *an endless succession of proofs for the proofs themselves*, not allowing axioms or first principles[4]. Gotama correctly says that if there can be no knowledge, no truth, no perception, no proof, then the quibbler himself has no right to obtrude his own opinions, for *they* cannot be proved either. There must, again, be first principles, and first principles *are like the light of a lamp*[5]. It is a pity that the true nature of affirmation, or testimony, has not been more fully expounded by his commentators. Gotama defined Affirmation to be

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[2] प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः Sútra II. 8
पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षसिद्धिः २। ९ पश्चात् सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः २॥ १० युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धीनाम् २। ११ त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः २॥ १२ सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः २॥ १३ तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रतिषेधः २॥ १४ त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः २॥ १५ प्रमेयताच तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् २॥ १६

[3] यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशये नासंशयो नात्यन्तसंशयो वा॥ ६॥

[4] प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः २॥ १७ तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धिः॥ १८

[5] न प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः २॥ १९

teaching of unerring authority. '*A'pta,*' says Vátsáyana, 'is one, who, having had ocular proof of a certain matter, 'desires to communicate it to others, who thereby under-'stand it; and this is a common characteristic of Ṛishis, 'Aryas, and Mletchas. The practice of all parties is 'thereby regulated. Gods, men, and animals act on these 'proofs, and not on any other. Affirmation is of two 'kinds, according as the object is visible or invisible. That 'which is seen *here* is visible, that which appears in the '*other* world is invisible. And thus are the words of Ṛishis 'and ordinary men divided[6].' So far good. But we have nothing whereby to sift the testimony of 'Ṛishis, A'ryas, and Mletchas.' A great deal of unimportant discussion has been raised in the refutation of frivolous objections on the possibility of mistakes in the import of words. Language may of course be sometimes ambiguous, but it is nevertheless sufficiently explicit for all human purposes. Gotama says, accordingly, 'Reliance is placed on the 'contents of a statement on the strength of the affirma-'tion of a competent person.' 'By verbal evidence[7], *I believe* this,' says the scholiast.' We do not however find much discussion on the nature and characteristics of credible testimony; nor are we taught how to discriminate between that which may, and that which may not, properly challenge our *belief*.

[6] आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा साक्षात्करणमर्थस्याप्तिस्तया वर्तते इत्याप्तः ऋष्यार्य्यम्लेच्छानां समानं लक्षणं तथाच सर्वेषां व्यवहाराः प्रवर्तन्त इति एवमेभिः प्रमाणै र्देवमनुष्यतिरश्चां व्यवहाराः प्रकल्पन्ते नातोऽन्यथेति स द्विविधो दृष्टादृष्टार्थत्वात् यस्येह दृश्यतेऽर्थः स दृष्टार्थो यस्यामुत्र प्रतीयते सोऽदृष्टार्थ एवमृषिलौकिकवाक्यानां विभाग इति ।

[7] आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दार्थे सम्प्रत्ययः ॥ शब्दादमुमर्थं प्रत्येमि ॥

"I cannot follow Gotama in all he says about the composition of the body, and about the elements. You may have heard that a great many more elementary substances have been discovered than are found in his list. I do not know that the supposition of an *akás'a* (ether), pervading all space as a *substratum of Sound* is not somewhat gratuitous. But I have no hesitation, on the whole, in acknowledging, learned Tarkakáma, that the works of Gotama and Kaṇáda lay down excellent rules for the investigation of Truth. But here the vulgar proverb is verified: *The man who holds the torch does not see for himself.* Those who inculcated such correct modes of investigating truth failed to find her themselves on some points of great importance. In spite of their care in furnishing us with the methods and instruments of thought, they left us as far as ever from a satisfactory solution of the most important problems that the human mind can propose to itself."

Tarkakáma.—"On this purely philosophical point, we may perhaps fairly expect a dispassionate discussion. What are the truths you think they failed to discover?"

"*Pramána*, Sir," said Satyakáma, "is not *pramá*. The two are quite different. The first is the instrument of true knowledge; the second is true knowledge itself. A person may possess the one, without employing it to get at the other. He may have the instrument, and yet fail to make any worthy use of it. Such I believe to have been the case with Gotama and Kaṇáda. On several points of serious importance they have taught what is inconsistent with their own principles of Reasoning."

Tarkakáma.—"Do not indulge in general censures. Specify what you mean."

Satyakáma.—"I will not again refer to their theology. You say their object was philosophy. Do they not however *profess* to clear the way to final emancipation thereby? Do they not say that a knowledge of their especial topics and categories is necessary for Salvation? Gotama promises Emancipation on an accurate knowledge of his sixteen topics, and Kaṇáda on that of his six categories. What connection those topics or categories can have with the emancipation of the soul, is to me incomprehensible."

Tarkakáma.—"Does not the knowledge of truth lead to the improvement of our nature?"

Satyakáma.—"Gotama does not speak of the *knowledge of truth,* but of the *true knowledge of his sixteen topics.*"

"You are so hard on poor Gotama," said Tarkakáma. "An eminent Scholar, himself a Mletcha, has construed his first aphorism in a very different way. 'Gotama 'starts,' says he, 'with the grand question of all questions, 'the inquiry as to how we shall attain the *summum bonum,* 'the chief end of man, as the Westminster catechism 'literally represents the Sanscrit *paramapurushártha.* 'The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism, 'where he lays down further the position that deliverance 'from evil can be reached only through knowledge of 'the truth[8].'"

Satyakáma.—"Here are Gotama's own words as translated by that eminent Scholar himself. 'Proof (*i. e.,* 'the instrument of right notion), that which (as having 'a proof) is the subject of right notion; doubt; 'motive; familiar fact; scholastic tenet; confutation; 'ascertainment; disquisition; controversy; cavil; sem'blance of a reason; perversion; futility; and unfitness

[8] Aphorisms of the Nyáya Part I, printed for the Benares College.

'to be argrued with :—from knowing the truth in regard 'to these (sixteen things) there is the attainment of the '*summum bonum* (nis'reyasa)[9].'

"I do not see, continued Satyakáma, what connection most of these topics can have with any such improvement of our spiritual nature, as is involved in the idea of emancipation. You will say, the second topic, 'subject of right notion,' includes every thing. So, according to the Puráṇas, did the mighty ocean, both poison and nectar. Would you then tell a person, who was longing for immortality, to go down to the sea-shore, and drink a quantity of sea water?"

"Do you then deny, asked Tarkakáma, that the pursuit of philosophy is the highest employment in which man can engage?"

"Philosophy is a loose expression; so I cannot directly answer your question. But to say to a *mumukshu*, or an inquirer after Salvation, that a knowledge of certain topics and categories is necessary for the soul's welfare, is like telling an invalid, who requires a remedy for the cure of fever, that anatomy and materia medica are necessary to be studied for the removal of diseases."

"But is not the mind improved by the knowledge of logical rules? and as the soul derives, through the mind, the information necessary for its welfare, it follows that the art of disputation is useful for the soul's welfare."

"You mistake me, said Satyakáma, if you think I undervalue the study of logic. That study may be as important a help in leading to right conclusions and guarding against fallacies, as the sextant is to the mariner in making his observations at sea. But the

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[9] प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानान्तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥

logician should not therefore set forth *Nis'reyasa*, or emancipation, as the reward for studying that science."

Tarkakáma.—"But why do you exhaust your energy on mere verbal criticisms? What wrong doctrine do you find in Gotama's philosophy?"

"Let us then consider, said Satyakáma, the nature and end of human existence, as inculcated by Gotama. Your Achárya places *janma*[10], birth, and *pravṛitti*, activity, among evils, the annihilation of which is necessary for Emancipation. He also says distinctly that birth is a calamity. (Nyáya Sútras i. 2 and iv. 55). I appeal to you, is birth then essentially an evil[1], and activity a sin?"

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[10] दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥ विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखं जन्मोत्पत्तिः ।

[1] The learned principal of the Benares College has thus expounded Gotama's view on this point.

"The remembering of the order of the steps in 2. may be facilitated, to some "readers, by availing ones self of the distributively cumulative form of exposition "employed in the nursery tale of the house that Jack built." Thus:—

"1. *Dukha.*—This is the pain that the man had.

"2. *Janma.*—This is the birth (again renewed) that gave room for the pain that "the man had.

"3. *Pravṛitti.*—This is 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the birth (again "renewed) that gave room for the pain that the man had.

"4. *Dosha.*—This is the fault" (of 'desire—or dislike' alike to be shunned, or "stupidity) which (in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,) begot the "activity' (requiring reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room "for the pain that the man had.

"5. *Mithyá Jnána.*—This means the wrong notions (of that man unversed in the "truth teaching Nyáya Philosophy) which (since the man knew no better) gave "rise to the 'fault' (of 'desire' or 'dislike' or stupidity,) which in the man who, if "wise, had done nothing at all, begot the activity (requiring reward) that led to "the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

"6 *Apavarga.*—This last is beatitude' promised as fruit of the truth teaching Nyáya Philosophy, which gave us right ones instead of the wrong notions, which gave rise to what Gotama styles a fault, in as much as it mischievously begot the 'activity' carefully shunned by the wise,—for 'activity' shaping itself in acts that are good or bad, and requiring reward of a like description, occasions a man to be born again,—and 't was this same 'birth' that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

Tarkakáma.—"Is it not a fact, notwithstanding what A'gamika said a little while ago, that our birth is attended with numerous sufferings, and that when the soul is born, it is born to misery and unhappiness?"

"Is it not," said Satyakáma "sapping the very foundation of filial duty to parents, and of piety to God, to say that birth is an essential evil?"

Here I interposed a remark; "I confess it is possible to push the doctrine to an unwarrantable extreme."

"But," said Satyakáma, "has not Gotama already so pushed it? We must get rid of our births if we are desirous of Liberation. This view I know he deduced from the endless transmigrations involved in his doctrine of a pre-existence. Those transmigrations are in spite of ourselves. We are tied hand and foot by *karma* or *adrishṭa*[2]. If we do good, we shall have to return to the world to enjoy our reward. If we commit evil we must still return to undergo our punishment. Tired of such transmigrations, he considered birth itself an evil. The pity is he rested so much on deductions from a theory hastily adopted, in opposition to his own principles of investigation. He did not reason inductively by regular argument from *facts*.

"Then, again, continued Satyakáma, *pravṛitti*, or activity, is noted down as an evil, and *pravṛitti* is defined to be the originator of the functions of the voice, the understanding, and the body." (Nyáya I. 17)[3].

"I am sure, said A'gamika, you will not tax Goṭama with what he has not himself said. He placed *pravṛitti* among *the things to be removed*, but did not call it an evil."

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[2] नास्त्यसाविह संसारे यो न दैवेन बाध्यते। Márcaṇḍeya.

[3] प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः॥

"Whatever is necessary to be removed, rejoined Satyakáma, in order to attain a good object, must be its *pratiyogi*, or something incompatible with it, and therefore an impediment in its way, and whatever is incompatible with a good object, must be an evil. But it is not by mere implication that he condemns *pravṛitti*. He has defined it to be the cause of dosha, or fault[4]." (I. 18.)

"I cannot deny that he does say so," replied A'gamika.

"Let us then see what this amounts to. Agreeably to Gotama's doctrine, it is a fault to speak, think, or do any thing. Can this be a true view of the nature of human existence?"

A'gamika.—"It is a fault because it is not the chief good."

Satyakáma.—"And yet, on your theory, thought, speech, and powers of action are divine gifts;—indeed the only gifts God bestows on man;—for as regards existence, that you do not hold to be a *gift of God*, since the soul is uncreated, and has independent existence. The body and mind are only given by God, and yet, you say, it is a fault, or rather it is not for our chief good, to give exercise to our physical and mental powers."

A'gamika.—"But man has abused the gifts of God. When the nectar is converted to poison, what can you do? You must throw it away."

Tarkakáma.—"Victory to Rama! You have made a very good remark, A'gamika. I contend that Gotama has not pushed any doctrines to unwarrantable extremes, nor is it mere deductions from a 'hastily adopted theory,' that he sets forth in his work. In his representation of the evils of life, he only reasoned from facts, and there is no gap in the chain of his reasonings. Every

[4] प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा दोषाः ।

conclusion has a *hetu*, or reason, to support it. You seem, Satyakáma, to stumble at the 2nd Sutra in which he shows how certain hindrances to the soul's release require to be removed. I had a sort of presentiment that it might be a stumbling-block in your way, and I have brought with me a leaf from Vátsáyana (the very author to whom you have just made reference) in the hope of smoothing your passage. Now listen attentively how that excellent commentator expounds these grand ideas of Gotama,—ideas which he was the first among our Ṛishis to embody in a short pithy sentence for the instruction of mankind. That sentence is as follows: 'pain, birth, activity, 'fault, false notions,—since on the successive annihilation 'of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next 'before it, there is (on the annihilation of the last of them) 'Beatitude.' That is to say, Beatitude proceeds from the annihilation of false notions as its primary cause. Vátsáyana thus expounds this sentence: 'False notions are manifold; (1) with reference to Spirit, that there is 'no spirit at all; (2) with reference to Matter, that it is 'spirit; (3) with reference to Pain, that it is pleasure; '(4) with reference to the Transient, that it is eternal; (5) 'with reference to No-salvation, that it is salvation; (6) 'with reference to Risk, that it is security; (7) with 'reference to the Culpable, that it is desirable; (8) with 'reference to the thing to be eschewed, that it is not to be 'eschewed; (9) with reference to Activity, that it does not 'involve *karma*, (deed), nor the fruits of deeds; (10) 'with reference to Faults, that this world is not caused 'by faults; (11) with reference to Renewed birth, that 'there is no being, soul, entity, or spirit, that dies, and, 'having died, is born. Birth is without cause, the cessa-'tion of birth is without cause. Renewed birth has a 'beginning and is without end. Being occasional, renewed

'existence is not the effect of *karma,* (works.) Renewed birth is without soul, because of the growth and existence of the body, the senses, the understanding, and the feeling. That Emancipation is terrific. That it is in fact the cessation of all work, the disruption of every thing. That many good things are thereby destroyed. What intelligent person, then, will desire such emancipation—a state of insensibility, in which all works and all enjoyments are extinct?

'From this false notion, or ignorance, continues the commentator, proceed partiality to favourites and prejudice against adversaries. In partiality and prejudice, again, consist the faults of detraction, envy, delusion, intoxication, pride, avarice, &c. Connected with faults, and acting with a body, a person commits injury, theft, and unlawful sensualities; becomes false, harsh, and slanderous in speech; with hatred, avarice, and atheism, in the mind. This vicious activity produces *adharma,* (demerit). But to do acts of charity, benevolence, and service, with the body, to be truthful, useful, agreeable in speech, or given to reading the Veda, to be kind, disinterested, and reverential in the mind, these produce *dharma,* (merit). Now *dharma* and *adharma,* (merit and demerit), being fostered by *pravṛitti,* (activity), are denoted by the word *pravṛitti,* just as life is denoted by food which fosters it, for it is said, Food is the life of living creatures. This activity is the cause of a vile, as well as of an honourable, birth. Birth, again, is connected with the manifestation and assemblage of body, senses, and understanding. Attendant on birth is pain. That, again, comprises the feeling of distress, trouble, disease, sorrow. The congregated attributes, beginning with Ignorance and ending with Pain, compose *sansára,* (the world).'

"Having thus described the concatenation of evils, produced by ignorance, the learned and ingenious Vátsáyana proceeds next to represent the effects of *true knowledge.* 'But when,' says he, 'ignorance is extinguished, then, by 'the extinction of ignorance, Faults are extinguished. By 'the extinction of faults, Activity is extinguished. By the 'extinction of activity, Birth is extinguished. By the extinc-'tion of birth, Pain is extinguished. By the extinction of 'pain, is the beatitude of final Emancipation. As for 'true knowledge, it is best explained as the contrary 'of ignorance. With reference to spirit, that such a 'thing exists. With reference to matter, that it is 'not spirit. And it is to be similarly understood with 'reference to pain, to the transient, to the no-salva-'tion, to the perilous, to the culpable, and to the things 'to be eschewed. With reference to activity, that it in-'volves *karma,* (works), and the fruit of works. With 'reference to faults, that the world is caused by faults. With 'reference to renewed birth, that it is a living soul, 'entity, or spirit, which, having died, is born. Birth has 'a cause, the cessation of birth has a cause, renewed birth 'is without beginning, and continues until emancipation. 'Renewed birth has a cause, and its cause is activity. 'Being endowed with a soul, renewed birth remains 'in force until emancipation, with the restitution of 'the body, senses, understanding, and feeling. Eman-'cipation, however, is the disruption of all these, the 'cessation of all these. A multitude of troubles, fears, 'and vices is thereby extinguished. What intelligent 'person will not desire an emancipation which is the 'extinction of all pain, which is separation from all 'pain? For, it is said, food mixed with honey and poison 'is to be avoided; pleasure, joined with pain, is to be 'avoided.'"

"Such is the exposition of Vátsáyana[5]. You see how correct was A'gamika's remark, that if the nectar be converted to poison, you must throw it away. Sansára is but an assemblage of ignorance and other evils. This

[5] मिथ्याज्ञानमनेकप्रकारकं वर्त्तते आत्मनि तावन्नास्ति इति अनात्मन्यात्मेति दुःखे सुखमिति अनित्ये नित्यमिति अत्राणे त्राणमिति सभये निर्भयमिति जुगुप्सितेऽभिमतमिति हातव्येऽप्रतिहातव्यमिति प्रवृत्तै नास्ति कर्म्म नास्ति कर्म्मफलमिति दोषेषु नायं दोषनिमित्तः संसार इति प्रेत्यभावे नास्ति जन्तुर्जीवो वा सत्व आत्मा वा यः प्रेयात् प्रेत्य च भवेदिति अनिमित्तं जन्म अनिमित्तो जन्मोपरमइत्यादिमान्प्रेत्यभावोऽनन्तश्चेति नैमित्तिकः सन्नकर्म्मनिमित्तः प्रेत्यभाव इति देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनासन्तानोच्छेदप्रबन्धाभ्यां निरात्मकः प्रेत्यभाव इति अपवर्गो भीष्मः खल्वयं सर्व्वकर्म्मोपरमः सर्व्वविप्रयोगोऽपवर्गो बह्वत्र भद्रकं लुप्यत इति कस्य बुद्धिमान् सर्व्वसुखोच्छेदमचैतन्यममुमपवर्गं रोचयेदिति। एतस्मान्मिथ्याज्ञानात् अनुकूलेषु रागः प्रतिकूलेषु द्वेषः रागद्वेषाधिकरणाच्चासूयेर्ष्यामायामदमानलोभादयो दोषा भवन्ति। दोषैः प्रयुक्तः शरीरेण प्रवर्त्तमानो हिंसास्तेयप्रतिषिद्धमैथुनमाचरति वाचानृतपरुषसूचनासंबद्धानि मनसा परद्रोहं परद्रव्याभीप्सानास्तिक्यञ्चेति सेयं पापात्मिका प्रवृत्तिरधर्म्माय अथशुभं शरीरेण दानं परित्राणं परिचरणञ्च वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायञ्चेति मनसा दयामस्पृहां श्रद्धाञ्च सेयं धर्म्माय। अथ प्रवृत्तिसाधनौ धर्म्माधर्म्मौ प्रवृत्तिशब्देनोक्तौ। यथान्नसाधनाः प्राणा अन्नं वै प्राणिनः प्राणा इति सेयं प्रवृत्तिः कुत्सितस्याभिपूजितस्य च जन्मनः कारणं। जन्म पुनः शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धीनां निकायविशिष्टः प्रादुर्भावः अस्मिन् सति दुःखं तत्पुनः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं बाधना पीडाताप इति त इमे मिथ्याज्ञानादयो दुःखान्ता धर्म्मा अविच्छेदेन प्रवर्त्तमानाः संसार इति। यदा तु तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञानमपैति तदा मिथ्याज्ञानापाये दोषा अपयन्ति दोषापाये प्रवृत्तिरपैति प्रवृत्त्यपाये जन्मापैति जन्मापाये दुःखमपैति दुःखापाये आत्यन्तिकोऽपवर्गो निश्रेयसमिति।

is a matter of fact, and not a mere deduction. If you are disposed to deny the fact, then you must have a theory of *optimism*, in which it will be impossible for me to follow you. For I cannot overlook the miseries and sufferings with which the world abounds. Let us only make up our minds to call things by their right names, and then—what can we say of life in this stage of existence? Is not this the one great characteristic of our bodies, that they fall into decay and are dissolved? How can we, then, think complacently of them[6]? We may as well repose confidence in lightnings, and autumnal clouds, and fairy cities[7]. For what, indeed, is it to be born? Is it not simply—to die! Every thing, accordingly,

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तत्त्वज्ञानन्तु खलु मिथ्याज्ञानविपर्य्ययेण व्याख्यातं आत्मनि तावदस्तीति ह्यनात्मनि अनात्मेति एवं दुःखेऽनित्येऽत्राणे सभये जुगुप्सिते हातव्ये च यथाविषयं वेदितव्यं प्रवृत्तौ अस्ति कर्म्मास्ति कर्म्मफलमिति दोषेषु दोषनिमित्तः संसार इति प्रेत्यभावे खल्वस्ति जन्तुर्जीवः सत्वआत्मा वा यः प्रेत्यभावो इति निमित्तवज्जन्म निमित्तवान् जन्मोपरम इत्यनादिः प्रेत्यभावोऽपवर्गान्त इति नैमित्तिकः सन् प्रेत्यभावः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त इति सात्मकः सन् देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिवेदनासन्तानोच्छेदप्रतिसन्धानाभ्यां प्रवर्तत इति अपवर्गान्ततः खल्वयं सर्व्वविप्रयोगः सर्वोपरमोऽपवर्ग इति बह्वत्र कृच्छ्रं घोरं पापकं लुप्यत इति कथं बुद्धिमान् सर्वदुःखच्छेदं सर्वदुःखासम्विदमपवर्गं न रोचयेदिति तद्यथा मधुविषसम्पृक्तान्नमनादेयमिति एवं सुखदुःखानुषक्तमनादेयमिति।

6 रक्तमांसमयस्यास्य सबाह्याभ्यान्तरं मुने।
नाशैकधर्म्मिणो ब्रूहि कैव कायस्य रम्यता। Yoga-vásishṭha.

7 तडित्सु शरदभ्रेषु गन्धर्व्वनगरेषु च।
स्थैर्य्यं येन विनिर्णीतं स विश्वसितु विग्रहे। Ibid.

is unstable[8]. Life is only a source of trouble, the mind being *intoxicated* with the poisoned objects of sense, and the soul being destitute of true knowledge[9]. You may speak of the beauty and symmetry of our corporeal frames, you may talk of our mental powers, you may set forth the excellencies of our understandings, and the greatness of our efforts; but is not the whole, I ask, troublesome in the extreme,—like an additional weight on the neck of a man already burdened?[10] To what is an infant born in the world? To a life of happiness? By no means. It is only to buffet the waves of *works* in the ocean of this world[1]. And, as he grows in years and attains manhood, he is exposed to temptations calculated to cause his ruin[2]. As to old age, again, it is difficult to determine which of its infirmities are the more pitiable—the physical or the moral[3]. Who, then, can desire to continue in this embodied state—this house of a body, in which the organs of sense, and desire, and the mind, are, as fellow-occupants, continually delud-

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[8] जायते मृतये लोको म्रियते जननाय च।
अस्थिराः सर्व्व एवेमे सचराचरचेष्टिताः। Yoga-vásishṭha.

[9] विषयाशीविषासङ्गपरिजर्ज्जरचेतसां।
अप्रौढात्मविवेकानामायुरायासकारणं। Ibid.

[10] रूपमायुर्मनोबुद्धिरहङ्कारः स्थिरोहितं।
भारो भारधरस्येव सर्व्वं दुःखाय दुर्धियः। Ibid.

[1] लब्ध्वापि तरलाकारे कार्य्यभावतरङ्गिणि।
संसारसागरे जन्म वाल्यं दुःखाय केवलं। Ibid.

[2] वाल्यानर्थमथ त्यक्ता पुमानभिहिताशयः।
आरोहति निपाताय यौवनं संभ्रमेण तु। Ibid.

[3] दुष्प्रेक्ष्यं जरठं दीनं हीनं गुणपराक्रमैः।
शरीरं वृद्धमिवादीर्घं गर्द्धाप्यभ्येति वार्द्धकं। Ibid.

ing and distressing us ?[4] Of all the causes of our miseries the greatest is desire, which, like a traitor in your own house, betrays its inmates to danger and difficulty[5]. Hence we say that the renouncement of this whole assemblage of evils is our only remedy, and that they alone live happily, whose birth shall not be renewed in the world[6] !

"We do not say that there is no such thing as happiness in the world. We do not deny the possibility of dharma, or merit, but we cannot ignore the painful fact that dharma is mixed up with adharma, that pleasure is linked with pain, and that birth, when renewed, is but a renewal of misery. We do not deny the existence of pleasure, nor do we say that there is no good *pravṛitti*, or laudable activity[7] ; but, since evil unquestionably predominates, we cannot help considering life, in our present stage, to be a great misfortune. Hence we denote both *dharma* and *adharma* by pravṛitti, because it produces *karma*, which is our great bondage. When honey is mixed with poison, the whole cup is called poison, and thrown away. Even so we call *pravṛitti* an evil, and look for emancipation, as our only effectual escape from the miseries of transmigration and the sufferings of life."

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[4] पंक्तिबद्धेन्द्रियपशुं फल्गुतृष्णागृहाङ्गनं ।
चित्तभृत्यक्तानन्दं नेष्टं देहगृहं मम । Yoga-vásishṭha.

[5] सर्व्वसंसारदुःखानां तृष्णैका दीर्घदुःखदा ।
अन्तःपुरस्थमपि या योजयत्यपि सङ्कटे । Ibid.

[6] जातास्तएव जगति जन्तवः साधुजीविताः ।
ये पुनर्नेह जायन्ते शेषा जठरगर्द्दभाः । Ibid.

[7] सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः । न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानायहीनक्लेशस्य ।
Gotama iv. 56, 64.

Satyakáma.– "If you had not said that the yellow paper[8] in your hand is a leaf from Vátsáyana's commentary, and that you are giving an exposition of the doctrine of Gotama, the author of the Nyáya, I might have mistaken it for the teaching of Gotama, the founder of Buddhism."

A'gamika.—"Mahábhárat! Mahábhárat[9]! Oh Satyakáma! what *do* you say? Can there be any similitude between a learned Ṛishi, who contended for orthodoxy, and the unhappy heretic, who reviled gods and Brahmins?"

Satyakáma.—"Pardon me, A'gamika, if I have caused you pain. But the 'heretic who reviled gods and Brahmins' taught doctrines so very much akin to those of the 'learned Ṛishi who contended for orthodoxy,' that it is no hyperbole to say you are liable to mistake the one for the other. Indeed, the tenets of the two Gotamas, the orthodox and the heretic, bear such a strong resemblance in their features, that you may safely declare they were uterine brothers, if not twins; and, unless you studied to note their distinctive signs, you might always incur the danger of a mistake. Now mark their resemblance. The orthodox Gotama begins with the assertion that supreme felicity is derivable from true knowledge. The heretical Gotama exhorts his followers to seek it from the same source[10].

8 Native manuscripts are generally preserved in paper saturated with yellow arsenic to guard against insects.

9 When Brahmins hear any thing which shocks their feelings, they repeat some auspicious word, just as the Mahometans rehearse لاحول ولاقوت الا بالله العظيم

10 मोहकलुषान्धकारं प्रज्ञाप्रदीपेन विधमथा सर्वं ।
सानुशयदोषजालं विदारयत ज्ञानवज्रेण ॥
* * * * *
मोहाहृष्टिरविद्याघातको हिरिशिरिभरिता ।
त्वं वैद्य कुशलचिकित्सको ह्यमृतसुखददो
* * * * *

The orthodox Gotama says that Ignorance, by producing faults and activity, becomes the cause of Birth. The heretical Gotama taught the same—only enlarging the list of intermediate agencies between Ignorance and Birth. The orthodox Gotama acknowledged that the world is a compound of good and evil, dharma and adharma, pleasure and pain, and yet maintained that the whole is to be renounced, and that the only remedy for the perils of life is *apavarga*, or the complete cessation of effort and activity, and separation of the soul from body and mind. The heretical Gotama also allowed that the world contains *dharma* and *adharma*, *kus'ala* and *akus'ala*, the one being a cause of virtue, and the other of vice, and yet that there is no other salvation from the miseries of life, than the 'acquirement of the unchangeable state of *nirváṇa*[1].'' Both pronounced the world to be a state of suffering, and transmigrations to be calamities and misfortunes[2]. Both considered human life to be unimprovable, except as it tends to *apavarga* or *nirváṇa*.

ज्ञानिं ज्ञानकथाग्रधारका ज्ञापयसि त्रिभवे
त्रैविद्य विमोक्षदेशका त्रिमलमलनुदा। Lalita Vistara.

[1] Wayland's Memoir of Judson. Also in the Lalita vistara;

मोक्षं ते च लघु सर्व्वं छित्वा वै क्लेशबन्धनम्।
यास्यन्ति निरुपादानाः फलप्राप्ति वरं शुभम्॥
दक्षिणीयाश्च ते लोके आहुतीनां प्रतिग्रहाः।
न तेषु दक्षिणा न्यूना सत्त्वानिर्वाणहेतुकी॥

[2] "Painful are repeated births" (दुःखा जातिपुनः पुनः) Hardy's Manual of Buddhism Again in Lalita vistara,

जातिजरामरणदुःखक्षयं संसारबन्धनं विमोक्षयितुं।
चरितुं विशुद्धगमनान्तसमं तं शुद्धसत्त्वमनुबन्ध्ययत॥

Compare these lines with Gotama I. 2. iv. 55.

"You have heard how Gotama, the orthodox, connected birth with ignorance, and emancipation with true knowledge. Hear now how Gotama, the heretic, did the same in the following catechism;

'On what existing, do decrepitude and death come 'into existence, and on what do they depend?

'On Birth taking place, decrepitude and death come 'into existence, and they depend on birth.

'On what existing, does birth come to pass, and on what 'again does it depend?

'On the World existing, birth comes into existence, 'and it depends on the world.

'On what existing, does the world come into existence, 'and on what does it depend?

'On Affection existing, the world comes into existence, 'and it depends on affection.

'On what existing, does affection come into existence, 'and on what does it depend?

'On Desire existing, affection comes into existence, 'and it depends on desire.

'On what existing, does desire come into existence, 'and on what does it depend?

'On Sensibility existing, desire comes to exist, and it 'depends on sensibility.

'On what existing, does sensibility come to exist, and 'on what does it depend?

'On Contact existing, sensibility comes to exist, and it 'depends on contact.

'On what existing, does contact come to pass, and on 'what does it depend?

'On the Six organs existing, contact comes to pass, and 'it depends on the six organs.

'On what existing, do the six organs come to existence, 'and on what do they depend?

'On Name and form existing, the six organs come to 'exist, and they depend on name and form.

'On what existing, do name and form come into exis- 'tence, and on what do they depend ?

'On Apprehension existing, name and form come into 'existence, and they depend on apprehension.

'On what existing, does apprehension (vijnána) come 'to exist, and on what does it depend ?

'On Ideas (sanskára) existing, does apprehension come 'into existence, and it depends on ideas.

'On what existing, do ideas come into existence, and 'on what do they depend ?

'On Ignorance existing, ideas come to exist, and they 'depend on ignorance ?'[3]

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[3] कस्मिन् सति जरामरणं भवति। किं प्रत्ययं च पुनर्जरामरणम् ॥
जात्यां सत्यां जरामरणं भवति। जातिप्रत्ययं हि जरामरणम् ॥
कस्मिन् सति जातिर्भवति किम्प्रत्यया च पुनर्जातिः ॥
भवे सति जातिर्भवति भवप्रत्यया च पुनर्जातिः ॥
कस्मिन् सति भवो भवति किम्प्रत्ययश्च पुनर्भवः ॥
उपादाने सति भवो भवत्युपादानप्रत्ययो हि भवः ॥
कस्मिन् सत्युपादानं भवति किम्प्रत्ययश्च पुनरुपादानम् ॥
तृष्णायां सत्यामुपादानं भवति तृष्णाप्रत्ययो ह्युपादानम् ॥
कस्मिन् सति तृष्णा भवति किम्प्रत्यया च तृष्णा ॥
वेदनायां सत्यां तृष्णा भवति वेदनाप्रत्यया च तृष्णा ॥
कस्मिन् सति वेदना भवति किम्प्रत्यया पुनर्वेदना ॥
स्पर्शे सति वेदना भवति स्पर्शप्रत्यया हि वेदना ॥
कस्मिन् सति स्पर्शो भवति किम्प्रत्ययश्च पुनः स्पर्शः ॥
षडायतने सति स्पर्शो भवति षडायतनप्रत्ययो हि स्पर्शः ॥
कस्मिन् सति षडायतनं भवति किम्प्रत्ययश्च पुनः षडायतनम् ॥
नामरूपे सति षडायतनं भवति नामरूपप्रत्ययं हि षडायतनम् ॥

"Having thus given the succession of causes by which the sufferings of decrepitude and death, the two great evils which had struck Sákya most, are produced, he proceeds next to show how their cessation may be brought about. 'On what subsiding, do decrepitude and death 'subside, and on whose cessation is the cessation of decre- 'pitude and death?

'On birth subsiding, decrepitude and death subside, and 'on its cessation is their cessation.

'On what subsiding, does birth subside, and on whose 'cessation, is its cessation?

'On the world subsiding, birth subsides, and on the 'world's cessation, is the cessation of birth.

'On what subsiding, in fine, do ideas subside, and on 'whose cessation is the cessation of ideas?

'On ignorance subsiding, ideas subside, and on its cessa- 'tion is their cessation. On the cessation of ideas, is the cessation of apprehension[4].'"

कस्मिन् सति नामरूपं भवति किम्प्रत्ययञ्च पुनर्नामरूपम् ॥
विज्ञाने सति नामरूपं भवति विज्ञानप्रत्ययं हि नामरूपम् ॥
कस्मिन् सति विज्ञानं भवति किम्प्रत्ययञ्च विज्ञानम् ॥
संस्कारेषु सत्सु विज्ञानं भवति संस्कारप्रत्ययञ्च विज्ञानम् ॥
कस्मिन् सति संस्कारा भवन्ति किम्प्रत्ययाश्च संस्काराः ॥
अविद्यायां सत्यां संस्कारा भवन्ति अविद्याप्रत्यया हि संस्काराः ॥

[4] कस्मिन्नसति जरामरण न भवति कस्य वा निरोधाज्जरामरणनिरोधः ॥
जात्यां असत्यां जरामरणं न भवति जातिनिरोधाज्जरामरणनिरोधः ॥
कस्मिन्नसति जातिर्न भवति कस्य वा निरोधाज्जातिनिरोधः ॥
भवेऽसति जातिर्न भवति भवनिरोधाज्जातिनिरोधः ॥
कस्मिन्नसति विस्तरेण यावत्संस्कारा न भवन्ति। कस्य वा निरोधात्संस्कारनिरोधः ॥

Tarkakáma.—"The sufferings and miseries of existence are the common lot of all men. That the Buddhists had their share is no marvel; and it is only natural that, in their deplorable ignorance of the true remedy for the perils of life, they should be somewhat uncomfortable. To place them on the same level with us, simply because they did not know how to escape from their miseries, and therefore complained of their sufferings, is certainly not fair. Our Gotama did not rest satisfied with giving us a knowledge of evil and a sight of darkness. He also taught us the way of emancipation. He showed us light. Like a benevolent and experienced physician, he told us at once what our disease was,—what its cause,—and what the treatment should be, that we might be restored to health. The Buddhists, on the contrary, only set up loud yells under their sufferings, but were lamentably ignorant of the means of escape. Their *master physician,* as they delighted to call their leader, could only tell them what the very clowns in the streets knew for themselves —that they were miserable and wretched, and that their only escape was in the extinction of their miserable existence! The great empiric could only cure souls by condemning them to—perdition. He could talk of nothing but *Nirváṇa,* (annihilation), as if an eternal principle, such as the soul, could ever cease to exist. The founder of the Nyáya led us to look for *apavarga* or emancipation."

Satyakáma.—"But what is *apavarga?*"

Tarkakáma.—"Apavarga, or emancipation, is final deliverance from these, that is to say, from pain, birth, activity, fault, false notions, and it is a state of unmingled felicity."

अविद्यायामसत्यां संस्कारा न भवन्त्यविद्यानिरोधात्संस्कारनिरोधः ·
संस्कारनिरोधाद्विज्ञाननिरोधः ॥ *Lalita Vistara.*

Satyakáma.—"If, as you say, the soul, when emancipated gets rid of birth it must, on your theory, be separated both from body *and* mind. It cannot then have any powers of thought and action. Emancipation must accordingly be a state of torpor and of perfect insensibility. I cannot understand what *felicity* there can be in such a state, nor, in what respect, it *can* differ from the Nirváṇa of the Buddhists."

Tarkakáma.—"There are certain truths, Satyakáma, which cannot be described by metaphysical definitions. They can only be realized by the *feeling*. I mean they are comprehensible to those alone, who can understand and *enjoy* them. I must therefore decline a discussion of the metaphysical definition of our Emancipation. I can only say that it is a state of supreme felicity, by which all evil, all suffering, all sorrow, all pain, are at once and for ever extinguished. The utmost efforts of human rhetoric cannot adequately represent—the highest flights of human imagination cannot properly comprehend—such a state of ineffable joy and of undisturbed tranquillity. But do not, I pray you, commit such a grievous outrage on common sense, as to confound our Emancipation with the Buddhistic *Nirváṇa* or annihilation."

Satyakáma.—"But Buddhists talk of their Nirváṇa precisely in the same way as you do of your emancipation. 'The Pali doctrinal books speak of Nirváṇa as an exemp-'tion from old age, from decay, and from death; and as 'being also the acquirement of all bliss. The most celebra-'ted of the Burman priests at Ava, in reply to inquiries 'made by one of the Catholic Missionaries, replied as fol-'lows: 'When a person is no longer subject to any of the "following miseries, namely, to weight, old age, disease "and death, then he is said to have obtained nigban. No "thing, no place, can give us any adequate idea of nigban;

"we can only say that to be free from the four above-"mentioned miseries, and to obtain salvation, is nigban[5]." 'Here, said Buddha, lust and anger arising from de-'lusion, and infesting the world, are, like convicted thieves, 'utterly destroyed. Here that ignorance and worldly lust, 'which are ever productive of mischief, are burnt up from 'their corrupt roots, by the great fire of knowledge. Here 'the intractable cords of time, with lands and houses as hard 'knots, and consisting of the selfish discriminations, *myself* '*and mine*, are cut down by the weapons of my knowledge. 'Here is dried up, by the sun of my knowledge, the violent 'stream of desire, which takes its rise in evil, and is fed with 'the waters of sight, together with avidity and all evil 'thoughts. The forest of troubles, slander, and detraction, 'together with delusion, jealousy, and envy, is here burnt 'up by the fire of moderation. The three-fold bonds of 'the world are all loosened by me on attaining emanci-'pation by the weapon of knowledge. Here I have, by the 'boat of resolution, *(vírya)*, got over the ocean of sansára, '(the world), infested with the aquatic monster of lust, and 'agitated by the waves of the waters of desire, excited 'by an evil eye. Here I have an experience of immor-'tality for the benefit of the world, wherein is cessation 'of old age, death, sorrow, and trouble, and which is 'unattainable by the followers of other doctrines. Here 'I have experience of that which was known to innume-'rable saints of yore, whose agreeable and pleasing report 'is celebrated in the world[6].'"

[5] Wayland's Memoir of Dr. Judson.

[6] इह ते कामक्रोधा मोहप्रभवा जगत्परिनिकासाः।
साहृता इव चौरा विनाशिता ये निरवशेषाः॥
इह सा अकार्य्यकर्त्री भवतृष्णाचारिणी तथाऽविद्या।

Tarkakáma—"I cannot understand the utility of this laborious attempt to confound the teaching of the Nyáya with that of Buddhism. You are acting with a vengeance on the principles of *upamána*, or analogy, inculcated by Gotama himself. You are exerting yourself to no purpose with a view to turn his own weapon against himself. You forget that there are certain truths, which, like the solar rays, are self-apparent to the whole world, and that although, if a desperately blind man fails to recognize them, it is no proof *against* their existence, (any more than the incapacity of certain animals for seeing by day-light is an argument against the existence of the meridian sun,) yet when men of gross sensibilities do succeed in getting glimpses of the truth, the fact is a verification not refutation of it. What if the Buddhists

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सानुशयमूलजाला महाज्ञानाग्निना दग्धा ॥
इह सा अहं ममेति च कालिपाशदुरानुगाढलितमूला ।
नीवरणकठिनग्रन्थिश्छिन्ना मम ज्ञानशस्त्रेण ॥
काङ्क्षा विमतिसमुदया दृष्टीजडजन्तिता अशुभमूला ।
तृष्णानदी तिवेगा प्रशोषिता मे ज्ञानसूर्य्येण ॥
कुहनलपनप्रहाणं मायामात्सर्य्यदोषईर्ष्याद्यं ।
इह ते क्लेशारण्यं छिन्नं विनयाग्निना दग्धम् ॥
सर्व्वभवबन्धनानि च मुक्तानि मयेह तानि सर्वाणि ।
प्रज्ञाबलेन निखिलास्त्रिविधमिह विमोक्षमागम्य ॥
इह रागमदनमकरं तृष्णोर्म्मिजलं कुदृष्टिसङ्ग्राहम् ।
संसारसागरमहं सन्तीर्ण्णा वीर्य्यबलनावा ॥
इह तन्मयाऽनुबुद्धं सर्व्वपरप्रवादिभिर्यदप्राप्तम् ।
अमृतं लोकहितार्थं जरामरणशोकदुःखान्तम् ॥
इह तन्मयाऽनुबुद्धं यद्बुद्धं प्राक्तनैर्जिनैरपरिमाणैः ।
यस्य मधुरोऽभिरम्यः शब्दो लोकेषु विख्यातः ॥

had understood a few fragments of the grand truth which our Gotama was the first to embody in his memorable work?"

Satyakáma.—"I do not see how you can justly say that the Buddhists had only got glimpses of the 'grand truth' which Gotama taught in the Nyáya. The followers of Sákya appear to me to have had greater reasons for saying that the *grand truth* was first inculcated by *their* leader.[7] The fact is that the thoughtful natives of India had begun at an early period to recognize the evils which existed in the world, and were not satisfied that the mere performance of the ceremonies inculcated in the Veda could give them deliverance. Such ideas had long been floating in the popular mind, and certain aspirations after higher objects than were propounded in the Mantras and Brahmaṇas had also occasionally found entrance into it. But to say that Gotama, the founder of the Nyáya, was the first to embody them in his sútras, appears to me to betoken no small *sáhasa* or boldness. For the age of Buddha was confessedly anterior to that of the Nyáya. Indeed you glory in saying that one great object of the Nyáya was the refutation of Buddhism. And surely the inculcation of the evils of existence and of the alleged felicity of emancipation or Nirváṇa was more characteristic of Buddhism than of the Nyáya. What is the idea prominently suggested by the word Buddhism? Is it not (however divided public opinion may be as to its *theism)* associated with the idea of an aspiration after something called *Nirváṇa* as an escape from the sufferings of life? 'Anitya, Dukha, Anatta, *(anartha)*, Transience, 'Pain and Unrealty, (so the devout Buddhist mutters 'as he tells his beads) these are the characters of all

[7] वोधिसत्त्वस्य पूर्व्वमश्रुतेषु धर्म्मेषु। Lalita vistara.

'existence, and the only true good is exemption from these 'in the attainment of Nirváṇa[8].' What again is the prominent idea associated with the *Nyáya?* Is it not metaphysical and logical speculation? If then the Nyáya gives a representation of the evils of life and of emancipation, which has a strong resemblance with Buddhistic teaching, the probability is that the author of the Nyáya made a concession to Buddha on these points under the pressure of existing popular opinion, or was perhaps himself infected by the doctrine of the great heretic.

"You say that the author of the Nyáya was the first to embody those ideas in his sútras. But the founder of Buddhism had embodied them in his *personal history.* For what is his biography, but a consecutive account of acts, deeds, and speeches, all indicative of his impatience of life, because of the evils of decay, old age, and death, and of the sufferings entailed by desire and attachment, and bearing record to his idea of nirváṇa, or final escape from these? Sákya was in this respect a *character*, such as the Brahminical literature fails to produce in the pre-Buddhistic age."

A'gamika.—"But the divine Ráma, we find, was also disgusted with the evils of life, and panted after mukti or emancipation."

Satyakáma.—"Válmíki, if he was really the author of the *Yoga vás'isṭha,* has certainly attempted the personation of a character in that work, somewhat approaching to Sákya's. Nay he makes use of the identical terms *(jará, maraṇam, tṛishṇá,)* by which Buddha described old age, death, desire. But Válmíki's sketch is a poor imitation of the Buddhists, and in ill keeping with the story of his own Epic. Ráma was only for a time

[8] Capt Yule's Narrative of the Mission to the court of Ava.

afflicted, when a boy, with the ideas in question. The Brahmins in the palace of Das'aratha were evidently greater adepts in the art of persuasion than those in the court of his successor Sudhodhana, for we find that Ráma had quickly unlearnt his disgust with the world. He chased the Rákshases, when his infantine locks were yet uncropped on his head, in the hermitage of Vis'wámitra, and then accompanied the sage to the court of Janaka, where he competed successfully for the prize of fair Sitá's hand. Returning home with his bride, he accepted his father's proposal for his installation as associate king, and was only prevented from assuming the reins of Government by the jealousy of his step-mother. He became a voluntary exile from his country under the necessity of vindicating his father's truthfulness, and retired to the forests in the cheering company of his wife and brother. Even there, though unjustly excluded from his home and his throne, and afterwards deprived of his wife's society by the dastardly outrage of the wicked Rávaṇa, he does not appear to have had any relapse into his early disgust with life. On the contrary, nothing can exceed the thoroughly business-like energy, with which he proceeds to the rescue of his captive wife. We then see Ráma happily returning home with his queen, and resuming the pleasures and responsibilities of his throne. And if we afterwards find him abandoning the world in a melancholy mood of mind, we are at the same time assured that it was to return to a life of sensuous enjoyment in heaven.

"Buddha, on the contrary, declined to accept a throne and a sceptre, the possession of which was undisputed, and betook himself to the life of an ascetic, notwithstanding the importunities of affectionate relatives,—teaching every where that life was a series of troubles and sorrows, and holding out the hope of nirváṇa as the only

effectual escape. The means adopted for reconciling his mind to the pleasures of a palace served only to increase his disgust. To the characteristic peculiarities of his life and doctrine, and to the success which attended his efforts, ample testimony is borne to this day by the history and traditions of Nepaul, Thibet, Burmah, Ceylon, Siam, China and Tartary."

A'gamika.—"You seem to have a greater faculty for recognizing resemblances than differences. You are ignoring the fact that the Buddhists denied the existence of God and spirits, and reviled the Vedas and Brahmins."

Satyakáma.—"Atheism is certainly not the common teaching of all Buddhists, for the Ais'warikas among them acknowledge a self-existent Deity whom they call A'di Buddha[9]. Nor do they positively deny the existence of the soul. In fact the existence of the soul cannot be practically denied by men who hold out promises and threats of future reward and punishment. The Buddhists certainly do hold out such hopes and fears. 'The sceptic,' they say, 'will be punished in one or other of these two ways. He 'will be born in hell or as a beast. The wise man will 'be rewarded in one or other of these two ways; he will 'be born in a dewa-loka, or as a man[10].' They, again, who get a sight of Buddha are exempted from troubles for thousands of Kalpas[1].

"I do not pretend to have a clear understanding of Buddhistic psychology. Many of their writers speak of the soul in terms that might justify your suspicion of their denying its existence. But it is impossible to charge them with such positive denial of the soul in the face of their declarations of future retribution.

[9] Hodgson.

[10] Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, p. 472.

[1] येषां त्वद्दर्शनं सौम्य एष्यसे पुरुषर्षभ। न ते कल्पसहस्राणि जातु यास्यन्ति दुर्गतिं॥ Lalita Vistara.

"As to their 'reviling' of the Veda, it would be more correct to say that they do not enforce the necessity of the prescribed rites and ceremonies, and thus *ignore*, rather than revile, its contents. They may, under cross exmination by Brahminical controversalists, or when irritated by invective and abuse, have used strong expressions against its authority, or even denounced it as the production of impostors. But that was the language of provocation, and what a man says under provocation requires to be charitably construed, for Nárada himself poured, under irritation, blasphemous invectives on Vishṇu[2], and yet no one would call him a reviler of gods.

"With reference to the Veda, again, has not the divine lecturer in the Bhagavad-gitá himself spoken in disparagement of it. Those who, relying on the promises of the Vedas, engage in the performance of prescribed rites and ceremonies are denounced as *fools.* The heroic son of Páṇḍava is exhorted to rise above the level of the Veda, which propounds nothing but *objects connected with the three qualities.* 'Be thou, O Arjuna, above 'the three qualities[3].' And since Gotama and Kapila themselves say that something else is necessary for human emancipation than the mere observance of its ritual, I do not practically see any real difference between theirs and Buddha's teaching.

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[2] सुनत वचन उपजा अति क्रोधा। मायाबश न रहा मन बोधा॥ परसंपदा सकहु नहिंदेषी। तुमरे ईर्षा कपट विशेषी। मथत सिंधु रुद्रहिं बौरायेहु। सुरन प्रेरि विष पान करायेहु॥ असुरसुरा विष शंकरहिं आपु रमा मणि चारु। स्वारथ साधक कुटिल तुम सदा कपटब्यावहार॥

Toolseedas's Rámáyaṇa.

[3] यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः। वेदवादरताः पार्थ नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः॥ * * त्रैगुण्यविषया वेदा निस्त्रैगुण्यो भवार्जुन।

"Nor do I find, with reference to their 'reviling Brahmins,' that Buddha ever taught his desciples to denounce the sons of Brahmá on peril of their salvation. Many Brahmans had themselves enlisted under his spiritual standard. He was of course no advocate for the distinctions of caste, and received as equals all that came unto him. But he did not say, 'revile Brahmins and be saved.' On the contrary, he virtually allowed some sort of superiority to the higher castes, when he declared that birth in a Brahmin family was a reward for merit. He taught '(with reference to those who commit murder) that such 'persons, on the breaking up of the elements (the five 'Khaṇḍas), will be born in one of the hells; or if on account of the merit received in some former birth, they 'are born as men, it will be of some inferior caste, or if 'of a high caste, they will die young, and this shortness 'of life is on account of former cruelties. But if any one 'avoid the destruction of life, not taking a weapon into his 'hand that he may shed blood, and be kind to all, and 'merciful to all, he will, after death, be born in the world 'of the déwas, or if he appear in this world, it will be 'as a kshatra, or Brahman, or some other high caste, 'and he will live to see old age[4].'

"He only denied the spiritual supremacy of Brahmins. I do not know however that some of the sects, tolerated by yourselves, do not go a good way with him in this respect. The Vaishṇavas and other followers of special gods admit men in their respective fraternities without any distinction of caste or racc. The Buddhists do the same. They do not go about teaching that salvation depends on service done to Brahmins. They maintain that *Nirváṇa* consists in the moral improvement of human nature with which caste has nothing to do.

[4] Hardy's Manual, p. 446.

"And here I will take the liberty of adding that their scheme of Nirváṇa, notwithstanding the false view of human nature implied in it, is more consistent than Gotama's of emancipation. While they agree with the Naiyáyikas in denouncing the world as an assemblage of evils, and in considering *karma* as the cause of continuance in life, they do not say that good works present an obstruction to final bliss by requiring reward and so keeping up the transmigrations of the soul. They do not say you must get rid *both* of merit and demerit in order to escape transmigration. They agree with the Naiyáyikas in representing that Adharma, which they also call Akus'ala, leads to punishments here and hereafter, and causes ignoble births, but they do not say that Dharma, or, as they more frequently style it, Kus'ala, is a hindrance to what they consider supreme felicity. 'The reward of merit is according to its character, as well as its degree. When it arises from something unconnected with dharma, worldly prosperity is received, or birth is secured as a garuda, with suparṇa, or nága. When it arises from something connected with dharma, it secures birth in a déwa-lóka or brahmalóka, or an entrance into the paths[5],'—the paths being four in number, 'leading to Nirwana[6].' The Buddhists accordingly felt themselves at liberty to propound an elaborate system of ethics for the moral government of their community. They enforced the practice of virtue, and held out hopes of the highest of their rewards to the meanest of their fraternity.

"The author of the Nyáya, however, could not consistently propound such a system of ethics—could not so boldly enforce the practice of virtue—because the rewards of

5 Ibid p. 453.

6 Ibid p. 37.

virtue were, on his theory, opposed to the attainment of Emancipation. He does indeed advise his followers to purify their souls by 'abstinence and observance,' and recommends them to have recourse to the *Yoga*[7], but that is simply as a temporay expedient, not so much with a view to emancipation, as with the intention of preventing inveterate habits of sinfulness. For how does he dispose of the objection, cited by himself, to the possibility of Emancipation? 'There is no emancipation because of 'the association of one's debts and troubles and exertions[8],' or, as the scholiast expounds it, 'there can be no emanci-'pation, because, by reason of the clinging to us of our "debts,' &c., there is no opportunity for working out our 'salvation:—and so it is stated in scripture 'when born, 'verily, a Bráhman is born triply indebted;—from the 'Ṛishis, by his course of student-life; from the gods, by 'sacrifice; from the progenitors, by progeny;'—that is to 'say, one is *freed* 'from the Ṛishis,' i. e., from his debts 'to the Ṛishis, by his course of student-life; he is freed 'from the gods,' i. e., from his debts to the gods, by 'sacrifice; he is freed 'from the progenitors,' i. e., from 'his debts to the progenitors, 'by progeny,' i. e., by [his 'begetting] offspring: and life passes away in the mere 'clearing off of these debts[9].' The debts or duties, thus entailed by the Sástra, are opposed to the idea of Emancipation,—for their non-performance would be a *demerit*, and hence require punishment by renewed birth, while their performance, on the other hand, would entail *merit*, and require reward, also precisely in the same way. Well how does he dispose of the objection? Not by contending

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7 तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चात्मविध्युपायैः ॥
Nyáya Sutra iv. 111.

8 ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः ॥ Nyáya iv. 59

9 *Ballantyne's translation.*

that the discharge of duty is not incompatible with salvation,—but by endeavouring to weaken the force of the injunctions, and showing that, since the words could not be literally interpreted,—for how can a child, just born, perform any duty or discharge a debt?—they must be taken figuratively[10]. And then he falls back on another rule of the Sástra which requires a Brahmin to retire from the world when he is old. Noticing the objection that 'even if burnt sacrifices were no obstacle, the very 'fruit of it, Heaven, must be an obstacle to emancipation,' Gotama refutes it by saying that the Brahmin, when old, must retire from the world, and so be unable to procure the utensils necessary for a sacrifice, which cannot therefore be completed, and the enjoyment of heaven will as a matter of course be avoided[1]. Dr. Ballantyne, expounding Viśwanátha's scholium on iv. 61, says, 'when a Brahmin, 'having reached the age at which he ought to retire from 'the world, is no longer competent to perform the regular 'daily duties, he must *imagine* himself performing them;— 'and this will free him from the bad consequences of '*neglecting* them; while, on the other hand, the defect of 'actual fulfilment will free him from the necessity of 'having to undergo *reward* for the same.' 'In the case of 'him that possesses knowledge, the 'fruit,' i. e., Paradise, 'does not take place:—for burnt sacrifice implies a 'collection of vessels,'—vessels, i. e., vessels for burnt 'sacrifice,—a collection of such,—an arrangement of them 'with respect to the members of the victim, the thing 'sacrificed,—according to the direction "In the mouth 'a ladle filled with butter," and so in order. These cannot 'be provided by a *beggar*, and therefore, the fruit of the

[10] प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ॥ iv. 60.

[1] पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः ॥ iv. 62.

'burnt sacrifice, from the want of these things, does not 'take place.' Dr. Ballantyne makes the scholiast's meaning clearer, by adding, 'for it is he "that possesses knowledge" who can both perform the "constant duties," so as 'to avoid the guilt of their neglect, and at the same time 'escape the opposite Charybdis of having to *suffer the 'reward* of them in Paradise.'

"The scheme of emancipation in the Nyaya comes then to this—that none but Brahmins of advanced age can possibly attain it, for all others are bound by duties, the performance of which, quite as much as their neglect, must subject them to transmigration. To the Kshetriyas, Vaiśyas and Śúdras, and to *young* Brahmins, the Nyáya has nothing to say—nothing to propound with a view to their final salvation. The Buddhist scheme, to say the least of it, is certainly more consistent and better arranged. Śákya could address himself to all men, and enforce the practice of virtue by holding out the prospect of supreme felicity or Nirváṇa."

Tarkakáma.—"You are talking after a fashion which makes me suspect that Buddhism is your newly adopted faith. You must be a follower of Śákya in disguise, and are attempting to lead us, blindfolded, to the borders of his impious system."

Satyakáma.—"I can assure you, Tarkakáma, I am no Buddhist. In the midst of this controversy I will not tell you what my new faith is, for I do not wish to propound it as a rival system. If after mature consideration of the points we are discussing, you should be desirous of hearing me on that subject, I shall gladly embrace a future occasion of explaining my views. Meanwhile I must tell you that you have already been brought,—and that, blindfolded too,—by Gotama himself into the very heart of Buddhism. What a melancholy prospect you are laying

before human nature when you say that life is an essential evil, that the soul must get rid of its moral powers and emotions, and return finally to the state of torpor and insensibility, in which it was before 'the primal action of atoms and of the mind;'—that the only escape from transmigrations is in that torpid state;—that this escape, again, is available to old Brahmins only, who, being necessarily beggars, cannot have the means of completing sacrifices, and thus, not meriting heaven, may attain to emancipation, if only they be versed in the topics and categories of Gotama and Kaṇáda."

Tarkakáma.—"You seem, Satyakáma, to be ridiculing the systems of Gotama and Kaṇáda. You cannot surely be such an *optimist* as to deny the corruptions which abound in the world. Take facts as they are, and you will easily understand the difficulty our A'cháryas had to deal with. Here is an evil world tormenting the soul which is burdened with the *accidents* of body and mind. Its physical and mental powers are not necessary to its existence, for it existed before it was endowed with them, and it exists independent of them during *pralayas*, or periods of the world's dissolution. Whatever is accidental and transient is removable. The divine Vásudeva has taught us that as the constantly existing can never cease to be, so the transient can never have constant existence[2]. The soul then is capable of final release from its bondage of life. The possibility is evident from the freedom it enjoys during periods of dissolution. Now how is the transient freedom, which recurs periodically, to be made perpetual? The question will be best understood by considering its hindrances. What is it that prevents the perpetuation of that freedom? Is it not the merit and demerit of past works?—

[2] नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः। Bhagavad-gita.

the requital of which requires fresh creations and brings on the transmigrations of individual souls. How to procure emancipation means in other words how to prevent transmigrations. This is a question as important as it is solemn. You cannot avoid *merit* without incurring *demerit*, for we have certain duties to perform, certain debts to discharge. Are we to perform those duties and discharge those debts? If we do, we must accept merit, and be entitled to rewards, the enjoyment of which will render renewed birth necessary. But can we not avoid the merit by neglecting the duties? We may, but *demerit* will then stick to us, and require a repeated life of punishments. In this dilemma Gotama proposes that since a Brahmin must, toward the close of life, become a mendicant, he may as well take care to remain in want of the utensils necessary for the due performance of sacrifices. Let him perform the prescribed rites in his intention, but neglect them in the act. The intention will be accepted for the deed, and guard him against punishment. The non-fulfilment, from want of the requisite vessels, will protect him from the evils of *merit*, and save him from reward. He may thus get rid of the bondage of birth, and, meriting neither reward nor punishment, be released from the necessity of transmigration. Thus will he be blessed with emancipation, like a person who sleeps soundly, and, not being disturbed by dreams, has no distress[3]."

A'gamika.—"I do not like this subtle metaphysic, Tarkakáma. It appears to me to be a piece of refinement, unworthy the character of spiritual guides and leaders of communities. And this is the reason for which I have always had a dislike of your philosophy. Why not rest satisfied with the plain injunctions of the S'ástra? *Let*

[3] सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः Gotama, iv. 63.

him who desires heaven perform sacrifices[4]. Why not content yourself with heaven, and the plain words of the Vedas. You wish to obtain emancipation by setting one injunction against another. Because you must be poor in your old age, you will take advantage of your poverty, and neglect to procure the sacrificial vessels, and thus leave undischarged your debts to the gods."

Tarkakáma.—"Oh Ágamika! beware of the precipice of heresy. You wish to be satisfied with heaven. Do you not know that it is equally transient with the earth, that Brahmá, Vishṇu, and Rudra are all fast approaching their end[5]. Emancipation is our only escape from the evils of life."

Satyakáma.—"But what *is* Emancipation? It is a state in which the soul must get rid of its physical and mental powers, in which there can be no speech, no deed, no thought, nor any feeling or sensibility. It is, you say, a sleep without dreams. What then is the meaning of the soul's being in the enjoyment of *felicity* in such a state of torpor. What right have you to say that the soul exists at all, when it is without its characteristics, without thought, desire, or aversion? You know it now by these characteristics. How can you say it is capable of existence without them? You have no *udahárana* or instance of spiritual life in which there is an *atyantábháva*, a necessary absence, of signs of animation and intellect. You may as well undertake to predicate of a stone that it has spiritual existence, *in a sound sleep without dreams.*"

[4] स्वर्गकामो यजेत।

[5] ब्रह्मा विष्णुश्च रुद्रश्च सर्व्वा वा भूतजातयः नाशमेवानुधावन्ति सलिलानीव वाडवं। Yoga-vásishṭha.

Tarkakáma.—"I have already told you that the soul exists in an emancipated state in the same manner as it did before creation."

Satyakáma.—"What *is* existence then? How can a spiritual essence exist without thought, feeling, desire? The very idea is incomprehensible. And if it were possible, it would still be far from desirable The existence you attribute to the soul in such a state appears to be a mere technical deduction from certain of your maxims. But what idea can you form of spiritual existence, destitute of thought and feeling, not only without body, but also without mind? It becomes a word without meaning. You have dwelt too much, learned Tarkakáma, on the dark side of human nature. That nature is no doubt corrupt. But the picture, as a whole, is far from being so melancholy as you are representing it. That the affections of human nature, if unrestrained and misdirected, lead to evil, no one can for a moment deny. But it must be remembered, that it is useless to dream of perfect release from those characteristics without which the soul cannot possibly exist in any state. Nor must you forget that God has endowed us with the capacity of correcting and purifying our affections. True happiness consists in seeking the best way of rectifying our passions, not in vainly trying to get rid of them; for improvement does not imply annihilation or eradication. When you improve your garden you do not pluck up every plant, and reduce your grounds to a desert.

"I say again it is useless to dream of a total release from our passions and appetites. Your venerable Kaṇáda himself maintains, that no substance can exist without action or quality. The soul is a substance. The soul must always possess some characteristic qualities. If it be, as you rightly hold, indestructible, it can never

be deprived of its peculiar properties. Emancipation, such as you define it, is simply a creature of the imagination, a sky-flower, a town of Gandharva. It can have no reality.

"Then, again, you have entirely left out of consideration that we are endowed with the capacity of correcting and purifying our passions. Have you not heard of the filial piety of a Nachiketas, not only cheerfully submitting to his fate, when unjustly consigned to death by an angry father, but continuing, without abatement, the affection and reverence due to a parent? You would not surely say that the affection he exhibited was a *dosha*. What think you again of the joy with which a S'aivyá accepted the degraded condition of a menial slave in order to absolve her royal husband, Haris'chandra, from a debt, which she believed was pressing on him? Could such conjugal devotion be called an evil? I do not cite these as instances of human perfection, but I ask you if the affection and devotion therein displayed could be called *dosha*. Perfection is not of course to be found on the earth. Desire and aversion, Love and hatred, when misdirected, are no doubt sources of misery and unhappiness. But would you call the love of good and hatred of evil, sources of misery? In classifying the active powers of the mind, the popular scholiast of Gotama has not made a fair enumeration; and of those which he has enumerated he has given the darkest definitions. He gives seven sorts of desire, and six of aversion. He speaks of *thirst after objects*, of *covetousness*, of *desiring others' evil*, &c[6]. But of those affections which bind men with men, he mentions only *Káma*, and defines it to be *riransá*, which again he renders *a*

[6] तत्र रागपक्षः काम मत्सरः स्पृहा तृष्णा लोभो माया दम्भ इति कामो रिरंसा ।

desire of sensual enjoyment. Káma itself does not, however, exclusively imply lust, since the Upanishads themselves attribute it to the Supreme Spirit before the creation. 'He desired (akámayata) let me become many.' And as to those feelings which attach parents to children and children to parents; which distinguish the amity that brothers and sisters bear to one another; which knit the hearts of friends and companions, fellow citizens and fellow subjects; which compose the links by which Society is kept together; of these lovely traits of the human character the author of the *Vṛitti* makes not the slightest mention.

"Likewise, in classifying Aversion, he speaks of anger 'which produces a redness in the eye,' of envy, malice, &c.[7] but says nothing of such feelings as resentment, indignation, and impatience of that which is wicked or evil.

"This, I repeat, is not a correct analysis of human feelings. The Upanishad, notwithstanding what I believe to be its fundamental error, *i. e.*, its pantheism, gives a much more correct description of the human passions. It compares them to horses which the understanding, as charioteer, guides by the reins of the mind. When the passions are left unrestrained, they become like *bad* horses: when properly checked they resemble good steeds[8]. You would not condemn the whole breed of

[7] द्वेषपक्षः क्रोध ईर्ष्याऽसूया द्रोहोऽमर्षोऽभिमान इति क्रोधो नेत्रलौहित्यादिहेतु र्दोषविशेषः।

[8] आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु। बुद्धिन्तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च॥ इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहुर्विषयांस्तेषु गोचरान्। आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः॥ यस्त्वविज्ञानवान् भवत्ययुक्तेन मनसा सदा। तस्येन्द्रियाण्यवश्यानि दुष्टाश्वा इव सारथेः॥ यस्तु विज्ञानवान् भवति युक्तेन मनसा सदा। तस्येन्द्रियाणि वश्यानि सदश्वा इव सारथेः॥

horses as essentially evil, because when they are not properly restrained they turn out bad. Neither ought you to pass a sweeping condemnation on human affections. Without those affections man would be incapable of piety, devotion, and charity; and, sure I am, that the pleasure and satisfaction which these feelings of duty to God and man contribute to the mind are far more cheering than your artificial notion of Emancipation which is only an imitation of the Buddhist conception of nirváṇa. It is a satisfaction, however, to believe that there is no reason for thinking such a catastrophe to be even possible. Why spend your strength, then, on what—supposing its desirability—is yet impracticable?

"It is useless to exhaust one's energies on the achievement of impossibilities. Even if the annihilation of our passions were desirable, it is impracticable. Our wisest course is to seek the amendment of that which we cannot destroy. By amending and purifying, we may turn them into sources of unalloyed pleasure and of rational enjoyment. But by seeking their destruction we may be in danger of imparting to them a greater impetus *in the opposite direction.* A most profound writer says: 'Those who formerly aimed at this (*i. e.,* the destruction of 'the passions) upon the foot of philosophy, appear to 'have had better success in eradicating the affections 'of tenderness and compassion, than they had with the 'passions of envy, pride, and resentment[9]." How many instances do our own Itiháses and Puráṇas present of Ṛishis, who in the midst of their efforts to eradicate their passions, were *a great deal more liable* to be overcome by the temptations of sights and sounds than ordinary mortals?

[9] Bishop Butler.

"To say that the mental powers of human nature are essentially corrupt, and that the only remedy is *Apavarga*, which implies entire eradication, sounds as bad in a moralist, as it would in a physician to say that the organs of respiration are *dosha*, because they admit malaria into the system, and cause diseases, and that the only way of guarding against the evil is suffocation, or destruction of those organs. What would you say to the doctor who, instead of prescribing the proper medicine and aliment, would advise his patient to abstain from all kind of food, and thereby to starve himself, that he might effectually escape the pains and torments of indigestion! And yet Gotama's moral treatment of the soul is no better. It must get rid, (which however it cannot,) of sensibility and activity, and exist without any characteristic signs of existence. I said you have been brought, blindfolded, into the very heart of Buddhism. Is it not so in reality with reference to your doctrine of the present and future prospects of human nature? You affect to harp on the transience, instability, and vanity of the world in the very tune of Gotama Buddha, and you talk of your emancipation precisely in the same terms as he did of Nirváṇa. If there be a difference between you, it seems to be in favor of the Buddhist leader; for his metaphysics did not technically compel him to deny the perpetual concomitance of the Soul with mind, and therefore he might have meant that Nirváṇa was a sort of spiritual existence in which the Soul was not debarred from capacities for thought and feeling. He had also this further advantage that his theory did not preclude him from the privilege of inculcating a code of morals, to be enforced equally on the highest and the lowest of his adherents, as the direct means of attaining supreme felicity. Gotama however could not enjoin the practice of virtue

so freely, for on his principles merit was hardly less an obstacle to emancipation than demerit."

A'gamika.—"I cannot certainly regret our conference of this morning—for it has opened my eyes to the defects of our philosophers, of whom I long had a sort of intuitive dread. I am now convinced that some of our leaders at least, have only been drawing us, nearer and nearer, toward the vortex of Buddhism, by broaching transcendental ideas of emancipation, unheard of in the Mantras and Bráhmaṇas. I for my part will return to the old paths, and continue to seek for admission to heaven by the performance of sacrifices. It appears to me to partake of no small irreverence to talk slightingly of the heavenly reward. All I can say is that I shall be perfectly satisfied with it—only, may I attain it!"

Satyakáma.—"I say *tathástu*! (So be it.) And may you be led still further to understand the True Sacrifice for sin, and may you attain, I do not say such heaven as the Puráṇas describe—but the Heaven of unspotted purity, of ever-enduring stability, and of joy without alloy,—of which our ancestors had evidently derived some idea from the primitive traditions of the human race, when they styled it *suvarga*[10] (the good society), since corrupted, perhaps both in form and idea, into *swarga.*"

A'gamika's concluding sentence was articulated in a tone which for the moment produced a strong impression on us all. Even Tarkakáma, with his strong opinion of the transience and the chequered character of celestial existence, and of the vanity of earthly life and deeds, seemed for once to fear that he was perhaps, after all, himself pursuing a mere *mirage,* while he was denouncing the

[10] तेनैवानुरूपेण यजमानः सुवर्गं लोकमेति । Taittiriya Bráhmaṇa.

heavenly rewards of Dharma. Satyakáma's closing reply, again, was not quite intelligible to any of us, though it received an expressive response from A'gamika, by a muscular motion on his face, which I shall not attempt to describe. I have scarcely recovered myself from the mental excitement produced by the last conference, and you must therefore excuse my inability to add any further remarks.

DIALOGUE VI.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

My last letter was written in a very excited state of mind. I was wondering what Satyakáma could mean by the 'True Sacrifice for sin,' or what he could be driving at, either, by the ingenious distinction between *suvarga* and *swarga.* I went yesterday to put these questions to him personally, but I found that Kapila and Ágamika had already come, and commenced a controversy on the Sánkhya system. On entering the room, I heard Satyakáma saying, "I believe Śankaráchárya's strictures on your system are unanswerable."

Kápila.—"I am surprized at *your* saying so. Have you never observed the *vac-chhala* (verbal tricks) played by that bigoted Vedántist? When for instance he quotes against us texts implying an intellectual exercise on the part of the Creator, such as *seeing, desiring,* he reasons as if we held *prakriti* (Nature) to be the *efficient* cause of the universe, and labours to convict us of supreme folly in supposing that unintelligent and inanimate nature can *see* or *desire.* But Śankara knew, quite as well as our own selves, that *nature* is, in our system, the *material,* or substantial, not the *efficient,* cause of the world. While again he has ransacked the Vedas for every sentence or phrase that

might by any stretch of criticism be turned against us, he has cautiously avoided to mention those texts which obviously teach what we inculcate. I will not be so disingenuous as to deny that there are a few passages which are apparently against us, and of these S'ankara has not failed to take the utmost advantage. You will perhaps not deny that the question between us and the Vedantists is how to reconcile the two sets of conflicting texts. We hold that the texts which ascribe the creation to inanimate and unintelligent *prakriti* as its material cause, or, in the language of our venerable A'chárya, as the *rootless root*[1], are the key whereby all others are to be interpreted. Vyása and S'ankara, on the other hand, maintain that our texts are to be overruled by those which seem to inculcate that Brahma, or the spirit, is the material of which the universe is made. I may venture to hope you will allow our argument its due weight. It is certainly more consistent than that of the Vedantist. The universe is composed both of rational and irrational principles. We are not here discussing the origin of rational principles, because the Vedántists and ourselves are both agreed that the Soul is uncreated and eternal. It is only the inanimate and irrational creation that we are called upon to account for. And here our much misunderstood A'chárya thought, I must add, rightly, that it would be losing sight of all moral and physical discrimination to say that an intelligent spirit could be the *substance* of inanimate matter. To say again that the universe sprang from a spirit, that the impure was a development of the pure, would be to maintain that creation was a process of deterioration. We have numerous instances of animated beings springing from inanimate matter, as vermin from filth, but we

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[1] मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलं ।

nowhere see a single instance of inanimate matter arising out of spiritual substances. I have yet to learn that he who is loth to pronounce the world, with all its grossness and impurity, to be consubstantial with the spirit, and therefore traces it to a cause *connatural* with itself, (as the Vedas themselves phrase it,) can be guilty of the impiety which is charged upon us. You must remember that the question is not, who is the efficient cause of the Universe. *That*, the Vedántists and ourselves are agreed, is a minor point of inquiry. Both of us, also, maintain that instrumental causality is here unnecessary, for the source from which the world was produced may have worked itself out, like milk becoming curds. We do not fear discomfiture, if we be allowed a *fair field* with the Vedantist; if those who are to judge between us will remember that we are both speculating on the substance of which, not the agent by whom, the world was made.

"True it is," continued the advocate of the Sánkhya, "that Vyása and S'ankara have in some places argued for an efficient cause. But that is against the general spirit of their speculations. They ought not surely to have the benefit of their own inconsistency. After these explanations, I should be very much surprized to find you still taking the Vedantist's part in this controversy."

Satyakáma.—"When I spoke of S'ankarácharya's argument against your doctrine, I did not allude to the texts which he cited from the Vedas. Nor did I mean that he, *as a Vedantist*, had a right to say any thing to you. I cannot deny there is some force in what you say, *as the matter stands between you and the Vedantists.* I believe that if you be bound hand and foot by dogmas of the Vedas, you may be driven to some of the conclusions which Kapila has drawn; for there is no denying the fact that the Upanishads do speak of an unproduced

female, answering to your description of *prakriti*, red, white, and black, (the very colours by which the three original qualities are typified,) producing many creatures like itself[2]. But I do not see any reason why you should allow the Vedas to lead you astray. If the Vedas lay down doctrines so manifestly absurd, why should you bow to their authority? The founder of your School did not hesitate to pronounce an independent verdict about the ritual of the Vedas. Why should you allow their cosmogony to warp your judgment?

"Why should you, either, discard the notion of an efficient cause of the world? If S'ankarácháryа is inconsistent, that does not vitiate a good argument. He may be debarred from the privilege of benefitting by it, but what is good reason in itself continues such, notwithstanding the fault of the party who adduces it. True knowledge may, according to Menu, be reverently received even from the vulgar; just as nectar is not the less acceptable when extracted from poison[3]. Now it appears to me extremely unphilosophical to speculate on the *substance* of the universe. The first thing that strikes us when we look around is the beautiful arrangement of the heavens and the earth, the uniformity of the law which regulates the planetary motions, and secures the stability of the solar system; and the adaptation of the whole to the happiness and comforts of animal life. Huge masses, far exceeding the earth in magnitude, are perpetually moving in space, not without some eccentricities in their orbits, and yet there is no collision.

[2] अजामेकां लोहितकृष्णवर्णां बह्वीःप्रजाःसृजमानां सरूपां अजोह्येको जुषमाणोनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥ S'wetas'watara Upa.

[3] श्रद्दधानः शुभां विद्यामाददीतावरादपि। अन्त्यादपि परं धर्मं स्त्रीरत्नं दुष्कुलादपि। विषादप्यमृतं ग्राह्यं ॥ Menu II. 238, 239.

"The uninterrupted succession of days and nights, of weathers and seasons; and the adaptation of the atmosphere to the properties of light and heat, whereby evaporation and condensation are so regulated that the waters on the earth are alternately drained and replenished, just in the manner suited to the wants of animal and vegetable life, precluding alike the opposite *nirítis* (plagues) of too much and too little rain; the structure again of animals and vegetables in exact conformation to the action of the elements by which they are surrounded and to the material properties of that to which their sustenance and growth are owing; all these mutual adaptations indicate design, and point, not to a plastic substance, but to an intelligent Artificer, an efficient Agent, of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness.

"I confess that Śankaráchárya's argument against you, *so far as it relies on the Vedas,* is singularly unsatisfactory. But his appeals to common sense, his reasoning from the beautiful structure of the world, however inconsistent with his other sayings, are irresistible. I know you may reason against *his* doctrine (the Vedanta) with equal force. But that does not embarrass *me.* My motto is truth. Let us seek out the truth, no matter what system or school is thereby falsified or stultified. Śankaráchárya says[4]; 'If the question is to be decided by analogy

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[4] यदि दृष्टान्तबलेनैवैतन्निरूप्यते नाचेतनं लोके चेतनेनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं किञ्चिद्विशिष्टपुरुषार्थनिर्वर्त्तनसमर्थान् विकारान् विरचयत् दृष्टम् गेहप्रासादशयनासनविहारभूम्यादयोहि लोके प्रज्ञावद्भिः शिल्पिभिर्यथाकालं सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहारयोग्या रचिता दृश्यन्ते तथेदं जगदखिलं पृथिव्यादिनानाकर्म्मफलोपभोगयोग्यम् वाह्यमाध्यात्मिकञ्च शरीरादि नानाजात्यन्वितं प्रतिनियतावयवविन्यासमनेककर्म्मफलानुभवाधिष्ठानं दृश्यमानं प्रज्ञावद्भिः सम्भाविततमैः शिल्पिभिर्मनसाप्यालोचयितुमशक्यं

'(without the authority of the Vedas) then no irrational 'substance, undirected by a rational essence, is seen in the 'world transforming itself of its own accord into something that may be useful to men. Houses and palaces 'with rooms for sleeping, sitting, and amusement, are 'seen to be erected by skilful artists, in adaptation to the 'seasons, for the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoiding 'of pain; how then can unintelligent nature form the 'earth and this whole universe, adapted to various works 'and enjoyments, organic and inorganic, containing bodies 'and various matter, with parts mutually and severally 'adapted to one another; the scene of many works and 'enjoyments, incomprehensible to the mind even of the 'most skilful artist? Such formations are never seen in 'clods and stones. Earth and other materials are seen to 'be moulded into fine shapes under the direction of potters 'and other manufacturers. Nature too must in like 'manner have an intelligent director. Nor is there any 'necessity, in the tracing of the original cause, to confine 'the attention to the want of a homogeneous substance, 'such as earth, overlooking the requirement of an external cause, such as the potter or other manufacturer. 'There could be no absurdity in the latter supposition; 'and it would certainly be agreeable to the Vedas, for 'there the cause of the universe is declared to be in-

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सत् कथमचेतनं प्रधानं रचयेत् लोष्टपाषाणादिष्वदृष्टत्वात् मृदादिष्वपि कुम्भकाराद्यधिष्ठितेषु विशिष्टाकाररचना दृश्यते तद्वत् प्रधानस्यापि चेतनान्तराधिष्ठितत्वप्रसङ्गः न च मृदाद्युपादानस्वरूपव्यापाश्रयेणैव धर्म्मेण मूलकारणमवधारणीयं नवाह्यकुम्भकारादिव्यपाश्रयेणेति किंचिन्नियामकमस्ति नचैवं सति किञ्चिद्विरुध्यते प्रत्युत श्रुतिरनुगृह्यते चेतनकारणत्वसमर्पणात् अतोरचनानुपपत्तेश्च हेतोर्नाचेतनं जगत् कारणमनुमातव्यं भवति ॥

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'telligent. Therefore because of the existence of arrange-'ment, and of the want of conclusiveness in the reason, 'an unintelligent cause of the world cannot be inferred.'

"You say, learned Sir, this argument is not to the point, because you pronounce nature to be the material, not the efficient, cause. But Śankara justly says there is no necessity for deducing a consubstantial cause. You are not called upon to speculate on the material cause of the world. That undertaking is itself a radical defect in your system. The defect is the more glaring because you have not elsewhere provided an intelligent efficient cause.

"And here I must say the passages of the Vedas to which you look with such confidence do not bear you out. A Prakriti, such as you assume, is no doubt spoken of, but it is nowhere asserted that it performs the creative office, *undirected by the soul.* Your A'chárya seems to glory in denying such direction.

"'Nature is the real agent' says he ; 'the agency attri-'buted to the soul is only apparent or illusory ; the 'soul is no agent even in connection with nature, as it 'is not the iron that burns when heated, but the fire 'that is connected with it. Nature, though inanimate, 'works like the curdling of milk, or like the operation of 'time. Nature is the original cause. Other things are 'its products. The spirit, though eternal, is not the agent, 'because it is incompetent. The products of nature are 'found every where ; hence nature is all pervading[5].'

[5] प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्याससिद्धिः। अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्येनायोदाहवत्। अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य। कर्म्मवद्दृष्टेर्वा कालादेः। प्रकृतेराद्योपादानतान्येषां कार्य्यत्वश्रुतेः। नित्यत्वेपि नात्मनो योग्यत्वाभावात्। सर्व्वत्र कार्य्यदर्शनात् विभुत्वं। Sánkhya. Sútras, ii. 5, 8, iii. 59, 60. vi. 32, 33, 36.

"Now the few texts of the Upanishads on which you rely do indeed inculcate a duality of principle, but they do not justify the boldness with which you define one of those principles as, at the same time, both devoid of sensation, and also productive of the world. I do not find any such lesson in the three texts which you are in the habit of citing :

'Two birds inhabit the same tree as friends joined 'together; one tastes its fruits, the other looks on in 'abstinence.'

'Two unproduced males (there are), intelligent and un-'intelligent, independent and dependent; and one un-'produced female joined to enjoyer and objects enjoyment; 'when the soul attains this three-fold Brahma, it becomes 'infinite, of universal form, and freed from agency.'

'One unproduced male united enjoys the unproduced 'female, red, black, white, and producing many creatures 'like herself; another unproduced male renounces her, 'the enjoyer[6].'

"Of your extreme repugnance to the idea of an intelligent creator, your Vedantic opponents have no doubt taken ample advantage. So far indeed you have given a color to their pantheism, and I do not doubt that many persons have been the more readily reconciled to the Vedanta by regarding it as the only refuge from the repulsive idea of a creation without an intelligent Creator.

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[6] द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥

ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशनीशावजा ह्येका भोक्तृभोग्यार्थयुक्ता। अनन्तश्चात्मा विश्वरूपो ह्यकर्त्ता त्रयं यदा विन्दते ब्रह्म मेतत् ॥

अजामेकां लोहितकृष्णवर्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपां अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः

"In this respect your theory is worse than that of the Naiyáyikas—(I mean—the modern followers of Gotama and Kaṇáda,) for though they set up atoms as eternal principles, they do not reject the agency of a supreme Intelligence. I do not deny you had some reason to argue against the Naiyáyika the other day, and to contend that Gotama or Kaṇáda was no better theist than Kapila. But if the disciples of those two Ṛishis are determined to interpret the Nyáya and Vais'eshika Sútras in a theistic sense, what right have we, outsiders, to say any thing against them? You may, if you choose, interpret the Kapila Sútras in a similar manner, and I will not undertake to say you will not be justified in your construction, quite as much as they consider themselves to be in theirs.

"But you boldly avow that your prakriti is the sole cause. Your A'chárya says, and you do not deny, that nature works itself up like the self-working of milk into curds. You are, so far, fully exposed to S'ankara's powerful battery; though his own system suffers equally by it; for he too maintains that the spirit worked up itself into the world like milk into curds!"

Kápila.—"And he does so with a boldness which ill befits a controversalist in a question such as this. 'For, says he, 'it (the creation) is accomplished like milk, 'through the peculiar property of the substance itself. 'As in the world milk or water turns of itself into curds 'or ice, without requiring an external instrument, so also 'here. But does not milk itself when turning into curds 'require an external instrument, such as heat? Then how 'can it be said that the creation is like the operation of 'milk? This is no fault. Milk is only more quickly 'turned by heat into the state of curds, but not in a 'greater measure than it would itself attain. If it had

'not the capacity of turning into curds, it could not be 'forced into that state by the power of heat; for air and 'ether cannot be forced into that state by the power of 'heat[7].' And yet S'ankara attacks *us* for teaching the 'same doctrine!"

Satyakáma.—"S'ankara is no doubt chargeable with inconsistency, but he attacks you because you deny the existence of an intelligent Author in a creation so full of indications of design. You say that *prakriti* is the equipoise of the three qualities of goodness activity and darkness. The equipoise of the three qualities cannot be a substance. It is a mere relation, not an entity,—a quality, not a thing. What conception can you form of a *quality* without a *substance?* But whatever your *prakriti* may be, you flatly deny the agency of a living and intelligent creator. Had I not read the very words of your teacher and found you maintaining the same doctrine, I should have considered it perfectly impossible for a philosopher to hold such an opinion. And here, as if to complete our perplexity, you attribute to the equipoise of the three qualities, a creative power, of which, you say, the soul is incapable, because it involves desire and activity. How can you consistently attribute to the equipoise that which implies an excess of *rajas*, or your

[7] यतः क्षीरवत् द्रव्यस्वभावविशेषादुपपद्यते यथाहि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमभावेन परिणमते ऽनपेक्ष्य वाह्यं साधनं तथेहापि भविष्यति। ननु क्षीराद्यपि दध्यादिभावेन परिणममानमपेक्षत एव वाह्यं साधनं औष्ण्यादिकं कथमुच्यते क्षीरवद्धीति॥ नैष दोषः। स्वयमपि हि क्षीरं याञ्च यावतीञ्च परिणाममात्रामनुभवत्येव त्वार्यते त्वौष्ण्यादिना दधिभावाय॥ यदिच स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यान्नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्येत। नहि वायुराकाशोवौष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते॥ *Com. Vedant.* 11. 1. 24.

second quality, Activity? The balance must then be disturbed. It is no longer an equipoise. Śankaráchárya gives you a terrible hit on this point.

"Your plea that your material cause should not be argued against, as if you held it to be an efficient agent, is again nullified by your admission of an *end* in the creation. You say the *final cause*[8] of nature's agency is the emancipation of the *Purusha,* or soul, passively watching her proceedings. She labours for the soul's use, just as the camel carries the *kumkum* for another. With reference to those who attain knowledge, the agency of nature ceaseth, because of their aversion to the world, just as cooking ceaseth when food is prepared; but as to all others nature ceaseth not. She does not desist even when she has done with the already wise. But when the object is attained she ceaseth, like a dancing girl when dancing is over. When her fault is known she no longer approaches the soul, just as a lady of rank is ashamed to appear before her husband if she be known to have misbehaved.

"Now the idea of a final cause cannot be separated from that of design. It pre-supposes intelligence quite as much as the idea of efficient agency. That unintelligent and inanimate nature, which cannot think or feel, could have an end in view, is simply a self-contradictory assertion. That it should know when to work and when

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[8] विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य

प्रधानसृष्टिः परार्थं स्वतोऽप्यभोक्तृत्वादुष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत्

नर्त्तकीवत्प्रवृत्तस्यापि निवृत्तिश्चारितार्थ्यात्॥ विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूदवत् पाके। अनुपभोगेपि पुमर्थं सृष्टिः प्रधानस्योष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत्। विमुक्तबोधात् न सृष्टिः प्रधानस्य लोकवत्। दोषबोधेपि नोपसर्पणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत्। Sán. Sut.

to cease is an enigma which I for my part cannot pretend to solve."

Kápila. "Ah! but the contradiction disappears when we say that nature does so from *habit*[9], like the involuntary services of a devoted servant,—or perhaps from the attraction of works which are without beginning. Is it absurd to say that an irrational substance should perform a certain act by habit?

"Consider how forcible a principle of action habit is. Instances of it are constantly met with in the animal and even the vegetable world. The horse drags your carriage, the ox draws your plough, the elephant carries your luggage. They have drivers, it is true, but how often the drivers do nothing but *watch* the animal's motions. It is not that they whip or goad the beasts without intermission. It is habit which guides those irrational creatures. The best driver in the world will not drive those which are not influenced by habit. Witness the cases of wicked and untrained horses. There can be no absurdity in saying that *prakriti* does for the soul what your horses are seen to do for yourselves. But you will perhaps say, that horses and oxen, though irrational, are still animated creatures, and that nature's case is not parallel with theirs. Well, what say you as to the power of steam? Have you not seen the Railway train dragged by the *iron horse,* as the locomotive is sometimes called? Is not that an instance to the purpose? Nature works similarly. Though unintelligent, she is sufficiently powerful for her purpose. As the cow's milk, itself formed from grass, though inanimate, is naturally moved for the growth of the

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[9] अकार्य्यत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात्

स्वभावाच्चेष्टितमनभिसन्धानाद्भृत्यवत् ॥ Ibid.

calf[10]; as the water, though inanimate, flows naturally for the benefit of men, so inanimate nature and her products also move for the accomplishment of the soul's object."

Satyakáma.—"We are speaking of the original creation. I am astonished at your attributing such an act to habit, or the attraction of works. Habit pre-supposes past acts, which the idea of an original creation precludes. Nor could there be, *at that time*, the attraction of works, for works there could not be before the creation. Will you fall back on the old idea of an eternal succession of *adṛishṭa*, or works, and worlds, mechanically following one another? Your A'chárya does indeed recognize *karma* (works) as the cause of differences[1] in creation, but he appears to reject the theory of an eternal succession of works and worlds like seed and plant[2].

"Again, although an irrational creature may, under the power of habit, induced by previous training under the superintendence of a rational agent, produce an *end* which that agent had in view, and an inanimate substance may, by means of an impulse it had received from a similar agent, mechanically subserve a purpose, yet such an idea is incomprehensible where no intelligent direction of any kind is admitted. Our horses, oxen, and elephants would be of no avail, if they were not trained and directed under intelligent superintendence. But your system flatly denies such direction on the part of the soul, and yet maintains that inanimate nature works for its benefit.

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[10] पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोल्लासात्। धेनुवद्वत्साय Ibid.
वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥ सां कां ॥

[1] कर्मवैचित्र्यात् सृष्टिवैचित्र्यं। [2] न वीजाङ्कुरवत् सादिसंसारश्रुतेः। *San. Sut.*

"If you got a wild horse from the jungles, would he spontaneously get into harness, drag your carriage, go where it is your object he should go, and stop where it ought to stop? Your A'chárya has compared Nature's operation with the camel's carrying *kumkum* for the use of men. Would the camel carry it without direction and guidance? An operation which has an *end* necessarily implies design—and though the mechanical instrument of the operation may be inanimate or irrational, the designer must be both animated and intelligent.

"You have spoken of the railway train, of the mother's milk issuing for the offspring's nourishment, of waters flowing for the benefit of men. Hear what S'ankaráchárya says on your two last pleas:

'This is not well said for, from the fact, acknowledged by 'both parties, that we never see independent action in in- 'animate substances, such as carriages, we infer that 'action in the cases of milk and water must be from ani- 'mated agents. The S'ástra too says: He who resid- 'ing in water is different from it, is the imperishable 'person under whose government the other eastern rivers 'flow. The milk again flows because of the tender 'affection of the animated cow, and because of the suck- 'ing of the calf. Nor is the flowing of water spontane- 'ous, it depending on low lands and other causes[3].'

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[3] नैतत् साधूच्यते यतस्तत्रापि पयोऽम्बुनोश्चेतनाधिष्ठितयोरेव प्रवृत्ति
रित्यनमिमीमहे उभयवादिप्रसिद्धेः रथादावचेतने केवले प्रवृत्त्यादर्शनात्।
शास्त्रं च योऽप्सु तिष्ठन्नद्भ्योऽन्तरो योऽपोऽन्तरो यमयति एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य
प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ते। चेतनायाश्च धेनोः स्नेहेनेच्छया
पयसः प्रवर्त्तकत्वोपपत्तेः वत्सचोषणेन च पयस आकृष्यमाणत्वात्। नचा-
म्बुनोऽप्यत्यन्तमनपेक्षा। निम्नभूम्याद्यपेक्षत्वात् स्यन्दनस्य।

Com. Vedant. II. 2. 3.

"The *substance* of S'ankaráchárya's reply cannot be gainsayed. He refers to a proximate and an ultimate cause. The proximate cause is the law to which things are naturally subject; the ultimate cause is that Omniscient and All-wise Governor who gave that law. The proximate cause alone, I allow, would be a mere repetition of what you say. That water flows over low grounds, or that steam acts upon every thing that presents a barrier to it, is merely enunciating the natural process. But there is an ultimate or Supreme cause, who enacted the law which steam, water, and milk all equally obey. If it were not liable to be construed in a pantheistic sense, I should have no objection to S'ankara's own formula as quoted from the Upanishad:—'He who, residing in water, is different from it,' is the governor under whose guidance steam and water exhibit the powers which prove so beneficial for men.

"The power of steam is no doubt wonderful as we see it daily in the train that passes from Rajmahal to Howrah. But can you forget the mental exercise involved in the projection of the Railway scheme—the vast preparations making for years by skilful engineers, the making of roads and bridges, the laying of the rail, and the daily labour bestowed by intelligent workmen on the guiding of the train? The Railway is no doubt a brilliant triumph of science, but science implies intellectual exercise, not the blind force of nature.

"Do you think the locomotive moves from Rajmahal to Howrah without the intervention of intelligent engineers? Do the boiler and the hearth find water and coals for themselves as often as they are wanted, and in the exact quantities of their requirements? What would you say to a man if he showed you a book—say the S'útras of Kapila himself with the com-

mentary of Vijnána Bhikshu—and said that the words and sentences which appear in black and white were produced by a quantity of rags. Part of the rags took fire by friction, and from the smoke was produced collyrium which turned into ink. Part dissolved through damp, and became paper, which folded into pages and stuck together. The ink then traced the letters which appear on the several pages in large and small characters, distinguishing the *Sútra* from the *Bháshya*—and all this, like milk turning into curds, without an author to compose Sútra or Bháshya, without manufacturer to make the paper and ink, without clerk to write out the sentences, or binder to fold and stitch the papers. If a person gave you such an account of the production of the *Sánkhya pravachana Bháshya*—what would you say to him?"

Kápila.—"That is an unfair question. We all *know* that the Sánkhya sútras were composed by Kapila. How could I then believe such a story?"

Satyakáma.—"Well, suppose a manuscript book were brought to you of which you *knew* nothing. Could you receive such a story of its production—especially, if you found that it was a work of great excellence as regarded philosophy and rhetoric?"

Kápila.—"If a book contained transcendental conceptions in regard to philosophy, it would itself be an evidence of mental effort, and of the existence of some great mind prior to its production. In a work of any value we must have (1) the conceptions of the author's mind; (2) those conceptions couched in appropriate and intelligible terms; (3) the terms correctly inflected, and put together agreeably to the rules of grammar; (4) the sentences and phrases arranged accurately and syntactically; (5) the whole again written out in the ordinary

latters of the alphabet with orthographical correctness. All this could not be achieved by the fortuitous action of mere rags. A good book is universally held to betoken the prior existence of a *master mind*. Your allusion to the Sánkhya Sútras, excuse me for saying so again, is unfair. It looks like a surrender of your point in this debate."

Satyakáma.—"It does not certainly appear so to *me*. You say that a good book betokens the prior existence of a *master mind*. No doubt it does. But does not the visible world the same too? Does not matter itself betoken the prior existence of mind? If matter had the power or capacity of self-action, who endowed it with that power? Who made and fitted it with that capacity? Are not the arrangement of the universe and the structure of animal bodies superior by far to the arrangement of letters and the structure of sentences in a book? Letters could not form words, nor words signify ideas, if they were not arranged by a mind familiar with orthography and grammar. But could the sun, moon, earth, and atmosphere be placed as they are without a supreme Intelligence ordaining and regulating their positions, attractions, motions, and powers, so as to cause our days and months, our seasons and years, our light and heat, in exact adaptation to our wants and comforts? A book could not be produced without a master mind. The very idea appears preposterous to you. And yet you think this world could be self-produced from an inanimate and unintelligent principle, and that, with a view to the soul's emancipation! You think undirected nature sufficient to account for the beauty, symmetry, and arrangement of a universe—the combinations of which are so complex as to baffle our highest efforts to comprehend them—the links and adaptations so numerous that we

can never hope to live long enough to master even a small portion of them; the structure of animal organs so curiously formed that each performs a certian function, and the whole produces a certain end to which it is adapted. You think such an arrangement could be made without a Designer, a Director, a Governor. Consider once more the consequences of your theory. Think on the sort of works which you thus attribute to an inanimate, irrational principle, incapable of design or deliberation. We have a sun above us the source of light and heat. An inestimable blessing it is; but without the co-operation of just such an atmosphere as surrounds our globe, it would be impossible for us to benefit by it. Without such diffusion of its rays as is caused by the atmosphere, our houses, indeed all places in the shade, would at noon-day be as cold as ice, and as dismal as the night of an *amávasyá*, or the last of the moon; while the open air would be a furnace of fire during day-light. When we got out of doors it would be like going suddenly from thick darkness into a blaze of light,—to the sun of a noon-day from the gloom of a midnight. I need not tell you that creatures, such as we are, could never live if the sun and the atmosphere were not so adapted to each other, as that light and heat, shot forth from the one, should, by the other, be diffused to suit our condition. Could this adaptation, far transcending any conception of Kapila's mind, proceed from a blind principle like your Nature?

"The same sun again is the centre of our system. You have no doubt heard, what I believe you are prepared to admit, that the theory of the sun's being the centre of motion in our system is a philosophic necessity, the non-acknowledgement of which would lead us to the wildest schemes in order to account for the phenomena observed

in the heavens. And it is the principle of attraction, of which our own Bháskaráchárya was not entirely ignorant, which regulates the motions, and prescribes the velocity with which the planets perform their revolutions. Their orbits are also fixed by the nature of that attraction.

"The advantages derived from this arrangement of the solar system are so obvious that I need scarcely mention them. To specify one instance,—the position of the earth is such that her two poles are alternately presented toward the sun during her revolution, and thus our periodical change of seasons is occasioned. Consider what the consequences would be if this change of seasons did not come round regularly. It may be all very fine in poets to extol the pleasures of an eternal spring, but fancy what the result would be of the realization of such a conception. Not only would the anticipated pleasure be annihilated by its monotonous sameness, but the effect would soon be manifest in the failure of our crops and the drying up of our ponds. After you have had abundance of rain, and passed through the cold of winter, it may be all very pleasant to have for a month or two a bland atmosphere and a mild sun. But the process of evaporation would be affected by a perpetual spring, and that, in its turn, would cause a suspension of rain. The atmosphere would itself prove hurtful to life in the absence of the elements of purification presented by the summer and autumn. Is it possible that inanimate nature could give a position to the earth's axis, and create a law of motion, so exactly adapted to the wants of terrestrial life?

"Consider again the wisdom manifested in the structure of animal and vegetable organs. The arrangement and mutual adaptation of the parts, harmonious as they are, are yet so complex, that they have given occasion to several sciences, each of which separately requires the study of

years. Anatomy and the other departments of medical science, with Natural History, and Botany, present an accumulation of extraordinary facts, all loudly testifying to a uniformity of purpose and benevolence of design, infinitely beyond the grasp, as S'ankaráchárya well expresses it, of 'the most skilful' of our species. The smallest insect, hardly discernible by the naked eye, presents as perfect an arrangement of organs for the sustentation of life and the reproduction of its species, as the largest animal. Who can for a moment believe that all this systematized arrangement and adaptation of parts, with a provident eye to the life and comforts of the lowest no less than the highest animal,—an arrangement and an adaptation by which crude matter turns into vegetable, and vegetable matter is assimilated with animal flesh, by which blood and milk are extracted from leaves and roots, and leaves and roots formed from gas and moisture,—could be projected and accomplished by an agent that is devoid of thought, animation, and design?

"You confess that a quantity of rags could not of themselves produce a book, and yet you say that nature, or the equipoise of the three original qualities, was able to bring such a world into existence. Is the *Sánkhya pravachana bháshya*, or any other book that may be named, a greater proof of intelligence or design, than the Universe with its complicated but harmonious arrangements? Of the one you think it preposterous that mere rags should produce it. To the other you would assign a cause more flimsy even than rags. For your *prakṛiti* appears to me to be a mere name, a mere phantom. You say it is the equipoise of the three original qualities of goodness, activity, and darkness. Quality is itself no substance. Your doctrine amounts to the assertion that the external world came spontaneonsly into being without any cause at all.

What conception can we have of *prakṛiti*, as an aggregate of qualities, without a substance qualified thereby— or, to speak in the language of Naiyáyikas, without a *samaváya*, (substratum)? To such a mere theoretic nature you assign the work of creation, a work for which you say the soul was not competent. How could the soul fail to do that for which nature sufficed? Your doctrine is simply unintelligible."

Kápila.—"I will explain what our A'chárya means. He has shown that Atoms could not be considered the first cause of all things; and, as to the soul, it is evident an intelligent principle could not be the material of which the inanimate world is composed. Besides it is *ahankára*[4] (egotism), one of the products of *prakṛiti*, not the soul, that has agency. The soul can never be moved to make an effort, and without effort there could be no creation."

Satyakáma.—"But why could not the soul do every thing that was necessary without a material cause?"

Kápila.—"Because, says the reverend Ṛishi, a *substance cannot be out of no substauce.* Because also, he says elsewhere, there is necessity for a material cause."

"Can you, continued the Sánkhya s'ástri, make a house without bricks or a box without wood?"

"I cannot," said Satyakáma, "but the Almighty can. With incomparably greater reason might I ask you to say how a mere equipoise of three qualities could supply the place of bricks?"

Kápila appeared somewhat perplexed. A'gamika, who had all this time been listening patiently to the above conversation, interposed a remark on the etymology of the word 'Prakṛiti.' "Some light," said he, "may be thrown on the subject by considering the etymology of

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[4] अहङ्कारः कर्त्ता न पुरुषः San. Sut. vi. 54.

the word. Prakṛiti is derived from *kṛi* with the affix क्तिन्. Generally speaking that affix is added to express *bháva*, or the abstract idea, sometimes the *karma*, or the object, of the action. The rule has many exceptions, but they are always obvious. I am told that the Greek language has a grammatical affix (σις) corresponding to our क्तिन्, which, released from its characteristic redundants, and inflected in the nominative, becomes तिः (*tis*) not more different from the Greek, than τ is from σ. These two letters are notoriously interchanged in that language, and the affixes in the two languages may be considered similar.

"*Prakṛitis* is the φυσις of the Greeks. I am the more confirmed in this opinion by a passage which a friend read to me from Strabo in which φυσις was called the *fifth* element of the Brahmins. I suspect the Greek geographer meant by the term φυσις to represent this very *prakṛitis* of Kapila, especially as he added that it was from the same element that heaven and the stars were produced. Now what is the cosmogony of Kapila? There is the self-existent *Purusha*, and there is this *prakṛiti*, or nature. The first product of the latter is *mind*, the immediate cause of *ahankára* or self-consciousness, from which all the rest were produced. Might not Kapila have only meant to say that the self-existent Spirit was naturally endowed, first with mind, then with self-consciousness, and so created the world."

Satyakáma.—"There would be some meaning in the theory according to the interpretation you suggest. Indeed the Matsya Puráṇa appears to identify the equipoise of the three qualities with the one-formed triad[5] (*ekú*

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[5] सत्त्वंरजस्तमश्चैव गुणत्रयमुदाहृतं। साम्यावस्थितिरेतेषां प्रकृतिःपरिकीर्तिता ॥ केचित्प्रधानमित्याहुरव्यक्तमपरे जगुः। एतदेव प्रजायन्ते

múrti strayodeváh, one form and three gods) Brahmá, Vishṇu, and Maheśwara. Even the admirers of Kapila have not received his doctrine without an amendment. But he himself glories in denying creative agency to the Purusha or soul. *Prakṛiti* worked itself up like milk in the cow's body."

"I am astonished," continued Satyakáma, turning, after a brief pause, to Kápila, "at your A'chárya referring to the cow and her milk in support of *his* doctrine. A better example cannot easily be adduced for its refutation. Your A'chárya maintains that nature, inanimate and unintelligent, works without direction and guidance for the benefit of the soul. The instance of the cow and her milk is appealed to in illustration of this theory. That milk, it is said, comes up spontaneously for the benefit of the calf. S'ankaráchárya replies to you that the milk does not come up spontaneously, and that its determination is owing to the tender affection of the cow and to the calf's power of suction. I admit this reply does not fairly meet your doctrine. But how does the milk come up in the cow? The animal eats the grass which goes into its stomach, where by the process of digestion food turns into *chyle,* which is carried by a curious mechanism into the reservoir of blood with which it then assimilates. The mechanism is as fine as it is curious, and by a wonderful contrivance it protects the blood vessels against any matter in the chyle which

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विख्याता वसवोऽपिच॥ गुणेभ्यः क्षोभ्यमाणेभ्यस्त्रयोदेवा विजज्ञिरे। एका मूर्तिस्त्रयोदेवा ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः॥ सविकारात्प्रधानात्तु महत्तत्त्वं प्रजायते। महानिति ततः ख्यातिर्लोकानां जायते सदा॥ अहंकारश्च महतो जायते मानवर्द्धनः। इन्द्रियाणि ततःपंच वक्ष्ये बुद्धिवशानि तु॥ प्रादुर्भवन्ति चान्यानि तथा कर्मवशानि तु। मन एकादशं तेषां काम बुद्धिगुणान्वितम्॥ Matsya Puráṇa.

might cause inconvenience to the animal. The blood, thus replenished by food, performs a secreting function, the very conception of which strikes the mind with awe. The secretions are partly constant and partly occasional. Those that are constant are necessary for the conservation of the organs and the healthy state of the body. Those that are occasional answer certain purposes called for by the condition of the animal at a definite time. And provision is made in its physical organism for meeting such contingencies. When the animal is in a condition to bring forth young, the blood makes a new secretion, with a quality not found in any other secretion, namely, that of nutrition. This secretion we call milk. There is an organ already provided by a prospective contrivance for the reception and retention of that secretion, and there is an excretory duct annexed whereby the fluid determines to the udder at the particular juncture when it is about to be wanted. We have in all this a machinery and a contrivance, suited to an especial end and purpose, and obviously indicative of design. Now to say that an inanimate and irrational principle is capable of design is simply a contradiction in terms."

Kápila.—"You were candid enough to admit that S'ankaráchárya's remark on the instance of the cow and her milk is not to the point. This admission encourages me to hope that you will not lend any countenance to the popular calumny against our system. Men, incapable of nice discriminations, think they will pass muster for piety by only calling the Sánkhya *nirís'wara* (godless). Wiser heads have however confessed that there is no knowledge equal to that which is embodied in our system. Even the popular poet Tulasidasa[6] is compelled to speak

[6] स्वादि देव प्रभु दीन दयाला। जठर धरेउ जेहि कपिल कृपाला॥
साख्य शास्त्र जिन प्रगट बखाना। तत्त्व विचार निपुण भगवाना॥

of Kapila with religious reverence, and to acknowledge that the distinguishing characteristic of the Sánkhya is *tattwa vichára*, or discussion of truth. It is perfectly gratuitous to charge us with ungodliness. Any discussion may be cut short by putting on a cloak of piety after this fashion. But how stands the argument? Śankarácharya has told us of houses with rooms for sleeping, sitting, and amusements, and you have just made reference to a wonderful organism in the cow's body. We never denied that. The organism in the cow's body cannot surely be more wonderful than the organism of the world itself, which we not only admit but perhaps admire even more than our adversaries. But what is the question between us? Without contravening what people call the religious intuitions of human nature, we simply declare that the physical arrangement of the universe may be sufficiently accounted for by physical causes, that nature and natural law, that is to say *prakṛiti* and her prolific operations, were themselves competent to settle the positions, and give the propelling impulses which regulate the motions, and secure the stability of all things in heaven and earth. Whether you refer to the phenomena which are owing to the motions of luminaries far above, or to formations, mechanisms, and organisms near at hand on our globe, they may be all traced to the agency of the same prakṛiti or natural law as their ultimate cause. The formations and organisms have been gradual, have taken time, and been developed by a slow process like milk turning into curds. And this is a conception of Kapila's mind in which, I am credibly informed, he is followed by eminent philosophers in Europe, and which is confirmed by recent discoveries in all parts of the world. I have heard from a relative, who has received a paper of

commendation (Diploma) from the Doctors' College in Calcutta, that many learned Europeans have come to the conclusion that the earth has, from time immemorial, been a scene of changes, by natural development, of dead matter into organic and vegetable substances, and of vegetables into animal life. One eminent writer says, that 'in pursuing the progress of development of both plants and animals upon the globe, an advance is visible in both cases, from simple to higher forms of organization.' 'In the botanical department we have first sea, afterwards land, plants.' In the department of zoology, too, we see, first traces of the very lowest, removed by a few steps only from vegetable life, and leading by slow gradation to higher forms. Then we have fishes, then land animals, commencing with reptiles, then birds, and at last the *jaráyuja*, or mammalia.

"Thus after a long series of years you see a wonderful confirmation of Kapila's grand conception. For what else is his great doctrine? He recognized onward progress in the world, and therefore protested against the fanatical doctrine of the Vedánta that the world was a product of the Supreme Spirit, as if dead matter could be a manifestation of a pure and spiritual essence. The process of creation would then be a process of deterioration—a process inconsistent with the very idea of creation. In opposition to such a fantastic notion he taught that nature was the original of all things, and that the act of creation was one of development and progress. But as the spiritual could not proceed from the material, he added that the soul was eternal and independent. The ignorant may brand him as niriśwara, or godless, and cover their imbecillity as logicians by an affectation of piety, but his doctrine is found to commend itself now to all thoughtful minds—even in Europe."

Satyakáma.—"You have given a colouring to Kapila's doctrine which I do not remember to have seen elsewhere, and you seem to think you have strengthened his cause by forming an alliance with certain philosophers of Europe. But it does not add strength to your doctrine in reality. For the eminent writer to whom you have made reference does *not* ignore an intelligent Creator, the author of nature and the giver of nature's law. His theory has reference only to proximate or secondary causes which fall within the province of science. The doctrine, however, has not, certainly, commended itself 'to *all* thoughtful minds' in Europe, for the leading men of science consider it to be based on inaccurate statements of fact and on untenable premises. But I am not going to *discuss* the theory of transmutation of species. That has been already done satisfactorily by profound investigators. All that I am concerned with at present is to say that the author to whom you have made reference does not deny a supreme Intelligence as the ultimate cause of all things,—as the initiator and ordainer of the natural law which science attempts to expound. Your medical friend who spoke to you of the development theory ought to have drawn your attention to passages like the following:

'All these considerations, when the mind is thoroughly 'prepared for them, tend to raise our ideas with respect 'to the character of physical laws, even though we do not 'go a simple step further in the investigation.

'But it is impossible for an intelligent mind to stop 'there. We advance from law to the cause of law, and 'ask what is that? Whence have come all these beautiful 'regulations? Here science leaves us, but only to conclude, 'from other grounds, that there is a First cause to which 'all others are secondary and ministrative, a primitive,

'Almighty will, of which these laws are merely the man-'dates. That great Being, who shall say where is his 'dwelling place, or what is his history! man pauses 'breathless at the contemplation of a subject so much 'above his finite faculties, and only can wonder and adore! 'When all is seen to be the result of law, the idea 'of an Almighty author becomes irresistible, for the crea-'tion of a law for an endless series of phenomena, an act 'of intelligence above all else that we can conceive, could 'have no other imaginable source, and tells, moreover, as 'strongly for a sustaining as for an originating power[7].'

"The eminent writer to whom you have made reference does not accordingly inculcate a *niris'wara*, (excuse me, for repeating the word,) or atheistic doctrine. How *could* there be a law without a lawgiver? or a final cause without design and purpose? or a design or purpose without a designer? It is impossible therefore for an inanimate principle, such as nature, to have worked, as you represent, without intelligent direction.

"But are you not shifting from your original ground? You contended in opposition to the Vedánta that your Prakṛiti is the material or substantial cause, and now you talk of its *operation* and its *aim*. You treat it, then, as an efficient cause. S'ankaráchárya's argument, of which you complained, recoils therefore with double force against you. How could a principle, itself inanimate and therefore incapable of thought and intelligence, produce by its operation such a vast and wonderful world with its infinite adaptations, and with such harmony in all its parts?"

Kápila.—" Of God we can know nothing. Of physical causes we are constantly witnesses. The founder of

[7] Vestiges of the Natural history of creation.

the Sánkhya was only treating his subject *scientifically*, and all that he meant to inculcate, was, that as far as pure science was concerned, the development of the world can be explained by natural law. The European author to whom I made reference, and from whose work you have just read a passage, confessed that the Almighty Being he spoke of was found, not in science, but out of science. Kapila did not choose to go out of science."

Satyakáma.—"But you cannot stop at what you call natural law without offering violence to a science which is higher than mere physics."

Kápila.—"I do not quite understand your meaning. Explain yourself."

Satyakáma.—"How do you arrive at what you call the known in science. How do you come to know what you call objects of *pratyaksha*, or perception? A wave of light strikes your optic nerve, and hence you perceive some form before you. A vibration of the atmosphere strikes your acoustic nerve, and you perceive a sound. The particles of some substance resist your touch, and you feel its presence. Knowledge, which is itself power, is also produced by power—the force of sensation. But as you have the organs of external sensation, so you have also an organ of internal perception, the mind, which your system dignifies by the appellative *mahat* or great. Now this *great* organ has a force, no less powerful than those of external sensation, and it convinces you of the existence of certain objects quite as forcibly and constantly, as the organs of seeing and hearing do. If your organs of external sensation force on your observation the form and mechanism of the world—if your science tells you of the wonderful adaptations of means to ends on our globe—if indeed you are thereby compelled to theorize that your *prakṛiti*, or nature, worked for the

happiness and comforts of *Purusha* (Soul) in the formation of the world, (just as the king's cook aims at the king's satisfaction in his culinary office, and as an experienced servant aims at his master's convenience,)—the great organ of internal perception at once compels you to look up higher. It protests against the possibility of adaptations of means to ends without intelligent agency, and rejects the notion of such numerous harmonious mechanisms and wonderful combinations being brought into existence by mere chance. *It also repudiates your account of its own creation from an unintelligent principle.* Mind will not admit matter to be its progenitor or superior. The fact of intelligent agency in creation becomes therefore as much a suggestion of science as any physical deduction with reference to cosmical phenomena.

"What constitutes the distinction between our ideas of matter and mind? Is it not simply this—that the one has no *pravṛitti,* no motion or action, *of itself,* and that the other has both; that the vis inertiæ of matter requires to be overcome by an external impulse before matter can act, and that all impelling forces, which have an object in view, pre-suppose the existence of mind. To speak of the self-moving power of matter is to introduce a confusion of language calculated only to create misunderstanding and misapprehension. Design, purpose, aim are all mental operations. To speak of them as predicates of an inanimate principle is to talk like *children and madmen*[8], to adopt Kapila's own expression when administering a wholesome rebuke to the Vedantists."

A'gamika.—"But does not Kapila virtually acknowledge a Supreme intelligence as the creator of the

[8] बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्त्वम्।

world? He speaks of 'an omniscient author of all things'[9]?"

Satyakáma.—"The scholiast says he thereby means the *first male*[10], or the first agent at the commencement of a world. I would have most willingly received this Sútra as a consoling proof of Kapila's theism, had not Kapila himself exhibited a sort of unaccountable obstinacy in arguing, not only against the existence, de facto, of a Supreme Being, but also against the possibility of a Supreme Intelligence, the author and governor of all things. The *all-knowing creator* is only a *sort of god; such a god,* says he, *is proved;* that god being, as the scholiast adds, himself a creature or a created agent[1]. In the first book it is broadly stated that the existence of God is not proved—that if there were a God he must be either bound or free, if bound, he would be incompetent for the act of creation; if free, that is to say, if unmoved by passion and desire, he could be subject to no motives, and hence would not concern himself in the act of creation; whether therefore bond or free, he could not be the creator of the universe. As to theistic passages in the Śástra, they are, says the author of the Sánkhya, 'either mere eulogies of emancipated souls, or 'expressions of devotion to perfected spirits, such as (according to the scholiast) the transient or created gods 'Brahmá Vishṇu and Hara, figuratively styled eternal[2].'

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[9] स हि सर्व्ववित् सर्व्वकर्त्ता। iii. 56.

[10] सर्व्ववित् सर्व्वकर्त्तेश्वर आदिपुरुषो भवति। Vijnána Bhikshu.

[1] ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा। iii. 57.

जन्येश्वरस्य सिद्धिः। V. B.

[2] मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा। i. 95.

सिद्धस्य ब्रह्मविष्णुहरादेरेवानित्येश्वरस्याभिमानादिमतोपि गौण-नित्यत्वादिमत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्युपासापरा। V. B.

He defends the infallible authority of the Vedas, while thus denying the existence of an omniscient inspirer, simply by asserting that their texts are experimentally verified[3] by events, just as the teaching of medical science is established by facts.

"In the fifth book, again, Kapila resumes his atheistic argument, and commences with denying God's providence and his government of the world. 'The distribution of 'fruits, or rewards, is not by divine appointment, for it is 'regulated by works,' which, the scholiast designates *necessary*[4]. 'If, continues the author, there were any divine 'interference, then it must be for God's own purpose, and 'if God had a purpose in view, he would himself be a '*worldly God*. If a worldly God were acknowledged, it 'would be using a mere technical term[5],' for, adds the scholiast, 'the theist would then be speaking like us of a 'created being by the technical term *God*[6] ?' 'Such an act, 'with a purpose in view, is not possible without *rága*, or 'passionate desire, for effort invariably implies such desire. 'And if he were subject to a vehement passion he could 'not be essentially free. Passions and affections cannot 'be attributed to God, for then he would be proved to 'be a soul with attachments. If it be said that God is 'creator by the very virtue of existence, then all existing

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[3] सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः। i. 98.

[4] नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्म्मणा तत्सिद्धेः। v. 1.
आवश्यकेन कर्म्मणैव फलनिष्पत्तिसम्भवात्। V. B.

[5] स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत्। लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा। पारिभाषिको वा।

[6] संसारसत्त्वेपि चेदीश्वरस्तर्हि सर्गाद्युत्पन्नपुरुषे परिभाषामात्रमस्माकमिव भवतामपि स्यात्।

'souls must be gods[7], and, so adds the commentator, the 'doctrine of one God must be surrendered.'

"Kapila then goes on saying that the existence of God 'cannot be established[8] because there is no proof. There 'can be no evidence of sensation[9] on such a subject, 'nor can it be proved by Inference,[10] because you cannot 'exhibit an analogous instance. And as to the testimony 'of the Sástra, it is decidedly for *pradhána*, or nature[1], 'as the ultimate cause of all things.'

"I need not follow our author further in what he says to point out certain inconsistencies in the Vedánta doctrine. But I suppose there can be no doubt of his absolute denial of a Supreme Deity."

Kápila.—"I think my good friends you are not doing justice to Kapila. As I said the other day, his only fault is his unflinching honesty. He will not equivocate on a serious subject such as the one under discussion. The difficulty with all philosophers has been how to reconcile the idea of perfect freedom, suggested by the conception of a Supreme Divinity, with the bondage betokened by subjection to motives. No animated and thinking agent does any thing without a purpose, and a purpose must always betoken mental imbecillity. The followers of the Nyáya and the Vedánta feel this difficulty as keenly as ourselves,

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7 न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् ।
तद्योगेपि न नित्यमुक्तः । v. 6, 7.
रागस्तूत्कटेच्छा । Vijnána Bhikshu.
प्रधानशक्तियोगाच्चेत् सङ्गापत्तिः । सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्व्वैश्वर्य्यं । v. 8, 9.

8 प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धि । v. 10.

9 ईश्वरे तावत् प्रत्यक्षं नास्ति ।

10 सम्बन्धाभावान्नानुमानं ।

1 श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्य्यत्वस्य । v. 12.

only they do not boldly avow it. The Vedántists evade the real question by saying that God creates the world in connection with *avidyá*, (ignorance or delusion). They thus support their system by actually attributing ignorance and delusion to the creator of the universe. They virtually deny supreme intelligence to the creator. Such is the theism of our opponents before whom Kapila's teaching must dwindle into a *niríśwara* system! I doubt whether any one can have the boldness to say that *avidyá*, or a principle of ignorance, is a more *intelligent* cause than *prakṛiti* or inanimate nature. Śankaráchárya's wonder at the idea of inanimate nature producing such a harmonious world ill consorts with his own doctrine that the same world was created by ignorance or want of deliberation. He that can believe that a principle of ignorance could project a plan of the universe before us, need not look aghast at the idea of an unintelligent principle performing the same exploit.

"Śankara is as confident that Brahma or the spirit is *nirguṇa*, or destitute of affections, as Kapila that the Purusha is *nissanga* or free from attachments. Kapila carries out his principle and maintains that the soul without attachments cannot be a creator, having no motive for any action. The Vedántist endeavours to reconcile opposite principles by maintaining that the *nirguṇa* Spirit, also independent of motives, creates the universe in association with avidyá or ignorance.

"But the most unaccountable flight of Vedántic imagination is in the saying that Brahma or the spirit is not really associated with delusion—that it is through avidyá or delusion that delusion is attributed to him. Kapila will have nothing to do with this tissue of inconsistencies[2].

[2] नाविद्यायोगो निःसङ्गस्य । तद्योगे तत्सिद्धावन्योन्याश्रयत्वं ॥ v. 13, 14.

If it is a delusion to attribute delusion to the spirit, then he is not really associated with delusion, and if without such unworthy association he could not create the universe, then it is a fallacy to call him the creator. Avidyá or ignorance must be the real creator. If the Vedántist will only give up his addiction to party and boldly search out the truth, he must be driven to the conclusion that the world was created by a principle of ignorance, a conclusion not essentially different from ours—while ours has the further advantage of being a more intelligible and consistent theory.

"It is useless to remind us of the complex and harmonious arrangement of the world. The real question remains unchanged—how to associate a perfectly free intelligence (such as you must suppose the Creator to be) with ignorance and delusion, or with a subjection to motives and purposes."

A'gamika.—"But you do not deny, friend Kápila,—do you?—that *purusha*, or the Spirit, does perform various acts in the world. Why then must you deny his creative agency?"

Kápila.—"We do deny that *purusha* does any thing in reality. He is essentially free from those impulses which lead to action, and from the encumbrances of body and mind wherein consist capacities for operativeness. The soul appears operative simply because of its active accidents—just as a crystal vase appears coloured because of the red flowers placed in it, but is itself devoid of any taint or tinge. It is not affected or fettered by the operativeness of its accidents. If it appears affected, disturbed, or fettered, it is because of the mind with which it is for a time associated. The actions and passions are all of the mind not the soul[3]. Nor does this accidental and

[3] कुसुमवच्चमणिः । तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् । असङ्गोयं

temporary association produce any permanent, or even momentary, impression on the soul, for it passes off like water on a lotus leaf without real contact, and without leaving any traces behind itself[4]. 'The soul is witness, solitary, by-stander, speculator, and passive.' 'The qualities, as agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists from action.' 'Though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.' 'There being activity of the qualities, soul which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent, which it is not[5].'

"So you see we do deny the operativeness, and maintain the perfect freedom of *purusha.* And even if the contrary were the fact—even if we allowed that the soul was competent for certain acts, still it would not follow that he was competent for the act of creation. Supposing the soul were subject to motives and impulses, and therefore capable of ordinary agencies in the world, he would for that very reason be disqualified for the great work of creation, for which no agent, fettered by attachments, could be competent."

A'gamika.—"You have just cited a passage from the Kárika and Gauṛapáda's commentary thereon. Those authorities seem to acknowledge the superintendence of the soul over nature. The Kárika says 'there must be superintendence,' on which Gauṛapáda comments thus; 'As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able 'to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so the soul guides the 'body: as it is said in the Shashṭi Tantra,—Nature,

पुरुषः इति। न कर्म्मणान्यधर्म्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च। जवास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किन्त्वभिमानः।

[4] श्रुतिस्मृतिषु पद्मपत्रस्थलेनेव पद्मपत्रस्यासङ्गतायाः पुरुषासङ्गतायां दृष्टान्तताश्रवणाच्च।

[5] Wilson's Sánkhya Kárika.

'directed by soul, proceeds.' Váchaspati also says, 'whe-'ther this (evolution) of nature be for its own purpose or 'that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. 'Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there 'must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, 'though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant 'of its character; therefore there is an omniscient Being, 'the director of nature, which is I'swara, or God[6].'

"Thus you see, Kápila, that even among the upholders of your characteristic doctrine of creation by the agency of nature, men are compelled to aknowledge a Supreme Intelligence, the author and director of nature."

Kápila.—"The Sánkhya is pre-eminently a system of discriminative knowledge. We are, by name and profession, guardians of the interests of truth and reason, and it would be a betrayal of those interests, if on a subject of such awe-striking solemnity as the creation, we failed to follow out our principles to their legitimate consequences. I have told you that we are not wanting in admiration of the wonderful mechanism of the universe, but we cannot persuade ourselves so far to lower our conceptions of moral and spiritual greatness as to allow the competence of a creator that is itself under the thraldom of motives and purposes. The very title of Sánkhya would be a misnomer if we admitted such a low standard of moral greatness in the Creator of the world."

Satyakáma.—"I feel more perplexed than ever how to understand the drift of your sayings. You have challenged our veneration by speaking of the awe-striking solemnity of the subject of Creation, and you have been raising our conception of the moral greatness of the Creator of the world. You have been raising our conceptions however only to hurl them down by a dash.

6 Wilson's Sánkhya Kárika.

You tell us of the moral greatness of the Creator, only as a prelude to your doctrine that there is no Creator of any intellectual and moral qualifications whatever; and you raise our conceptions of that greatness, only to assure us that there is no moral greatness of any standard in the world—for thought and action are affections of the mind, not the soul. They can no more touch the soul than the red roses in a vase taint the crystal of which it is composed. What is the meaning of 'awe-striking solemnity' if there be no God in the universe? Who is to strike the awe? What can be the value of knowledge at the utmost, if there be no God to be known? What can you mean by a betrayal of the interests of truth and reason, if the soul is not responsible for any acts?

"You say your difficulty in the way of acknowledging a Creator of supreme intelligence is how to reconcile subjection to motives and purposes with omnipotence. You do not deny the evidences of design which the universe displays, but you cannot allow the existence of a Designer because of the moral difficulty you have mentioned. Before this difficulty the argument from design loses its force with you.

"In the case of the Supreme Being, however, we are not called upon to say that he requires an external motive for any thing He he does, much less are we at liberty to speculate on his motives. He has His all-wise, all-gracious plans, and he acts according to the good pleasure of His will.

"The argument from design, again, is a sheer logical argument based on the very nature of all reasoning. It cannot lose its force from any consideration whatsoever, while the moral difficulty you have raised is a creature of your own imagination. It does not consort well with the position you claim for your system, as 'pre-eminently

one of discriminative knowledge,' to set aside a logical argument on a mere fanciful theory about motives and purposes. That the universe was created by a Supreme Intelligence is attested by the indications of design around us, prior to all other considerations. As to His motives and purposes, that is a point which concerns the question of His attributes, not of His existence.

"And here must we not pause to consider the nature of our inquiry before we venture a single step further? Before Him who projected the vast universe, in which our own dwelling place is but an atom, and of which our powers of sensation and reflection can reach but the smallest conceivable portion, before Him, I ask—what are we, and what are the highest flights of our imagination! Are we to venture on probing His motives and purposes? Can the human mind by any of its devices fathom the depth of His purposes—the finite grasp at the Infinite? And are we to say that His motives and purposes are abridgments of His essential freedom?

"Well does the author of the Sarva-dars'ana-sangraha say that benevolence is His purpose[7]! And that such a purpose can be no detraction from His freedom, just as a person's own body cannot be an interposing barrier to himself. His motives and purposes who shall presume to fathom? Enough for us that in all He has made we see striking adaptations to the comforts and conveniences of animal life, and thus descry signs of benevolence written in indelible characters.

"To say that an essentially free spirit is incapable of motives is to beg a moral question—and to build a moral system on a mere fanciful theory. Granted, Brahminical

[7] करुणया प्रवृत्तिरस्त्येव * * न च स्वातन्त्र्यभङ्गः शङ्कनीयः स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवतीति न्यायेन ॥

philosophers have held the same theory—granted, the Vedántists are guilty of inconsistencies;—(though I very much doubt they will protest against your version of their doctrine)—is that a reason why the divine glory should be obscured, and knowledge deprived of its highest object—the only object that can lend it dignity or importance? Do you think you have made out a great case for your system by contending that all its speculations end in this, that there is no God in the world—and that all its knowledge consists in the dogma that there is not and cannot be any intelligent and deliberate act or moral agency in the universe?

"Is not the saying that a free spirit *can* have no motive itself a gross abridgment of its freedom? The only idea we can have of a spiritual essence is that it is an existent substance endowed with mind, with will, with powers of intelligence and action, but destitute of physical organs. To deprive it of motives and emotions is to deprive it of will and of active powers. You do not deny that mind implies all this, but you will not allow that spirit is essentially and constantly connected with mind. What *can* its existence mean then? How can it differ from a nullity?

"What is the value of a freedom, either, in which there is no freedom of action? What is independence, if one is denied the choice of doing what he pleases? True freedom implies not a mental void, not a destitution of attachment and activity, not a state which can only be characterized by a negation, but a power, a power to think and to act. If it involves a negation at all, it is simply a negation of attachment to that which is evil—a negation of activity in the wrong direction."

Kápila.—"But how can you trust to one's discriminating between that which is good and that which is evil—between a right and a wrong direction?"

Satyakáma.—"Is not that the very discrimination which your philosophy undertakes to discuss? But whether your philosophy teaches that discrimination or not, you will perhaps allow that it is no bondage to the creature to do that which his Creator intended he should do. And the intention of the Creator may be inferred from the constitution of the mind itself. If desire and aversion be, as they undoubtedly are, natural to the mind, they cannot of themselves be evils. It is not a bondage to the father to love his son. It is no bondage to any—it is on the contrary true freedom to love virtue and hate vice. It is no bondage to desire or do what is good. No one has ever regretted such an impulse or act. No one has ever derived any thing but pleasure therefrom.

"There is no doubt much evil in the world. One cannot be too jealous of his affections lest they lead him astray. Care should be taken to regulate them. Human nature requires to be reformed and regenerated. But to destroy is not to reform. To renounce is not to regulate. Nay you *cannot* destroy, you cannot renounce the passions and emotions of the mind. They are natural, and, as your Áchárya admits, what is natural cannot be destroyed[8]. You will only force them to take the wrong way by refusing them a field of action in the right way."

Kápila.—"We do not deny that passions and affections are natural to the mind. We say it is endowed both with intellectual and active powers[9]. But the mind is distinct from the soul, nor are they so associated as that the passions of the one should really affect the other. The association is temporary. The two are not essentially connected with each other."

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[8] स्वभावस्यानपायित्वात् ॥

[9] उभयात्मकं मनः । II. 26.

Satyakáma.—"You mean the soul is not essentially possessed of intellectual and active powers. The freedom then which you are postulating in behalf of the soul is not the freedom which implies moral greatness. It is the freedom of which stocks and stones may boast; it is the freedom which the paralytic attains in proportion to the extent of his disease. There can be no moral greatness without moral agency, nor any moral agency without choice of action. He that is open to impulses and has the power of action, he that resists temptations to evil and deliberately chooses that which is good may assert a claim to moral greatness—not he, who is destitute of feeling and emotion, or has no power of action.

"Nor do you propound a very dignified idea of spiritual freedom when you say that the soul's tranquillity and contentedness are or ought to be like those of the harlot Pingalá who simply submitted to what she considered a hard necessity when it was out of her power to attain her wished-for object[10]. There is no moral virtue in such forced resignation.

"And yet on a mere moral quibble, itself militating against every moral principle, you must set at nought all the indications of benevolent design which you see in the world, and pronounce it to be a world without God. And rather than allow freedom of action to a free spirit you are content to admit the undirected agency of an inanimate and unintelligent principle. You will allow that dead matter is competent to produce the wonderfully complex mechanism of the world, but you cannot admit that an in-

[10] निराशः सुखी पिङ्गलावत्। IV. 11.

आशां त्यक्त्वा पुरुषः सन्तोषाख्यसुखवान् भूयात् पिङ्गलावत्। यथा पिङ्गला नाम वेश्या कान्तार्थिनी कान्तमलब्ध्वा निर्विण्णा सती विहायाशां सुखिनी बभूव तद्वत्। V. B.

telligent spirit, having a purpose in view, could have such competence. This is, to use a well known proverb, to strain at a gnat while swallowing a camel. And the gnat, too, is simply a creature of your own fancy; for there is no moral difficulty in the supposition of a free spirit acting freely according to the good purpose of his own will.

"I am perfectly amazed at your undertaking to rid the country of heresy and yet admitting and enforcing some of its worst tenets. The *swabhávicas* are no doubt the most dangerous of Buddhists. And yet your theory seems to me precisely the same as theirs."

A'gamika.—"Is it possible that the doctrine of the venerable Kapila can be so bad as that!"

Satyákama.—"The Buddhists I have named deny God's agency and attribute the creation to *swabháva.* They speak also of the efficacy of *Karma,* or the merit of works, and reject the idea of a divine providence by asserting the necessary connection between works and their deserts. They say;—if God is the agent, then what are works for? and what is the use of *yatna* (effort) either[1]? Kapila's teaching on creation and providence appears to me to be precisely the same. He deliberately gives up the idea of an intelligent Creator by maintaining the theory of an inanimate but yet operative *prakṛiti*, and he says, almost in the very words of the *swabhávika* Buddhists, that the *distribution of rewards is not under divine direction because it is regulated by karma,* (works). I must do him the justice to add that the majority of Brahminical philosophers have broached the same doctrines in other words. Vedántism, as our friend Kápila justly remarked, did not dare to assert God's creative power without associating him with *avidyá,* nor could it acknowledge his providence without at the same time teaching that God

[1] *Sambhu Puráṇa* in Hodgson.

and the world were identical, and that there could be no giver or receiver of benefits or favors. Vedántism also falls back on the old idea of *adṛishṭa* or *karma* and its deserts, in order to account for the unequal distribution of pleasure in the world.

"Our philosophers, indeed, while professing to guard against Buddhistic teaching, have only contributed to its wider diffusion by setting forth, perhaps unconsciously, some of its characteristic tenets of a very pernicious tendency. Discontent with life and existence are taught as clearly in the Brahminical schools as in the Buddhist sects. The merit and demerit of *karma* or works are spoken of, in some of our schools at least, not only without reference to, but also to the absolute denial of, a judicial governor of the universe. The influence of *karma* is supposed to be itself sufficiently powerful for the government of the world, and the idea of God as Creator and Supreme ruler is deliberately renounced. *Dhyána* or meditation is inculcated as an effectual means of escape from the miseries of life and existence, but no object is presented to the mind on which *dhyána* is to be exercised. I do not know whether Buddha himself taught all these doctrines, but there is no denying that many of his followers hold them with great tenacity—and our Kapila has evidently adopted them from the same source. He denies a Supreme Being as creator and governor of the universe, and attributes the distribution of *fruits* or rewards to the influence of *karma*. And yet, like the Buddhists, he talks of *dhyána* and of *true knowledge* as the only means of emancipation. What importance can possibly be attached to *dhyána* or knowledge if the world be without a God?"

Kápila.—"I will not be so disingenuous as to deny the force of some of your observations. I must however

exlpain our definition of *dhyána*. Our A'chárya had said that knowledge is the only means of emancipation. But lust after the things of the world presents formidable obstructions in the way of knowledge. He accordingly tells us that *dhyána* is the best means of suppressing lust and promoting knowledge[2]. He tells us also that *dhyána* consists in the stoppage of intellectual exercises on other points than those which are the select objects of contemplation[3]. And this is done by controlling the breath in a proper posture and by assiduous discharge of the duties of one's[4] own stage of life, as well as by renouncement of all passions and desires."

Satyakáma.—"But what can be the 'select object' of *dhyána* or knowledge in your system? You acknowledge no Supreme Divinity, and your great conclusion is *I am not, nor aught is mine.*"

Kápila.—"By *dhyána* we mean the abstraction of the mind from all objects."

Satyakáma.—"Am I to understand that *dhyána* or meditation means that the mind does not actually meditate on any thing, and that it is in a state of entire inactivity, not dwelling on any reality whatever."

Kápila.—"Yes—certainly you are to understand so." For though the scholiast adds, 'other than the select

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[2] रागोपहतिध्यानं। III. 30.

ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धको यो विषयोपरागश्चित्तस्य तदुपघातहेतुर्ध्यानं।

Vijnána Bhikshu.

[3] वृत्तिनिरोधात् तत्सिद्धिः।

ध्येयातिरिक्तवृत्तिनिरोधरूपेण सम्प्रज्ञातयोगेन तत्सिद्धि ध्यानस्य निष्पत्तिर्ज्ञानाख्यफलोपधानरूपा भवति।

[4] धारणासनस्वकर्म्मणा तत्सिद्धिः। निरोधश्छर्दिविधारणाभ्यां। स्थिर-सुखमासनं। स्वकर्म्म स्वाश्रमविहितकर्म्मानुष्ठानं। वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च।

objects of contemplation,' yet that is not found in the Sutra itself. And Kapila says elsewhere that *dhyána implies the mind without an object*[5]."

Satyakáma.—"What can be the efficacy of such meditation, or rather such no-meditation?"

Kápila.—"Our A'chárya, in anticipation of this very question; says that one great use of *dhyána* is the suppression of lust[6]. When you can abstract your mind from every thing in the world, it is certain you exclude all passion and lust."

Satyakáma.—"Your *dhyána* or meditation is then a negative idea. It does not imply the pondering of any reality in the mind, but rather dwelling on no-thing. It is natural that your knowledge should be equally negative, —for, says the Kárika, 'through study of principles, the 'conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is at-'tained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I 'exist.'"

Kápila.—"Is it not one of the most admirable features in the Sánkhya system that it teaches you the truth of truths—that all things are vain and transient. You may call it a negative conclusion, but are not some negative conclusions of the greatest value, and above all is it not of prime importance that men should be convinced of the vanity and nullity of vain and unreal things?"

Satyakáma.—"It is no doubt of the greatest importance to be convinced of the vanity of vain things, but why is it so? Is it not because the exposure of the vanity of vain things facilitates the knowledge of things that are real? But if, as you say, there be no God in the world, nothing pre-eminently real—if all that your

[5] ध्यानं निर्विषयं मनः।

[6] उभयथाप्यविशेषश्चेन्नैवमुपरागनिरोधाद्विशेषः।

discriminative knowledge has to unfold is that we *are not*, nor *is aught ours*,—I really cannot see what great value there can be in such knowledge. That knowledge is simply the information that *nothing is ours*. It might be a most valuable information, if along with the denial of things unreal, it contained an assurance of that which is real and abiding. The dispelling of error is no doubt an inestimable blessing when there is a corresponding great truth to be communicated. But in a system without God, without an active soul, with simply a passive by-stander *purusha*, essentially devoid of mind, and with the mere projections of an inanimate principle, themselves to be denounced as vain and transient—in an empty system such as this, what claims can be possibly set up on the score of valuable information of any kind?

"And as to the ultimate object which the system professes to have in view, the emancipation of the soul, the idea becomes preposterous when you confidently assert that the soul neither has nor is capable of any real bondage or freedom[7]. There is nothing to emancipate the soul from—for you say the soul can have no bondage. If it has any pain by reason of its connection with mind, it is merely a reflection or shadow of pain[8]. Nor could there be a possible way of emancipating it, for you say it is not so associated with mind and the senses (the only media through which it could be reached) as that sensation and reflection could affect it any more than water can affect the lotus leaf on which it drops[9]. And even if the soul could be reached, it could not be emancipated from a real

[7] नैकान्ततो बन्धमोक्षौ पुरुषस्याविवेकादृते।

[8] स च दुःखप्रतिबिम्बरूप एव। Vijnána Bhikshu.

[9] श्रुतिस्मृतिषु पद्मपत्रस्थजलेनेव पद्मपत्रस्यासङ्गतायाः पुरुषासङ्गतायां दृष्टान्तताश्रवणाच्च। Vijnána Bhikshu.

bondage, because that which is essentially bound cannot on your theory be liberated.

"Such is your system, and it is you say a preservative from Buddhism. But, what Buddhistic doctrine can possibly be put down thereby, appears to me an enigma incapable of solution. It cannot be its atheism, for Kapila's system is itself without God. Is it then simply its rejection of caste that you wish to remedy with the help of the Sánkhya? Allow me once for all to put you on your guard against the spirit that pervades your system. You care not for the honor due to God, or rather you argue against His existence; but you are particularly jealous for the honor of your own fraternity. You are not offended at Buddhists' denying the God of Heaven—on the contrary you support their doctrine in this respect, you are ready with your *prakṛiti* to re-inforce their *swabháva* in the unholy contest against God. But you cannot tolerate their denial of Brahminical supremacy—you cannot allow their onset against gods-of-the-earth as you delight to call yourselves."

Kápila remained silent for some minutes He then remarked that he had never thought of the Sánkhya except in connection with the Vedánta, and there could be no doubt it contrasted favourably with Śankara's pantheism. He never reviewed it in its relation to Buddhism. He must confess that such a review was desirable for the purpose of investigating truth, but all he could now promise was that he would cogitate calmly on the subject.

DIALOGUE VII.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

We have just got through the festivities of a grand marriage in our neighbourhood. The Rajah's daughter was united to a fine young man, as handsome in his person, as he is noble in his origin and graceful in his manners. You have never yet told me how you manage these social affairs in your part of the world. With us matrimonial ceremonies are generally performed at night. The bridegroom comes with a large retinue of friends, marching in procession. He is received at the door by the bride's party, and thence conducted to a spacious hall where he takes his seat as the lion of the evening. Before him are assembled, on the one hand, the party he has himself brought, and on the other the company invited by the bride's friends. Learned Brahmans often take these opportunities of making themselves known by means of literary and philosophical controversies; which commence in good humour indeed, but sometimes become sufficiently animated to require the interference of third parties for the peace of the house.

On the occasion of the wedding I have just mentioned, all pundits of any pretensions in the neighbourhood were invited to grace the assembly. Tarkakáma, A'gamika,

among my new friends, as well as many old faces long familiar to me, were there. Satyakáma was not asked, for his highness, though himself of an enlarged mind, was afraid of offending the prejudices of others. The bridegroom, however, was not so timid. Young Bengal, you may have heard, does not give way to such scruples; and we had an instance the other night in the bridegroom's bringing Satyakáma in his company.

As soon as the bridegroom was conducted to his splendid velvet throne, and the numerous guests who formed the two parties for the evening had assembled, Tarkakáma came up to me and said, "Do you see, Satyakáma is here? He has, as you know, lately been carrying on hot debates on the several schools of our philosophy. I think we should have told him at the very beginning that although we assent to the teaching of the Nyáya and the Sánkhya in deference to the venerable Ṛishis who propounded them, yet it is not on the Nyáya or the Sánkhya that our hopes of salvation are practically placed. We dare not say that Gotama or Kapila was or could be wrong, but we certainly do not look to the system founded by either for spiritual consolation. Men may in their speculations give a preference to their analysis of the intellectual powers or their peculiar rules of reasoning; *vidyárthis* (students) may go to the school of Gotama or Kaṇáda for mental discipline, but the *mumukshu* will not turn that way for the salvation of his soul. It is to the Vedánta that we look for such salvation. It is on the sacred teaching of this school that we rely in our efforts to escape the miseries of life. Satyakáma could not have enjoyed even a seeming triumph against us if we had taken our vantage-ground on the Vedánta, and cut short the unprofitable discussion of categories and topics. Our case has at present an unfavourable appearance because

of our not having considered what would be the best tactics for us to adopt. But it is not too late to set him and ourselves right on this point. We have a good and fitting opportunity now and here."

Scarcely had Tarkakáma finished these words when our attention was arrested by a noisy debate which several pundits had commenced with a view to introduce themselves to the notice of the assembled audience. It did not appear to be a regular controversy on any particular point. It was a series of desultory discussions, kept up at random, by several persons, impelled by *jigíshá* (a desire of victory) rather than *jijnása* (a desire of knowledge), in which there was a greater display of learning than search after truth. It is impossible to report to you all I heard. As there was no connected argument the reasoning employed cannot be called to recollection on any principle of suggestion. I can only put down desultory passages as memory may serve them out.

One said the world was produced by the union of *prakṛiti* and *purusha*, and that S'iva was the great God. 'I cannot, said another, allow your last saying. The Máhes'waras are all wrong. Vishṇu is the great God. Did not S'iva confess his inferiority when he failed to protect his devotee, king Vána, against the divine Kṛishṇa[1]?' 'You are all wrong, cried a Yogi of the Sánkhya school, all wrong, both Máhes'waras and Bhágavatas. The active intervention of God is not at all necessary, prakṛiti is alone sufficient.' 'Prakṛiti alone sufficient! (said another) I say purusha is alone sufficient. No necessity for a prakṛiti. All this is out of nothing' 'All this is out of nothing! Then the husbandman may reap without

[1] श्रीरुद्र उवाच। * * * अहं ब्रह्माथ विबुधा मुनयश्चामलाशयाः। सर्वात्मनाप्रपन्नास्त्वामात्मानं प्रेष्ठमीश्वरं। Sri Bhagávata, x. 63.

sowing, the potter may get his vessel without working, and the lazy weaver find his cloth as successfully as his hard working associate[2]!'

One of the loudest talkers was a Vaishṇava of the new school of Chaitanya, and a follower of the Bhágavata philosophy, for which he had acquired the surname of Bhágavata. He was contending, against a follower of S'ankaráchárya, that the Supreme Being was not and could not be *nirákára* (formless), that he had an eternal *vigraha* or form of which no created being can have the least conception, and that those who denied this truth denied in effect the existence of God, and are to be stigmatized as those rankest of rank Buddhists who maintained that the creation and conservation of the world do not require the exercise of divine agency, the merit of *karma* being itself sufficient. 'Well has it been said that the doctrine of *máyá*, which falsifies the eternal form of God, is only disguised Buddhism[3]—a blasphemy against gods and Vedas.'

While the learned expounder of the *pancha rátra* theory was thus declaiming against the ideal Vedantists, there came forward, from one of the hinder rows, a pundit, whose features and habiliments were somewhat different from the rest of the company, and who, I afterwards learnt, was a Buddhist s'ástri attending on a Nepaulese officer (colonel, they called him) now on a visit to Bengal. The officer and the s'ástri were both invited by the bride's father. "So, venerable Bhágavata, said the Buddhist, you take us to be not only impious ourselves, but also

[2] कृषीवलस्य क्षेत्रकर्म्मण्यप्रयतमानस्यापि सस्यनिष्पत्तिः स्यात् कुलालस्य मृत् सत्क्रियायामप्रयतमानस्यापि अमत्रोत्पत्तिश्च तन्तुवायस्यापि तन्तून-तन्वानस्यापि तन्वानस्येव वस्त्रलाभः। S'ankara Com. Vedant, II. 2. 27.

[3] मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमेव च। Padma Purána.

patterns of impiety. You cannot find a more rhetorical term for rebuking your opponents than by comparing them with Buddhists. You call us revilers of gods and Vedas. Well, we shall patiently submit to your inflictions. This is not the first time when we have been called to bear them. But will you allow us to say one word in our defence?"

Bhágavata.—"I meant no offence to you, Sir. But we shall gladly receive any explanations from you."

Buddhist.—"Well, then, I say, if we have reviled gods and Vedas, we have done nothing more than your own Bhagaván Vásudeva has done."

No sooner had the Buddhist S'ástri uttered these words than a whole troop of Bhágavatas and Vaishṇavas vociferated aloud—"Dont hear him! dont hear him! Oh blasphemy against the Lord! could the Lord revile gods and Vedas? Impossible."

The assembly was now in an uproar. It was with some difficulty that a domestic Brahmin of the Rajah restored silence and order, and told the disputants that it was unbecoming the dignity of learned and aged religionists to create such confusion and disorder. "Young men of hot blood," said he, "have been known on occasions of marriage festivities to carry literary contests to the length of smashing lights and chandeliers, but the Rajah has a right to expect better examples from venerable s'ástris."

The Buddhist was now allowed to speak for himself. "If," said he, "the force of numbers and the power of eloquence are to decide between us, then I must at once retire from the contest. I am a foreigner, single-handed, and far from my country, and I do not pretend to the dialectics of your schools. But if you will listen to facts, I will point to certain sayings of your Vásudeva

in proof of my assertion that we do not revile gods and Vedas more than he has done. For how did he remonstrate with his foster father Nanda against the popular custom of tendering divine worship to Indra. 'By '*karma* or the merit of works, said he, are living creatures 'born, by *karma* again they enter into dissolution. Plea- 'sure, pain, fear, bliss, all proceed from *karma*. If there 'be a god, the distributer of the fruits of others' actions, 'he too bestows them only on workers. There is no such 'thing as a Lord of one that works not. What can 'Indra do to men following their respective actions? 'He cannot counteract what they do by virtue of swa- 'bháva, or nature. We are subject to nature and we fol- 'low nature. Every one, whether a man, an *asura*, or a 'god is under the control of nature. A person receives and 'gives up various sorts of bodies by the instrumentality 'of *karma*, which is itself our friend, our foe, our stranger, 'our preceptor, our god. Let one therefore following 'his nature and doing his own work worship *karma*. 'That which a person is fitted to observe is in reality his 'god. He who, living on one principle observes another, 'receives no good therefrom, just as a lady of honor 'receives no benefit from a paramour[4].'

[4] कर्म्मणा जायते जन्तुः कर्म्मणैव प्रलीयते। सुखं दुःखं भयं क्षेमं कर्म्मणैवाभिपद्यते॥ अस्ति चेदीश्वरः कश्चित् फलरूप्यन्यकर्म्मणां। कर्त्तारं भजते सोपि नह्यकर्त्तुः प्रभुर्हि सः॥ किमिन्द्रेणेह भूतानां स्वं स्वं कर्म्मानुवर्त्तिनां। अनीशेनान्यथा कर्त्तुं स्वभावविहितं नृणां॥ स्वभावतन्त्रो हि जनः स्वभावमनुवर्त्तते। स्वभावस्थमिदं सर्व्वं सदेवासुरमानुषं॥ देहानुच्चावचान् जन्तुः प्राप्योत्सृजति कर्म्मणा। शत्रु र्मित्रमुदासीनः कर्म्मैव गुरुरीश्वरः॥ तस्मात् संपूजयेत् कर्म्म स्वभावस्थः स्वकर्म्मकृत्। अञ्जसा येन वर्त्तेत तदेवास्य हि दैवतं॥ आजीव्यैकतरं भावं यस्त्वन्यमुपजीवति। न तस्माद्विन्दते क्षेमं जाराद्नार्य्यसती यथा॥ Bhágavata. x. 24. 13—20.

"I appeal to your fairness, learned Sirs, continued the Buddhist, if any precept of S'ákya Sinha can be a stronger denunciation of the divine power than the passage I have just read from the great text book of all Bhágavatas. And as to the Vedas, allow me to remind you how the Upanishad itself talks of them when it stigmatizes all four as *apará*, or inferior, and classifies them with books which may be considered manuals for children[5]. We never intended to say any thing more severe than this. S'áṇḍilya also speaks of the four Vedas as failing to teach the way of salvation, and S'ankaráchárya calls that saying a reviling of the Veda[6]. And your divine Vásudeva himself condemns the florid speech of those unwise men who, 'addicted to the texts of the Veda, and bent on the enjoyment of heaven, say that there is no other way than this. The sentiments of such men are not fitted for *samádhi*, or the mental abstraction necessary for *nirváṇa* in Brahma[7],'—terms and ideas which I very much suspect you have borrowed from our philosophy and its nomenclature."

Bhágavata.—"Ah, but the divine Vásudeva has elsewhere set forth the authority of the Vedas and the dignity of the gods. It is only when he was expounding the *Jnána-Káṇḍa*, or chapter on knowledge, that he was speaking in depreciation—not of the whole Veda, but of the *Karma-Káṇḍa* or chapter on works."

Buddhist.—"And yet, relying on the same 'chapter on works,' he inveighed against the worship of any

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[5] तत्रापरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति। अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते।
Muṇḍaka.

[6] चतुर्षु वेदेषु परं श्रेयोऽलब्ध्वा शाण्डिल्य इदं शास्त्रमधिगतवानित्यादिवेदनिन्दा दर्शनात्। Vedant Com. II. 2. 45.

[7] Bhagavad-Gita. II.

divinity, after the fashion of Jaimini. Well, Sirs, the only difference between us is that we hold to a consistent doctrine, whereas you make a convenience of your gods and Vedas,—sometimes defending, sometimes condemning them, just as your fancy prompts you for the moment. This only confirms me in my opinion that when our S'ákya of blessed memory protested against your original system of mere rites and ceremonies, and taught the way of escaping the miseries of life and of transmigration, you would neither follow him, nor could you resist the force of his doctrines. So you borrowed some of his ideas about the bondage of works and the means of *samádhi* and *nirváṇa*. But truth does not find its natural place in a system of error, and so you have a series of inconsistencies in your philosophy on which your best doctors are perpetually wrangling with one another. Your original Vedas say nothing of the miseries of life, decay, and transmigration, nor impress on your minds the necessity of seeking for *nirváṇa* or *mukti*. Several of your Upanishads too present to your aspirations nothing higher than the sensuous enjoyment of heaven[8]; and, if some of those Vedic appendages chime in other tunes, they were evidently written after the age

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[8] य एवमेता महासंहिता व्याख्याता वेद। सन्धीयते प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेनान्नाद्येन सुवर्गेण लोकेन॥ Taittiriya.

अतोऽत्रापि य एवं वेद सन्धीयते प्रजादिभिः स्वर्गान्तैः प्रजादिफलमाप्नोतीत्यर्थः॥ S'ankara on ditto.

स एवं विद्वानस्माच्छरीरभेदादूर्द्ध्वं उत्क्रम्यामुष्मिन् स्वर्गे लोके सर्व्वान् कामानाप्त्वाऽमृतः समभवत् समभवत्॥ Aitareya.

यो वा एतामेवं वेदापहत्य पाप्मानमनन्ते स्वर्गे लोके ज्येये प्रतितिष्ठति प्रतितिष्ठति॥ Kena.

of S'ákya, and have learnt those tunes from the lyre of our philosophy."

The debate was going on after this fashion when Tarkakáma told me there was no use sitting and listening to such incoherent discussions. He proposed that we should leave the disputants to themselves, and seek a less noisy place for ourselves. We accordingly moved to a quiet corner in one of the side wings of the hall. A'gamika, Satyakáma, Vaiyásika, and a few other friends followed us. We formed a little group of our own. Tarkakáma, referring to our past conferences, said to Satyakáma that the Nyáya and the Sánkhya were intended as intellectual exercises rather than as means of escape from the troubles of a sinful world. "It was the Vedanta to which we really looked for salvation. Vyása and S'ankara are our real guides in a spiritual point of view. Gotama and Kapila may have taught us metaphysics and logic, but the author of the Brahma sútras and his commentator have shown us the way to life and happiness."

Vaiyásika, not anticipating a controversy on the subject, spoke thus in support of Tarkakáma's remarks; "Do you not see, Satyakáma, the great service which our venerable A'chárya and his commentator have rendered to the cause of Theology. How nobly have they fought with men who would set up other eternal principles in rivalry with the one Supreme Spirit Vyása told them, as he told the whole world, that it was perfectly needless to look for other causes than one only Brahma in order to account for the origin of the universe."

Satyakáma.—"I should be unwilling this night to enter into a discussion with you Vaiyásika. You and I have come in the same procession; it is not usual for friends of the bridegroom to choose such an occasion for a debate

among themselves. I will simply remark that your *one* Brahma is otherwise described to have as many forms or modifications as there are things in the universe, and therefore your *one* eternal principle exceeds millions."

Tarkakáma.—"I am glad to find you enter so readily into the spirit of our social institutions. Well, I have not come in your procession; perhaps you will have no objection to discuss the question with me. How do you make out that our one Brahma is of as many forms as there are things in the universe?"

Satyakáma.—"Śankaráchárya, while dessenting from the Bhágavata theory of God possessed of four modifications, Vásudeva, Sankarshaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, acknowledges that all existing substances 'from Brahmá down to a bundle of grass' are modifications of God[9]. And he approvingly cites the text of the Upanishad which pronounces *all this* (*i. e.*, the whole universe) *to be God*[10]. The effect is declared to be identical with its cause, and that in a way which smells strongly of material pantheism."

Tarkakáma.—"Invert the predicate and you will easily understand the meaning of that text. Let 'God' be the subject, and 'all this,' the predicate. It will then read thus: 'God is all this,' that is to say, God is manifest in all this. On whatever substance you may cast your eyes, you see nothing but an instance of the power of God."

Satyakáma.—"Very ingenious, friend Tarkakáma. But the 5th Sútra of IV. 1. protests against the idea of looking on the superior as inferior, on the king as a mere coachman, on Brahma as a creature. Brahma is to be

[9] न चैते भगवद्व्यूहाश्चतुः संख्यायामेव व्यवतिष्ठेरन् ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्य्यन्तस्य समस्तस्य जगतो भगवद्व्यूहत्वावगमात्। Ved. Com. II. 2, 44.

[10] सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलान्।

predicated of creatures, not any creature of Brahma[1]. You may say A'ditya is Brahma, vital air is Brahma, lightning is Brahma, but you cannot affirm the converse. Besides you must remember I am not criticising the text itself. I spoke of the leading doctors of the Vedánta who cited it. If you refer to their writings you will find they did not cite it in the sense in which you read it. I suspect Vaiyásika will not be thankful to you for reading that celebrated passage in a sense which will evidently stultify the authorized teaching of his school. And, Tarkakáma, you can scarcely be ignorant of the fact that the meaning you attach to that sentence, though it is suggested by some eminent critics, is not supported by the context. What are the words that follow? '*Tajjalán*,' an elliptical expression, the meaning of which no one has controverted, *(i. e.) being produced from, resolved into, and existing in Him*[2]. It would not be a natural reading to take the whole sentence in your sense; "*God is all this,* being produced from, resolved into, and existing in Him!" The sense in which S'ankaráchárya and other eminent expositors have read the passage must be the correct signification."

Tarkakáma.—"Well, I will not press that point. But you cannot be ignorant of the fact that Vedantists consider the universe as a mere idea, a non-entity, a no-thing.

[1] ब्रह्मदृष्टिरादित्यादिषु स्यादिति। कस्मात् उत्कर्षात् एवमुत्कर्षेणादित्यादयोदृष्टा भवन्ति उत्कृष्टदृष्टेस्तेष्वध्यासात्। तथा च लौकिकोन्यायोनुमतो भवति। उत्कृष्टदृष्टिर्हि निकृष्टेध्यसितव्येति लौकिको न्यायः यथा राजदृष्टिः क्षत्तरि सचानुगन्तव्यः विपर्य्यये प्रत्यवायप्रसङ्गात्। नहि क्षत्तृदृष्टिपरिगृहीतो राजा निकर्षं नीयमानः श्रेयसे स्यात्।

S'ankaráchárya.

[2] यस्मात् सर्व्वमिदं विकारजातं ब्रह्मैव तज्जत्वात् तल्लत्वात् तदनत्वाच्च।

Ibid. I. 2, 1.

The passage cannot therefore inculcate, as you contend it does, a material pantheism, or an indefinite deification of every thing. It does not say that every *thing* is God; but that all this, which is no *thing*, is God.

Satyakáma.—"I am not sure the Vedantists will thank you for this interpretation either, though it has the support of Benares scholarship[3]. If 'all this' means 'no *thing*,' then the sentence will teach that something, which is itself no *thing*, is God, or 'the one only *thing*!' Will you tell me if the passage in question is intended to teach doctrine or enforce practice? I can understand those interpreters who say that this text, inculcating the identity of the world with God, is calculated to recommend mental tranquillity and contentment by showing that there is no room for ambition avarice and lust[4]. According to your rendering, the text pronounces the world, itself no *thing*, to be 'the one only *thing*.' Why this compliment? There is a class of Vedantists who say the world is a non-entity, but I doubt whether their theology is at all better than that of Kapila or Kaṇáda."

Tarkakáma.—"I do not quite understand you. Explain yourself."

Satyakáma.—"Whichever view you may take of external nature, whether with the *pariṇáma-vádis*, who may be called material pantheists, you pronounce it to be a reality, or with the *vivarta-vádis*, who are a species of spiritual pantheists, you call it a non-entity, the text above cited must teach very questionable theology. It must either deify the world and inculcate the very error (which Kapila

3 "All, that is, no *thing*: Brahma being the one only *thing*." Benares Magazine vol V. p. 421.

4 न च सर्व्वस्यैकात्मत्वे सति रागादयः सम्भवन्ति तस्माच्छान्त उपासीत । S'ankara. Com. Vedant, I. 2. 1.

contended was necessarily involved in the Vedant doctrine) of every thing being God, or it will nullify the creation, and declare that nothing was called into being by God. And really it is difficult to say which is the worse teaching of the two. One thing however is certain; it confirms the opinion I lately read in an English review that *pantheism is practical atheism.* He who says the world is God precludes the idea of serving that God; for where the creature itself is God, who is to be the worshipper. The Vedant triumphantly adopts this conclusion, but we ought not therefore to be the less jealous of the impiety implied in it. It involves the very essence of Kapila's atheism. And he who says nothing was produced from him, as effectually excludes the practice of religion; for if nothing be a reality in the world, there can be no real worship of God."

Tarkakáma.—"I think, Satyakáma, you rely too much on English reviewers. If you adopt them as your masters, no wonder you will vilify the doctrine of the Vedant as practical atheism. Like teacher like pupil. But you cannot expect me to be much influenced by the language of your English masters."

Satyakáma.—"Pardon me, Tarkakáma. I should have told you that it was *Chiranjíva,* the author of the *Vidwan-moda-taranginí,* that first suggested the idea which I afterwards found in the Review of which I have spoken. Listen to the words he has put into the mouth of his atheistic interlocutor; '*Atheist* (to the Vedantist) Well, very well, you have now entered a little 'into my views * * * But if the universe be in your 'opinion unreal, then why unnecessarily invent your 'Brahma? Without form, without agency, what can he 'be doing in the world[5]?'

[5] नास्तिकः। साधु रे साधु किंचिन्मन्मते प्रविष्टोऽसि॥

"The Vedantist, the author adds, was silenced by the question[6]. But this was not the whole extent of his humiliation. The Tárkika, or philosophical interlocutor, who seems to propound the author's own views, says afterwards to the Vedantist; 'By pronouncing the world to 'be false, notwithstanding the evident proofs of its exis-'tence, you appear to be a master atheist, destitute alike 'of shame and fear[7].'"

Tarkakáma.—"It may be all very fine to talk in this way, but how do you know the world has 'evident proofs of its existence'? How do you know that there are external substances? The evidence of the senses is surely not to be depended upon. How can you credit the eye which has been proved to be delusive in the case of a Mirage? Will you follow the example of the irrational deer who falls a sacrifice to his thirst, thereby giving the name to the Mirage[8].

"How can you trust the ear which has practised deception on you in open day light, as, for instance, in an exhibition of ventriloquism? What confidence can the organs of smell and taste consistently call for, when they will present the same objects as sweet and savoury to some, but insipid or fetid to others? Witness the effects which assafœtida and English cheese produce on men of different tastes. Have you never walked, Satyakáma, through the China

जगन्मृषैवेति भवन्मतं चेत् किं कल्प्यते ब्रह्म निरर्थकं तत् ।
आकारशून्येन गतक्रियेण कर्त्तव्यमेतेन किमस्तिलोके ॥

[6] इत्याकर्ण्य चकिते तूष्णींभूते वेदान्तिनि सस्मितं सर्व्वे तार्किक मवलोकयन्ति ॥

[7] प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमप्येतज्जगन्मिथ्येति कीर्त्तयन् । लज्जाभयोभयत्यागान्नास्तिकस्य प्रभुर्भवान् ॥

[8] मृगतृष्णा मरीचिका ॥

bazar of Calcutta, nor covered your nostrils before shops to which the barbarians flock for refreshment? The world, whose existence you deduce from proofs of this description, doubtless occupies a considerable space in your imagination: but I cannot conceive what right you can have to speak of it as *real*, much less to vilify those who do not follow you in your phantastic flights."

Satyakáma.—"I think I have the same right to speak of the world as a reality that any of us has to speak of any thing at all. You cannot hold an argument and at the same time deny the validity of proof. Remember the language of Gotama whom you confess to be a master of logic. 'If all evidence is to be rejected, then the refutation itself is inadmissible[9].'

"The reasons you have advanced against the validity of the evidence which our senses give, themselves demolish your argument. The facts concerning the Mirage and ventriloquism must have been communicated to you through the instrumentality of the senses; and if the senses are never to be trusted, then the facts from which you have deduced your objections fall to the ground. How do you know, but through your senses, that the Mirage and ventriloquism have deceived you?

"Kaṇáda has well said that it is only when the senses are unsound[10], or defective, or when some particular bad habit is contracted, that a person may be deceived.

"When however one sense may thus deceive you, the others may come to your relief, and disabuse your mind. If the eye is imposed upon by a *mirage*, you can soon discover the illusion by the help of the ear and the touch. If the ear is deluded by the practice of ventriloquists, the

9 सर्व्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः। Nyáya Sútra, II. 3.

10 इन्द्रियदोषसंस्कारदोषाच्चाविद्या।

eye helps it to detect the error. You cannot I believe adduce a single instance in which all the senses were simultaneously deceived.

"But by arguing against the validity of the senses and the doctrine of the world's reality, you are by no means doing good service to the cause of Vedantism; for you are thereby cutting away the ground on which the system rests. How does the great doctor of Vedantism introduce his doctrine? He declares the reasonableness of desiring the knowledge of Brahma. But who is Brahma? *He from whom is the production &c., of this*[1], says the aphorist; that is to say, as Śankaráchárya explains and expounds it; 'That Omniscient and Omnipo-'tent cause, from which proceed the production, conserva-'tion, and destruction of this world, which is distin-'guished by names and forms, containing many agents 'and patients, and times, spaces, causes, effects, and 'fruits, adapted to one another, and the beautiful arrange-'ment of which cannot be even imagined by the mind, is 'Brahma[2].' The aphorism and the commentary are but expositions of the text in the Upanishad in which the inquirer is informed that 'He is Brahma from whom 'these elements are produced, by whom those which are 'produced are sustained, in whom departing they are 'resolved[3].' Now if these elements are mere phantoms, no argument based *simply* on them, can be other than phantastic. Whether the maxim (ex nihilo nihil fit,)

[1] जन्माद्यस्य यतः। Vedant Sútra, I. i. 2.

[2] अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्यानेककर्त्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्व्वज्ञात् सर्व्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः॥

[3] यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म॥

which affirmatively is an exact rendering of our interrogatory adage[4] of the Vedas, be universally true or not, so far as the necessity of a material cause is concerned, there can be no doubt as to the logical fallacy involved in reasoning *a posteriori* from *nothing at all to something.* What sort of a *S'eshavat anumána* would Gotama call it, if after asserting *it has rained, because the river has risen;* you were presently to declare that *the river has not really risen.* The author of the *Vidwan-moda-tarangiṇi* does no injustice to the Vedantist when he calls him a master atheist, and represents him as foiled by the unhappy man who had worked up his mind into a denial of God. Nor does Chiranjiva wrong the Vedantist much by adding, 'If that be the case, then who are you? 'what do you say? and what is your Brahma? Of you, 'the utterer of unreality, nothing can be real[5].'

Tarkakáma.—"But does not even a shadow betoken some reality which has cast it? Does not a reflection point to its substance? does not even the mirage prove the existence of something of which it is a distorted likeness. The world is indeed a mere shadow, but it points to Brahma as its substance."

Satyakáma.—"We must remember that a shadow is only cast by an opaque body when it intercepts the rays shot by a luminous body, and it must be cast on something from which those rays are intercepted. A shadow, if it betokens a reality at all, must prove the existence at least of *three* entities, the luminous body whose light is intercepted, the opaque body which intercepts it, and the body on which the shadow is cast. But where is the

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[4] कथमसतः सज्जायेत। Chhándogya.

[5] तार्किकः सहासं। एवं सति त्वमपि कः किं ब्रवीषि किंवा त्वद्ब्रह्म सकलमपि मिथ्यैव मिथ्यावादिनस्ते॥

luminary before which Brahma stands as an opaque substance? Is not Brahma 'light of lights by whose refulgence all other things shine[6]?' How then can it cast a shadow like an opaque substance? Or if you prefer to use the words *reflection* and *mirage*, you must remember that a reflection, in like manner, must prove the existence at least of *two* or rather *three* substances; the luminous body, the light, and the reflecting mirror or refracting medium. The mirage too, besides pointing to the substance of which it is a distorted image, implies the existence of an *atmosphere* in which the refraction takes place. What room then can there be for your much talked of *unity of essence.* It is impossible for you to answer Kaṇáda's or Kapila's objections to your unity. You must either renounce your theory of one essence, or you must avow that you have no reasons for holding that opinion. You *can* have no reason if you deny every thing that is not Brahma, for then there can be no independent reason. What then will become of your Vedas either? If there be nothing but the Supreme Spirit, then the Vedas must be a nullity."

While Satyakáma and Tarkakáma were thus discussing the idealism of the Vedanta, I was reminded of what you so often wrote to me, learned śástri, of the lectures which the accomplished president of your Páṭhaśálá delivered on the subject, and specially of the analogy he pointed out between the doctrines of the Vedánta and the Philosophy of a celebrated English Bishop. And this brings to my recollection my ingratitude in never yet thanking you for the *Reprints for the Pundits* which contain the opinions of Berkeley, and propound the

[6] तच्छुभ्रंज्योतिषांज्योतिः तमेवभान्तमनुभाति सर्व्वं तस्य भासा सर्व्वमिदं विभाति Mundaka.

problem of *pressing into the ranks of progress* the generally revered system of the Vedánta. I thought it only just to Tarkakáma that he should have the benefit of the sentiments broached at Benares. We might then be able to discuss the question of assimilating the philosophy of the East with that of the West. Nothing could be more desirable than this consummation, if only it were practicable. You might then hope to see the Reverend gentlemen of Sigra and the learned alumni of your *páṭhas'álá* allied in one great cause.

Did you, I asked Satyakáma, approvingly cite the rebuke administered to the Vedantist in the *Vidwan-moda-tarangiṇi?* Do you really think that to deny the reality of the external world savours of atheism? What then would you say to Bishop Berkeley?

Tarkakáma who, it appears had read the *Reprints,* instantly took the hint, and triumphantly exclaimed; "Well said! well said! the ontology of the Vedánta is the philosophy of Berkeley! How can you pronounce the one to be atheism without including the other in the same condemnation?—You seem to hesitate, friend Satyakáma. Out with your usual boldness."

Satyakáma.—"I was not hesitating from fear. Indeed what can I have to fear? My object is to vindicate the truth. I care not where and in what shape that truth is found. But I was hesitating because I think you are not dealing fairly with learned Europeans by pressing them into this controversy. It is impossible for you to have read the fourth number of the *Reprints* without being convinced that Berkeley's opinions are *not* those of your Vedantists. It was Colonel Kennedy that first suggested the idea that the opinions of Berkeley were similar to those of the Vedánta, but in the plenitude of his surprize at the *Ne plus ultra* of transcendentalism which he found

in the Vedánta, he could only say that the good Bishop approached in some degree to that system. Another gentleman has since remarked that the ontology of the Vedánta is the doctrine of that prelate. But you must for your part remember that the object of those authors is to narrow as much as possible the points of difference between philosophers of Europe and India. If they have made any over-statement, it must be attributed to their charity. At any rate it is not for us to build philosophical arguments on mere compliments generously paid to the systems of our fathers. If you take unfair advantage of compliments, foreigners will be at a loss how to deal with you. Courtesy will then prove a dangerous virtue."

Vaiyásika.—"I do not understand what you mean. But is it true that there is any resemblance between the Vedánta and Berkeley's doctrine ?"

Satyakáma.—"I should like to hear what Tarkakáma says to this. A question from the bridegroom's party had better be answered by the bride's guests."

Tarkakáma.—"Not a resemblance merely, but, as it has been well said, the doctrine of Berkeley *is* the ontology of the Vedant."

Satyakáma.—"Is it in their affirmations or negations that Berkeley and the Vedánta are consentient ?"

Tarkakáma.—"Both. Berkeley acknowledges the existence of spirit, and denies that of matter. The Vedánta does the same."

Satyakáma.—"First then with reference to their affirmations :—can you tell me whether Berkeley allowed the existence of one Eternal Spirit only, or did he also assert the reality of many created spirits."

"On this point, said Tarkakáma, the Christian is of course inferior to the Brahman. Berkeley was unfortunately destitute of the light of the Vedas, and ignorant

of our grand doctrine of unity. Consequently he allowed a multiplicity of real spirits."

"Such as God, angels, men, &c."

"I must say so."

"Well, said Satyakáma, how many spirits does the Vedánta allow ?

Tarkakáma replied instantly, "*Ekamevádwitiyam,* one only without a second."

"And that is a cardinal doctrine of the Vedánta. Is it not ?"

"Of course, or it would degenerate into a *dwaitaváda,* a system of duality."

"Is Berkeley's teaching *adwaitaváda,* a system of unity ?"

"I wish, said Tarkakáma, it were, but here is his failure."

"Then in one of your cardinal points, the very point which distinguishes the Vedánta from other schools of Brahminical philosophy, the ontology of the Vedánta is *not* the doctrine of Berkeley. The Vedánta's idea of spiritual existence is eternal and underived existence. It does not allow the possibility of a created soul really existing. It likens such souls to the reflection of the sun or the moon in the waters. It pronounces all derived existence to be a nullity. Nothing can be which has not always been. Nothing can really exist which has not always existed. But Berkeley held the real existence not only of God, but also of all created spirits. Berkeley found no difficulty in admitting that a soul could come into existence without having existed from eternity—that a spiritual substance, which once was not, could afterwards begin to be—an idea perfectly inconsistent with the ontology of the Vedant. I am only astonished that you did not see the difference directly. Now as to the negations :—

Berkeley, you say, denies identically what the Vedánta also rejects."

"No doubt about it?"

"Please to tell me, said Satyakáma, what it is that he denies."

"Matter."

"And what does the Vedánta deny."

"The same, answered Tarkakáma, even matter?

"What is the word used in the Vedánta for *matter?*"

"It is difficult to light on a Sanscrit word that is exactly equivalent to *matter*. Haughton proposed a good many, but an ingenious writer of our own day has shown that none of them will do[7]."

"Then the objects denied in the two systems cannot be *prima facie* identical; the one sums up the things denied by a term for which the other has no equivalent. You still think their negations are the same, and that the objects denied in the one correspond to those denied in the other?"

"Yes."

"What, asked Satyakáma, are the objects denied in the Vedánta?"

"Every thing which is not Brahma. The whole universe."

"As we have seen before, much that the Vedánta denies is acknowledged by Berkeley; viz. men, angels, demons. These are spiritual essences. But you think Berkeley denies all other things; whatever is not spirit, whatever has parts or dimensions."

"Does he not?" said Tarkakáma, somewhat faltering.

A'gamika, who fancied that the Vedánta doctrine involved a sublimity which none but a Brahmin, learned in the Veda and taught by an Achárya in the prescribed

[7] There is no Sanscrit word for "Matter." Ballantyne's prize Essay p. 123.

way, could comprehend[8], was not pleased with the idea that an English Bishop, untaught of a Brahmin, had discovered the great mysteries of philosophy. "If you find any reason for faltering, said he, the question should have been asked and considered ere you undertook to pronounce, in such a circle and on such an occasion, that the doctrine of a Mletcha dualist was identical with our divine Vedánta.".

Satyakáma remarked that his friend A'gamika needs not be alarmed. If the learned disputant of the bride's party had attentively read the *Reprints for the Pundits*, he might have solved that question in a way that would be quite satisfactory to the admirers of Berkeley on the one hand and the followers of the Vedánta on the other.

A member of the Rajah's family, who was listening to the discussion with great interest, produced the book in a minute from his highness's library, when Satyakáma read the following extracts from it:

'When Berkeley denied the existence of matter he 'simply denied the existence of that unknown substratum, 'the existence of which Locke had declared to be a 'necessary inference from our knowledge of qualities, 'but the nature of which must ever be altogether hidden 'from us. Philosophers had assumed the existence of 'substance, *i. e.*, of a noumenon lying underneath all 'phenomena, a substratum supporting all qualities, a 'something in which all accidents inhere. This un-'known substance Berkeley denies. It is a mere ab-'straction, he says. If it is unknown, unknowable, it is a 'Figment: and I will none of it: for it is a Figment 'worse than useless: it is pernicious as the basis of all 'Atheism. If by matter you understand that which is

[8] आचार्याद्धैव विद्या विदिता साधिष्ठं प्रापयति। Chhándogya.

'seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter exists. 'I am as firm a believer in its existence as any one can 'be. Herein I agree with the vulgar. If on the con-'trary, you understand by matter that occult substratum, 'which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, and not touched, 'that of which the senses do not, cannot inform you, then 'I say I believe not in the existence of matter, and here-'in I differ with the philosophers and agree with the 'vulgar.

'I do not argue against the existence of any one thing 'that we can apprehend either by sensation or reflection. '*That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my* '*hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.* '*The only thing whose existence I deny is what philosophers* '*call matter, or corporeal substance.* And in doing this 'there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who 'I dare say will never miss it[9].'

"It appears, said Satyakáma, from the above extracts that Berkeley only denied something which philosophers called matter, but could not explain, which no body perceived by his senses. He acknowledged the *pratyaksha-siddha-jagat* (the world proved by the senses), the denial of which savoured of atheism in the estimation of the *Vidwan-moda-tarangiṇi*.

"Berkeley, in short, did not deny the whole external world, nor any thing we see or touch. The only thing he denied is 'that which philosophers called matter.' The Vedánta has no term for matter, and as matter, in Berkeley's use of the term, is something different from what is seen, it cannot be made out that he understood by it the identical things denied in the Vedánta. In fact it is difficult to say what Berkeley denied. It is easier to say what he did not deny. He did not deny the

[9] Reprints for the Pundits No. 4,

truthfulness of the senses, nor the facts of sensation, nor the existence of objects of sensation—all which however are denied in that school of the Vedánta which talks of 'all this as no *thing*.' *Every thing is false which is not Brahma*[10].

"You see then what a large residuum Berkeley's negations leave untouched, not of spiritual essences alone, but of non-spiritual things perceptible by the corporeal senses, which the Vedánta, I mean the doctrine of the elementary treatises, nevertheless absolutely denies, by *falsifying* every thing which is not Brahma."

Tarkakáma.—"But the Vedánta's denial is not absolute. It allows a *vyavahárika* existence to them,"

Satyakáma.—"That it could not help doing. *Vyavahárika* means what is customary, conventional, popular. If people cannot divest their minds of the reality of the world, the Vedantist cannot help saying, it is *Vyavahárika*, just as even Bhaskaráchárya will allow it is *Vyavahárika* to say the moon is taken (by the giant) when she is in an eclipse, although he knows that the true cause of that phenomenon is the interception of the solar light by the intervention of the earth. This is not the sense in which Berkeley admits the existence of external things. *What he saw, heard, and felt, he believed to exist as really as his own being;* not in the sense in which Bhaskaráchárya believed in the periodical capture of the moon.

"Whatever *vyavahárika* existence and the Berkeleyian matter may be, it is evident that no negation in the one system is *obviously* identical with the other. If there be any *occult matter* equally denied by both, it is a hypothesis on which no theory can be built."

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[10] ब्रह्मभिन्नं सर्व्वं मिथ्या। Vedánta Paribhásha.

But how was it, I asked, that Berkeley has been so universally accused of denying the reality of the external world?

"The reason, said Satyakáma, is explained in the *Reprints.* 'True it is that owing to the ambiguities of 'language, Berkeley's Theory does seem to run counter 'to the ordinary belief of mankind, because by matter 'men commonly understand the seen, the tasted, the 'touched &c.: therefore when the existence of matter is 'denied, people naturally suppose that the existence of 'the seen, the tasted, and the touched is denied, never 'suspecting that matter in its philosophical sense is the '*not seen, not tasted, not touched.*'"

A'gamika.—"Then there does not seem to be a shadow of reason for confounding the ontology of the Vedánta with the doctrine of Berkeley, if the extracts you have read are genuine. The one denied the very thing the other allowed, viz. the seen, the tasted, the touched. How was it then that eminent men have hazarded such assertions?"

Satyakáma.—"The extracts are from the *Reprints,* and I have also verified them. There cannot be a doubt on that score. But, as it is added in the *Reprints,* 'Berkeley 'has not, it must be confessed, sufficiently guarded against 'all ambiguity. He says 'It is indeed an opinion strangely 'prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, 'and in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, 'natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by 'the understanding.'

"I do not pretend to stand up as Berkeley's advocate, nor do I feel myself called upon to reconcile what may appear inconsistencies in him. All I contend for is that no case has been made out for asserting that the ontology of the Vedánta is the doctrine of Berkeley, and that neither in their affirmations nor in their negations are the

systems characteristically consentient. The stigma of idealism which has been affixed to Berkeley's theory is no doubt owing to assertions like the following:—

'For what are the forementioned objects but the things 'we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive, besides 'our own ideas or sensations, and is it not plainly repug-'nant that any one of these, or any combination of them, 'should exist unperceived?

'In short, if there were external bodies it is impossible 'we should ever come to know it, and if there were not, 'we might have the very same reasons to think there 'were that we have now; suppose, what no one can 'deny possible, an intelligence, without the help of 'external bodies to be affected with the same train of 'sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same 'order, and with like vividness in his mind, I ask 'whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to 'believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented 'by his ideas and exciting them in his mind, that you 'can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of 'this there can be no question; which one consideration 'is enough to make any reasonable person suspect the 'strength of whatever arguments he may think himself 'to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

'I say it is granted on all hands, and what happens 'in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dis-'pute, that it is possible we might be affected with 'all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed 'without, resembling them. Hence it is evident the 'supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the 'producing our ideas: since it is granted they are pro-'duced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, 'in the same order we see them in at present, without 'their concurrence.'"

Vaiyásika, on hearing the above extracts from Berkeley, said he was perfectly astonished at the remark that the doctrine of Berkeley was the ontology of the Vedánta. Nothing could be a greater mistake than to charge such an opinion on the founder of the Vedánta or his great commentator.

"Did you not know, he asked, that the extracts last read contain the very heresy of the Buddhists which Vyása and Śankaráchárya have taken infinite pains to refute? The learned president of the Benares páṭhaśálá should rather have taught that the ontology of Buddhism was the doctrine of Berkeley—that its Vijnána-váda, demolished by our commentator, was identical with his idealism."

"Impossible!" said I, "do you mean to say that the founder of the Vedánta and his celebrated commentator have denounced idealism?"

Vaiyásika.—"I appeal to my learned friends here."

"What, said I, the very system which the atheistic interlocutor in the *Vedwan-moda-tarangiṇi* hailed as his auxiliary, and which the author stigmatized as the teaching of a master-infidel, because it denied the visible world,—that very system contains a refutation of idealism?"

Tarkakáma and Ágamika remained silent.

Satyakáma said that the Vedant, as taught by Vyása, was not idealistic, and that his fellow-companion of the bridegroom's procession was right.

"Let us have the Sútras and commentary," he added, "you, Vaiyásika, must have them at your finger's end:—come, give us chapter and verse."

A copy of the Vedant Sútras with commentary was instantly brought from the Royal library and handed to Vaiyásika, who, on opening the book, said, "The 28th Sútra of the 2nd Section of the second Chapter reads: 'Not

unreality, because of perception[1],' or perhaps apprehension would be a better rendering of *upalabdhi*. This Sútra was intended for the refutation of Buddhistic idealism which denied the reality of the world, and which S'ankara thus epitomized[2]:

'In that theory of *Vijnána* (cognitions or ideas,) all dealing with proof and the provable is an internal process by

[1] नाभाव उपलब्धेः।

[2] तस्मिंश्च विज्ञानवादे बुद्ध्यारूढेन रूपेणान्तःस्थ एव प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारः सर्व उपपद्यते सत्यपि वाह्येऽर्थे बुद्ध्यारोहमन्तरेण प्रमाणादिव्यवहारानवतारात्। कथं पुनरवगम्यते अन्तःस्थ एवायं सर्वो व्यवहारो न विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तो वाह्योऽर्थोऽस्तीति। तदसम्भवादित्याह। सहि वाह्योऽर्थोऽभ्युपगम्यमानः परमाणवो वा स्युः। तत्समूहो वा स्तम्भादयः स्युः। तत्र न तावत् परमाणवः स्तम्भादिप्रत्ययपरिच्छेद्या भवितुमर्हन्ति परमाण्वाभासज्ञानानुपपत्तेः। नापि तत्समूहास्तम्भादयः तेषां परमाणुभ्योऽन्यत्वानन्यत्वाभ्यां निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्। अपिचानुभवमात्रेण साधारणात्मनो ज्ञानस्य जायमानस्य योऽयं प्रतिविषयपक्षपातः स्तम्भज्ञानं कुड्यज्ञानं घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति नासौ ज्ञानगतं विशेषमन्तरेणोपपद्यत इत्यवश्यं विषयसारूप्यं ज्ञानस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। अङ्गीकृते च तस्मिन् विषयाकारस्य ज्ञानेनैवावरुद्धत्वादपार्थिकार्थसद्भावकल्पना। स्वप्नादिवच्चेदं द्रष्टव्यं। यथा हि स्वप्नमायामरीच्युदकगन्धर्वनगरादिप्रत्ययाः विनैव वाह्येनार्थेन ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारा भवन्ति। एवं जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्तीत्यवगम्यते। प्रत्ययत्वाविशेषात्। कथं पुनरसति वाह्यार्थे प्रत्ययवैचित्र्यमुपपद्येत वासनावैचित्र्यादित्याह अनादौ संसारे वीजाङ्कुरवद्विज्ञानानां वासनानाञ्चान्योन्यनिमित्तनैमित्तिक भावेन वैचित्र्यं न प्रतिषिध्यते अपिचान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वासनानिमित्तमेव ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमित्यवगम्यते स्वप्नादिष्वन्तरेणाप्यर्थं वासनानिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्योभाभ्यामावाभ्यामप्यभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् अन्तरेण तु वासनामर्थनिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्य मयानभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् तस्मादप्यभावो वाह्यस्यार्थस्येत्येवम् प्राप्ते ब्रूमः॥

'means of images existing in the understanding. Even 'if there were external objects, their proof could not 'be had except by its existing in the understanding. 'If it be asked, how is it known that all operations are in-'ternal, and that external objects have no existence apart 'from cognitions? The reply is—from sheer impossibility. 'External objects must be comprehended either as atoms, 'or as their aggregates, pillars &c. But there cannot 'be atoms distinct from pillars &c., for it is impossible 'there should be cognition of atomic appearances. Nor 'can they be the pillars, their aggregates, for it is impos-'sible to regard them as at the same time both different 'from and identical with atoms. * * * Again; of the 'general apprehensions produced by perception, that which 'becomes especial with reference to individual objects, 'such as the notion of pillar, the notion of wall, the notion 'of pot, the notion of cloth, is not produced but by 'peculiarities in the notion itself. Hence it must be 'acknowledged that objects are similar to cognitions. 'And this being acknowledged, the theory of real objects 'is rendered nugatory, because it is contradicted by the 'cognition of their forms. * * * This is also to be regarded 'in the light of dreams, &c. As dreams, jugglery, mirage, 'fairy towns, become, without the presence of external 'objects, forms of apprehensions and apprehenders; in the 'same manner may the notions of pillars &c. come in 'when one is awake, for in either case the notion is the 'same. If it be asked, how a variety of notions is occa-'sioned if there be no external objects; the answer is, from 'a variety of fancies. There can be no difficulty in sup-'posing that in this world without a beginning fancies 'and cognitions may have mutually caused each other's 'varieties like seed and sprout. That the variety in no-'tions is owing to a variety of fancy is evident from

'positive as well as negative proof. We are both agreed 'that in dreams and other visions there is a variety of 'notions occasioned by fancy even in the absence of 'external objects. Only [we Buddhists maintain the same 'is also the case in the presince of objects] we do not 'allow a variety of notions occasioned by objects in the 'absence of fancy. Hence there is no real external 'object.'

"This, learned Sirs, continued Vaiyásika, was a theory of the Buddhists who pronounced the world to be a mere phantom. S'ankara has by no means made an over-statement of their doctrine. Their popular books liken the universe to a *máyá, a mirage,* a flash of lightning, a froth[3]. They no doubt carried the ideal theory further than Berkeley, but substitute the word *idea* for *vijnána,* and you put the very words of the Christian Bishop into the mouths of those Buddhists. And now listen to the masterly way in which our accomplished leader demolished the whole of that phantastic argument[4].

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[3] सर्व्वे अनित्या अकामा अध्रुवा न च शाश्वतापि न कल्पाः। माया मरीचिसदृशा विद्युत् फेणोपमाश्चपलाः। Lalita-vistara.

[4] नाभाव उपलब्धेरिति नखलु अभावो वाह्यस्यार्थस्याध्यवसातुम् शक्यते कस्मात् उपलब्धेः उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं वाह्योर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्यम् घटः पट इति नचोपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति यथाहि कश्चिद्भुञ्जानो भुजिसाध्यायां तृप्तौ स्वयमनुभूयमानायामेवं ब्रूयात् नाहं भुञ्जे नच तृप्यामीति तद्वदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेण स्वयमुपलभमान एव वाह्यमर्थं नाहं उपलभे न च सोस्तीति ब्रुवन् कथमुपादेयवचनःस्यात् ननु नाहमेवं ब्रवीमि नकञ्चिदर्थमुपलभ इति किन्तूपलब्धिव्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभ इति ब्रवीमि वाढमेवं ब्रवीषि निरङ्कुशत्वात्ते तुण्डस्य नतु युक्त्योपेतं ब्रवीषि यत उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोपि बलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः उपलब्धेरेव नहिकश्चिदुपलब्धिमेव स्तम्भकुड्यञ्चेत्युपलभते उपलब्धिविषयत्वेनैवतु स्तम्भकुड्यादीन् सर्वे लौकिका

'Not unreality; because of perception. It is impos-'sible to maintain that there is no external object. Why? 'Because of perception. External objects are severally 'perceived such as a pillar, a wall, a pot, a cloth. It is 'impossible there can be unreality in that which is per-'ceived. As if a man, while enjoying a good dinner, 'were to say, I am not eating, nor am I enjoying it, the 'saying would not be handsome; so if, while himself 'apprehending an object by sensation, a person were to 'say, I am not apprehending it, nor is there any external 'substance, how could his disclaimer be acceptable? If it 'be objected, I do not say I do not *perceive* any object, 'but that I do not perceive *any thing besides the perception*. 'Well, you say this because your mouth is ungoaded, but 'you do not speak reasonably; for from the very act of 'perception, something distinct from perceptions must 'also be apprehended by the force of objects. No one

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उपलभन्ते अतश्चैवमेव सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते यत् प्रत्याचक्षाणा अपि वाह्यमर्थमेवमाचक्षते यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तद्वहिर्वदवभासत इति तेपि हि सर्वं लोके प्रसिद्धां वहिरवभासां सम्बिदं प्रतिलभमानाः प्रत्याख्यातुकामाश्च वाह्यमर्थं वहिर्वदितिवत्कारणं कुर्वंति इतरथाहि कस्माद्वहिर्वदिति ब्रूयुः न हि विष्णुमित्रो बन्ध्यापुत्त्रवदवभासत इति कश्चिदाचक्षीत तस्माद्यथानुभवं तत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छद्भिर्वहिरेवावभासत इति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुं नतु वहिर्वदवभासत इति ननु वाह्यस्यार्थस्यासम्भवात् वहिर्वदवभासत इत्यध्यवसितं नायं साधुरध्यवसायः यतःप्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ सम्भवासम्भवाववधार्य्येते न पुनः सम्भवासम्भवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत्सम्भवति यत्तु नकेनचिदपि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तन्नसम्भवति इह तु यथास्वं सर्वैरेव प्रमाणैर्वाह्योर्थ उपलभ्यमानः कथं व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविकल्पैर्न सम्भवतीत्युच्येत उपलब्धेरेव न च ज्ञानस्य विषयसारूप्याद्विषयनाशो भवति असति विषये विषयसारूप्यानुपपत्तेः वहिरुपलब्धेश्च विषयस्य ।

'indeed perceives that a pillar or a wall is *a mere perception*, but every one perceives it as an *object of perception*. 'Thus do (idealistic) men, too, perceive things; for, even 'while denying external objects, they virtually acknowledge them by avowing that the forms, internally apprehended, are *like* the externals. Partaking of the knowledge of externals, universally prevalent among men, and 'yet desirous of denying external objects, they turn them 'into a simile by using the phrase *like the externals*. 'Otherwise [*i. e.*, if they did not perceive external objects] 'why should they use the phrase *like the externals*. No 'one can say Vishṇu Mitra appears like a barren woman's 'son. Those therefore who perceive things as they are, 'should say that the externals themselves appear, not 'that appearances like externals are seen. Perhaps it 'will be urged that because of the [antecedent] impossibility of external objects you talk of appearances like 'externals. This is not a right saying at all, for possibility or impossibility is determined by the impulse or 'non-impulse of proof, not the impulse or non-impulse 'of proof by possibility or impossibility. That which is 'established by perception or any other proof is possible: 'that which cannot be established by any proof is impossible. Now external objects being established, like 'the spirit itself, by all descriptions of proof, why should 'exceptions be taken to the one, when they are not taken 'to the other, and the former be pronounced impossible? 'Nor, again, because cognitions may resemble objects, 'therefore objects must be negatived; for there could not 'be such resemblance with objects if there were no 'objects, and because those objects are externally apprehended.'

"S'ankaráchárya, you will observe, contends that there is the same proof for the reality of the external

world as there is for that of the internal spirit. It is impossible to conceive how learned men could persuade themselves, merely on the authority of a few pages of elementary manuals, that the ontology of the Vedant was the doctrine of European idealism. Our commentator goes on smashing to fragments all the idealistic arguments of the Buddhists. He denounces the theory that there could be cognition, or any intellectual process, without objects to act upon. 'If you say, he continues, 'that cognitions, being of the nature of light, are self-'produced, like a self-shining lamp, without the force of 'external objects, you utter a most unreasonable doctrine 'that the spirit acts on itself, as if one could say fire 'burns its own self. But that which every body calls 'reasonable, the perception of external objects by cogni-'tions distinct from themselves, you do not allow. Oh, 'what great wisdom you show[5]!'

"The 29th Sútra denies that external objects are like dreams and visions because the characteristics of the two are different[6]. And Śankara thus expounds it: 'As to 'what has been said by the denier of external objects 'that waking sensations of pillars &c. may be caused like 'the visions of dreams without the presence of external 'objects, the sensations being alike in both cases, we 'thus reply to it. Waking sensations cannot be like 'visions of dreams, because the two are different. There 'is a difference between dreaming and waking. What

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[5] अथ विज्ञानं प्रकाशात्मकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् स्वयमेवानुभूयते न तथा वाह्योर्थ इति चेत् अत्यन्तविरुद्धां स्वात्मनि क्रियामभ्युपगच्छसि अग्निरात्मानं दहतीतिवत् अविरुद्धन्तु लोके प्रसिद्धं स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्तेन विज्ञानेन वाह्योर्थोनुभूयत इति नेच्छसि अहो पाण्डित्यं महद्दर्शितं ।

[6] वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ।

'now is the difference? We reply, Contradiction and 'Non-contradiction. What is perceived in a dream is 'contradicted by the waking conviction, my interview 'with a great man is untrue, there has been no inter-'view with a great man, my mind was deceived in sleep, 'hence it is a misapprehension. Jugglery and similar 'appearances are also contradicted in that manner. But 'waking sensations are never contradicted in any state[7].

The Nepaulese Buddhist, worried by the Bhágavatas, had sought refuge in our little circle while the extracts from S'ankara were yet being read; and he was now going to speak in defence of his doctrine, when the military musicians commenced beating their drums and blowing their trumpets, and the European guests, ladies as well as gentlemen, began to dance in front of the bride-groom. The attention of all present was thereby concentrated in the middle hall, and our philosophical discussion was at once interrupted. A'gamika's simplicity amused us not a little, when, mistaking the company for professional dancers, he expressed his indignation at the station-doctor, the only European face he could recognize, engaging in such a questionable occupation from mere pecuniary motives. I told him that the company was not one of professional

[7] यदुक्तं वाह्यार्थापलापिना स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवज्जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया विनैव वाह्येनार्थेन भवेयुः प्रत्ययत्वाविशेषादिति। तत्प्रतिवक्तव्यं अत्रोच्यते। न स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवज्जाग्रत्प्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्ति कस्मात् वैधर्म्यात्। वैधर्म्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः किं पुनर्वैधर्म्यं बाधाबाधाविति ब्रूमः। बाध्यते हि स्वप्नोपलब्धं वस्तु प्रवुद्धस्य मिथ्यामयोपलब्धो महाजनसमागम इति। न ह्यस्ति महाजनसमागमो निद्राग्लानन्तु मे मनोवभूव तेनैषा भ्रान्तिरुद्भुवेति। एवं मायादिष्वपि भवति यथायथं बाधः। नैवं जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु स्तम्भादिकं कस्याञ्चिदप्यवस्थायां बाध्यते।

dancers, but of respectable ladies and gentlemen, who were expressing their joy on the happy event they had come to celebrate, by joining in a dance for the amusement of all present. "Then, said A'gamika, even Indra's court could not exhibit a scene, so beautiful, and this was not an occasion when any argument for Buddhistic idealism can prevail against the reasoning of S'ankará-ch'arya. It would certainly be most unhandsome at this moment to say we are not perceiving any objects by our eyes and ears."

DIALOGUE VIII.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

The conference we held at the marriage assembly in a corner of the Hall was reported to the Rajah by his nephew, who was listening with great attention to the arguments adduced on both sides. The following day his highness gave a private audience to Vaiyásika, A'gamika, Satyakáma, and myself. He thanked us all for the interest we took in the happy event of his daughter's marriage. He felt proud, he said, that his assembly was graced by such learned men, and that his house was the scene of a discussion, in which certain ideas were elicited, which he for his part had not met with elsewhere, and which might possibly throw new light on the history of Indian philosophy. "It is a great pity that the Brahma Sútras and S'ankara's commentary are so little known. I have not met with a single pundit, with the exception of the venerated Vaiyásika, who was familiar with the whole of the *S'arírika mímánsa bháshya.* Vedantic scholars in my circle profess to have read only such manuals as the *Vedánta sára* and the *Paribhása.* Their acquaintance with the Sútras and commentary never extended beyond the opening section of the opening chapter. When therefore I first read in a native newspaper at Bombay, now more than a quarter of a century ago,

that Colonel Kennedy had discovered some resemblance between the theory of Bishop Berkeley and the Vedantic doctrine, I sought for further information from my father's pundits, but in vain. Colonel Kennedy's idea was lately adopted and enforced by the authorities of the government College at Benares. I then thought it must be substantially correct. You have however now successfully disproved it, as far as Vyása's Vedant is concerned. But, Satyakáma, what have you gained by it? The disproof of that idea does not necessarily throw discredit on the Vedant, for my friend Vaiyásika was no less impatient than yourself of the statement, which has of late been so widely circulated, that the ontology of the Vedant is the doctrine of Berkeley."

Satyakáma.—"Please your highness, I cannot say what I have gained, or whether I have gained any thing, nor do I know that I came with the expectation of gaining any thing besides the pleasure of congratulating you on the happy occasion which brought us together. With reference to our conference, the right way to look at it is to consider—not if a particular system is necessarily overthrown thereby, but if in the course of fair discussion truth of any kind is elicited. If a wrong idea, which had been much in vogue of late, has been disproved, it must so far be a service to truth. Your highness will now know how to deal with persons that may say in your presence that the ontology of the Vedant is the doctrine of Berkeley."

Rájáh.—"But will you accept my friend Vaiyásika's suggestion that the ontology of Buddhism is the doctrine of Berkeley? Are you gratified at the idea that Berkeley is proved a Buddhist?"

Satyakáma.—"Certainly not, please your highness. I always protested against making free with Berkeley's

name in an Indian discussion. What he wrote had reference to philosophers that lived far away from us. Even Europeans find it difficult to say what Berkeley's opinions were. We cannot expect so to understand them in a hurry as to find analogies between them and Indian theories. I did not think it necessary last night to undertake the defence of Berkeley, because I thought his reputation for piety and theological orthodoxy was far too well established to require any advocacy from myself."

Rájáh.—"Do you think, Vaiyásika, you have gained any thing for the Vedant by last night's conference?"

Vaiyásika.—"Blessings on your highness! I agree with Satyakáma that if a popular error has been disproved the result itself must be a gain to truth, and I must rejoice over it. I think also that the Vedant, as inculcated in the Sútras, does not involve the doctrine of *Máyá*, which some of our Śástras condemn as Buddhism in disguise. The erroneous notion, disproved last night, virtually connected the Vedant with the doctrine of *Máyá*. It is only just to our system that people should know it was not originally allied to that theory, and that it contended strenuously, against the Buddhists, for the reality of external objects. Whether later writers have mixed it up with the doctrine of *Máyá*, or not, is quite a different question."

The Chobdar now came in, and, with hands joined, announced that the Nepaulese colonel and the Buddhist Śástri had come to bid farewell before leaving the station for Calcutta. "Show them, said his highness, into this private-audience chamber. You will not mind their presence, my learned friends. I am sure the Colonel will be pleased to see you. He takes great interest in philosophical discussions. He has adopted the Buddhist

faith, though by birth a Kshetriya, and a Hindu. The S'ástri, you saw last night, is his domestic priest."

The Colonel entered the room with his Sástri, and was courteously received. The Rajah apologized to the S'ástri for the annoyance he had received the night before from the turbulent Vaishṇavas, and told him what the nature of *our* conference was—that some of us were anxious to disclaim the doctrine of Máyá, and that therefore Vaiyásika was reading S'ankarácharya's argument against the idealism of Buddhists.

"You have every right, said the Buddhist, to disclaim what you do not hold. I will not deny that S'ankara in his commentary on the Vedant contends against, what you call, our idealism, but his argument is virtually shown to be untenable—not only by his own admissions in his commentaries on the Upanishads, but also by the general reception of our doctrine by all recent writers on the Vedant."

Rajah.—"I do not quite understand you. Do you mean that Vedantic writers have generally adopted any of your doctrines."

Buddhist.—"I have no doubt they have. In fact all your schools of philosophy have taken lessons from us."

Rajah.—"What lessons? Speak more definitely."

Buddhist.—"Blessings without number on your highness! The doctrine of *Máyá* and all your ideas of *Mukti* and *Nirváṇa* are borrowed from us. We first taught you to reflect on the miseries of life and transmigration, and to seek for perfect release from the bondage of works. Your highness will allow that our system is older than that of Vyása or Gotama."

Rajah.—"Of course I must allow that, for the Ṛishis who founded our schools aimed at the refutation of Buddhism as one of their principal objects."

Buddhist.—"I do not know whether they *aimed* at the refutation of Buddhism. They have certainly done much for the *reproduction* of Buddhism, for which we must ever be thankful to them."

Rajah.—"How so? You astonish me. Speak more plainly. Name the doctrines one by one which you think we have learnt from you."

Buddhist.—"The very doctrine of *Maya*, of which you were speaking before we came."

Rajah.—"How do you know we learnt it from you?"

Buddhist.—"Because before the rise of our Śákya Muni (blessings on him!) you knew nothing but rites and ceremonies, and your sole business was how to fulfil them agreeably to the formula of your Vedas. The great objects of your ambition were the good things of earth and heaven. For them you worked, for them you sacrificed, for them you prayed. Śákya was the first to teach you that the good things of earth and heaven were transient and illusory—that the external world by which you were so fascinated was a phantom, a máyá, a mirage, a mere flash of lightning. You cannot point to a single sage of your school who taught that idea before the age of Buddha."

Rajah.—"What! not Vaśishṭha,Válmiki, or Viśwámitra?"

Buddhist.—"It is not for me to say when those Rishis lived, or what they taught; but I think I may affirm that none of your Ṛishes can, like our Śákya, be singled out, even in your own traditions, as the original teacher of a novel doctrine in depreciation of the sensuous and carnal enjoyments promised in your older Vedas, and certainly no work, written decidedly before the age of Buddha, contains any description of the world as a mere phantom or mirage."

Rajah.—"What do you mean by writings before the age of Buddha?"

Buddhist.—"The Vedas certainly,—by which I mean, what your own writers themselves generally understand by the term, the Mantras and Brahmanas. These do not represent the world as an illusion, nor direct the mind to any higher aspirations than sensuous enjoyments, whether of heaven or of earth."

Rajah.—"What say you of the Upanishads?"

Buddhist.—"The term Upanishad, please your highness, itself a vague designation, cannot mark out a separate division of the Vedas. It is applied to certain parts from doctrinal considerations. Any thing is called an Upanishad which sets forth a certain favourite doctrine—the doctrine of Brahma. Hence even the Bhagavad-gita is called an Upanishad. I think therefore the authority of the Upanishads, as historical guides, cannot be very weighty. A small section might at any time have been added to a Veda with a view to set up a claim for antiquity in behalf of a favourite doctrine. Such claims ought to be received with great suspicion—especially when you consider that, in order to recommend their own novel doctrines, some of those spurious additions have gone the length of slighting the original Vedas themselves, and treating them with quite as much contempt as Śákya could ever have poured on them, calling them the repositaries of inferior doctrines, and classing them with mere children's books. And if any of the Upanishads bear marks of decided antiquity, they do not inculcate the doctrine of *máyá*.

"That the doctrine of the Brahmins was not originally a *maya-váda* is evident from the Vedas themselves—*i. e.*, the Mantras and Brahmanas. When, then, was it first taught? Who introduced it, where, and how? What is

the history of this great innovation,—this transition from doctrines purely carnal to a denial of the material world? How came you into possession of that which you must acknowledge you did not possess originally, and which is decidedly not a natural development of your primitive doctrine of sacrifices and heavenly enjoyments? You cannot answer these questions. You cannot account for your possession of the doctrine of Máyá. We can. We tell you that Śákya taught it first—that, reflecting on the vanity of the world, he condemned the whole as a shadow without substance, a *maya*, a *mirage*. His life is the best history of the doctrine. While you were scrambling and fighting for the pleasures of life, he renounced them all as vain and illusory. Myriads were convinced by his precepts and his example. But his party could not ultimately hold their place in Hindoostan. They were turned out, but their teaching was left as a legacy to their country. You banished them under the influence of party-spirit, but nevertheless the watchword of your philosophy has since continued to be *maya*."

Rajah.—"Well, my Buddhist friend—what other stolen goods do you find amongst us?"

Buddhist.—"Our doctrine of *Nirváṇa* and *mukti*. It is well known that your original Vedas propound to your aspirations nothing but the sensuous enjoyments of life, whether in heaven or earth,—houses, lands, cattle, and similar things. It is equally well known that Śákya Muni taught his disciples to regard those very enjoyments as vain, illusory, and fleeting, and to look forward to nirváṇa, or complete release from life and transmigration. Teaching this transcendental doctrine, he exemplified it in his life—renouncing his home which was a palace, his dignity which was that of a throne, his enjoyments which were those of empire and sovereignty. These are facts patent to

all the world, and you dare not dispute them. They are interwoven with the rise and progress of our society—a society which now overspreads the greater part of the vast continent of Asia. Even children are catechized on the vanity of this passing world from the great wall of China to the utmost boundary of Ceylon. If now you say you knew the same doctrine before the birth of Śákya, the burden of proof is decidedly on you. You are bound to account for the way you got possession of what we assert, and you cannot deny, to be a characteristic tenet of our great corporation. And you failing to prove your acquisition of it from a Brahminical source, we hold ourselves justified in charging you with borrowing it from us.

"I repeat, your original Vedas say nothing of the miseries of life and transmigration, or of the necessity of complete escape from the bondage of works. Apavarga, nirvaṇa, and mukti are words unknown to your Vedas. You will refer me to your Upanishads. As the burden of proof is on you, because the doctrine of *mukti* involves an impatience of life, not only unknown to your earlier system, but at variance with its essential doctrines, you must adduce some stronger evidence than the Upanishads, and give a better account of its introduction than is furnished in those writings, before you can justly claim the merit of originating a doctrine so foreign to your ancient philosophy. I repeat the testimony of the Upanishads cannot be held satisfactory in a historical research. The name Upanishad is arbitrarily applied to works, or rather tracts, setting forth a favourite doctrine—that of Brahma. Such of the Upanishads, again, as chime, in our tunes and in our very words, on the miseries of life, both earthly and heavenly, and on the necessity of emancipation, contain references to doctrines and ideas so manifestly modern, that they cannot, consistently with

historical criticism, be classed with the original Veda in point of antiquity.

"Some of them stand, also, in open rivalry with the four Vedas which they stigmatize as inferior. This shows that they are compositions of a much later date, when the Vedas had partially lost credit with the learned, probably owing to our own forcible denunciations of mere rites and ceremonies.

"Please your highness, I must crave your indulgent consideration of the points I have had the good fortune to advance in your presence. I think we may fairly claim the honor of having, at the cost of expatriation, somewhat diverted the Brahminical mind from an empty ritual, stained with the blood of helpless animals, and of having taught it the elements of a philosophy to which it betakes itself to this day for rest and consolation. S'ankara may have argued strongly against our denial of the reality of external objects, but it is that very denial—it is the idea of a *maya* and the prospect of *mukti* and *nirvaṇa*, which at the present moment constitute the hopes, and regulate the aspirations of all minds, capable of rising above the world and its fascinations."

The Nepaulese colonel apprehending that the hortatory strain, which the Buddhist had adopted, might be disrespectful to the Rajah, here stopped his spiritual guide. "Enough, said he, enough!—a word to the wise.—You have stated our argument, and the Rajah will no doubt give it a fair consideration."

The colonel, then, after a few minutes of social conversation with the Rajah, took leave agreeably to the mode prevalent among men of distinction and dignity.

When the Nepaulese officer had left the room the Rajah asked Vaiyásika what he thought of the Buddhist's charges against our philosophy.

"As far, said Vaiyásika, as the doctrine of Máyá is concerned, I cannot say that the Buddhist's charge is entirely without foundation. Vyása does not inculcate that doctrine, nor do the Upanishads *Taittiriya, Aitireya* and *Kená.* Vijnána Bhikshu, in his commentary on the Sánkhya sútra (1.22), only does us justice when he draws a marked distinction between the Brahma Sútras and the theory of *máyá.* 'There is not a single Brahma 'Sútra, says he, in which our bondage is declared to be a 'mere deception. As to the novel theory of máyá, pro-'pounded by persons calling themselves Vedantists, it is 'only a species of the Vijnána-váda (of Buddhists).' The commentator then quotes the well known passage in the Padma-puráṇa in which that theory is called *disguised Buddhism.* He proceeds to say, 'that theory is not a 'tenet of the Vedanta, and it must be understood that the 'doctrine of the newfangled disguised Buddhists, who 'assert the theory of máyá, and reduce our bondage to a 'mere delusion, is in this way refuted[1].'"

Rajah.—"But is it not singular that learned Europeans, who have written on our philosophy in a friendly spirit, should not have discovered that the theory of Máyá is not inculcated in the Brahma sútras, and that they should in reality be complimenting Buddhism by seeking analogies between their Bishop Berkeley and our Vedanta."

Satyakáma.—"Please your highness, there were at least two Europeans who knew how to distinguish between

[1] ब्रह्ममीमांसायां केनापि सूत्रेणाविद्यामात्रतो बन्धस्यानुक्तत्वात्। यत् तु वेदान्तिब्रुवाणामाधुनिकस्य मायावादस्यात्र लिङ्गं दृश्यते तत् तेषामपि विज्ञानवाद्येकदेशितया युक्तमेव। नतु तद्वेदान्तमतं। अनयैव रीत्या नवीनानामपि प्रच्छन्नबौद्धानां मायावादिनामविद्यामात्रस्य तुच्छस्य बन्धहेतुत्वं निराकृतं वेदितव्यं।

the original Vedant and the theory of Máyá. Your highness has no doubt heard that an eminent scholar, Colebrooke by name, wrote digests of the sútras of our several schools for the information of his countrymen. In his digest of the Vedanta, he translated many of Vyása's aphorisms, inculcating that God is the material cause of the universe, and remarked in conclusion that 'the notion 'that the versatile world is an illusion (Maya); that all 'which passes to the apprehension of the waking indivi-'dual is but a phantasy, presented to his imagination, and 'that every sensible thing is unreal and all is visionary, 'does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the *Ve-'dant.* I have remarked nothing, he added, that coun-'tenances it in the Sútras of *Vyása,* nor in the gloss of 'S'*ankara,* but much concerning it in the minor commen-'taries and elementary treatises.'

"This conclusion of Colebrooke proved unsatisfactory to Colonel Kennedy, the Bombay Officer you have already mentioned, who, in a letter to the Royal Asiatic Society, remarked: 'I am therefore at a loss to understand the 'grounds on which Mr. Colebrooke, in his essay on this 'system, has thus stated: 'The succeeding section affirms " the important tenet of the Vedanta, that the Supreme " Being is the material as well as the efficient cause of the " universe; it is a proposition directly resulting from the " tenor of the passages of the Vedas, and illustrations " and examples adduced.' For the copy of the Sùtras 'now before me is divided in a different manner from 'the one referred to by Mr. Colebrooke, and I have 'not been able to find in them a single Sùtra which, 'in my opinion, would bear such a meaning. In fact, 'the Sanscrit language does not contain any term equi-'valent to the word matter; and even the four principal 'schools of Hindu philosophy concur in rejecting the

'notion of matter which has invariably prevailed in Eu-'rope[2]."

Rajah.—"But who was the other European, who, you say, did not fall into the popular error about the Vedanta?"

Satyakáma.—"Sir G. C. Haughton; who defended Colebrooke and to whom Colonel Kennedy replied saying: 'If therefore, Maya, or illusion, is not the doctrine of the 'Vedantikas, as Sir G. C. Haughton maintains, and their 'belief is that the Creator and nature are one, and that he 'is the efficient and material cause of the universe, it 'must necessarily follow that their tenets are precisely the 'same as those which have been held to constitute mate-'rial pantheism by every writer on philosophy. But, so 'far are the *Vedantikas* from identifying God with 'matter, that they have always denied the existence of 'matter, and maintained that one sole undivided spiritual 'essence alone exists. * * * For otherwise, he (Sir G. 'Haughton) must have perceived that, if the creation is 'held to be material, the identifying the Creator with the 'creation necessarily turns the *Vedanta* system into one 'of pure materialism[3]."

Rajah.—"Well, Vaiyásika, if you maintain that the doctrine of maya is not an original tenet of the Vedant, then you do pronounce us guilty of possessing stolen goods."

Satyakáma.—"Not exactly so, please your highness, if I may interpose a remark by way of qualifying the verdict. You may have, in your possession, goods claimable by Buddhists, but you may also on your part ask, whence did they themselves get them? We have heard of Sákya's teaching certain doctrines, but whence did Sákya himself learn them? He was brought up under

[2] Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol. III.

[3] Col. Kennedy in Asiatic Journal.

the influence of Brahminism, and if Brahminism has taken lessons from his school, it is simply the tutor learning in his turn from a smart pupil."

Rajah.—"Speak more plainly, Satyakáma. Have we learnt from Buddhism any thing which our Vedas and Upanishads do not inculcate?"

Satyakáma.—"You have just heard Vaiyásika repudiate the doctrine of Máyá, and refer to certain authorities which condemned it as Buddhism in disguise. That is certainly a lesson which Brahminical philosophers have taken from Sákya Muni. The Upanishads, with perhaps one or two exceptions, (of which I shall speak presently), taught no such lesson. They do not maintain that the world is a mere phantom or shadow, a no *thing*. Most of them on the contrary promise sensuous enjoyments both here and hereafter as the rewards of knowledge. The *Taittiriya* says repeatedly, 'He 'who knows these great summaries of doctrine, thus 'explained, will obtain offspring, cattle, holiness, food, 'and heaven[4].' These words form a sort of chorus, which is repeated five or six times in the short compass of the tract. The *Aitireya* too contains a similar chorus which it repeats at the end of two out of its three sections called the Upanishad part. 'He, knowing this, 'went upward on the dissolution of body, and, attaining 'all desires in that heavenly world, became immortal[5].' The *Kena* promises the same 'heavenly world' to those who attain knowledge[6]. The *Kaṭha*, also, to which a discerning translator has assigned a date posterior to the Sánkhya[7], is quite ignorant, notwithstanding its trans-

[4] See note 8 in page 275. [5] See the same. [6] See the same.

[7] "In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit, it deviates, however, from that adopted by other Upanishads and by the later Védánta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sánkhya. The order is here:—The unmanifested (avyakta), the great soul, (mahátma or mahat), intellect, (buddhi), mind, the objects of

cendentalism in other respects, of the idea that the world is a phantom and a shadow. The *Pras'na* says, 'he who, thus knowing, knows the vital air, will not be 'wanting in offspring, and will be immortal[8].' It certainly does not inculcate the doctrine of Máyá. The word máyá does indeed occur in this Upanishad, but it is in the sense of a moral turpitude, akin to deceit and falsehood[9], disqualifying men from entering the world of Brahma, not in the philosophical sense of an illusion. The same Upanishad says, also, 'all this and whatever is 'of repute in heaven is subject to life. Do thou protect 'us, as a mother protects her sons; give us also pros-'perity and knowledge[10].' The *Is'a* says, 'performing duty 'in this world, one is to desire a life of a hundred years[1],' and adds nothing as to the unreality of the world. Nor has the Máṇḍukya, notwithstanding the grand *Kárika* which Gauḍapáda has made on it, any thing to say against the reality of the external. It promises the *attainment of all desires*, and *of pre-eminence*, with a *learned progeny*, as the rewards of knowledge[2]. The *Bṛihadáraṇyaka*

the senses and the senses. The same order is followed by the Sánkhya, with the exception, that they have not between the unmanifested and intellect the intervening "mahat," which with them is equivalent to intellect. The "manas" (mind) has here also the same founction as in the Sánkhya the ahamkara (self-consciousness). Hence it is probable, that this Upanishad was written at a time, when the Sánkhya had already been founded." *Dr. Röer, in Bibliotheca Indica.*

[8] य एवं विद्वान् प्राणं वेद न हास्य प्रजा हीयतेऽमृतो भवति ॥

[9] न येषु जिह्ममनृतं न माया चेति ॥

[10] प्राणस्येदं वशे सर्व्वं त्रिदिवे यत्प्रतिष्ठितं। मातेव पुत्त्रान् रक्षस्व श्रीश्च प्रज्ञाञ्च विधेहि नः।

[1] कुर्व्वन्नेवेह कर्म्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः ॥

[2] आप्नोति ह वै सर्वान् कामानादिश्च भवति य एवं वेद। * * उत्कर्षति ह वै ज्ञानसन्ततिं समानश्च भवति नास्याब्रह्मवित् कुले भवति य एवं वेद ॥

and *Chhándógya,* both a good deal larger than the tracts already named, are also silent on the subject of Máyá, or illusion. They say nothing about the unreality of the world.

"The *Bṛihadáraṇyaka* says, he who knows thus, *becomes a god,* and *attains heaven.* The ignorant, departing from this world, become slaves, the knowers, Brahmins[3]. The *Chhándogya* assures to those who understand its mysteries, a heroic progeny, and heavenly enjoyments, as well as a life of *sixteen hundred years,* together with the free choice of *any pleasures* for which they may have a taste, whether it be for those of *food and drink,* or of *perfumery,* or of *music,* or whether it be for objects of filial, fraternal, or conjugal affection[4]. The

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[3] देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते। This is repeated several times in the form of a chorus. एति स्वर्गं लोकं य एवं वेद ॥

यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वाऽस्माल्लोकात् प्रैति स कृपणोऽथ य एतदक्षरं गार्गि विदित्वाऽस्माल्लोकात् प्रैति स ब्राह्मणः ॥

[4] स य एतानेव पञ्च ब्रह्मपुरुषान् स्वर्गस्य लोकस्य द्वारपान् वेदास्य कुले वीरो जायते प्रतिपद्यते स्वर्गं लोकं य एतानेवं पञ्च ब्रह्मपुरुषान् स्वर्गस्य लोकस्य द्वारपान् वेद। * * षोडशं वर्षशतं जीवति य एवं वेद। * * स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य पितरः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति तेन पितृलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। अथ यदि मातृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य मातरः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति तेन मातृलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। अथ यदि भ्रातृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य भ्रातरः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति। तेन भ्रातृलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। अथ यदि स्वसृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य स्वसारः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति तेन स्वसृलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते अथ यदि सखिलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य सखायः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति तेन सखिलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। अथ यदि गन्धमाल्यलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य गन्धमाल्ये समुत्तिष्ठतस्तेन गन्धमाल्यलोकेन सम्पन्नो

Muṇḍaka is more sparing in its promises of sensuous enjoyments, but it does not decidedly countenance the theory of Maya, and as this is the Upanishad which passes a sweeping censure on the Vedas, calling all four (to use the Buddhist Śástri's words) the repositaries of inferior doctrines, and placing them in the same category with grammars and children's manuals,—it would hardly be correct chronologically to class it among books whose short-comings it professes to supply. It would almost be a contradiction in terms to say that the *Muṇḍaka* is a section of the Atharva-veda, which it condemns, along with the others, as inferior science. And if it must be referred to a post Vedic age, it would be difficult to affirm that it was composed before the age of Buddha. But even the Muṇḍaka says nothing directly of Maya, though it marks a period, still riper than that of any other Upanishad above named, and still further removed from the date of the original Vedas. It boldly condemns sacrificial rites with their eighteen members as vain and futile, and affixes the stigma of folly to those who perform or rely on them[5]. But it does not plainly say that the world is a phantom, or a shadow without substance."

महीयते। अथ यद्यन्नपानलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्यान्नपाने समुत्तिष्ठतस्तेनान्नपानलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। अथ यदि गीतवादित्रलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य गीतवादित्रे समुत्तिष्ठतस्तेन गीतवादित्रलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। अथ यदि स्त्रीलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य स्त्रियः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति तेन स्त्रीलोकेन सम्पन्नो महीयते। यं यमन्तमभिकामो भवति यं कामयते सोऽस्य सङ्कल्पादेव समुत्तिष्ठति तेन सम्पन्नो महीयते॥

[5] प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपा अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म्म। एतच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापि यन्ति॥

Rajah.—"But the Buddhist S'ástri seemed to admit that some of the Upanishads did affirm the doctrine of maya—only he would not allow their existence in the Vedic period. He likewise claimed the doctrine of Nirváṇa or mukti as Buddhistic property."

Satyakáma.—"I cannot say that he has a right to claim the doctrine of *mukti* as the peculiar property of his sect, though the formation of a distinct school, fearlessly inculcating the necessity of Nirváṇa and mukti, in open opposition to sacrificial rites and ceremonies, was perhaps an unprompted act of S'ákya. The Brahmins had long been panting for some reward more permanent than the terminable enjoyment of heaven. In some of the Upanishads, the Bṛihadaraṇyaka and the Chhandogya for instance, we see the commencement of a notion, that those who attain to the knowledge of their mysterious teaching *do not revolve again*[6], which S'ankara understands to imply a release from the necessity of transmigration. I do not see any trace of this notion in the *Taittiriya, Aitireya, Máṇḍukya, Pras'na, or Kena.* These were probably the productions of an anterior age, when the Brahmins had only begun to identify the Creator with the creation, and when their pantheism had not yet got to its maturity. The notion of a release from life and birth had not attained any thing like the vigor of age in the *Bṛihadaraṇyaka* and *Chhandogya* either, for while the conception of sensuous enjoyments, as the rewards of knowledge, is constantly met with, that of a freedom from transmigration is but rarely found. Nor can the latter be said to occupy its natural place in the midst of boons, not only described in the language of voluptuaries, but also sometimes opposed to

[6] तेषां न पुनरावृत्तिः। न च पुनरावर्त्तते। इमं मानवमावर्त्तं नावर्त्तन्ते॥

all ideas of decency[7]. One of the Upanishads, again, in which this crude notion of release from the necessity of transmigration is found, speaks of 'Kṛishṇa, son of Devaki,' receiving a certain lesson from Ghora, son of Angiras. The name, Kṛishṇa, was not itself unknown in the Vedic period, but the 'son of Devaki' was a character of a later date. If then the passage be accepted as genuine, it must militate very much against the antiquity of the Chhándogya. If, on the other hand, the idea of an interpolation be admitted, I do not see any reason for not extending it to a few more isolated passages, promising freedom from sensuous existence,—a notion not less at variance with other Vedic promises than is the appellative *Devakiputra* with the ordinary rule of Vedic patronymics.

"The transcendental idea of emancipation has a more definite form in the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Kaṭha*, but these are Upanishads which, for reasons already mentioned, we may fairly assign to a much later, probably a post Buddhistic, age. And it is only in the *S'wetás'watara* that we see the notion in its full grown shape, and it was perhaps this very Upanished which the Buddhist had in his mind, when he made the admission to which your highness refers There we have the theory of máyá, and we hear of God as its projector in the sense of a juggler[8]. There, too, we have the doctrine of mukti, or release from transmigration and bondage. But, as the Buddhist contended not unreasonably, there we also see evident marks of a still more advanced era in the history of Brahminical

[7] Dr. Röer was obliged to translate nearly the whole of the concluding chapter of the Bṛihadáraṇyaka into Latin because of its gross indecencies. "It would not bear an English rendering." See note page 273. *Bibliotheca Indica* No. 135.

[8] य एक जालवान् ईशित ईशनीभिः। यस्मान् मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्॥

philosophy, and it would only harmonize the better with ascertained facts to ascribe its origin, or at least its recasting, to a period after the rise of Buddha."

Rajah.—"But what evident marks of a still more advanced age do you detect in it? The simple doctrine of Maya cannot be held as such, for we have not conceded the Buddhist's claim that his sect originated it, albeit some of our own writers have called it Buddhism in disguise."

Satyakáma.—"As we are considering the Buddhist's charges against Brahminism, it would certainly be unfair to call the *S'wetás'watara* a post-Buddhistic work, merely because it inculcates the doctrine of maya. But I think I can adduce at least two or three independent reasons for assigning it to an age much riper than the Vedic period. It appears to be a sort of *S'aiva* Upanishad. It sets forth the glory of S'iva. It speaks of Mahes'wara, 'the supreme among gods,' as the 'adorable Lord of the world[9].' The words Rudra, Is'ána, Hara, Bhava, which are all proper names of S'iva, are interspersed in the tract as designations of the Supreme Being. When five or six of the characteristic names of S'iva are repeatedly found, in a small tract of a hundred and twelve slokas, as appellatives of the Creator, the fact may be considered conclusive proof of its fabrication by a modern S'aiva hand. The supreme being, Rudra, is again accosted as *Giris'anta* and *Giritra*, or *protector of the mountain,* holding an arrow in his hand. He has a *S'ivá* or *Aghorá*—as his *body personified,* in the sense of a female emanation. These are descriptions which can only become intelligible by a reference to the legendary acts of S'iva, recounted in the Itihases and Puráṇas. There we have S'iva, the lord of Kailása and Himálaya, armed with the

[9] तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं * * विदाम देव भुवनेशमीड्यं ॥

bow Pináka, and having, as a wife, Párvati, otherwise called Sivá, originally an emanation from himself. The conception of S'iva and S'ivá in later mythology is the very conception of the Supreme Being and S'ivá, of Mahes'wara and Prakṛiti or Máyá[10], contained in the *Swetas'watara*.

"My next reason is that Kapila, the author of the S'ánkhya, and his system the S'ánkhya Yoga, are mentioned and lauded, and several terms are used which are peculiar to that system, such as *pradhána*, *prakṛiti*, *sákshi*, together with something like a description of two eternal principles, which the modern followers of the S'ánkhya are fond of quoting to this day in defence of their theory. This may be considered indisputable proof of the tract being a post-S'ánkhya, and therefore a post Buddhist, Upanishad. And I may add in further confirmation of this view that the S'wetas'watara speaks of the creation of Brahmá, and the production of the Veda through him under the agency of the Supreme Being[1], a legend of which no other Upanishad makes any mention, and which decidedly belongs to the later mythological period of the Puráṇas.

"Again atheistic speculations, deliberately attributing the production of the universe to other causes than the Supreme Being, were unknown in the Vedic period, and are clearly *post* Buddhistic in point of date. The S'wetás-

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[10] या ते रुद्र शिवा तनूरघोराऽपापकाशिनी। तया नस्तनुवा शन्तमया गिरिशन्ताभिचाकशीहि॥ यामिषुं गिरिशन्त हस्ते बिभर्ष्यस्तवे। शिवां गिरित्र तां कुरु मा हिंसीः पुरुषं जगत्॥

मायान्तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान् मायिनन्तु महेश्वरं॥

[1] यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै। The idea contained in last sentence is almost identical with that in the *S'ri Bhágavata*.

तेने ब्रह्म हृदा य आदि कवये॥

watara, however, addresses itself to a community in which such infidel speculations had already gained currency. It starts with the questions, 'Is Brahma the cause? Whence 'are we produced? Is time, nature (swabhava), or succes- 'sion of works, or chance, or the elements, or Purusha, 'the cause[2].'' Now most of these hypothetical causes of the universe were originally inculcated in Buddhistic schools, though they may have been afterwards countenanced by Brahminical atheists. Several Buddhistic schools were in fact designated by terms which were derived from some of those very theories. We have the *Swabhávicas* from *Swabháva*, or nature, to which they attributed the origin of all things. We have the *Kármikas* from *Karma*, or works, which they considered as one of the causes, at least, of the universe. We have also those who contended that the conjunction of the material elements is sufficient of itself to produce intelligence, just as the intermixture of fermenting drugs begets the power of intoxication[3]. The *Swetaswatara* must be glancing at those infidels when it proposes to refute the theories just mentioned, and especially when it adds afterwards, 'Some wise men talk of Nature *(Swabhava)*, others of time[4].' We have heard of no infidels in the Pre-buddhistic period attributing the creation of the universe to the sole operation of Nature or time, or the conjunction of the material

[2] किं कारणं ब्रह्म कुतः स्म जाता * * कालस्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्या ॥

नियतिरविषमपुण्य पाप लक्षणं कर्म्म ॥ S'ankara.

[3] अत्र चत्वारि भूतानि भूमिवार्यनलानिलाः चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्य श्चैतन्य मुपजायते किण्वादिभ्यः समेतेभ्यो द्रव्येभो मदशक्तिवत् ॥ Sarva Dars'ana Sangraha.

[4] स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति । कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः ॥

elements, although we find some such doctrine reproduced in the Sankhya. It would certainly be the very extreme of *sáhasa* (boldness) to deny under these circumstances that the Swetaswatara was written after the rise of Buddha.

"Your highness will observe that the doctrine of Maya is definitely inculcated only in the *Swetaswatara* Upanishad, and that appears to be a *post* Buddhistic work. There can be no absurdity in attributing the eventual reception of that theory by the Brahmins to the influence of Śakya's teaching. As to the idea of mukti or emancipation, the Brahmins had certainly been pondering it for some time before the rise of Buddhism. It was probably they themselves who instilled it into the mind of Śakya. It was perhaps their own aspirations after something better than the degrading pleasures of Indra's territories, that first suggested the futility of rites and ceremonies to the fertile imagination of the young prince of Kapilawastu. But it was the prince himself who appears to have imparted a coherent shape to the doctrine, which in some of the Pre-buddhistic Upanishads appears in a chaotic state of disconnected fragments, not unfrequently by the side of the very contrary idea of sensuous enjoyments. Sakya appears to have first separated the two by contending that rites and ceremonies do not contribute to our highest good, and that it was nirvaṇa alone which could secure our final escape from the miseries of sensuous life. In Post-buddhistic writings the notion of emancipation which pervades the philosophy of the Nyaya, the Sankhya, and the Vedant, appears in a consistent form as distinct from that of heavenly enjoyment. *Swarga* and *apavarga* are always contrasted. The Buddhists therefore have some right to say you have received lessons from them, though their own leader was

originally your own pupil, indoctrinated in early life by your predecessors in the faith."

Rajah.—"But does not the disproof of the Maya-vada acquit the Vedantist of the charge *master-atheist?*"

Satyakáma.—"If it acquit the Vedantist of that charge, it arraigns him at once on another. Reverting to the text, *all this is God,* how can we acquit him of the charge of *deifying every material thing,* that is to say of teaching a system of gross pantheism? Since the theory of Maya, which was his only defence against this latter charge, must as a plain matter of fact be separated from the Vedánta, I do not see how Colonel Kennedy's hypothetical inference can be denied."

Rajah.—"Whatever Colonel Kennedy's view of the discussion might have been, a single text, approvingly cited by the commentator, cannot decide such a weighty question. All that you may be allowed to say is, what Vaiyasika himself contends for, that Vyasa and Sankara were not idealists. But you have not proved that they really taught material pantheism."

Satyakáma.—"Your highness is quite right in saying that this is a question which cannot be decided by a single text, however pointed; I mean, if you concede that the Vedas and the Sútras are, in some respects at least, human compositions. For if you adhere unflinchingly to the story of Brahma's breathing the Vedas out, whole and entire, then even a single text ought to decide the question however weighty. Still I will not press that point for the present, but, treating the Vedas and the Sútras as human compositions, will make such allowances as the rules of liberal criticism may call for. A single isolated passage may be explained away in such a case. The general tenor of the work must afford the key to the interpretation of detached texts.

"May we then, with your highness's permission, review the general tenor of the sútras of Vyasa with reference to the relation which Brahma bears to the world? [The Rajah nodded, and Satyakáma continued.] Professing to deduce his system from a critical examination of the texts of the Vedas, Vyasa commences his work by assailing the Sankhya, and denounces Kapila's theory on the origin of the Universe. He prosecutes this aggressive war against Kapila, by appeals to the Vedas, almost throughout the whole of the first chapter. He labours to show that the dogmas of his antagonists are contradicted by express passages of the Upanishads, and that the texts on which they rely may be otherwise explained. In the course of this war on the Sankhya, he takes occasion to declare that wherever the Vedas speak of any substance, as a cause of the universe, they can mean no other than the one Supreme Intelligence which prevades all space, and which will eventually be the receptacle of all things. He says the *purusha* (soul) *in the sun, the purusha in the eye, the little purusha no bigger than a thumb, the purusha of the measure of a span, the ether in the heart,* all these personifications, set forth in the Upanishads, are no other than the supreme Brahma who is without a second. So likewise the passages which speak of certain inanimate things as the primary element, *e. g.*, food, air, breath of life, light, ether, are referred to Brahma. If it be asked what right the author had to identify those descriptions with Brahma, the commentator reminds you of the great charter of Pantheism, the text, *All this is Brahma.* Vyasa does not however say, except by implication, that the world is identical with Brahma, or that Brahma is *Prakṛiti,* nature, or *substance* of the universe, before the 23*rd* sútra of the 4*th* Pada of the 1st chapter."

Rajah.—"But does he, in the earlier portion of his work, say by implication that the world is identical with Brahma ?"

"The idea is undoubtedly found, said Satyakáma, in the following sútras: 'Because of resolution or ab'sorption into the spirit.' (I. i. 9.) 'It (the Veda) de'clares its (the world's) assimilation into Him." (I. i. 19.) 'He is the Eater, because he takes into Himself move'ables and immoveables.' (I. ii. 9.) 'Because it is dis'tinguished as the place to be approached by the eman'cipated.' (I. iii. 2.) 'It (the Sankhya) is not true, 'it is disproved, because of observation.' I. i. 5. 'From 'desire, too, there is no room for the Sankhya inference[5].' I. i. 18. The two Sutras, last mentioned, evidently refer to texts in which the Supreme Being is represented as desirous of *multiplying himself* by the process of creation.

"I, of course, continued Satyakáma, make use of Sankara's authorized gloss in interpreting the above sútras, but I am not confounding the commentator's *deductions* with the author's language. The light which the commentator throws on the Sútras must be accepted, but it would be quite unphilosophical to attribute to the author of the Sútras all that the fertile mind of his commentator has imagined. Were I to consider every sentence of S'ankara to be an exact index of Vyasa's mind, I could recognize many more decided instances of his pantheism before coming to the 23rd sútra I. iv. But it is at that sútra that the author commences a series of aphorisms, unhesitatingly pronouncing God to be the material cause of the world."

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[5] स्वाप्ययात्। अस्मिन्नस्यच तद्योगं शास्ति। अत्ताचराचरग्रहणात् मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात्। ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दं। कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा॥

Rajah.—"Do you mean to say that S'ankara's commentary contains any misconception of Vyása's teaching?"

Satyakáma.—"I do not exactly mean that, but I do not wish to lose sight of the distinction between the author and his commentator."

Rajah.—"What do you say, Vaiyásika, to this?"

Vaiyásika.—"As Satyakáma has not charged the commentator with *misrepresenting* the author's views, I do not wish to say anything."

Rajah.—"What authority then do you attach to S'ankara's commentary?"

Vaiyásika.—"S'ankara deserves all credit for learning, honesty, and clearness of mind. He at once gets at the mind of his author, and expounds the meaning plainly and fully. I cannot conceive the possibility of his misapprehending a single expression of Vyása,—nor can I imagine it to be within the range of a mortal's capacity to add to or subtract from what S'ankara has said. To say less would involve a sacrifice of fulness. To say more would be incurring prolixity. There is nothing redundant in his commentary, nor any thing defective. You cannot improve it by adding or curtailing. Still S'ankara was not a Ṛishi. The author of the *S'ankara-digvijaya* has indeed represented him as an incarnation of S'iva[6], but we have not received that story in any other light than that of a complimentary tribute for his successful refutation of Buddhism. We cannot say he was essentially infallible. Vyása was a Ṛishi. He was essentially infallible, for Ṛishis cannot err."

Satyakáma.—"Have not different Ṛishis,—Gotama, Kapila, Vyása,—taught mutually conflicting doctrines? Are we then still to suppose them all to be infallible?"

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[6] यतीन्द्रः शङ्करो नाम्ना भविष्यामि महीतले ॥

Raja.—"But a learned writer has suggested that their differences are capable of being reconciled[7]."

Vaiyásika.—"Without waiting for Satyakáma's reply, I shall at once admit that the differences are not capable of being reconciled. At least S'ankaráchárya did not think they were. He not only condemns the opinions of the Nyáya and the Sánkhya on the origin of the universe, but he brands their authors as discordant heretics[8]. There is certainly no reason for saying that Gotama lays greater stress on *sensation* than Kapila, or that Kapila speaks more of *emotions* than Gotama. Nor can it be urged that the authors of the Nyáya and the Sánkhya undertook to teach their systems on *the foundation of the Vedas.* The fact of their differences is certainly a difficulty with us, but still we hold that Ṛishis are infallible. We are not bound to receive their teaching if it be opposed to the Veda, but we must not be wanting in reverence to their memory. But why do you press

7 "Assuming, each of them implicitly, the truth of the Vedas, and proceeding to give, on that foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three systems differ in their *point of view.* To illustrate this, suppose that three men in succession take up a cylindrical ruler: the one, viewing it with its end towards his eye, sees a circle; the second, viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelogram; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting away in front of his eye, sees a frustum of a cone. These three views are different, but no wise irreconcileable. So far are they from being irreconcileable, that it might be argued that *all* of them must be accepted in succession, before any adequate conception of the form of the ruler can be arrived at. Now, in somewhat such a way, the three Hindū systems differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe from different points of view,—viz., as it stands in relation severally to *sensation, emotion,* and *intellection.*—The *Naiyāyika,* founding on the fact that we have various *sensations,* enquires what and how many are the channels through which such varied knowledge flows in. The *Sānkhya,* struck with the fact that we have *emotions,*—with an eye to the question *whence* our impressions come,—enquires their *quality.* The *Vedāntin,* rising above the question as to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks simply, what *is,* and what is *not.*"—*Ballantyne's prize Essay pp. xvi, xvii.*

8 तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्।

Com. Vedant, II. i. 4.

on our attention a point which we confess is attended with some difficulty, and which is irrelevant to our present discussion? Go on with your review of the Vedant teaching."

Satyakáma—"Well then, with reference to Sútra 23. iv. I., it runs thus[9],—'He is also *prakṛiti* (the substance

[9] प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्। यथाभ्युदयहेतुत्वाद्धर्म्मो जिज्ञास्य एवं निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वाद्ब्रह्मापि जिज्ञास्यमित्युक्तं। ब्रह्म च जन्माद्यस्य यत इति लक्षितं। तच्च लक्षणं घटरुचकादीनां मृत्सुवर्णादिवत् प्रकृतित्वे कुलालसुवर्णकारादिवन्निमित्तत्वे च समानमित्यतो भवति विमर्शः किमात्मकं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वं स्यादिति। तत्र निमित्तकारणमेव तावत् स्यादिति प्रतिभाति। कस्मात्, ईक्षापूर्व्वककर्त्तृत्वश्रवणात्। ईक्षापूर्व्वकं हि ब्रह्मणः कर्तृत्वमवगम्यते स ईक्षाञ्चक्रे स प्राणमसृजतेत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः ईक्षापूर्व्वकञ्च कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेष्वेव कुलालादिषु दृष्टं तद्वत् परमेश्वरस्यापि निमित्तकारणत्वमेव युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं। कार्य्यं चेदं जगत् सावयवमचेतनमशुद्धं च दृश्यते। कारणेनापि तस्य तादृशेनैव भवितव्यं। कार्य्यकारणयोः सारूप्यदर्शनात्। ब्रह्म च नैवं लक्षणमवगम्यते निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनमित्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। पारिशेष्याद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यदुपादानकारणमशुद्ध्यादिगुणकं स्मृतिप्रसिद्धमभ्युपगन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकारणत्वश्रुतेर्निमित्तमात्रे पर्य्यवसानादित्येवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः। प्रकृतिश्चोपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च। न केवलं निमित्तकारणमेव कस्मात् प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्। एवं प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तौ श्रुतौ नोपरुध्येते। प्रतिज्ञा तावत् उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति अमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातमिति तत्र चैकविज्ञानेन सर्व्वमन्यदविज्ञातमपि विज्ञातम्भवति इति प्रतीयते तच्चोपादानकारणविज्ञाने सर्वविज्ञानं सम्भवति उपादानकारणाव्यतिरेकात् कार्य्यस्य निमित्तकारणादव्यतिरेकस्तु कार्य्यस्य नास्ति लोके तक्षप्रासादव्यतिरेकदर्शनात्। दृष्टान्तोऽपि यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्व्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं इत्युपादानकारण-

'of the world) because the Question and Example require 'it.' Śankara expounds the aphorism thus. 'It has 'already been said that as inquiry into duty is necessary 'for prosperity, so inquiry into Brahma is also necessary 'for emancipation. Brahma again has been defined as 'He 'from whom are the production &c., of this.' But that 'definition is equally applicable [both to material and 'efficient causes] to the substance, such as the clay and 'gold are in the case of the jar and necklace, and to the 'agent such as the potter and the goldsmith. Hence the 'doubt, *of what kind is the causality of Brahma?* Here it 'might appear that He is only the efficient cause. Why? 'Because we hear of observation preceding the agency.

गोचर एवाम्नायते। यथैकेन लोहमणिना सर्व्वं लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्यात् एकेन नखनिकृन्तनेन सर्व्वं कार्ष्णायसं विज्ञातं स्यादिति च। तथान्यत्रापि कस्मिन्नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्व्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवतीति प्रतिज्ञाय यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः सम्भवन्तीति दृष्टान्तः। आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञाते इदं सर्व्वं विदितमिति प्रतिज्ञाय स यथा दुन्दुभेर्हन्यमानस्य न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय दुन्दुभेस्तु ग्रहणेन दुन्दुभ्याघातस्य वा शब्दो गृहीत इति दृष्टान्तः एवं यथा सम्भवं प्रतिवेदान्तं प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तौ प्रकृतित्वसाधनौ प्रत्येतव्यौ। यत इतीयमपिपञ्चमी। यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते इत्यत्र जनिकर्त्तुः प्रकृतिरिति विशेषस्मरणात् प्रकृतिलक्षण एवोपादाने द्रष्टव्या। निमित्तत्वन्तु अधिष्ठात्रन्तराभावादवगन्तव्यं। यथा हि लोके मृत्सुवर्णादिकमुपादानकारणं कुलालसुवर्णकारादीनधिष्ठातॄनपेक्ष्य प्रवर्त्तते नैवं ब्रह्मण उपादानकारणस्य सतोऽन्योऽधिष्ठातापेक्ष्योऽस्ति। प्रागुत्पत्तेरेकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यवधारणात् अधिष्ठात्रन्तराभावोऽपि प्रतिज्ञादृष्टन्तानुपरोधादेव चोदितो वेदितव्यः। अधिष्ठातरि ह्युपादानादन्यस्मिन्नभ्युपगम्यमाने पुनरप्येकविज्ञानेन सर्व्वविज्ञानस्यासम्भवात् प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तोपरोध एव स्यात्। तस्मादधिष्ठात्रन्तराभावादात्मनः कर्त्तृत्वं उपादानान्तराभावाच्च प्रकृतित्वं ॥

'The agency of Brahma is indeed found preceded by 'observation, in the following texts. 'He observed. He 'created the vital air.' Now agency with observation is 'seen only in efficient causes such as potters and others. 'Therefore it is proper to understand the causality of 'God as simply that of an agent. The universe, again, 'as a work, is composed of parts, inanimate, impure. Its 'cause must likewise be of the same kind, for cause 'and effect are homogeneous. But Brahma does not 'answer to this description; witness the texts, 'with-'out parts, without work, quiet, unblemished, unstained.' 'In fine, a material cause, different from Brahma, and 'possessed of impurity and similar qualities,—such a 'cause as is set forth in the *smṛiti*,—should be looked 'for; and as to the text declaring the causality of Brah-'ma, it would be quite sufficient to consider Him as 'the efficient agent (alone). To this argument, (continues Śankara) we reply: Brahma is to be understood 'as the *Prakṛiti*, the substance or material, and also the 'the efficient cause. Not simply the efficient cause. 'Why? Because the congruity of the question and ex-'ample requires it. This is the question, 'Did you ask "him for the doctrine by which that which is unheard "becomes heard, that which is unthought of becomes "thought of, that which is unknown becomes known?' 'Herein it was understood that by the knowledge of one, 'all others, though unknown, become known. Now it 'is by the knowledge of the material cause, that every 'thing else is known, because the material cause is in-'separable from the effect. But the efficient cause is 'not inseparable from the effect, because a difference 'between the architect and the edifice is seen in the 'world. This, again, is the example,—'As O beloved! "by means of one clod of earth every earthy form is

"known, it being in truth only earth, though called, in "words, a modification.' Thus is the material cause set 'forth in the Vedas. Also, 'as by means of one magnet, "every [magnetized] iron becomes known, and as by "means of one nail-clipper, every black iron is known.' 'So also elsewhere, 'What is that, Sir, which being "known, all this becomes known?' on this question the 'example is; 'as in the earth herbs are produced.' 'The "Spirit being seen, heard, thought of, known, all this is "known,'—on this question the example is, 'as one cannot "take hold of the external sound of a drum that is beaten, "but by taking up the beaten drum itself, the sound of "the stroke is also taken up.' Thus in every Vedant 'text bearing on the point, the question and example are 'to be known as proving material causality. Again, in 'the sentence, 'From whom all these creatures proceed,' '—*from whom* is in the ablative case; hence since it 'refers especially to the maker's material, it must be ex-'pressive of the material cause. His efficient causality 'is to be deduced from the want of any other agent. As 'in the world, the material causes, such as earth and 'gold, need the working of potters, goldsmiths, and other 'agents, not so does the material cause Brahma need ano-'ther agent, for before the creation we learn there was one 'only without a second. The want of another agent is 'also deducible from the congruity of the question and 'example, for if there were another agent, separable from 'the material, then by means of one thing every thing else 'could not be known, and the question and example would 'become incongruous. Hence from the want of another 'agent, is deduced the spirit's agency, and from the want 'of another substance his material causality.'

"The next Sútra (24th) confirms the above view. 'From the doctrine of his desire too.' Śankara thus ex-

pounds it. 'The doctrine of desire, too, demonstrates the 'spirit's efficiency and material causality. 'He desired, "let me become many, let me be born.' Also 'He saw '&c.' 'Here from the independent action preceded by 'desire he is inferred as the actor; from the words 'let me "become many,' because of individual souls being the 'objects of the thought or intention of multiplication, he is 'inferred to be the substance or material cause also[10].' The founder of the Vedanta School goes on urging the same doctrine. 'Because the two processes [of springing from 'and being resolved into] are both manifestly spoken of 'in the Vedas[1].' Śankara explains it thus: 'This is the 'exposition of the state of *prakṛiti.* Hence too is 'Brahma the material cause, for the Vedas, manifestly 'taking Brahma to be the only cause, speak of production 'and absorption. 'All these elements proceed from ether "and are resolved into ether.' That from which any 'thing proceeds and into which it is resolved is called 'the material cause—as the earth is of rice and wheat. 'By the use of the word 'manifest,' too, he shows that 'the words 'from ether' exclude the supposition of any

[10] अभिध्योपदेशाच्च। अभिध्योपदेशश्चात्मनः कर्त्तृत्वप्रकृतित्वे गमयति सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तदैक्षतेतिच तत्राभिध्यानपूर्व्विकायाः स्वातन्त्र्यप्रवृत्तेः कर्त्तेति गम्यते बहु स्यामिति प्रत्यगात्मविषयत्वात् बहु भवनाभिध्यानस्य प्रकृतिरित्यपि गम्यते॥

[1] साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नानात्। प्रकृतित्वस्यायमभ्युच्चयः इतश्च प्रकृतिर्ब्रह्म यत्कारणं साक्षाद्ब्रह्मैव कारणमुपादायोभौ प्रभवप्रलयावाम्नायेते सर्व्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यन्तीति यद्धि यस्मात् प्रभवति यस्मिंश्च प्रलीयते तत्तस्योपादानं प्रसिद्धं यथा ब्रीहियवादीनां पृथिवी साक्षादितिचोपादानान्तरानुपादानं सूचयति आकाशादेवेति प्रत्यस्तमयश्चनोपादानादन्यत्र कार्य्यस्य दृष्टः॥

'other material. Nor is the resolution of an effect ever seen 'to be into any other than the material cause.' Again, says Vyása, 'Because of his creating himself—by muta-'tion.' S'ankara thus expounds it: 'Hence too is Brahma 'the material cause—for with reference to his operation, 'it is said 'He himself created himself'—thereby indi-'cating that he was both the agent and the object of the 'creation—'himself' signifying the object—'he himself 'created' signifying the agent. But now how can one, 'already held to be the Maker, be again represented as 'an object, *being made?* We reply, by mutation. The 'spirit, before proved to be existent, altered himself, by a 'particular modification. It is by particular modifications 'that the mutation of materials like earth and other 'things is found. The specification, too, of 'He himself' 'excludes the supposition of another agent[2].' Vyása con-'tinues: 'He is also sung as the womb[3].' S'ankara 'explains it thus—'Hence also is Brahma the material 'cause, for the expression 'Brahma is the womb' is read 'in the Vedant, thus 'the Lord, the creative soul, Brahma,

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[2] आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्। इतश्च प्रकृतिर्ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मप्रक्रियायां तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुतेति आत्मनः कर्म्मत्वं कर्त्तृत्वञ्च दर्शयति आत्मानमिति कर्म्मत्वं स्वयमकुरुतेति कर्त्तृत्वं कथं पुनः पूर्व्वसिद्धस्य सतः कर्तृत्वेन व्यवस्थितस्य क्रियमानत्वं शक्यं सम्पादयितुं परिणामादिति ब्रूमः पूर्वसिद्धो हि सन्नात्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामासात्मानमिति। विकारात्मनाच परिनामो मृदाद्यासु प्रकृतिषूपलब्धः स्वयमिति च विशेषणान्निमित्तान्तरानपेक्षत्वमपि प्रतीयते॥

[3] योनिश्च हि गीयते। इतश्च प्रकृतिर्ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मयोनिरित्यपि पठ्यते वेदान्तेषु कर्त्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्म योनिमिति यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीरा इति च। योनिशब्दश्च प्रकृतिवचनः समधिगतो लोके पृथिवी योनिरोषधिवनस्पतीनामिति॥

"is the womb,' also, 'the self-restrained see the womb of 'the creation.' The womb is popularly understood to 'be the material cause—thus the earth is the womb of 'herbs and trees.' The fourth section, and consequently the first chapter, concludes with he aphorism, 'Hereby 'all (hostile tenets) are refuted[4].'

"The above extracts, continued Satyakáma, prove that according to the teaching of Vyása and Śankara the substance or material of the universe is God, and that the world is only a development of Him. Such a view of Brahma's relation to the world could not but be startling. Many were the objections preferred by the followers of the Sánkhya and Nyáya, which Śankaráchárya cited and answered. I cannot say he has fairly met them,—but let us now review that discussion.

Objection[5].—'Brahma is not the material cause for 'this has a characteristic difference, and so also the

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[4] एतेन सर्व्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः ।

[5] न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वञ्च शब्दात् । ब्रह्मास्य जगतोनिमित्तं कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्य पक्षस्याक्षेपः स्मृतिनिमित्तः परिहृतः तर्कनिमित्त इदानीमाक्षेपः परिह्रियते कुतः पुनरस्मिन्नवधारिते आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षेपस्यावकाशः ननुधर्म्मइव ब्रह्मण्यप्यनपेक्ष आगमोभवितुमर्हति भवेदयमवष्टम्भो यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्यः आगममात्रप्रमेयोऽयमर्थः स्यादनुष्ठेयइवधर्म्मः परिनिष्पन्नरूपन्तु ब्रह्मावगम्यते परिनिष्पन्ने च वस्तुनि प्रमाणान्तराणामस्त्यवकाशो अतस्तर्कनिमित्तः पुनराक्षेपः क्रियते न विलक्षणत्वादस्येति । यदुक्तं चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतःकारणं प्रकृतिरिति तन्नोपपद्यते कस्मात् विलक्षणत्वादस्य विकारस्य प्रकृत्याः । इदं हि ब्रह्मकार्य्यत्वेनाभिप्रेयमाणं जगत् ब्रह्मविलक्षणमचेतनमशुद्धञ्च दृश्यते ब्रह्म च जगद्विलक्षणं चेतनं शुद्धञ्च श्रूयते न च विलक्षणत्वे प्रकृतिविकारभावोदृष्टः नहि रुचकादयो विकारा मृत्प्रकृतिका भवन्ति शरावादयो वा सुवर्णप्रकृतिकाः मृदैवतु मृदन्विता विकाराः प्रक्रियन्ते सुवर्णेन च सुवर्णान्विताः तथेदमपि

'Veda says.' This is Vyása's epitome of his adversaries' sayings. Śankara thus expounds it. 'The objection, 'raised on the authority of the Smṛiti against Brahma's 'substantial and efficient causality has been refuted;

जगदचेतनं सुखदुःखमोहान्वितं सदचेतनस्यैव सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य कारणस्य कार्य्यं भवितुमर्हति न विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वञ्चास्य जगतोऽशुद्ध्यचेतनत्वदर्शनादवगन्तव्यं अशुद्धं हीदं जगत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया प्रीतिपरितापविषादादिहेतुत्वात् स्वर्गनरकाद्युच्चावचप्रपञ्चत्वाच्च। अचेतनञ्चेदं जगत् चेतनं प्रतिकार्य्यकरणभावेनोपकरणभावोपगमात् नहि साम्ये सत्युपकार्य्योपकारकभावो भवति नहि प्रदीपौ परस्परस्योपकुरुतः। ननु चेतनमपि कार्य्यकरणं स्वामिभृत्यन्यायेनभोक्तुरुपकरिष्यति न स्वामिभृत्ययोरप्यचेतनांशस्यैव चेतनं प्रत्युपकारकत्वात् योह्येकस्य चेतनस्य परिग्रहो बुद्ध्यादिरचेतनभागः स एवान्यस्य चेतनस्योपकरोति न तु स्वयमेव चेतनश्चेतनान्तरस्योपकरोत्यपकरोति वा निरतिशया ह्यकर्त्तारश्चेतना इति साङ्ख्या मन्यन्ते। तस्मादचेतनं कार्य्यकरणं। न च काष्ठलोष्टादीनां चेतनत्वे किञ्चित् प्रमाणमस्ति प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनप्रविभागो लोके। तस्माद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगत्तत्प्रकृतिकं। योपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्बलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमिष्यामि प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारेऽन्वयदर्शनात् अविभावनन्तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद्भविष्यति यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते एतस्मादेव च विभावितत्वाविभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्याञ्च कार्य्यकरणानामात्मनाञ्च चेतनत्वाविशेषेपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते यथाच पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्त्तिनोविशेषात् परस्परोपकारित्वं भवति एवमिहापि भविष्यति प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्यत इति तेनापि कथञ्चिच्चेतनत्वाचेतनत्वविलक्षणत्वं परिह्रियेत शुद्ध्यशुद्धिलक्षणन्तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव परिह्रियते नचेतरदपि विलक्षणत्वं परिहर्त्तुं शक्यत इत्याह तथात्वञ्च शब्दादिति। अनवगम्यमानमेव हीदं लोके समस्तस्य वस्तुनश्चेतनत्वं चेतनप्रकृतिकत्वश्रवणात् शब्दशरणतया

'that founded on argumentation is now being disposed 'of. It may be asked how could there be room for 'argumentation on a point settled by the Sástra? May

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केवलयोत्प्रेक्षते तच्चशब्देनैवविरुध्यते यतः शब्दादपि तथात्वमवगम्यते। तथात्वमिति प्रकृतं विलक्षणत्वं कथयति शब्द एव विज्ञानञ्चाविज्ञानञ्चेति कस्यचिद्भागस्याचेतनतां श्रावयन् चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणमचेतनं जगत् श्रावयति। ननु चेतनत्वमपि क्वचिदचेतनत्वाभिमतानां भूतेन्द्रियाणां श्रूयते यथा मृदब्रवीदापोऽब्रुवन्निति तत्तेज ऐक्षत ता आप ऐक्षन्तेतिचैवमाद्या भूतविषयाचेतनत्वश्रुतिः इन्द्रियविषयापि ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसेविवदमाना ब्रह्माणं जग्मुरिति ते ह वाचमूचुस्त्वं न उद्गायेतिचैवमाद्येन्द्रियविषयेति अतउत्तरं पठति। * अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्यां। * तु शब्द आशङ्कामपनुदति। न खलु मृदब्रवीदित्येवंजातीयकया श्रुत्या भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वमाशङ्कनीयं यतोभिमानिव्यपदेश एषः मृदाद्यभिमानिन्यो वागाद्यभिमानिन्यश्च चेतना देवतावदनसंवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रं कस्मात् विशेषानुगतिभ्यां विशेषो हि भोक्तृणां भूतेन्द्रियाणाञ्च चेतनाचेतनप्रविभाग लक्षणः प्रागभिहितः सर्व्वचेतनतायां चासौनोपपद्येत। अपि च कौषीतकिनः प्राणसंवादे करणमात्राशङ्काविनिवृत्तयेऽधिष्ठातृचेतनपरिग्रहाय देवता शब्देन विशिंषन्ति एताह वै देवता अहंश्रेयसे विवदमाना इति तावाएताः सर्व्वा देवताः प्राणेनिःश्रेयसं विदित्वेति च। अनुगताश्च सर्व्वत्राभिमामिन्यश्चेतना देवता मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणादिभ्योवगम्यन्ते। किञ्च अग्निर्व्वाग्भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशदित्येवमादिका च श्रुतिः करणेष्वनुग्राहिकां देवतामनुगतां दर्शयति प्राणसंवादवाक्यशेषे च तेह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुरिति श्रैष्ठनिर्द्धरणाय प्रजापतिगमनं तद्वचनाच्चैकैकोत् क्रमणेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्राणश्रैष्ठ्यप्रतिपत्तिः तस्मै वलिहरणमिति चैवं जातीयकोऽस्मदादिष्विव व्यवहारोनुगम्यमानोभिमानि व्यपदेशं द्रढयति। तत्तेज ऐक्षतेत्यपि परस्या एव देवताया अधिष्ठात्र्याः स्वविकारेष्वनुगताया इयमीक्षा व्यपदिश्यत इति द्रष्टव्यं। तस्माद्विलक्षणमेवेदं ब्रह्मणो जगत् विलक्षणत्वाच्च न ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमित्याक्षिप्ते प्रतिविधत्ते।

'not the Śástra be an independent authority in the 'case of Brahma, as it is in the case of Dharma? But 'then it would be a question of practice, whereas Brahma 'is a demonstrable substance. Hence further evidence 'is admissible. And so he anticipates the logical objec- 'tion, 'This has a characteristic difference &c.' You say 'that the sentient Brahma, the cause of the world, is also 'its *prakṛiti.* This is not congruous. Why? because 'of the characteristic difference between this, the fabric, 'and its substance. This world, which you would describe 'as a production of Brahma, is of a different charac- 'ter from Him, being perceived to be non-sentient, 'impure. And Brahma is declared to be of a different 'character from the world, *i. e.* sentient and pure. The 'relation of material and fabric is never seen where there 'is characteristic difference; for neckchains and other 'golden fabrics cannot have earth for their material, nor 'earthen pots, gold. Earthen fabrics are made only of 'earth, and golden of gold. So this world, too, being 'connected with pleasure, pain, and delusion, must be the 'production of a non-sentient cause, also connected with 'pleasure, pain, and delusion, and not of Brahma, 'which is of a different character. That Brahma has 'a characteristic difference is evident from our obser- 'vation of the world's being non-sentient and impure. 'This world is indeed impure, because, being a compound 'of pleasure, pain, and delusion, it is a cause of delight, 'sorrow, and grief, and because it consists of the opposite 'varieties of heaven and hell. And it is non-sentient, 'for we see that it serves the sentient as an object 'or an instrument. But there cannot be the relation 'of server and served where there is equality. Nor 'can two lamps serve each other. But cannot the 'sentient too serve as the object and instrument of

'the enjoyer, after the manner of master and servant? 'No! for even as regards master and servant, it is the 'non-sentient part that serves the sentient. That which 'is the attribute of one that is sentient, such as the under-'standing, itself non-sentient, does service to another that is 'sentient, but the sentient himself does neither service nor 'damage to another sentient. Sentient actors have no 'superior. Thus do the followers of the Sánkhya believe. 'Therefore object and instrument are non-sentient. Nor 'is there any sign of sentiency in wood and earth, and 'this distinction between the sentient and non-sentient 'is notorious in the world. Therefore because of its 'characteristic difference from Brahma, this world cannot 'have him for its material. Perhaps some one will say, "since the Vedas declare that the world has a sentient "being for its material, I shall for that very reason hold "the world to be sentient, because the quality of the "material follows in the fabric. Its sentiency may "be latent owing to some especial modification. As "in souls, obviously sentient, sentiency does not properly "appear in the state of sleep or trance, so the sentiency "of wood and earth may also be only latent. Because "also of this difference of manifestation and non-mani-"festation, and of colour and no colour, notwithstanding "that sentiency is common to objects and instruments "and to spirits, the predominant quality is not affect-"ed. As also flesh, sauce, and rice, though all of "one common element, earth, are still subservient to each "other, because of their several distinctions, so also "here. Therefore the known distinction is not affected.' 'It is with difficulty that this person explains away the 'characteristic difference between sentiency and non-'sentiency, but he cannot explain away the character-'istic difference between purity and impurity. Nor can

'he really explain away the other either, and therefore it 'is added [by Vyása in his summary of the Sánkhya ob-'jection,] 'And so also the Veda.' This sentiency 'of all things, which is not held among men, is a mere 'hypothetical deduction from the Vedic teaching of a 'sentient material cause, depending solely on that teach-'ing. But it is negatived by Vedic teaching itself, for 'the Veda also inculcates that (characteristic difference). ' 'And so'—the Veda itself expresses the characteristic 'difference—thus, 'Knowledge and ignorance'—teaching 'thereby that some part being non-sentient, the non-'sentient world is characteristically different from the 'sentient Brahma. But do not some texts inculcate the 'sentiency of the elements and organs, (otherwise) con-'sidered non-sentient? thus, 'the earth spake, the waters 'spake,' and, 'that light saw, those waters saw.' These 'texts teach that the elements are sentient. So do others 'about the organs, thus, 'these my vital airs debating on 'what is good went to Brahmá'—also, 'they said, do thou 'sing us.' To this the objector replies, (as Vyása represents 'him in the next Sutra II. i. 5.) 'But that is proved to 'be a mere personification, both by the distinction and 'the usage.' Śankara again thus expounds Vyása's curt representation of his adversary's rejoinder: 'The word '*but* contradicts the previous supposition. From texts 'such as 'the earth spake,' one cannot suppose that the 'elements and organs are sentient, because it is a mere 'personification. Sentient gods, imagined as personifica-'tions of earth and other elements, and of speech and 'other organs, are described as speaking and discoursing, 'which are acts of sentient beings; not that elements and 'organs speak. Why? because there is the distinction 'and the usage. A distinction has been before esta-'blished between enjoyers and elements and organs,

'marking the division between sentient and non-sentient. 'That would not consort with the notion of every thing 'being sentient. Moreover in the *Kaushitaki*, the vital 'airs are distinguished by the word *gods*, in order to 'show that the sentient divinities which direct them, 'are meant, and not the mere organs themselves, thus 'these my gods debating what is good,' and, 'these 'gods know the supreme felicity to be in the vital air.' 'And in the figurative language of the Mantras, as well 'as in the Itihásas and Purāṇas, there are every where 'personifications of sentient gods introduced. Again, 'texts, such as 'Agni becoming speech, entered the 'mouth,' exhibit gods personifying the organs. In the 'context of the passage about vital airs, also, we have, 'they, the vital airs, went and spoke to Prajápati the 'father.' The going to Prajápati was for the ascertain-'ment of excellency, and the speech, directly and in-'directly, sets forth the excellence of the vital airs. So 'also the taking of offerings to him. Such following of 'acts like ours confirms the personification. In the pas-'sage, 'that light saw,' we are also to observe that the 'seeing is predicated of the presiding Supreme Divinity, 'personifying his own modification. The world is there-'fore characteristically different from Brahma, and because 'of the difference he cannot be its material.'

"I have no great respect, continued Satyakáma, for the Sánkhya philosophy, but the above argument, enforced by its adherents, appears irresistibly powerful. I do not acquiesce in every thing continued in the objection, so candidly and elaborately represented by S'ankara, but there is no denying that the external universe *is* characteristically different from Brahma, and that it cannot have the spirit for its *subject matter*, which indeed is a contradiction in terms."

Rajah.—"But has not S'ankaráchárya given a sufficient reply to that argument?"

Satyakáma.—"His reply is singularly unsatisfactory. Let us consider it in detail. The next Sutra (II. i. 6,) reads, 'But it is seen[6],' which S'ankara thus expounds. 'That which you urge, that the universe cannot, because 'of its characteristic difference, have Brahma for its sub- 'stance, is not conclusive; for from men and other animals, 'well known to be sentient, the production of hair, nails, 'and other things, different in character, is witnessed

[6] दृश्यतेतु। तु शब्दः पूर्वपक्षं व्यावर्त्तयति। यदुक्तं विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति नायमेकान्तः दृश्यते हि लोके चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्यः पुरुषादिभ्यो विलक्षणानां केशनखादीनामुत्पत्तिरचेतनत्वेन च प्रसिद्धेभ्यो गोमयादिभ्यो वृश्चिकादीनां। नन्वचेतनान्येव पुरुषादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां केशनखादीनां कारणानि अचेतनान्येव वृश्चिकादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां गोमयादीनां कार्य्याणीत्युच्यते एवमपि किंचिदचेतनं चेतनस्यायतनभावमुपगच्छति किंचिन्नेत्यस्त्येव वैलक्षण्यं। महांश्चायं पारिणामिकः स्वभाव विप्रकर्षः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादीनाञ्च रूपादिभेदात् तथा गोमयादीनां वृश्चिकादीनाञ्च अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत। अथोच्येत अस्ति कश्चित् पार्थिवत्वादिस्वभावः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादिष्वनुवर्त्तमानः गोमयादीनाञ्च वृश्चिकादिष्विति ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्त्तमानो दृश्यते। विलक्षणत्वेन च कारणेन ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वं जगतो दूषयता किमशेषस्य ब्रह्मस्वभावस्याननुवर्त्तनं विलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेयते उत यस्य कस्यचित् अथ चैतन्यस्येति वक्तव्यं प्रथमे विकल्पे समस्तप्रकृतिविकारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः नहि असत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकारभाव इति भवति। द्वितीये चाप्रसिद्धत्वं। दृश्यते हि सत्तालक्षणो ब्रह्मस्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्त्तमान इत्युक्तं। तृतीये तु दृष्टान्ताभावः किं हि यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिकं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मकारणवादिनं प्रत्युदाह्रियेत समस्तस्यास्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वाभ्युपगमात्॥

Ibid, II. i. 7.

'in the world; and that of scorpions and other insects 'from cowdung and other things, well known to be non-'sentient. If you object that the causes of hair and 'nails, which are non-sentient, are only the bodies of men 'and other animals which are no other than non-sentient, 'and the productions of cowdung and other matter, which 'are non-sentient, are the bodies of scorpions and other 'insects which are no other than non-sentient; my reply 'is, Here too there is a difference in the characters; 'something non-sentient becomes the receptacle of the 'sentient and something does not. Hence there is a 'difference. Great, again, is this natural mutation, be-'cause of the difference in colour between the human and 'other bodies (on the one hand,) and hair, nails, &c. (on 'the other); so also between cowdung and other matter 'and scorpions and other insects. Nor could there be the 'relation of material and fabric if there were too much 'similarity [and no difference at all in the characters]. 'Again if you say that there is a certain earthiness, or 'other natural character, in the human and other bodies, 'which is also found in hair, nails, and other things, 'and a similar one in cowdung and other matter, which 'is also found in scorpions &c. I reply, so is there a na-'tural character in Brahma, even his entity, which is also 'found in ether and other things. By finding fault with 'the notion of the universe having Brahma for its mate-'rial, because of a difference of characters, tell me, do you 'refer to the absence of the whole of Brahma's nature in 'the effect, or of any part of it, or merely of His Intelli-'gence? In the first case your argument would destroy 'the very possibility of the relation of material and fabric, 'for there cannot be such things, if the one is to have no 'excess above the other. In the second case the argu-'ment is not founded in fact, for, as I have already said,

'one natural character of Brahma, *i. e.*, his entity, exists 'in ether and other things. As to the third case, it has 'no example. Against them who assert that Brahma 'is the cause, what example can be adduced of a thing 'which is not endowed with sentiency *having other material* than Brahma,—when we declare that all this, which 'has sprung from a substance, has Brahma for its 'material ?'

"I submit, continued Satyakáma, the reply is not satisfactory. The example of hair and nails, as products of the animal body, gives no countenance to the relation which S'ankara would establish between the world and Brahma. Hair and nails, themselves material, (or earthy as he himself calls them), are produced from the animal body, also material, or earthy. The example would be analogous if hair and nails were products of the *immaterial* and *unearthy soul*. The Sánkhya would not however admit such a premiss, nor does S'ankara, though commencing the argument with such a suggestion, insist on it in the end. But then he tells us that as the relation of cause and effect between the animal body and hair and nails is verified by the property of earthiness, common to both, so may the relation of cause and effect, or rather material and fabric, between Brahma and the universe, be verified by the common property of entity. We shall see afterwards, when we review his theory of *avidyá*, or ignorance, whether this common property is compatible with that theory. Meanwhile I must remark that this part of his argument involves an *ati-vyápti*. It proves too much. To say that mere entity is a character on which the relation of cause and effect, or rather of material and fabric, may be founded, is simply to assert that merely because two things exist, the one may be a material of the other. Then any thing may be proved to

be a material of every fabric. When you are called upon to show in what respect can this fabric, the universe, exhibit a sameness of quality with its material Brahma, you say it is in respect of entity. But entity is a universal attribute of every thing that exists. It cannot be a characteristic attribute of a particular cause or effect. The argument involves the fallacy which Kaṇáda has expressed by the formula, *because it has horns, therefore it is a cow.* The general attribute of all horned animals cannot be an especial attribute of the individual cow.

"Then, again, the Sánkhya comes forward with a counter assertion, directly negativing the Vedantist's proposition. He says the non-sentient *cannot* be a product of the sentient. An assertion, such as this, might be at once disproved by a single example, if one could be adduced, and it is therefore for the opponent of the Sánkhya to dispose of it in that way if he can. S'ankara however challenges an example in support of the Sánkhya's negative proposition, and asks for a parallel instance of an inanimate fabric being produced from a material other than Brahma. It would be easier for him to disprove the Sánkhya's negative, than for the Sánkhya to adduce an instance in its support. Still it might not be unjust in itself to demand such an example. But S'ankara, when he demands the example, demands it in such a way as would make it absolutely impossible for the Sánkhya to satisfy him. He assumes that whatever exists has Brahma for its material! This is to ask for a thing you have antecedently resolved not to accept. It is in fact a mockery, and is in other words an evasion of the argument. No man can undertake to argue a case where his adversary plainly tells him he will admit no counter evidence. When you allowed room for the Sánkhya's argument—when you boasted that if *Veda alone were*

proof and arguments disallowed, then the question of Brahma would be degraded into one of mere practice—nay, when you confidently added, that, as, when there are conflicting texts one may be overruled by another, so, in the conflict of arguments, Veda itself may be overruled by the force of proof[7]—you virtually staked the correctness of your inference on the result of a logical discussion. But directly you enter into the argument, you endeavour to stop your adversary's mouth by a *sádhya-sama*, or an assumption, which not only amounts to, but is rather identical with the very proposition under examination. If such was your intention, why did you not say so to the Sánkhya at the first onset? Why did you meet him in the field of argumentation? Why did you not say plainly that since you cannot agree with the Sánkhya on first principles, you are mutually *nigraha-sthána* to each other, or not in a position to carry on a discussion."

Rajah.—"Well, go on with your review of the Vedanta Sutras, we shall have plenty of time for discussion afterwards."

Satyakáma.—"I cheerfully acquiesce. Here then is another objection preferred by the followers of the Sánkhya.[8] 'Because of contact with it in dissolution, there

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[7] यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्यः आगममात्रप्रमेयोयमर्थः स्यादनुष्ठेय इव धर्म्मः। * * * यथा च श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधे सत्येकवशेनेतरा नीयन्ते एवं प्रमाणान्तरविरोधेपि तद्वशेनैव श्रुति र्नीयते।

Com. Vedant, II. i. 4.

[8] अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसं॥ अत्राह यदि स्थौल्यसावयवत्वाचेतनत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वाशुद्ध्यादिधर्म्मकं कार्य्यं ब्रह्मकारणकमभ्युपगम्येत तदाऽपीतौ प्रलये प्रतिसंसृज्यमानं कार्य्यं कारणेऽविभागमापद्यमानं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण दूषयेदित्यपीतौ कारणस्यापि ब्रह्मणः कार्य्यस्येवा-

'is incongruity.' 'They say if a gross, material, inanimate, divisible, and impure effect have Brahma for its 'cause, then at the dissolution, when the effect resolves 'into, and becomes inseparable from, the cause, it will 'defile the cause by association with its own qualities. 'Therefore since at the dissolution the cause Brahma 'must become impure like its effect, the doctrine of the 'Upanishad, that the cause of the universe is omniscient 'Brahma, becomes incongruous. Moreover, because of all 'distinctions being then dissolved (by absorption in Brahma) there cannot, at the reproduction, be a production of 'the distinction of enjoyer and enjoyment owing to want 'of direction. This is another incongruity. Again, en'joyers being at that time inseparable from the supreme 'Brahma, and a re-production being inevitable even at the 'dissolution occasioned by works, the emancipated also 'are liable to that reproduction. This is another incon'gruity still. If you say the universe may, even in dis'solution, remain distinct from the Supreme Brahma, 'then there cannot be a dissolution at all, nor can the 'effect be inseparable from the cause. This is likewise 'an incongruity.'

शुद्धादिरूपताप्रसङ्गात् सर्व्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणमित्यसमञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनं। अपिच समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियमकारणाभावाद्भोक्तृभोग्यादिविभागेनोत्पत्तिर्न प्राप्नोति इत्यसमञ्जसं। अपिच भोक्तृणां परेण ब्रह्मणाऽविभागं गतानां कर्म्मादिनिमित्तप्रलयेपि पुनरुत्पत्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसं। अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेवपरेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेत एवमप्यपीतिरेव नसम्भवति कारणाव्यतिरिक्तञ्च कार्य्यं नसम्भवतीत्यसमञ्जसमेवेति॥

Ibid. II. i. 8.

The Vedantist replies[9]: 'Not so, there being example.' S'ankaráchárya expounds the aphorism in the following manner. 'There is no incongruity in our doctrine. That

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[9] अत्रोच्यते ॥ नतु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॥ नैवास्मदीये दर्शने किञ्चिदसामञ्जस्यमस्ति, यत्तावदभिहितं कारणमपि गच्छत् कार्य्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण दूषयेदिति तददूषणं, कस्मात्, दृष्टान्तभावात् सन्ति हि दृष्टान्ताः यथा कारणमपि गच्छत् कार्य्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण नदूषयति। तद्यथा शरावादयो मृत्प्रकृतिका विकारा विभागावस्थायामुच्चावचमध्यमप्रभेदाः सन्तः पुनः प्रकृतिमपि गच्छन्तो न तामात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण संसृजन्ति रुचकादयश्च सुवर्णविकारा अपीतौ न सुवर्णमात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण संसृजन्ति पृथिवीविकारश्च चतुर्व्विधो भूतग्रामोन पृथिवीमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण संसृजति। त्वत्पक्षस्यतु नकश्चिद्दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति अपितिरेव हि नसम्भवेत् यदि कारणे कार्य्यं स्वधर्म्मेणैवावतिष्ठेत अनन्यत्वेपि कार्य्यकारणयोः कार्य्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं नतु कारणस्य कार्य्यात्मत्वं आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः इति वक्ष्यामः। अत्यल्पञ्चेदमुच्यते कार्य्यमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्म्मेण कारणं संसृजेदिति स्थितावपिहि समानोयं प्रसङ्गः कार्य्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् इदं सर्व्वं यदयमात्मा आत्मैवेदं सर्व्वं ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात् सर्व्वंखल्विदंब्रह्मेत्येवमादिभिर्हि श्रुतिभिरविशेषेण त्रिष्वपि कालेषु कार्य्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वं श्राव्यते। तत्र यः परिहारः कार्य्यस्य तद्धर्म्माणाञ्चाविद्याध्यारोपितत्वान्नतैः कारणं संसृज्यतइति अपितावपि ससमानः। अस्ति चायमपरोदृष्टान्तः यथास्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते अवस्तुत्वात् एवं परमात्मापि संसारमायया नसंस्पृश्यतइति। यथाच स्वप्नदर्शकः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यते प्रबोधसंप्रसादयोरनन्वागतत्वात् एवमवस्थात्रयसाक्ष्येकोऽव्यभिचार्य्यवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा नसंस्पृश्यते। मायामात्रं ह्येतत् यत्परमात्मनोवस्थात्रयात्मनाऽवभासनं रज्ज्वाइव सर्पादिभावेनेति। अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्भिराचार्य्यैः अनादिमायया सुप्तोयदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते। अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं

'which is said as to the effect defiling the cause by contact with its own qualities on being resolved thereinto; 'it is not a valid objection. Why? Because we have 'instances on our side. There are instances of effects 'not defiling the cause by contact with their own qualities on being resolved thereinto; *e. g.*, earthen saucers 'and other manufactures, having mud for their material, 'and being in their separate states distinguished as large, 'small, middling, do not, when resolved into their material, affect it with their own qualities. Neckchains, 'having gold for their material, do not, when dissolved, 'affect their material with their own qualities. The fourfold organic modifications, too, of earth (viviparous, 'oviparous &c.) do not in dissolution affect it with their 'own qualities. But on your side there is no example.

बुध्यतेतदेति। तत्र यदुक्तमपीतौ कारणस्यापि कार्य्यस्येव स्थौल्यादिदोष
प्रसङ्ग इति एतदयुक्तं यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं समस्तस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनर्विभा-
गेनोत्पत्तौ नियमकारणं नोपपद्यतइति अयमप्यदोषः दृष्टान्तभावादेव
यथाहिसुषुप्तिसमाध्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभाविक्यामविभागप्राप्तौ मिथ्या
ज्ञानस्यानपोदितत्वात् पुर्व्ववत् पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति एवमिहा-
पि भविष्यति। श्रुतिश्चात्र भवति इमाः सर्व्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य नविदुः
सति सम्पद्यामहइति तइह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो
वा पतङ्गोवा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तत्तदा भवन्तीति। यथा-
ह्यसंविभागेपि परमात्मनि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिवद्धो विभागव्यवहारः स्वप्नव-
दव्याहतः स्थितौ दृश्यते एवमपीतावपि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिवद्धैव विभागशक्ति
रनुमास्यते। एतेन मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः सम्यग्ज्ञानेन
मिथ्याज्ञानस्यापोदितत्वात्। यःपुनरयमन्तेऽपरोविकल्प उत्प्रेक्षितोऽ-
थेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेतेति सोप्यनभ्युप
गमादेव प्रतिषिद्धः तस्मात् समञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनं॥

Ibid. II. i. 9.

'Nor would it be a dissolution at all, if the effect, when 'resolved into the cause, could continue with its own 'qualities. And though we say that the cause and effect 'are inseparable, we mean by such words as *mere names*, 'that the effect is of the same nature as the cause, not the 'cause as the effect. The objector, again, far understates 'his own argument, when he says that the effect may, 'in dissolution, affect the cause with its own qualities. 'For the same contact remains in the state of existence 'too, because cause and effect are held inseparable. 'All this is the same as this spirit.' 'All this is Spirit.' 'This is immortal in its front, even Brahma.' 'All 'this is indeed Brahma.' These texts teach that the 'cause and effect are inseparable in all the three states. 'Now the argument by which this difficulty is removed 'holds equally good in regard to dissolution also, viz. 'that the effect and its qualities, being fictions of Ignor-'ance, cannot affect the cause. There is also this other 'example. As a juggler is not himself touched in any 'of the three states by the projected illusion, because of 'its not being a substance, so the Supreme Spirit is un-'touched by the illusion of the world. As also a seer 'of dreams is not touched by the illusion, seen in dreams, 'because the pleasing vision does not follow the waking 'state, so the one invariable observer of the three-fold 'states [of production, continuance, and dissolution] is 'not touched by the variable three-fold state. For the 'appearance of the Supreme Spirit, as in the form of 'the three-fold states, is but an illusion, like that of a 'rope in the form of a snake. Thus has it been said 'by scholars versed in the Vedant doctrine: 'when 'the animal soul, sleeping under an eternal delusion, 'awakes, then it understands itself to be uncreated, un-'sleeping, undreaming, without a second.' Thus that

'which has been said that in dissolution the cause may 'be defiled by the grossness of the effect, is absurd. This, 'again, which has been said that all distinctions being 'then merged in a state of no distinction, there cannot 'be a directing cause for the reproduction of the distinc-'tions, is also no objection, for there are examples on our 'side. As in sleep and *samádhi* (or fixed meditation), 'notwithstanding the natural attainment of a state of 'no distinction, the distinctions come to pass again in 'the waking state, as before, because of ignorance not 'being destroyed,—so may it be here too. There is the 'Veda here also; 'All these creatures, having attained "to the [eternally] existent, did not know that they had "attained to the [eternally] existent.' 'Whatever they "be in this state, whether it be a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, "or a boar, or an insect, or a fly, or a gnat, or a musquito, "they become the same [in the reproduction].' As in the 'state of existence [in life], notwithstanding that there 'is no distinction from the Supreme Being, still the 'practice of distinction after the manner of a dream is, 'owing to ignorance, not precluded, so may the capacity 'of distinction be inferred also in dissolution owing to 'ignorance. By this the idea of the reproduction of the 'emancipated is also refuted, because their ignorance is 'dispelled by full knowledge. With reference to the 'other supposed alternative, that the world may, then, in 'dissolution remain distinct from the Supreme Brahma, 'that is also refuted, simply by its not following neces-'sarily from the premises. Hence this doctrine of the 'Upanishad is consistent.'"

Rajah.—"I do not wish to interrupt you, Satyakáma, but is not this a Sutra in which Vyása and Śankaráchárya inculcate the theory of Maya? What do you say Vaiyásika to this?"

Vaiyásika.—"Please your highness, there is nothing in the language of Vyása that countenances such a theory. He only relies on 'examples' seen in the world, which S'ankara correctly expounds notwithstanding that he adds something about Ignorance."

Satyakáma.—"And I may add with reference to S'ankara himself that he seems to make use of a convenient theory, inculcated by 'certain scholars versed in the Vedant doctrine,' rather than inculcate it himself. He certainly takes advantage of it in self-defence, and so far acquiesces in that doctrine, but he does not enforce or argue for it. His primary argument, suggested by the words in the Sutra, has reference to 'examples.' Earthen saucers do not, when in dissolution, affect their material with their specific qualities, nor neck-chains their gold."

Rajah.—"Well go on, Satyakáma, but we must consider afterwards to what extent S'ankara has adopted the theory of Maya after having so forcibly written against the idealism of Buddhists."

Satyakáma.—"A third Sánkhya objection is thus represented[10]. 'It may be said this distinction between

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[10] प्रसिद्धोह्ययं भोक्तृभोग्यविभागोलोके भोक्ताच चेतनः शारीरो भोग्याः शब्दादयोविषयाइति यथा भोक्ता देवदत्तोभोग्य ओदनइति तस्य च विभागस्याभावः प्रसज्येत यदि भोक्ता भोग्यभावमापद्येत भोग्यं वा भोक्तृभावमापद्येत। तयोश्चेतरेतरभावापत्तिः परमकारणाद् ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वात् प्रसज्येत न चास्य प्रसिद्धस्य विभागस्य बाधनं युक्तं यथात्वद्यत्वे भोक्तृभोग्ययोर्विभागोदृष्टस्तथातीतानागतयोरपि कल्पयितव्यः तस्मात् प्रसिद्धस्य भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्याभावप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणमितिचेत् कश्चिच्चोदयेत्तं प्रतिब्रूयात् स्याल्लोकवदिति। उपपद्यत एवायमस्मत्पक्षेपि विभागः एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्। तथाहि समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेणवीचीतरङ्गबुद्बुदादीनामितरेतर-

'enjoyer and enjoyment is well known in the world. The 'sentient soul is the enjoyer. Objects, such as sound, are 'enjoyments. For instance Devadatta is enjoyer. Food 'is enjoyment. The distinction would be destroyed if 'the enjoyer were to become the enjoyment, or the en-'joyment the enjoyer. Such interchange of conditions 'between the two would be inevitable, if they are iden-'tical with their supreme cause Brahma. This con-'founding of the distinction is not reasonable. As the 'distinction between enjoyer and enjoyment is visible at 'the present moment, so must it be supposed as to the 'past and future. Therefore because of the confounding 'of the well known distinction between enjoyer and en-'joyment, this theory of Brahma as the cause is absurd. 'If any one bring forward this objection, the author '(Vyása) would reply, 'it is as in the world.'

'Such a difference is proved even on our theory, because 'it is seen in the world. For it is usual to consider, at the 'same time, as different from one another, and also 'characteristically alike, waves, froths, and bubbles which 'are various modifications of the sea, though essentially 'water, and therefore identical with it. Nor can froths 'and waves which, though of the same substance as 'water, are various modifications of the sea, lose their 'separate individualities; neither are they different in 'substance from the sea because they are individually 'separate. So here too there is no *confusion* of enjoyer

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विभाग इतरेतरसंश्लेषादिलक्षणाश्च व्यवहार उपलभ्यते नच समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेणतरङ्गादीनामितरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति नचैतेषामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तावपि समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्वं भवति एवमिहापि नच भोक्तृभोग्ययोरितरेतरभावापत्तिर्नच परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्वमिति भविष्यति ॥ Ibid. II. i. 13.

'and enjoyment, nor is any thing different from the 'supreme Brahma."

A fourth objection is thus noticed[1]. 'Because of one 'being styled the other, there is the objection of doing 'injury.' S'ankara thus expounds it. 'The theory of a 'sentient cause is again objected to. If the produc-'tion of the universe be from a sentient cause, then 'objections present themselves on the score of doing 'injury. Why? Because of one being styled the other. 'The Veda styles another, that is the embodied soul, 'Brahma; thus in the assurance [given to S'wetaketu as follows.] 'He is the Spirit, thou art He, O S'weta-

[1] इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः। अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकारणवाद आक्षिप्यते चेतनाद्धि जगत्प्रक्रियायामाश्रीयमाणायां हिताकरणादयोदोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते कुतः इतरव्यपदेशात् इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतोइतिप्रतिबोधनात् यद्वा इतरस्य च ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशदिति स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्य्यानुप्रवेशेन शारीरात्मत्वप्रदर्शनात्। अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीतिच परादेवता जीवमात्मशब्देन व्यपदिशन्ती न ब्रह्मणोभिन्नःशारीरइति दर्शयति। तस्माद्यद्ब्रह्मणः स्रष्टृत्वं तच्छारीरस्यैवेत्यतः स्वतन्त्रः कर्त्ता सन् हितमेवात्मनः सौमनस्यकरं कुर्य्यात् नाहितं जन्ममरणजरारोगाद्यनेकानर्थजालं। नहि कश्चिदपरतन्त्रो बन्धनागारमात्मनः कृत्वानुप्रविशति नच स्वयमत्यन्तनिर्मलः सन्नत्यन्तं मलिनं देहमात्मत्वेनोपेयात् कृतमपिकथञ्चिद्यत् दुःखकरं तदिच्छया जह्यात् सुखकरं चोपाददीत स्मरेच्च मयेदं जगद्विविधं विचित्रं विरचितमिति सर्व्वोहि लोकः स्पष्टं कार्य्यं कृत्वा स्मरति मयेदं कृतमिति। यथा च मायावी स्वयं प्रसारितां मायामिच्छया अनायासेनोपसंहरति एवं शारीरोपीमां सृष्टिमुपसंहरेत् स्वकीयमपि तावच्छरीरं शारीरोनशक्नोति अनायासेनोपसंहर्त्तुं। एवं हितक्रियाद्यदर्शनादन्याय्या चेतनाज्जगत्प्रक्रियेति मन्यते॥

'ketu.' Or [as it may be otherwise construed] another, 'that is Brahma, is styled the embodied soul: thus, 'Having created it, he entered into itself,' representing 'God, the unchanged creator, to be the embodied soul 'by his entrance into his own production. The same 'also appears from the text, 'by entering as this animal 'spirit I will make names and forms.' The supreme divinity, describing the animal soul by the word spirit, shows 'that the embodied soul is not different from Brahma. 'Therefore that which is the agency of Brahma is in truth 'the agency of the embodied soul. Hence, being an 'independent actor, he would do that which was for his 'own benefit, and pleasing to himself,—not that which 'was injurious to himself, namely, the assemblage of 'vanities, such as birth, death, decay, and disease. No 'one indeed makes of his own accord a prison for himself, and enters it; nor, being himself perfectly unstained, 'would he betake himself to a body that is extremely 'foul. And even if he had created a world some how 'or other, he would willingly renounce that which was a 'cause of pain, and take to that which was a cause of 'pleasure. And he would remember that this variegated 'and diversified world was created by himself. For 'every person, when he has distinctly performed an act, 'remembers, 'this was done by myself.' Again, as a 'conjurer can, at pleasure, easily dissolve an illusion, [or 'charm], projected [or set up] by himself, so would 'the embodied soul dissolve this his own creation. But 'the embodied soul cannot, at pleasure, easily dissolve the 'body, though his own. Thus from non-observation of 'beneficial acts, it may be inferred that the world is produced from an irrational and inanimate cause.'

It is thus answered 'But it is the superior, because 'a difference is inculcated.' Śankara thus expounds it.

'The word *but* contradicts the foregoing objection. We 'call that the world's creator which is omniscient, all 'powerful, Brahma, eternal, pure, intelligent, free, true 'in his nature, superior to and different from the em- 'bodied soul. There cannot against him be objections 'on the score of doing injury. He has no benefit to 'bring about, nor injury to avert, being eternally free. 'Nor can there ever be in him any lack of knowledge, or 'of power, being omniscient and all powerful. The embo- 'died soul however is not so. Against him such objec- 'tions may be taken on the score of doing injury. But 'we do not call him the creator of the world. Why so? 'because a difference in inculcated. 'The spirit is to be "seen, heard, thought of, meditated on, sought, enquired "after. The embodied soul is then endued with the ex- "istent. The spirit followed by the knowing spirit.' 'Such inculcation of distinction between agent and ob- 'ject shows that Brahma is superior to the embodied 'soul. But is not identity also inculcated? thus, thou 'art He! How then can the two contradictory ideas, iden- 'tity and distinction, stand? This is no fault. Both are 'possible in their respective places after the manner of 'the ether and the ether-in-a-pot. Moreover, when iden- 'tity is inculcated after the fashion of the identification, ''thou art He,' then the worldliness of the animal soul 'and the creativeness of Brahma are both passed away. 'Since the practice of all distinctions, set up by Ignorance, 'is contradicted by full knowledge, where then is the 'creation, and where the objection on the score of doing 'injury? The total exhibition of name, form, act, object, 'instrument, being set up by ignorance is an error, a crea- 'ture of thoughtlessness. I have repeatedly told you 'that the world, characterized by good or evil acts, does 'not in reality exist, it being like the fancies of birth,

'death, separation, and division. But if the practice 'of distinctions be not disallowed, then such texts, as ''He is to be sought after,' inculcating a distinction, 'establish the superiority of Brahma, and preclude the 'ascription of fault because of doing injury[2].'

The same objection is again answered. 'It [the 'objection] is refuted, after the manner of stones &c.' Śankara says, 'Moreover, as in the world, of stones, 'though endowed with the common property of earthi-

[2] अधिकन्तु भेदनिर्द्देशात्॥ तुशब्दः पुर्व्वपक्षं व्यावर्त्तयति। यत् सर्व्वज्ञं सर्व्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावं शारीरादधिकमन्यत् तद्वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रुमः न तस्मिन् हिताकरणादयोदोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते। नहि तस्य हितं किञ्चित् कर्त्तव्यमस्ति अहितं वा परिहर्त्तव्यं नित्यमुक्तत्वात्। नच तस्य ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धोवा क्वचिदप्यस्ति सर्व्वज्ञत्वात् सर्व्वशक्तित्वाच्च। शारीरस्त्वनेवंविधस्तस्मिन् प्रसज्यन्ते हिताकरणादयोदोषाः नतु तं वयं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रुमः। कुत एतत् भेदनिर्द्देशात् आत्मावा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्योमन्तव्योनिदिध्यासितव्यः सोन्वेष्टव्यः सविजिज्ञासितव्यः सता सौम्य तदा संपन्नोभवति शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मना अन्वारूढ इत्येवं जातीयकः कर्तृकर्म्मादिभेदनिर्द्देशोजीवादधिकं ब्रह्म दर्शयति। नन्वभेदनिर्द्देशोपि दर्शितः तत्त्वमसीत्येवञ्जातीयकः कथं भेदाभेदौ विरुद्धौ सम्भवेयातां। नैषदोषः। आकाशघटाकाशन्यायेनोभयसम्भवस्य तत्र तत्र प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात्। अपिच यदा तत्त्वमसीत्येवञ्जातीयकेनाभेदनिर्द्देशेनाभेदः प्रतिबोधितोभवति अपगतम्भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्वं ब्रह्मणश्च स्रष्टृत्वं समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग् ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतोवा हिताकरणादयोदोषाः। अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्य्यकरणसंघातोपाध्यविवेककृताहि भ्रान्तिर्हिताहितकरणादिलक्षणः संसारोनतु परमार्थतोस्तीत्यसकृदवोचाम जन्ममरणच्छेदनभेदनाद्यभिमानवत्। अबाधिते तु भेदव्यवहारे सोन्वेष्टव्य इत्येवञ्जातीयकेन भेदनिर्द्देशेनावगम्यमानं ब्रह्मणोधिकत्वं हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिं निरुणद्धि॥

'ness, a great variety is seen, some being gems of great 'value, e. g. diamonds and *vaidurya*, others of middling 'worth, e. g. *súryakánta*, others, again, of low estimate, 'fit for casting at dogs and birds; as also of seeds, 'though all partaking of the same earthiness, a great 'variety [of developments] is found, of leaves, flowers, 'fruits, perfumes, and flavors, e. g. in the sandal and 'champá plants; as also, in fine, of the same substance 'of food, various effects are produced, e. g. blood, wool, 'so may there be a variety of productions from the same 'Brahma, in the distinction between the animal and 'the knowing souls. Hence 'it is refuted'—meaning, the 'objection adduced by the adverse party is refuted. 'It may also be said that the product, being agreeably 'to the Veda, a mere nominal one, appears various like 'visions seen in dreams[3].'

Another objection is thus met.' If you say, No! 'because an elaborate process is seen, I reply, No! it is like 'milk.' S'ankara says: 'The saying that one sentient 'Brahma is the only cause of the world is not demonstra- 'ble, because an elaborate process is seen. In this world, 'potters and other workmen, as manufacturers of jars, 'clothes, and other things, are found to accomplish their

[3] अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ यथा चलोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यात्मतानामप्यश्मनां केचिन्महार्हा मणयोवज्रवैदूर्य्यादयोऽन्ये मध्यमवीर्य्याः सूर्य्यकान्तादयोऽन्ये प्रहीणाः श्वावायसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः पाषाणा इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते यथाचैकपृथिवीव्यपाश्रयाणामपि वीजानां बहुविधं पत्रपुष्पफलगन्धरसादिवैचित्र्यं चन्दनचम्पकादिषूपलभ्यते यथाचैकस्याप्यन्नरसस्य लोहितादीनि केशलोमादीनिच कार्य्याणि विचित्राणि भवन्ति एवमेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणोजीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वंकार्य्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यत इत्यतस्तदनुपपत्तिः परपरिकल्पितदोषानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। श्रुतेश्च प्रामाण्याद्विकारस्य वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वात् स्वप्नदृश्यभाववैचित्र्यवच्चेत्यभ्युच्चयः ॥

'works, by successfully using the instrumentality of many 'agencies, earth, staff, wheel, string. You say Brahma 'had no helper. If he had no other instruments to assist 'him, how could he be the Creator? Hence Brahma is not 'the cause of the world. If this be said, it is no fault. 'For it is accomplished like milk, through the peculiar 'property of the substance itself. As in the world milk 'or water turns of itself into curds or ice, without requir-'ing an external instrument, so also here. But does not 'milk itself when turning into curds require an external 'instrument, such as heat? Then how can it be said that 'the creation is like the operation of milk? This is no 'fault. Milk is only more quickly turned by heat into 'the state of curds, but not in a greater measure than it 'would itself attain. If it had not the capacity of turning 'into curds, it could not be forced into that state by the 'power of heat; for air and ether cannot be forced into 'that state by the power of heat. By the fulness of the 'instrument, also, is its fulness accomplished. But 'Brahma has fulness of power. His fulness cannot be 'accomplished by any thing else. There is the Veda, 'too, saying, He has no work or instrument. He has no 'equal or superior. His power is heard to be supreme 'and diversified, and the exercise of his knowledge and 'strength, natural. Therefore, because of his diversified 'power, though but one Brahma, his diversified change, 'like milk, is proved[4]?

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[4] उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेतिचेन्नक्षीरवद्धि। चेतनं ब्रह्मैकमद्वितीयं जगतः कारणमितियदुक्तं तन्नोपपद्यते कस्मात् उपसंहारदर्शनात्। इहहि लोके कुलालादयोघटपटादीनां कर्त्तारोमृद्दण्डचक्रसूत्राद्यनेककारकोपसंहारेण संगृहीतसाधनाः सन्तस्तत्तत् कार्य्यं कुर्व्वाणा दृश्यन्ते ब्रह्मचासहायं तवा-भिप्रेतं तस्य साधनान्तरानुपसंग्रहे सति कथं स्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्येत तस्मान्न ब्रह्म

The objection is further answered[5], 'Like gods and 'other beings, in the world.' Śankara's gloss is as follows: 'Be it so. Milk and other non-sentient things are 'proved by observation to change into curds &c. without 'requiring external instruments. But sentient agents,

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जगत्कारणमिति चेन्नैष दोषः। यतः क्षीरवत् द्रव्यस्वभावविशेषादुपपद्यते यथाहि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमभावेन परिणमतेऽनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं तथेहापि भविष्यति। ननु क्षीराद्यपि दध्यादिभावेन परिणममानमपेक्षत एव बाह्यं साधनं औष्ण्यादिकं कथमुच्यते क्षीरवद्धीति। नैष दोषः। स्वयमपि हि क्षीरं याञ्च यावतीञ्च परिणाममात्रामनुभवत्येव त्वार्यते त्वौष्ण्यादिना दधिभावाय। यदिच स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यान्नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्येत। नहि वायुर्वाकाशोवौष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते। साधनसम्पत्त्याच तस्य संपूर्णता सम्पाद्यते। परिपूर्णशक्तिकन्तु ब्रह्म नतस्यान्येन केनचित् पुर्णता सम्पादयितव्या। श्रुतिश्च तत्र भवति न तस्य कार्य्यं करणञ्च विद्यते नतत् समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते। परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रियाचेति। तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगात् क्षीरादिवद्विचित्रः परिणामश्चोपपद्यते।

[5] देवादिवदपि लोके। स्यादेतत् उपपद्यते क्षीरादीनामचेतनानामनपेक्ष्यापि बाह्यं साधनं दध्यादिभावो दृष्टत्वात् चेतनाः पुनः कुलालादयश्च साधनसामग्रीमपेक्ष्यैव तस्मै तस्मै कार्य्याय प्रवर्त्तमाना दृश्यन्ते कथं ब्रह्मचेतनं सदसहायं प्रवर्त्तेतेति। देवादिवदितिब्रुमः। यथा लोके देवाः पितर ऋषय इत्येवमादयो महाप्रभावाश्चेतना अपि सन्तोऽनपेक्ष्य किञ्चिद्बाह्यं साधनमैश्वर्य्यविशेषयोगादभिध्यानमात्रेण स्वतएव बहूनि नानासंस्थानानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि रथादीनिच निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणप्रामाण्यात्। तन्तुनाभश्च स्वतएव तन्तून् सृजति बलाकाचान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य किञ्चित् प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात् सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते एवं चेतनमपि ब्रह्मानपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं स्वतएत जगत् स्रक्ष्यति॥

'such as potters, are found to engage in their occupations 'only by applying their tools and instruments to their 'respective works. Why then should sentient Brahma 'engage without help? We reply, Like gods and other 'beings. As in the world, Ṛishis, and other beings of 'superior power, though sentient, are, without requiring 'any external instruments, found, on the authority of 'the illustrative language of Mantras, and of Itihásas 'and Puráṇas, to create bodies, houses, chariots and 'many other things of various descriptions by the simple 'exercise of volition, by virtue of their especial dignities,— 'and as spiders weave their nets of themselves—as also 'cranes conceive without the assistance of their males— 'as again assemblages of the lotus move, without requir'ing any external help, from pool to pool, so may Brahma, 'though sentient, himself create the universe without 'any external instrument.'

Another objection is thus anticipated[6]: 'The whole 'would be affected, or violence done to the Veda that he

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[6] कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपोवा। चेतनमेकाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म क्षीरादिवद्देवतादिवच्चानपेक्षितबाह्यसाधनं स्वयम्परिणममानं जगतः कारणमिति स्थितं। शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धयेतु पुनराक्षिपति कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिः कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्य्यरूपेण परिणामः प्राप्नोति निरवयवत्वात्। यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत् सावयवमभविष्यत्ततोऽस्यैकदेशः पर्य्यणंस्यत एकदेशश्चावास्थास्यत निरवयवन्तु ब्रह्म श्रुतिभ्यावगम्यते निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनं दिव्योह्यमूर्त्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरोह्यजः इदं महद्भूत मनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघनएव सएष नेति नेत्यात्माऽस्थूलमनणित्याद्याभ्यः सर्व्वविशेषप्रतिषेधयित्रीभ्यः। ततश्चैकदेशपरिणामासम्भवात् कृत्स्न प्रसक्तौ सत्यां मूलोच्छेदः प्रसज्येत द्रष्टव्यत्वोपदेशानर्थक्यञ्चापन्नं अयत्न दृष्टत्वात् कार्य्यस्य। तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽभावादजत्वादिशब्दव्याकोपश्च। अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया सावयवमेव ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्येत तथापि

'is without parts.' Sánkara says, 'It is proved that the 'one sentient Brahma, changing himself without a second, 'and without requiring external helps, becomes the 'cause of the world. But with a view to clear the sense 'of the Sástra, he again anticipates an objection: 'The 'whole would be affected.' Brahma, as a whole, would 'be changed into the form of his product, because he 'has no parts. If Brahma were, like earth and other 'materials, composed of parts, then one portion might 'be lost, and one portion might stand. But texts, 'like the following, preclude the possibility of any quali-'fications, and describe him as without parts. 'Without "parts, without work, quiet, unstained, without blemish.' "The heavenly soul is without form, uncreated within and "without.' 'This great substance is without bounds, "without end.' 'He is a mass of knowledge.' 'This "is a spirit, not such, not such.' 'Not stout, not thin.' 'The alteration of a part being thus impossible, if the whole 'be supposed to be altered, then there will be a destruc-'tion of the root itself, and the exhortation to *observe him* 'prove futile. Besides, from the want of a Brahma, 'separate from his production, there would be violence 'done to the texts which describe him as uncreated. If 'to obviate this difficulty he were held to be composed 'of parts, then the texts, already cited, which inculcate 'he is without parts, would he outraged. If, again, he 'were supposed to have parts, he would be proved un-'eternal. On all accounts therefore this theory appears 'impracticable.'

Answer to the objection. 'But because of the Veda, 'because of its being founded on texts.' Sánkara thus

ये निरवयवत्वस्य प्रतिपादकाः शब्दा उदाहृतास्ते प्रकुप्येयुः। सावयवत्वे चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति सर्व्वथाऽयं पक्षो न घटयितुं शक्यत इत्याक्षिपति॥

expounds it. 'The word *but* refutes the objection. There 'is indeed no fault on our side. There is no affection 'of the whole. Why? because of the Veda. For as 'the production of the world from Brahma is heard, so 'is also his continuance, separate from the production, 'heard from the description of the substance and modifi- 'cation as distinct. 'That divinity observed, I am these 'three gods. By entering as animal soul I will make 'names and forms.' 'So much is his dignity. The soul 'is greater than he. The world is a quarter of Him. 'Immortality is three quarters of Him in heaven.' His 'existence, as separate from his production, is also evident 'from the declaration of his dwelling in the heart, and 'from that of being endowed with [eternal] entity. If 'Brahma were, in his totality, to be held as a production, 'then the following text, 'one is endowed with [eternal] 'entity,' describing the state of sleep, would be futile, 'because the altered Brahma must be held to be transient, 'and because of the non-existence of unaltered Brahma. 'Also because of Brahma not being subject to sensuous 'perception, and the mutation, or product, being subject to 'it. Therefore Brahma is unaltered. Nor can there be any 'violence done to texts which inculcate that He is without 'parts, for that very description is inculcated in the Veda, 'and received. 'It is founded on texts.' Brahma is de- 'pendent on Vedic testimony, not on that of the senses &c. 'He is to be received as inculcated in the Veda. The 'Veda describes Brahma both as unaffected in his totality, 'and also as being without parts. In worldly things, too 'such as stones, Mantras, medicines, owing to varieties of 'place, time, and occasion, powers are seen, productive of 'contradictory effects. They can, neither, be understood by 'mere argumentation without the indoctrination, that of 'such a substance, such are the powers, with such helps,

'such objects, and for such uses. What wonder then that 'the form of Brahma, who is of inconceivable power, 'cannot be established but by Vedic teaching? And the 'Paurāṇikas say, 'one is not to apply argumentation to 'topics that are inconceivable; that which is above nature 'is a sign of the inconceivable.' There the truth of matters 'that transcend the senses is based on the Veda alone. 'But may it not be said that contradictions cannot be 'established even by the Veda, such as the tenet that 'Brahma, though without parts, alters, but not in his tota-'lity? If Brahma be without parts, then, either he would 'not alter at all, or would alter in his totality. To say that 'he alters in one form, and remains in another, is, by 'introducting a distinction of forms, to say he has parts. 'With reference to practice, contradictory injunctions 'may be both alternately performed, and so there be no 'contradiction, the performance being dependent on the 'soul itself. But contradictions [in ontology] cannot be 'reconciled by means of alternation, for a substance is not 'dependent on the soul; therefore this doctrine is imprac-'ticable. This is no objection—because the distinction 'of forms is held to be a creation of ignorance. A 'substance is proved to be composed of parts by dis-'tinction of forms created by ignorance. For the moon, 'observed as many by the diseased eye, does not therefore 'really become numerous. By a distinction of forms, 'created by ignorance, signifying names and figures, modi-'fied and unmodified, and not describable either as *that* or '*another*, Brahma is held to be subject to alteration, and 'other conventional ideas, but he remains unaltered, 'in his essential form, superior to all conventional notions. 'The expression, that distinctions of names and forms, 'created by ignorance, are merely in words, protects the 'text about Brahma's being without parts, from being

'outraged. Nor is this text about alteration intended to 'set forth alteration, for there could be no [practical] 'fruit resulting from such doctrine, but the following 'aims at setting forth Brahma's spiritual essence, freed 'from all conventional notions, for there is a [practical] 'fruit resulting from that teaching, viz. (commencing with 'the words 'he is a spirit, not such, not such') 'O Janaka 'thou hast attained fearlessness.' Therefore there is 'no fault on our side[7].'

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[7] श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ तु शब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति नखल्वस्मत् पक्षे कश्चिदपि दोषोऽस्ति नतावत् कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिरस्ति कुतः श्रुतेः यथैवहि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोवस्थानं श्रूयते प्रकृतिविकारयोर्भेदेन व्यपदेशात् सेयन्देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेनजीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपेव्याकरवाणीति तावानस्य महिमा ततोज्यायांश्च पूरुषः पादोऽस्य विश्वाभूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवीतिचैवं जातीयकात् तथा हृदयायतनत्ववचनात् सत्सम्पत्तिवचनाच्च। यदिच कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म कार्य्यभावेनोपयुक्तं स्यात् सता सौम्य तदा सम्पन्नोभवतीति सुषुप्तिगतं विशेषणमनुपपन्नं स्यात् विकृतेन ब्रह्मणानित्यं सम्पन्नत्वात् अविकृतस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽभावात् तथेन्द्रियगोचरत्वप्रतिषेधाद्ब्रह्मणो विकारस्य चेन्द्रियगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः। तस्मादस्ति अविकृतं ब्रह्म। नच निरवयवत्वशब्दव्याकोपोऽस्ति श्रूयमाणत्वादेव निरवयवत्वस्याप्यभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात्। शब्दमूलञ्च ब्रह्म शब्दप्रमाणकं नेन्द्रियादिप्रमाणकं तद्यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्य। शब्दश्चोभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवताञ्च। लौकिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रौषधीप्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशात् शक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्य्यविषया दृश्यन्ते ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत् सहाया एतद्विषया एतत् प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तयइति किमताचिन्त्यप्रभावस्य ब्रह्मणोरूपं विनाशब्देन न निरूप्येत। तथाचाहुः पौराणिकाः अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा नतांस्तर्केण योजयेत्। प्रकृतिभ्यः परंयच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणमिति। तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधि-

Another objection is again brought forward: 'Not so, 'for there must be an object.' Śankara says, 'He again 'anticipates an objection to the universe being a production of a sentient being. The sentient supreme could not 'have fabricated this spectre of a world, for efforts must 'have objects. In the world a sentient person, acting on 'previous deliberation, is seen to engage, even in small 'efforts, to say nothing of great efforts, moved by some 'objects of his own. There is also the text concurring 'with this popular idea,—'Every thing is not agreeable 'to every one's desire, but every thing is agreeable to

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गमः। ननु शब्देनापि नशक्यते विरुद्धार्थः प्रत्याययितुं निरवयवञ्च ब्रह्म परिणमतेच नकृत्स्नमिति यदि निरवयवं ब्रह्म स्यान्नैव परिणमेत कृत्स्नमेव वा परिणमेत। अथ केनचिद्रूपेण परिणमेत केनचिद्रूपेणावतिष्ठेतेति रूपभेदकल्पनात् सावयवमेव प्रसज्येत। क्रियाविषये ह्यतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्येवं जातीयकायां विरुद्धप्रतीतावपि विकल्पाश्रयणं विरोधपरिहारकारणं भवति पुरुषतन्त्रत्वादनुष्ठानस्य। इहतु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः सम्भवति अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः तस्माद्दुर्घटमेतदिति। नैषदोषः अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदाभ्युपगमात् नह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु सम्पद्यते। नहि तिमिरोपहतनयनेनानेकइव चन्द्रमा दृश्यमानोऽनेक एव भवति। अविद्याकल्पितेनच नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वाच्येन ब्रह्म परिणामादि सर्व्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्व्वव्यवहारातीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते। वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वाच्चाविद्याकल्पितस्य नामरूपभेदस्य न निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः कुप्यति। नचेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादानार्था तत्प्रतिपत्तौ फलानवगमात्। सर्व्वव्यवहारहीनब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था त्वेषा तत्प्रतिपत्तौ फलावगमात् सएष नेतिनेत्यात्मेत्युपक्रम्याह अभयं वैजनक प्राप्तोसीति। तस्मादस्मत्पक्षे न कश्चिदपि दोषप्रसङ्गोऽस्ति॥

'the Spirit's desire.' The effort is indeed a great undertaking, that the world, with its varieties of high and low, 'should be fabricated. But if this effort on the part of 'the sentient Supreme Spirit be supposed to have an 'object of his own, then the all-contentedness of the 'Supreme Spirit, taught in the Veda, would be contradicted. And if such an object be not supposed, there 'could not be the effort. Perhaps it may be said that 'a maniac, though sentient, is sometimes seen to engage 'in efforts, by a default of his understanding, without 'an object of his own. The Supreme Spirit may have 'engaged in a similar manner. But in that case violence 'would be done to the Vedic doctrine of his omniscience. 'Therefore creation from a sentient cause is impossible[8].'

The objection is thus answered. 'But it is only a sport, 'as in the world.' Śankara expounds it thus: 'By the word '*but* he repels the objection. As in the world a king or 'courtier, having attained all his wishes, may be seen, in 'games and amusements, to engage in efforts, merely as

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[8] न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्। अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकर्तृकत्वं जगत् आक्षिपति न खलु चेतनः परमात्मेदं जगद्विम्बं विरचयितुमर्हति कुतः प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् प्रवृत्तीनां। चेतनोहि लोके बुद्धिपूर्व्वकारी पुरुषः प्रवर्त्तमानो न मन्दोपक्रमामपि तावत् प्रवृत्तिमात्मप्रयोजनानुपयोगिनीमारभमाणो दृष्टः किमुत गुरुतरसंरम्भां। भवति च लोकप्रसिद्ध्यनुवादिनी श्रुतिः। न वा अरे सर्व्वस्य कामाय सर्व्वं प्रियम्भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्व्वं प्रियम्भवतीति। गुरुतरसंरम्भा चेयं प्रवृत्तिर्यदुच्चावचप्रपञ्चं विरचयितव्यं। यदीयमपि प्रवृत्तिश्चेतनस्य परमात्मन आत्मप्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्प्येत परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत प्रयोजनाभावे वा प्रवृत्त्यभावोपि स्यात्। अथ चेतनोपि सन्नुन्मत्तो बुद्ध्यपराधादन्तरेणैवात्मप्रयोजनं प्रवर्त्तमानो दृष्टस्तथा परमात्मापि प्रवर्त्तिष्यत इत्युच्येत तथा सति सर्व्वज्ञत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत तस्मादश्लिष्टा चेतनात् सृष्टिरिति। II. i. 32.

'sports, without aiming at any objects,—and as acts of 'respiration also take place naturally without aiming at any 'other external objects,—so does God's effort naturally 'take place, after the manner of a sport, without looking 'for any other objects. The assignment of an ulterior 'object to God is not consistent with reason or Veda. 'Nor can nature oppose an argument. Although the 'fabrication of this spectre of a world appears to us like 'a great undertaking, yet to God it is a mere sport, be-'cause his power is unbounded. Although again with 'reference to worldly sports, some subtle object may be 'imagined, still no object can be imagined here, for 'the Veda says, He is one that has attained his wishes. 'Nor can the want of an effort, or a mad effort, be sup-'posed, because of the texts inculcating creation and all 'power[9].'

"Please your highness, continued Satyakáma, I must submit that S'ankara's replies to the Sánkhya are not at all conclusive. He commences with logic, but falls back

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[9] लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यं। तु शब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति। यथा लोके कस्यचिदाप्तैषणस्य राज्ञो राजामात्यस्य वा व्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमनभिसन्धाय केवलं लीलारूपाः प्रवृत्तयः क्रीडाविहारेषु भवन्ति यथा चोच्छ्वासप्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसन्धाय वाह्यं किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव भवन्ति एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति। नहीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितोवा सम्भवति। नच स्वभावः पर्य्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते। यद्यप्यस्माकमियं जगद्बिम्बविरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैवकेवलेयं अपरिमितशक्तित्वात्। यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित् सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते आप्तकामश्रुतेः। नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्व्वा सृष्टिश्रुतेः सर्व्वज्ञत्वश्रुतेश्च। II. i. 33.

on the Veda, and then, at last, when neither logic nor Veda is of any avail, he has recourse to the traditional doctrine of his school that the world is a fiction of ignorance, that there is no real universe, that it is Brahma himself that appears to you in the form of the world, just as a rope may do in that of a snake, and that there is no creation in reality! Without going into the question of Maya, at present, I shall only say that S'ankara has himself argued for the reality of the external world, which in most of his answers here he also takes for granted, and his arguments lead to the theory that so far as the world is a reality, it is itself God. He quotes texts which declare that the world is the same as this spirit or God. That the world is a reality is a doctrine, he himself inculcates elsewhere, and it is only by self-contradiction that he can maintain his position against the Sánkhya."

Rajah.—"What self-contradiction?"

Satyakáma.—"He says in his reply to the Sánkhya, 'The appearance of the Supreme Spirit, as in the form 'of the three-fold states, is but an illusion, like that of a 'rope in the form of a snake.' He says, elsewhere, in his reply to the Buddhists. 'Desirous of denying external 'objects, they turn them into a simile by using the phrase '*like the externals.*' He rebukes the Buddhists for denying the reality of the external world, and yet saying that the forms internally perceived are *like the externals.* The rebuke is certainly well deserved, for, as he justly adds, 'no one can say Vishṇu Mitra is like a barren woman's son.' But the same rebuke may with equal propriety be administered to himself for denying the reality of the 'three-fold states,' and yet maintaining that the Supreme Spirit appears *in those forms.* To use his own words, again, 'no one can say that Vishṇu Mitra is like a barren woman's son.' If the 'spectre of a world' be an

unreality, 'like a barren woman's son,' then it is absurd to say God *appears in that form.* If the 'spectre' be not altogether 'like a barren woman's son,' whatever minimum of reality may be ascribed to it, as an object of sensuous perception, must so far be material, and if that minimum of material reality be solemnly styled God, it must be material pantheism to the same extent."

"But, answered Vaiyásika, neither Vyása nor Śankaráchárya has said that God is a gross material substance."

"It is true he has never said that. It is also true that he desired that the world should be looked upon as God, not God as the world[10]; but the conversion cannot be altogether precluded if Brahma be an undivided and indivisible essence. Indeed when the Vedantic doctor brings in his caveat against the assimilation of God with the world, he does so as a matter of ethical policy. It will only be enhancing the coachman's dignity to give him a royal title. No one in our country takes offence on being addressed a king. In truth the word Maharaja has become a mere term of compliment like the English *Sir.* But you will not do well to address the King as a subject. That will be a degradation of the royal dignity. This is a way of reasoning which ill suits the solemnity of the subject. It is only by way of compliment that a subject can ever be addressed with royal appellatives, and the appellatives themselves have in such a case a *gauna,* or figurative, signification. But if you were seriously and solemnly to call an ordinary person your King, as verily and indisputably the

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[10] ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् ॥ Vedánta, IV. i. 5.

तथाच लौकिकोन्यायोनुमतो भवति उत्कृष्टदृष्टिर्हि निकृष्टेध्यसितव्येति लौकिकोन्यायः यथाराजदृष्टिः क्षत्तरि सचानुगन्तव्यः विपर्य्यये प्रत्यवायप्रसङ्गात् नहि क्षत्तृदृष्टिपरिगृहीतोराजा निकर्षं नीयमानः श्रेयसे स्यात् ॥

Vedant does every creature, it would involve the guilt of high treason against your rightful sovereign. Even though you did not dishonor your King by calling him a subject, still if you render royal honors to all his subjects, you virtually degrade him by elevating every body else to the level of his dignity. Levelling may be brought about in two ways. You may either bring down your high places to the level of the low, or you may raise your low grounds to the height of your eminences. In either case there will be a levelling. And so you may destroy the royal dignity either by degrading the king, or by unduly exalting the subject. You may not say in so many words that God is an impure material substance ; it is impossible for a cultivated mind so barefacedly to belie our moral persuasions as to affirm that God is an impure material substance. And yet when the world is pronounced to be identical with Him, that revolting doctrine is involved in the declaration. Men have, since the days of Vyása, endeavoured to refine the grossness of the theory by inculcating that the world is an illusion, not a reality. Vyása however has himself never said so, and you, Vaiyásika, yourself read out, at the marriage assembly, Śankaráchárya's strictures on Buddhistic idealism. Whether Śankara is consistent or not is a different question. The case is worse for the Vedant if he has not been able to maintain his consistency, if its great champion, while inculcating that the external universe has the same evidence for its reality as the internal spirit, is driven, in his encounter with antagonistic objections, to self contradictions. We may examine more fully bye and bye his tenets as to the illusory character of the world. I shall simply remark now that even if author and commentator had both declared the world to be an illusion that would not save their doctrine ; for what would then become of Śankara's assertion that

there is the characteristic attribute of entity as a common qualification between Brahma and the world. His argument would be destroyed by his own pen, if he wrote that the world was not a real entity, after having argued that the quality of entity in the cause, Brahma, is found in the effect, the world,—the only common attribute which he could cite in defence of his theory against the Sánkhya."

A'gamika.—"But what inconsistency could there be in the saying that God projected this spectre of a world, which has an illusory entity, but is himself a real entity and no illusion?"

Satyakáma.—"S'ankara himself has told us that there is no medium between entity and non-entity[1]. If an illusion means no *thing*, then it is a mere play on words to speak of illusory entity. In case you pronounce the world to be a mere illusion, it cannot have the quality of entity as a common characteristic attribute with Brahma. Besides what is the doctrine under discussion? Is it not this, that Brahma is not only the author or efficient cause, but also the *prakṛiti*, or substance, the subject matter of the world. If the world be an illusion projected by himself, he cannot be its substance or subject matter. The Máyi, or conjurer, may be the author, he cannot be the *substance* of the illusion by means of which he beguiles or deceives you. If it be a *sensible* illusion, its substance or basis, however subtle, must also be an object of sensuous perception, and therefore material. And if the Máyi is himself both the substantial and efficient cause of his illusion—if the illusion be himself,—and it is at the same time an object of sensuous perception, then the projector must also be an object of sensuous perception, or in other words material."

[1] नतु वस्त्वेवं नैवं अस्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते I. 1. 2.

The Chobdar now came in and said that pundit Tarkakáma was waiting in the public hall, desiring to confer his benediction on the Rajah.

"Show him into this room," said the Rajah. Tarkakáma entered the room and pronounced his benediction. As soon as he was comfortably seated, his highness said, "we are discussing the Vedant doctrine. Satyakáma contends that it inculcates material pantheism."

Tarkakáma.—"Material pantheism! There is no word for matter in the whole Vedant, nor in the Sanscrit language."

Satyakáma.—"That may be true, but the idea conveyed by the word matter exists both in the Vedant and in Sanscrit. The external world, as the object of sensuous perception, corresponds to that idea, and the external world is declared to be God. This is material pantheism. What again can the word *prakṛiti* mean but matter? And God is, in so many words, called the *prakṛiti* of the world."

Tarkakáma.—"But what objections can you have to the opinion that all this, the whole universe, is God?"

Satyakáma.—"If you say the external world is identical with God, then there cannot be a God over it, and the assertion involves the Sánkhya theory of there being no God besides or above the universe, which is described as a spontaneous production from nature. The assertion would amount to atheism, for if there be no God besides the world itself, there can be no God over and above it. Or if you say the world is God in the same sense in which froth is water, you affirm that it is consubstantial with God, which is saying, in other words, that the material is consubstantial with the spiritual,—that matter and spirit are the same substance. This is a clear contradiction in terms, and involves the very confusion of ideas,

which all our philosophers call a false notion. If again you say that the world is God because it is an emanation from Him, then in case you call that emanation a substance or thing, it must so far be a part or particle of the divinity. The divinity cannot then be an integral substance, devoid of parts, or incapable of increase or diminution, for the smallest particle must still be a part, the separation of which, as at the creation, must be a diminution of the Deity, and its reunion at the dissolution an increase of the same. But you declare rightly that God is devoid of parts, member, or body. Or if you say that the world, as an emanation from Deity is absolutely nothing, a mere charm, so that its separation involves no decrease, nor its restoration any increase of the divine substance, than you not only contradict Vyása's and Śankara's own arguments for the reality of the world, but you maintain that which is falsified by every branch of evidence to which appeal can possibly be made in a discussion between man and man. If, finally, you declare in a *gauna*, or figurative, sense that the world is God, only meaning thereby that it bears witness to, and is dependent on, the power and wisdom of God, you ought, in order to avoid the possibility of mistake on such a solemn subject, clearly and unequivocally to confess, at the same time, that the world is not and can never be really and essentially God—that the formula 'thou art He,' is not only not *maha-vakya* or a great mysterious saying, but that it is only a complimentary *atyukti* or hyperbole,—that the knower of God is not and cannot be God,—and that God and the universe are distinct substances as Creator and creature.

"But Sankarácharya insists on the identity of the soul with God in a literal sense of the term. He says that identity is not founded on a mere community of attribute

or quality, whereby a small thing may be classed as one with a greater; nor is it a mistaking of one thing for another, as when it is said, Mind is Brahma, A'ditya is Brahma. Neither is the identity founded on any occasional acts of assimilation, or absorption, such as the resolution of things into the atmosphere, or the vital air, as it is heard in the *Sanvarga vidyá*: 'The atmosphere is the great receptacle. 'When fire blazes up, or is extinguished, it is resolved into 'the atmosphere, when the sun sets, it is resolved into the 'atmosphere, when the moon sets, it is resolved into the 'atmosphere. Whatever dries up resolves itself into the 'atmosphere. The atmosphere receives them all.' Nor again is that identity after the fashion of vicariously taking the consecrated butter for the woman, as in the New and Full moon sacrifices. If the unity of the soul with Brahma were taken in these factitious senses, violence would be done to texts teaching the substantial unity of the soul with God, such as, 'Thou art He.' 'I am Brahma.' 'This soul is Brahma[2].'

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[2] नचेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्रूपं। यथा अनन्तं वैमनोऽनन्ता वैविश्वेदेवा अनन्तमेव सतेन लोकं जयतीति। नचाध्यासरूपं यथा मनोब्रह्मेत्युपासीत। आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेश इति मन आदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्याध्यासः। नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तं। वायुर्वाव संवर्गः प्राणोवाव संवर्ग इत्यादिवत्। नाप्याज्यावेक्षणवत् कर्माङ्गसंस्काररूपं। सम्पदादि रूपेहि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने तत्त्वमस्यहं ब्रह्मास्म्ययमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत। I. 1. 4. The technical words here used are thus explained:

सम्पन्नामाल्पे वस्तुन्यालम्बने सामान्येन केनचित् महतो वस्तुनः सम्पादनं। अध्यासः शास्त्रतोऽतस्मिंस्तद्धीः। संवर्गविद्यायां श्रुतं वायुर्वाव संवर्गो यदा वा अग्निरुद्वापयति उपशाम्यति वायुमेवाप्येति विलीयते यदा सूर्य्योऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति यदा चन्द्रोऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति यदा य उच्छुष्यन्ति वायुमेवापयन्ति वायुर्ह्येतान् सर्वान् संवृङ्क्ते॥ Ratnaprabhá.

"The Vedantic theory, continued Satyakáma, is simply a delusion. It is itself *avidyá*, conflicting with what logicians call accurate knowledge. A writer of no mean authority says; 'Thou art verily rifled, O thou animal 'soul, of thy understanding, by this dark theory of Maya, 'because like a maniac, thou constantly ravest, 'I am 'Brahma.' Where is thy divinity, thy sovereignty, thy 'omniscience? O thou animal soul! thou art as different 'from Brahma as is a mustard seed from Mount Meru[3].' Certainly the idea we have of God, and the experience we have of the visible universe, are widely different. God, you rightly say, is without body, and without parts. The universe has both. God is not an object of external perception. The universe is. You cannot see, hear, or touch God. You may the world. God is immutable. The world is changeable. God is not subject to decay. The universe is. The two therefore can neither be identical nor consubstantial. They do not bear the relation which earth and jar, gold and neckchain, yarn and cloth, sea and froth, bear to one another. I thought the simple citation of passages which contain such extravagant sentiments would be a sufficient refutation of the theory. That was the reason of my not adding many remarks of my own. If all this be God, then matter and spirit are one. What a confusion of ideas this must be! What criteria for the distinguishing of truth and falsehood will then remain?"

Tarkakáma.—"If you mean that the Vedanta destroys differences and distinctions, you confess to a fact which is

[3] मायावादमतान्धकारमुषितप्रज्ञोसि यस्मादहं ब्रह्मास्मीति वचो मुहुर्मुहुर्वदसि रे जीव त्वमुन्मत्तवत्। ऐश्वर्य्यं तव कुत्र कुत्र विभुता सर्वज्ञता कुत्र ते तन्मेरोरिव सर्षपेण हि भिदा जीव त्वया ब्रह्मणः ॥

Tattwa-muktávali by Gauḍapurṇánanda.

the glory of the system. It does obliterate distinctions and differences."

Satyakáma.—"I cannot conceive what glory there can be in obliterating distinctions that exist essentially, or in identifying things naturally different. The writer I have just cited, adds on this point: 'Thou art a finite soul, He 'is infinite. Thou canst occupy but one space at a time, 'He is always every where. Thou are momentarily 'happy or miserable, He is happy at all times. How 'then canst thou say, 'I am He?' Hast thou no shame[4]?' The self-denying devotee, the sensual voluptuary, and the blood-thirsty tyrant must be the same according to your theory, because each is God."

Tarkakáma.—"The Vedanta never encourages a voluptuary to say, I am God. It only teaches that the knower of God becomes Brahma."

"No one can *become*, said Satyakáma, what essentially he is not. You must allow me to quote another passage yet from *Gauḍa-purṇánanda.* 'Glass is glass, stone is 'stone, shell is shell, silver is silver. There can never be 'a cessation of their distinctive notions. Never does a 'Śudra, although devotedly worshipping Brahmins, with-'out intermission, become himself a Brahmin. He may 'obtain a little merit, but the Śudra race cannot attain to 'Brahminhood[5].' There is no such thing as a transmu-

[4] परिच्छिन्नोजीवस्त्वमसि खलु स व्यापकतमस्त्वमेकत्र स्थाता भवसि सहि सर्व्वत्र सततं। सुखी दुःखी त्वं रे क्षणिकः स सुखी सर्व्वसमये कथं सोहं वाक्यं वदसि वत लज्जां न कुरुषे॥

[5] काचः काचो मणिरपि मणिः शुक्ति रेवास्ति शुक्तिः रूप्यं रूप्यं न भवति कदाप्यत्ययं ज्ञानमेषां। * * भक्त्या सदा ब्राह्मणपूजनेन शूद्रोपि ब्राह्मणतामुपैति। किञ्चिद्गुणस्यैव भवेत् प्रवेशो न ब्राह्मणः स्यात् खलु शूद्रजातिः॥

tation of individuality. If the Vedanta teaches that certain men may each become God by the knowledge of Brahma, but that every man is not God, it teaches what is simply an impossibility.

"Again Śwetaketu was assured, 'Thou art He,' before he was perfected in knowledge. Hence it is acknowledged by implication that he was essentially God. Śankara distinctly taught this by repudiating any other sense of the soul's unity with God.

"All men must thus be identical, because each soul is essentially God, whether it be aware of it or not. This is an inference which, as I have just shown, I am not gratuitously deducing from your principles. Those who think with you have drawn it themselves. But that all are identical is disproved by the very fact of this conference. On no trust-worthy evidence can you or I say that we are the same individual. We have every possible kind of proof to believe that we are separate persons. The difficulty we feel in agreeing on vital points is itself no small evidence of what I say. But even if we could agree in all things—if we were of one heart and one mind, we would still continue separate personalities. If you were pinched, I should not feel it. If you saw a fine sight, I should not participate in your sensation. Our hearts might be so knit that we should perfectly sympathize with each other; and so when you communicate your joy or your sorrow I may be a partaker of it. But it would be a gross error to say we are identical. That error is involved in the theory that every person is God.

"Kaṇáda says rightly, that souls are manifold, because of varieties in condition. The scholiast Śankara Miśra says on that aphorism: 'Souls are manifold. 'Why? Because of varieties. One is respectable, another

'poor. One is happy, another miserable. One is high, 'another is low. One is a scholar, another a clown. 'These varieties, which cannot be reconciled with the 'unity of the Spirit, prove the distinction of souls[6].'

"Consider the moral consequences of the pantheistic doctrine. The founder of the system himself is anxious that his followers should still continue in the performance of the duties they owe to God and man. But if God and man be identical, then there can be no relation in life to give rise to the notion of duty. If there be only one essence in the world, then, 'who will regard, or honour, and whom?'—says the Upanishad. Where there is a difference of personality, one can perform certain offices to another. Such an interchange of offices is impossible where all are one[7]. It would be absurd to say that one can adore or worship himself. In truth Vedantic authors have boldly asserted that they are subject to no law, no rule, and that there is no such thing as virtue or vice, injunction or prohibition.

"Ponder now the drift of your theory. To give up all distinctions between right and wrong—all morals, all

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[6] व्यवस्थातो नाना । III. ii. 20.

नाना आत्मानः कुतः व्यवस्थातः व्यवस्था प्रतिनियमः यथा कश्चिदाढ्यः कश्चिद्दरिद्रः कश्चित् सुखी कश्चिद्दुःखी कश्चिदुच्चाभिजनः कश्चिन्नीचाभिजनः कश्चिद्विद्वान् कश्चिज्जाल्म इतीयं व्यवस्था आत्मभेदमन्तरेणानुपपद्यमाना साधयत्यात्मनां भेदं ॥

[7] यत्र हि द्वैतमव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं शृणोति तदितर इतरमभिवदति तदितर इतरं मनुते तदितर इतरं विजानाति यत्र वा अस्य सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्तत्केन कथं शृणुयात्तत्केन कमभिवदेत्तत्केन कं मन्वीत तत्केन कं विजानीयात् । Brihad.

religion, all science, all philosophy—would be to reduce human nature to a chaotic state—to destroy the bands of society, and outrage the sanctity and decency of domestic life. Once more I remind you of what the pious author, already cited, says: 'If I and the whole 'universe be God, then you and I are one. Then my 'wealth, my children, my wife, must be our common 'property, without any distinction. If, again, there be 'such unity, how can there be injunction or prohibition? 'If you are decided that there is no difference, then what 'faults have the Buddhists committed[8]?' What barrier can you oppose to the encroachments of bad passions, if men are to be persuaded that there can be in reality no law binding on any individual; that virtue and vice, right and wrong, are mere *vyávahárika,* or conventional ideas, founded on misapprehension; that no one can do good or evil to his neighbour, there being no such thing as a neighbour, for all are one."

Rajah.—"Is it fair, Satyakáma, to deduce far-fetched inferences of an immoral tendency from a system which repudiates such tendency? Can you show on any respectable authority that principles of an immoral tendency have been practically deduced from the doctrine of the soul's unity with God?"

Satyakáma.—"Without making any remarks on your highness's first question, I shall only say, in reply to the second, that I think I can show that inferences of an immoral tendency have been deduced from the Vedant doctrine of the identity of the creature with the Creator.

[8] सकलमिदमहञ्च ब्रह्मभूतं यदिस्यात् त्वमहं खलु तदास्यादावयोरैक्य मेव। धनसुतदारामामकीनास्तदास्यु मम तवच भवेयु र्नावयोरस्ति भेदः॥ बिधिर्निषेधस्य कदा कथं स्यादैक्यं यतो नास्ति च सर्व्वभेदः। निर्णीतमद्वैतमतं त्वया चेत् बौद्धैस्तदा कोविहितोपराधः॥

The Upanishads do not allow the possibility of any offices being done by one person to another. This is in itself a denial of all kinds of duty or obligation. And it is S'ankaráchárya's own argument when he justifies the inequalities found in the world by the plea that God and the world being essentially one, there can be no such thing as injustice!

S'ankara's argument has again been enforced in another way in the *S'ri-Bhágavata,* second only, perhaps, to the *Pancha-rátra,* in point of authority as a text-book of *Bhagavatas.* These theosophists receive the pantheistic element of the Vedant, notwithstanding their peculiarities in other respects. The character which they set up as the incarnation of the Supreme Being was a foul pattern of sensuality and lust. No community can encourage such sensuality without bringing instant ruin on itself. Now the Bhágavatas do not say that sensuality and lust are themselves innocent. How then do they justify the irregularities of the youthful Kṛishṇa? Chiefly by relying on the theory of pantheism. King Parikshit asks S'uka, 'The Lord of the world became incarnate with a view to establish virtue and put down vice. 'How could he, then, the preacher, the author, and the 'keeper of the bridges of virtue, behave so inconsistently, and dally with other men's wives?' S'ukadeva says in reply, 'He who lives within the cowherdesses, 'their husbands, and indeed all embodied souls, is the 'rightful owner and possessor of the sporting body[9].'

[9] श्री परीक्षिदुवाच। संस्थापनाय धर्मस्य प्रशमायेतरस्यच अवतीर्णो हि भगवानंशेन जगदीश्वरः। स कथं धर्मसेतूनां वक्ता कर्ताभिरक्षिता। प्रतीपमाचरद्ब्रह्मन् परदाराभिमर्षणं॥ श्री शुक उवाच। गोपीनां तत्पतीनाञ्च सर्वेषाञ्चैव देहिनां। योन्तश्चरति सोध्यक्ष एष क्रीडनदेहभाक्। S'ri-Bhágavata.

This is a practical application of the pantheistic dogma of the Upanishads and the Brahma-sutras, at which one cannot help looking aghast, and your highness will allow it is a serious warning against the reception of that dogma."

Tarkakáma.—" But S'uka does not not say that the example of Vásudeva can be safely followed by a mortal. 'He who is not himself divine should not commit 'such acts even in his mind. If a mortal were foolish 'enough to do so, he would perish as inevitably as if 'one, not being Rudra, took the sea-produced poison. 'The words of the gods are true, their acts only occasion- 'ally right. What is agreeable to their words, the wise 'are to observe in their conduct[10]."

Satyakáma.—" It will be practically hard to persuade men to observe the precepts of those whose examples they are instructed to avoid. But the gods *(Is'waráṇám)*, spoken of in the plural, necessarily include other persons than Vásudeva, and they represent a dignity, certainly within the reach of mortal ambition, according to the transcendental system of Bhágavata pantheism. 'Every thing is Kṛishṇa from Brahmá to a bundle of grass[1].' So that every person can consider himself Bhagaván, and, as such, claim the same liberty of action as Vásudeva. Especial mention is made of the dignity of the Guru, or spiritual preceptor, who is entitled to equal honor with Kṛishṇa himself[2]. The Gurus and other

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[10] नैतत् समाचरेज्जातु मनसापि ह्यनीश्वरः। विनश्यत्याचरन्मौढ्याद्यथाऽरुद्राब्धिजं विषं। ईश्वराणां वचः सत्यं तथैवाचरितं क्वचित् तेषां यत्स्ववचोयुक्तं बुद्धिमांस्तत् समाचरेत्। S'ri-Bhágavata.

[1] आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्य्यन्तं सर्वं कृष्णश्चराचरं। Nárada panch.rátra.

[2] सद्वंशजातः शिष्यश्च शुद्धः सुब्राह्मणः सुधीः।
मन्यते कृष्णतुल्यश्च गुरुं परमधार्मिकः॥

men of note in the Vaishṇava community, eagerly accept the honor thus conferred on them, and do not scruple to avail themselves of the privilege, therewith joined, of following Kṛishṇa's example. I do not wish to pry into the secrets of society, but it is no breach of charity, or departure from decorum, to notice what appears on the surface. Men there are who profess to have abandoned the world for the sake of their Bhagaván, and who are sometimes regarded as having, even in life, earned a sort of equality with him. They are then considered as Prabhus, or Lords, and females are never wanting who glory in the title of *sevá-dási*, or ministering slaves, and who take as much pride and delight in placing their *tan, man*, and *dhan*, (body, mind, and wealth) at the service of those *prabhus*, as the cowherdesses of Vṛindávan had ever done in devoting their *whole selves* to Kṛishṇa.

"S'uka himself adds in justification of Kṛishṇa, that 'if sages, who emancipated from the bondage of works by 'contact with the dust of his own lotus feet, and by the 'peculiar power of *yoga*, or contemplation of personal 'unity with him, are at liberty to act as they please, 'then what restraints could be imposed on the body 'voluntarily adopted by the god[3]."

Rajah.—"But I am not yet satisfied that Vyása did not elsewhere say something in modification of this apparent assimilation of God with the material world."

गुरुरूपी स्वयं कृष्णः शिष्याणां हितकाम्यया ।
गुरौ तुष्टे हरिस्तुष्टो हरौ तुष्टे जगत्त्रयं ॥
गुरु र्ब्रह्मा गुरु र्विष्णुः गुरु र्देवो महेश्वरः ।
गुरुर्देवपरं ब्रह्म गुरुः पूज्यः परात्परः ॥ Ibid.

[3] यत्पादपङ्कजपरागनिषेवतृप्ता योगप्रभावविधुताखिलकर्मबन्धाः । स्वैरं चरन्ति मुनयोपि न नह्यमानास्तस्येच्छयात्तवपुषः कुत एव बन्धः ॥

S'ri-Bhágavata.

Tarkakáma.—"S'ankaráchárya says plainly that the Universe is an illusion. How could he materialize the Deity by his doctrine?"

Satyakáma.—"He falls back on that traditional teaching only with a view to answer objections. He does not assert it as a primary doctrine of his school. It is only when logic and Veda both fail, that he betakes himself to that theory. In order to arrive at right conclusions on this point, we must discriminate between Vyása the founder, S'ankara the commentator, and the minor commentaries and elementary treatises, of the system. That the Vedanta doctrine was very much modified by the successors of Vyása, no one in his senses can deny: and therefore it is a great historical inaccuracy to attribute to the founder the doctrines contained in the Panchadas'i, and little manuals such as the Vedánta Sára and the Paribháshá. Vyása repeatedly identified the world with God, and contended strenuously for the reality of the external Universe.

"The characteristic doctrine of the Vaiyásika Vedánta is that God being himself the efficient and substantial cause of all things, the universe is necessarily consubstantial with Him. The characteristic doctrine of later Vedantists, (the *vedánti-bruvas*, or the so-called Vedantists, to use Vijnána Bhikshu's term[4],) is that the Universe is but an illusion, projected by God, and is itself God. It is no doubt in reference to Vyása himself that the master spiritualizer, Gauḍapáda, says, in his Káriká on the Máṇḍukya Upanishad, that 'it is contemplaters of the creation who consider this to be an expansion of God[5].'

"I confess I cannot speak of the commentator's teaching with the same confidence as the founder's. S'ankará-

[4] See note 1 page 313. [5] विभूतिं प्रसवन्त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः ॥

chárya lived at a time when the pantheism of the original Vedanta had been much modified by the general reception of the Buddhistic doctrine of Maya. In expounding the Sútras, S'ankara, while stoutly contending for the doctrine delivered by Vyása, and opposing the idealism of the Buddhists, could not maintain his consistency in his conflict with the Sánkhya, and so allowed himself, in some respects, to diverge from the old doctrine. He spoke of the world as the creation of *Avidyá*, or ignorance, thereby giving some reason to the followers of the Sánkhya to charge him with inconsistency, and although he has generally avoided calling the universe itself an illusion, he has in one or two places, at least, described it as such. But by speaking of the world as the creation of *Avidyá*, he did not necessarily deny its reality. The Brahminical mind had from times immemorial found it difficult to believe that great exploits could ever be performed without some impulse, contra-distinguished from reason and deliberation, and akin to *Avidyá*. The passions and emotions were supposed to be the very opposites of reason and discrimination; and, long before the rise of philosophical schools, Indra, fabled as the lord of heaven, was supposed to have been equal to his great efforts, (one of which at least involved the act of creation,) only because he had been under intoxication[6]!

"S'ankara however does not use the favourite phraseology of later spiritualizers, that the illusion is neither existent nor non-existent. His own ideas of substantial reality are marked by an exactitude, utterly at variance with such a loose proposition,—a mode of talking which,

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[6] अवंशे द्यामस्तभायद्बृहन्तमा रोदसी अपृणदन्तरिक्षं ।
स धारयत् पृथिवीं पप्रथच्च सोमस्य ता मद इन्द्रश्चकार ॥
Max Muller's, Rig Veda, Vol. II. p. 483.

as Kapila rightly says, becomes none but idiots and children[7].

"S'ankara's view of substantial existence is very different from that of spiritualizers who distinguish *vyávahárika*, or conventional, from *páramárthika*, or real, existence. The terms are indeed found in his writings, but he has not technicalized them after the fashion of the Paribhásh'a and the Ved'anta S'ara. To prevent mistakes, however, I must add that great as my admiration is of S'ankarácháyra's talents, I cannot repose much confidence in his opinions, he has so often contradicted himself on points of vital importance. You know how he has reasoned, against the Buddhists, that waking sensations are essentially different from dreams, and yet, in his commentary on Gauḍap'ada's K'arik'a on the *Máṇḍukya* Upanishad, he follows that writer in comparing our waking sensations of the world with dreams, and joins him in placing 'contemplaters of the creation' in opposition to 'contemplaters of the chief good, who take no interest in the creation'![8]"

Rajah.—"But you say Vy'asa does not inculcate the doctrine of Maya in his sútras. I have read of an English scholar's citing one in proof of that doctrine."

Satyakáma.—"The 3rd of III. ii. was cited by Colonel Kennedy, but under a great mistake. It reads thus: 'But 'it is a mere illusion, because its reality does not ap- 'pear by the whole of the properties of real substances[9].'

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[7] अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वं ॥

Sánkhya Sútra, I. 29

[8] स्वप्नस्वरूपा मायास्वरूपा च । सृष्टिचिन्तका मन्यन्ते. न तु परमार्थचिन्तकानां सृष्टावादरः ॥

[9] मायामात्रन्तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ॥

The latter part is of course elliptical. As the Colonel was not satisfied with S'ankara's explanation, let us consider the Sútra in detail. The 2nd Páda of the 3rd chapter commences with discussing the question whether the ideas which arise in the mind in dreams are real, as are those which arise in the waking state. 'In the intermediate state [between sound sleep and waking, *i. e.*, in dreams] is there a real creation? for it is so said[10].' S'ankara proves by citing a Vedic text that the 'intermediate state' means a dream. He thus expounds the question contained in the Sútra: 'There is the doubt, Is the creation (or imagination in dreams) real, as is the case in the waking state? * * * for the Veda says so[1].' The question is repeated in the 2nd Sútra where reference is made to other Vedic passages, seemingly inculcating that dreams are real. In the 3rd Sútra (that which the Colonel quoted) the author decides the question by declaring that a dream is a mere 'Maya,' or delusion, for its reality is not established by the collection of proofs by which real substances are distinguished.

"The late Rajah Ram Mohun Roy interpreted the last mentioned Sútra after the manner of S'ankara, in his Bengalee edition. He thus translates the question contained in the 1st Aphorism: 'Since the creations in 'a state of dreaming are like God's works, let them also be true, like His other creations. This question he 'determines in the following Sútra. Those things which 'are presented in a dream are mere illusions; for, of those 'which are seen in dreams, the reality is not sufficiently

[10] सान्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हि III. ii. 1.

[1] तत्रसंशयः किं प्रबोध इव स्वप्नेपि पारमार्थिकी सृष्टिराहो स्विन्मा-यामयीति Com, on Do.

'manifest[2].' Thus the very Sútra, which the learned Colonel had cited to prove his theory, proves precisely the contrary by implication. The author of the Vedanta calls dreams *maya*, or illusions, because they are unlike the realities perceived in the waking state.

"To me, however, spiritualistic pantheism, as it is called, I mean that which Col. Kennedy attributes to the Vedanta, appears scarcely better than material, or that which the 'so-called Vedantists' are anxious to disown. For it is as great a departure from truth, and as dangerous an error, to spiritualize matter, as it can be to materialize the spirit. You shrink from the idea of identifying the visible world with God, because the material world is not, and cannot be, a spiritual substance, much less, God, and because such an idea is subversive of the very first principles of religion. But is it not equally erroneous to say that the world is false, that all our senses are under a deception, and that God has deliberately projected certain appearances for the very purpose of practising that deception? I am quite sure it is equally subversive of the interests of religion and morals. And I may add it is more dangerous, because more insidious in its plausibility. For there can be no religion, there can be no devotion, without a subject and an object. There must be the devotee, and there must be the object of devotion. If however the world is a nullity, if the human soul itself is a mere reflection, then I ask in the words of the Upanishad, *who will worship, whom, and how?*"

"The successors of Vyasa, who were unwilling to identify matter with God, and therefore pronounced the

[2] জাগ্রৎ সুষুপ্তির সন্ধি যে স্বপ্নাবস্থা হয় তাহাতে যে সৃষ্টি সেও ঈশ্বরের কর্ম্ম অতএব অন্য সৃষ্টির ন্যায় সেও সত্য হউক * * * পর সূত্রে সিদ্ধান্ত করিতেছেন। * *। স্বপ্নেতে যে সকল বস্তু হয় সে মায়ামাত্র যেহেতু স্বপ্নেতে যে সকল বস্তু দৃষ্ট হয় তাহার উচিত-মতে স্বরূপের প্রকাশ নাই।

world to be an illusion, were aware of the difficulties connected with their new position. The denial of a world, which was evident to all our senses, was itself so much opposed to nature and common sense, that they taxed their ingenuity, as far as they could, to qualify that denial. They introduced the terms *vyávahárika* and *páramárthika*, or *conventional* and *real* existences, in order to save their doctrine. The former they attributed, the latter they denied, to the world. If asked, *how all this can be God,*—they would tell you the material world was a *Maya*, an illusion, and that by not recognizing any visible entity, they virtually inculcated nothing but monotheism. But the true inference from their position was—not unity of Deity, but unity of being.

"If however charged, on the other hand, with the absurdities, so well set forth in the *Vedwan moda tarangiṇi*, they instantly shift from their position, and tell you they did not entirely deny the visible world. It had an existence in *vyavahára*, though it was, *paramárthatah*, no reality.

"But the soul of man itself has no other than *vyávaharika* existence. Do you think you are an entity?—You may be one in popular parlance—you are not so *paramarthatah*, in reality. 'This one, says the Vedánta Sára, 'which, fancies itself to be agent and patient, and passes 'to and fro between this and the other world, is called the '*vyavaharika jiva*, or conventional soul[3].'

"The inference from the principles of this spiritualistic pantheism is inevitable, that in the sense in which the material world is existent, it is identical with God; and since it is existent in the same sense, and quite to the

[3] अयङ्कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाभिमानित्वेन इहलोकपरलोकगामी व्यावहारिको जीव इत्युच्यते ॥

same extent, as the human soul is existent; it must be God in the same sense in which a human being is not a non-entity. The Vedantist may solemnly swear *by his life* that the universe is God! The profound thinker, I have already cited several times, suggests, that the asserter of *maya,* if called on to declare, after the manner of jury-men, whether such and such persons, being guilty of theft, are to be punished by the King, will affirm on his oath that the whole is a tissue of falsehood[4].

"Vyásа's Vedanta was an unsuccessful attempt to reason from nature up to nature's God. The aphorist was certainly a contemplater of the creation and its wonders. He eyed the world—was struck by its reality and beauty, and fancied that it proceeded from God, as a spark proceeds from fire, or froth from the sea."

Tarkakama.—"But how can you avoid the train of thought which passed in Vyása's mind? How can you deny that the universe is to God what the spark is to fire, and froth to the sea? It must have a substantial cause, and if you deny that God is its cause, will you prefer to be an atheist?"

Satyakama.—"I do not think one needs be in such a dilemma. It is not necessary to be an atheist in order to meet the Vedantic conclusion with a negative. It is quite sufficient for all purposes of theism to consider God as the *efficient* cause and author of the world, without going the length of pronouncing it to be consubstantial with Him."

Tarkakáma.—"How could God make a substantial world of *no substance.*"

Satyakáma.—"I will simply refer to Vyása's own aphorism, 'Like the gods and others.' He maintains that

[4] एते चोराः किमिति धरणीनायकेनापि दण्ड्याः मायावादी सशपथमिदं वक्ति सर्वन्तु मिथ्या ॥ Tattwa-muktávali by Gaudapurṇánanda.

it is possible for gods, Ṛishis, and others of great power to produce effects by their own volition. Why could not the Supreme Being likewise create, by the exercise of His own will, the Universe before us, as a real substance—dependent indeed on Himself, and differing from Him *infinitely*, (for who, save God Himself, can fathom the gulph that separates the SELF-EXISTENT from the created ?) and yet real, not deceptive, or fallacious? No other conception of creative power is worthy of the Almighty. All other theories of creation are, not only unnecessary, but liable to insuperable objections and difficulties. It was only to escape from those difficulties that the successors of Vyása had recourse to the *maya-vada* of Buddhism. But if they escaped one error, they ran headlong into an opposite one. In order to preserve the spiritual purity of the God whom their founder had identified with the visible world, they denied the reality of His productions; not remembering that unless the world were originally received as a real effect, its cause could never have been deduced by human reasoning. Nor could there be any pious intuitions in a soul, that, in the plenitude of Vedantic knowledge, would deny its own existence. Howsoever deduced, whether ætiologically or morally, the truth of God's existence would, as an article of human belief, be affected in the same proportion in which the reality of the visible world and of the human soul was denied. The Vedantist forgot that the moment the effect was denied, the ground on which the deduction of the cause rested was cut away; the instant the deducer's existence was doubted, his moral persuasions lost all their value.

"If the Vedantism of Vyása, who was a 'contemplater of the creation,' materialized, and thereby degraded, the Divinity, the pantheism of Gauḍapáda, who 'took no interest in the creation,' deified humanity. I for one will

not undertake to say which of the two is, physically, the grosser error,—morally, the more pernicious delusion,—or, theologically, the more dangerous doctrine."

Tarkakáma.—"Excuse my repeating a question which I put last night, but to which you gave no distinct reply. Does not even a shadow betoken some reality which has cast it, or a reflection point to its substance? The world, though itself a mere shadow, may prove the existence of God as its substance."

Satyakáma.—"If you mean by the word reflection, or shadow, a reflection, or shadow, of God, as S'ankara suggests[5], I shall only remind you of the learned commentator's own admission in his scholia on the *Taittiriya*[6]. He allows that God, being Himself infinite and without form, cannot have a reflection, or cast a shadow—especially as there cannot be a medium or receptacle for such a reflection or shadow. If, again, there could be such a receptacle, would it not be material, and if it were identified with God, would that not be a material pantheism?

"Now there can be no such thing as a substance existing *conventionally*, but not *really*. Things there may be, existing in the opinions of men, or implied in their conduct, but if we deny their reality, we can only mean that they are mere fancies, and therefore not actually existing substances. S'ankaráchárya has said, what it is impossible to gainsay, 'that the question of the 'reality of a substance is not dependent on human notions. 'It depends on the substance itself. To say of a post that 'it is either a post, or a man, or something else, is not to 'enunciate the truth. That it is a man, or something

[5] See p. 371.

[6] न त्वात्मनोऽमूर्त्तत्वादाकारादिकारणस्यात्मनो व्यापकत्वात्। तद्विप्रकृष्टदेशप्रतिविम्बाधारवस्त्वभावाच्च प्रतिविम्बवत् प्रवेशान युक्तः॥

'else, is a false notion. That it is a post is alone the 'truth, since it is dependent on the substance itself. 'Thus the determination of an existing substance depends 'on the substance itself[7].' It must either exist, or not exist, whatever men may say or think. In fact conventional, as opposed to real, can only mean imaginary, in other words, false. It is conventional, even with the followers of Bháshkaráchárya, to say that the sun mounts the *udayáchala* (or the eastern mountains) in the morning, it is a *vyavahára*, or custom, to say so, though they know very well that it is a mythological fable. There are no such eastern mountains, notwithstanding their *vyávahárika* existence. So also with reference to eclipses, it is a *vyavahára*, or popular custom, to believe that the solar or lunar orb is in the giant's grasp, and, on that belief, to perform certain ceremonies. But here what is a *vyavaharika* truth is, in essence, a gross error."

Tarkakáma.—"But the cases are not parallel. When the Vedanta tells a person that while he is in society he ought not to slight what is *vyavaharika*, it merely means that conventional rules ought not to be set aside. Will you not acknowledge that a man's duty may vary with his position? A man in a state of ignorance must perform the duties attached to that state, and he must not aspire after the rights of the truly wise."

Satyakáma.—"You mean you will not allow the astronomer to evade the peformance of *puras'charaṇa!* But the question at present is not respecting a man's duty, but the

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[7] न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षं किं तर्हि वस्तुतन्त्रमेवतत्। नहि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषोवान्योवेति तत्त्वज्ञानम्भवति। तत्र पुरुषोवान्योवेति मिथ्याज्ञानं स्थाणुरेवेति तत्त्वज्ञानं वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्। एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रं। I. i. 2.

truth of substances. Whether duties may vary, as Śankara admits, we shall consider bye and bye—but, as that eminent commentator says, it is impossible for physical realities to change with the notions of society. Objective truth is independent of the subjective man.

"The moment you deviate from this unalterable rule of truth, you can have no confidence in any reality. What evidence can you have even of spiritual reality, but from traces of spiritual agency visible in the world, or from moral convictions in the mind itself? If you falter in your admission of those traces, and of the real existence of that mind, how can you be sure of any truth?"

Tarkakáma.—"When the Vedantist says that every thing is false which is not Brahma, or when he says the visible world, and even the human soul, have *vyávahárika*, not *paramárthika*, existence, he merely means that nothing can have the kind of reality which God has."

Satyakáma.—"When you say that the human soul and the visible world have a different kind of reality from the reality of God, and then add that both are God, you talk simply in unintelligible language. If the two classes of reality are different, then what do you mean by identifying them?

"No fallacy is more insidious than that of ambiguity, in ascribing two different meanings to the same word, and in the same argument. If you say the universe is of the same substance with God, and that the soul is identical with the Supreme Being in the strict sense of the term, (excluding the figurative senses of *sampat* &c.,) then you must either unduly exalt the world, or grossly degrade the divinity. In either case you strike at the root of *Dharma*, or duty. You cannot, with any fairness or consistency, impose upon persons duties which on your own theory are impossibilities. Whether you acknowledge the universe to be God,

or deny the existence of every thing that is not Brahma, you can have no law, no ethics, no discipline."

Tarkakáma.—"We allow that a man in a state of ignorance is bound by laws, rules, and duties."

S. "You allow that which your better sense contradicts. You hold that in truth there can be neither law nor law-giver. The bolder spirits among you glory in denying injunctions or prohibitions."

T. "When a man arrives at such a state of knowledge he needs no law."

S. "How can you prevent a sensualist from being encouraged in his evil course by your doctrine?"

T. "He has no right to deviate from the path of his duties."

S. "If you tell him so, he will only wonder you can keep your countenance, while you lecture him to do that which your better sense pronounces to be an illusion, a fabrication of ignorance. May he not say that since whatever he does must be an illusion, he had better remain satisfied with that which suits his pleasures best? What can you with any consistency say in order to exhort him to holiness of life?"

T. "I will tell him that if he goes on at that rate, he will never enjoy Brahma."

S. "Do not say, 'Never', for you hold that at general dissolutions, every thing is swallowed up by Brahma. Whether a man be good or bad, he cannot help enjoying Him on those occasions. The stream, whether turbid or limpid, must flow into the ocean."

T. "I will remind him of what Vyása says that if he attend to his duties, he might be much more quickly emancipated from the bondage of the world."

S. "Which in itself is nothing. The soul is no more in bondage than the crystal in the vicinity of blue cloth

is tinged[8]. If there be no world, there can be no bondage. Your spiritual pantheism again is a libel on God. You say the world is a maya, an illusion, and that God is the *mayi*, the conjurer who thus deceives you. Is it not grossly revolting to our moral feelings to say that God has deliberately projected a false appearance with a view to beguile rational minds of His own creation? And if the world be a mere spectacle—a mere charm—why again dignify it by the appellation of God?"

The sun had, by this time, got very near to the western hills, and was about to give rest to Aruṇa and his horses by betaking himself to the mountain summit. The Rajah desired us to lodge for the night in his gardens, where the requisite utensils would be provided for our evening prayers, and where a Koolin Brahmin had charge of the culinary department—"so competent for the office," said his highness, "and—without the least injury to animal life, that if the Mlechas could have but made sure of such dishes every day, the world would at once have got rid of the butcher's profession."

Leaving the Rajah in his palace, we came to the gardens, and attended first to our evening duties, and then proceeded to consider our physical wants for the night. But here a difficulty presented itself. The ingenious member of our sacred fraternity, at the head of the culinary office, was of the Vaidic S'reṇi. Vaiyásika, who was a *Ráḍi*, and A'gamika, who was a Várendra, were, as matters of course, obliged to deny themeslves the dainties of the royal kitchen. Tarkakáma said that although he was of the same *s'reṇi* as the provisioner-royal, yet he could not persuade himself to taste food

[8] शुद्धात्मा नीलवस्त्रादियोगेन स्फटिको यथा। A'tmabodha.

prepared by one who was a Śudra's hireling cook. As for myself, I had been so long in the habit of observing your close practice of absolutely refusing to partake of food, dressed by strangers, that I excused myself by telling the Koolin president of cookery, I had been accustomed to Hindoostani dishes, and had lost all relish for those of Bengal. Satyakáma accordingly engrossed to himself all the good things which, the Rajah said, required only to be tasted, in order to put a stop to the slaughter of dumb creatures for the table. We had to cook each for himself. All being of different *s'reṇis,* no one could perform that accommodating office for another. Utensils and raw materials were liberally and richly supplied, and we soon prepared every thing we could possibly require, and passed the night merrily and joyously.

DIALOGUE IX.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

My last letter informed you of our doings on the day we spent at the Rajah's house. I shall now report to you what passed on the morrow. We had scarcely done our prescribed duties of the first *prahara,* (or, quarter of day,) when the *adhikári,* in charge of the garden, came, and said, that the Rajah had sent a Jemadar to communicate his remembrance of us in the private-audience chamber. We responded to the summons, and repaired to that chamber. His highness was engaged in conversation with a *Daṇḍi,* who had taken to his staff the year before, and, giving up his home, had ever since been performing the exercises of a Yogi in the hope of attaining to *Samádhi* and *Nirváṇa.* On our reaching the audience-chamber, and taking our seats, the Daṇḍi turned to Satyakáma, and spoke as follows: "The Rajah has told me of the discussion you had yester-day. I will not deny that your arguments have some force, but I still feel, that on several important points, you have totally misapprehended our views. You say there is no medium between reality and unreality, and that, if we call the world an illusion, we cannot argue from it as a reality. You say we cannot be sure of any truth if we consider the world an illusion, and the human

soul a mere *Vyávahárika jiva.* You also argue that on our theory no one can have a motive for virtue, nor can there be such a thing as law or duty. You accuse us too, of gross inconsistency in talking of emancipation from a bondage which in reality has no existence, because the world is itself an illusion.

"Now, whatever Vyása or S'ankaráchárya may have said on the nature of substantial existence, I can point out a palpable middle term between reality and unreality. There is such a thing as a self-subsisting independent existence, and there is such a thing as dependent existence. The former we attribute to the Deity, the latter to the world. We accordingly say, emphatically, that He alone is *sat*, or really existent. He lives *paramárthatah.* We add that the world is *asat*, that is, not real in this absolute sense, because it is not self-subsisting, and therefore transient. And yet we do not pronounce it to be such an unreality as that we could not argue for any truths founded on its existence. It is certainly real, in some sort ; for it is producing actual impressions on the senses, and surely we may with logical propriety deduce the existence of a first cause from an illusion ; for how could the illusion be produced without the agency of a cause ? It requires to be accounted for as much as any phenomena on *your* hypothesis. Then again as to the human soul, the recipient of the impressions occasioned by the illusion, whatever the Vedanta Sára may say, we do not attribute to it a mere *vyavahárika* existence ; nor do we consider it as part of the Universe, for the human soul is consubstantial with God. With reference to practical duties, our theory cannot disturb them, for howsoever the ignorant voluptuary may argue to the contrary, we say, what every thinking man will readily understand, that in the state of *avidyá*, the observance of duty is the safest, and, when *avidyá* is

removed, and the soul gets the fulness of divine illumination, the violation of duty will be as impossible as its observance unnecessary. Nor can you justly say that we toil to no purpose in seeking for emancipation from a bondage, which, notwithstanding its illusory character, produces real apprehensions and fears in the mind. We are actually in terror under its influence, and therefore it is said, 'O Janaka, thou has attained fearlessness!'"

Satyakáma.—"I think, revered and learned Sir, the new explanations you have introduced into the Vedant philosophy fail to impart to it any additional strength. Your view of the Vedanta appears to be derived from foreign sources, and is therefore somewhat different, not only from Vyása's and S'ankara's, but also from the minor treatises, such as the Paribháshá and the Vedánta Sára. It is impossible in a general refutation of a system to anticipate every thing that an individual follower of the doctrine, especially one who is acquainted with other systems of philosophy, may conceive in his mind, apart from the positions laid down by leading expositors. Your philosophical principle seems to be that which Kapila recommends in Sánkhya Sutra iv. 13. 'Notwithstanding much reading of S'ástra, and much instruction 'from tutors, one is to take the substantial part only, 'like the bee[9].' The bee flies from flower to flower and takes only the meliferous matter. You seem to be collecting ideas in the same eclectic way. Now it would be a great historical inaccuracy to give to such a collection the name of Vedantism. But as you have unbo-

[9] बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासनेपि सारादानं षट्पदवत्॥

तदुक्तं। अणुभ्यश्च महद्भ्यश्च शास्त्रेभ्यः कुशलो नरः। सर्वतः सार मादद्यात् पुष्पेभ्य इव षट्पदः॥

somed yourself so frankly, I am bound to tell you what I think on the subject.

"That God's existence is independent and self-subsisting, is a doctrine which you cannot hold more firmly than myself. If by adding that the world has a dependent existence, you only mean that the world is a created, and, therefore, not a self-existent, substance, it is impossible for us to differ on that point either. You cannot then call it an illusion, for surely God is able to create a real substance by the power of his will. Why must you compare Him with a conjurer, that calls up an appearance, having no existence except in a deceived imagination? Why should you limit His power by such an unworthy comparison? If your meaning be that the world has no existence but in human ideas, cognitions, or impressions, then that is the very theory of the Buddhists which has been so successfully refuted by Śankaráchárya. I can only repeat that eminent philosopher's language, that the world has an existence, independent of human notions.

"Assuming, however, that the only difference in point of real existence that you desire to establish between God and the Universe is the necessary one of Creator and creature, my objection to the Vedantic tenet, that the Universe is identical with God, does not lose its force at all. That identification would, on the theory now before us, clearly amount to material pantheism. It must either be a degradation of the Creator, or a deification of the creature.

"Since, again, you call the world an illusion, I do not understand how you can reconcile such language with the notion of its existence (however dependent) as a creature. For I still contend that an existent creature cannot be an illusion. An illusion may, as an effect, prove the agency of a cause. That I do not deny. But the phan-

tom, as S'ankarácharya himself admits, must have a medium, a really existing medium, separate from its projector. The medium then must be a second substance, and so contradict your theory of one essence without a second. The medium, again, must be something material, for the illusion is an object of sensuous perception, and, if '*all this*' be God, the material medium must be deified too. Supposing, however, the world to be an illusion and no-thing, what do you mean by saying, All this is God? What can be the drift, what the motive of such an assertion? What truth can you explain, what knowledge can you impart, what object can you attain by calling that to be God which you are convinced is a no-thing? What can you be possibly aiming at by saying, almost in the same breath, 'every thing from Brahmá to a bundle of grass in false,' AND AGAIN, 'every thing, animate or inanimate, from Brahmá to a bundle of grass is Kṛishṇa, *i .e.*, God?'[10]

"When, moreover, calling the world an illusion, you still contend that it has perils which require to be remedied by a laborious process of philosophy, your argument is simply unintelligible."

Yogi—"Even an illusory peril may produce real fears in the mind. So long as a man is subject to such fears, the peril must be considered *real*, and remedied accordingly."

Satyakáma.—"Well how do you propose remedying the illusory peril?"

Yogi—"By teaching that nothing is existent but the Supreme Being. All else being a vanity, هوس as the Javans say. *Allah bas, baki haus* (God is sufficient, the rest is vanity)."

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[10] ब्रह्मादितृणपर्य्यन्तं सर्वं मिथ्यैव स्वप्नवत्। आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्य्यन्तं सर्वं कृष्णश्चराचरं ॥ Nárada-pancha-rátra.

Satyakáma—"But the Javans do not say that the world is an illusion. They call it a vanity, because it has nothing solid, nothing abiding, nothing worthy of love or attachment. You again contend that the vanity is God. The Javan theory may have a tendency to lead men to look up to God as their only refuge from evil, but your theory teaches there is no real evil, or the evil is God himself, and, there being one essence alone, no possibility of law or duty."

Yogi.—"But we do admit both law and duty. We tell men that, so long as they are in a state of *Avidyá*, or ignorance, it is safe for them to conform to the duties of their respective classes."

Satyakáma—"People look for what is practically safe when they are in a dilemma. The deluded subject of *Maya*, whom you wish to reclaim ,will naturally ask, why you speculate on what is merely safe, or expedient, if you are sure the world is an illusion, and there is no real evil? To tell a man that he must do his duty, merely, because it is safe to do so, is in fact to tell him that he is not bound by duty. It is to lose sight altogether of the definition of duty. Duty is what *ought* to be done. Such a duty, that is to say strict duty, cannot however exist where all is illusion, but Brahma. Duty presupposes the existence of two parties, the person bound by the duty, and the party to whom he is bound. The question of the Upanishad, however bold in setting duty at defiance, is, on its own principles, unanswerable, *Who will regard, whom, and how*? Do you think you will produce any impression on your neighbour by playing fast and loose with him on points of duty?"

Yogi.—"If my neighbour is determined to act like a depraved person I cannot help it. If he be a mass of corruption, nothing will save him."

Satyakáma.—"But how can you expect better things from Maya? How can there be a real mass of corruption, either, if all is illusion but Brahma? I of course believe that not your neighbour only, but all men are naturally depraved, though capable of the highest improvement. And it may be expected of a scheme propounded for the amelioration of the human race, that it will meet the disease with which our race is afflicted, and work on the affections of our nature, so as to promote virtuous and restrain vicious inclinations. But this service can never be performed by a system which confounds all distinctions of right and wrong, by pronouncing every thing to be an illusion but Brahma.

"What again is the precise meaning of your theory of maya? What is maya? Is it a deceptive power, or is it the deception itself? Is it the illusion by which you are deceived, or is it the delusive influence through which God presents the illusion to your senses? Śankaráchárya appears to take it in the sense of a delusive influence, the instrumental cause of the illusion—for he talks of the world as a creation of ignorance. This is something like the old story of Indra's propping up the heavens in a state of intoxication, but, in this sense, the creation itself may be a substance. A real and abiding effect may be produced under intoxication."

Yogi.—"We say it is either no-thing, or a distorted reflection of the only one thing existent, that is God."

Satyakáma.—"Is it not an extremely low view of the Divinity to say that He appears to us in the form of the world, that He has projected a distorted reflection of Himself with a view to delude His rational creatures? We are all agreed that religious errors are the most serious of all errors, and of all religious errors, the greatest must be that which consists in a false notion of the Divine

attributes. Is it possible to believe that God would deliberately produce such an error in his creatures by projecting a distorted likeness of Himself?

"And here allow me to direct your attention to the opinions which Ramanuja expressed on this point. He, like yourself, had abandoned the pleasures of the world, and looked for a higher spiritual position than most men think of. It is not for me to say anything as to his success, but his remarks on the subject of our present discussion, as recorded by one of his followers, will perhaps have some weight in your estimation[1]. 'In the re-

[1] ज्ञानञ्चाज्ञानमेव द्वयमपि विदितं सर्वशास्त्रान्तराले धर्म्माधर्म्मौ च विद्या तदनुतदितरा एकलग्ना विभाति। एवं सर्वत्र युग्मं भवति खलु तथा ब्रह्मजीवौ प्रसिद्धौ कस्मादैक्यं तयोः स्यादकपटमनसा हन्त सन्तो वदन्तु॥

तच्छब्दार्थः प्रघटपरमानन्दपूर्णामृताब्धिस्त्वंशब्दार्थो भवभयभरव्याग्रचित्तोतिदुःखी। तस्मादैक्यं न भवति तयो भिन्नयोर्वस्तुगत्या भेदः सेव्यः स खलु जगतां त्वंहि दासस्तदीयः॥

नाभिधा समवायो वा हेत्वाभावाच्च लक्षणा। मायावादिमते ब्रह्म बोध्यते केन हेतुना। तं हेतुं मुख्यया वृत्या जगत्कर्त्तेति कथ्यते सकर्तृकत्वमेतेषामनुमानाच्च सिद्ध्यति। इयं सकर्तृका नूनं क्षिति र्भवितु मर्हति। कार्य्यत्वं तत्र हेतुः स्यात् घटादौ दृश्यते यथा॥

तत्कथ्यते भगवतो महदन्तरं यत् कुद्दालदात्रहलपाणिभृतां जनानां। एते षडूतिविवशाः श्रमभारखिन्ना भ्रूभङ्गमात्रविषये स करोति सर्वं॥

तथाहि कस्मात् प्रतिविम्बमासीत्तस्यापरिच्छिन्ननिरञ्जनस्य। जडस्य कस्मान्निगमोक्तधर्म्माधर्म्मौ च तत्तत्सुखदुःखभोगं। प्रतिविम्बं भवेन्नूनं परिच्छिन्नस्य वस्तुनः। अपरिच्छिन्नता पूर्णा तस्य तद्भविता कथं। रामानुजः शिष्यगणाग्रगण्यो निनिन्द विम्बप्रतिविम्बवादं। शिष्टै र्गृहीतं न यतोमतं तत् तस्माद्भवेच्चारुतरं न नूनं॥

अहं सुखी क्वापि भवामि दुःखी सुखस्वरूपी सततं स आत्मा। एवं हि भेदः कथमैक्यमेव तयोर्द्वयोर्भिन्नपदार्थयोः स्यात्। नित्यं स्वयं

'cesses of all śástras we are told of both knowledge 'and ignorance, of virtue and vice, of right and wrong 'sciences. Thus we see [opposites in] pairs every where, 'and God and the soul are also notoriously so. How then 'can they have unity? Let holy men answer this with a 'candid mind. The word *tat* (it) stands for the ocean of 'immortality, full of supreme felicity. The word *twam* '(thou) stands for a miserable person, distracted in mind, 'through fear of the world. The two cannot therefore

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ज्योतिरनावृतो सावतोवशुद्धो जगदेकसाक्षी। जीवस्तु नैवंविध एव तस्मादभेदवृत्तोपरि वज्रपातः॥

येन व्याप्तमखण्डमण्डलमिदं ब्रह्माण्डभाण्डादिकं रे रे मन्दमते त्वया कथमहो सोऽहं वचः कथ्यसे। पश्य त्वं निज वैभवं स्वहृदये कृत्वा मतिं निर्म्मलां व्यूहः किं मशकोदरे प्रविशति प्रोद्दामदिग्दन्तिनां। कस्त्वं कुत आगतः कथमरे संसारबन्धक्रमस्तत्त्वं तत् परिचिन्तय स्वहृदये भ्रान्तस्य मार्गं त्यज॥

न्यस्तः श्रीपरमेश्वरस्य कृपया चैतन्यलेशस्त्वयि त्वं तस्मात् परमेश्वरः स्वयमहो नायाति वक्तुं शठ। लब्ध्वा कश्चन दुर्जनः खलु यथा हस्त्यश्वपादातकं भूयादेव तदीशराजपदवीं चक्रे ग्रहीतुं मनः॥

केचिद्वादबलाः कुतर्कजलधौ मग्नाः कुमार्गे रता मिथ्याजल्पनकल्पनाशनयुता भ्रान्ता जगद्भ्रामकाः। ब्रह्मैवाहमिदं चराचरमपि ब्रह्मैव दृश्याखिलं प्राहुर्यत्तदसन्मनोरथ इति व्याख्यातमन्तःस्फुटं॥

नैर्गुण्यवादो गुणसागरेऽपि तेषामहो गड्डरिकाप्रवाहः। सूत्रस्य भाष्यं पृथगेव कृत्वा प्रतारयन्ति स्वमतप्रपन्ना। ऐश्वर्य्यकर्त्तृत्वमुखाः समग्रा नित्या गुणास्ते परमेश्वरस्य। अतो गुणी निर्गुण एव कस्मा न्नैर्गुण्यवादस्तु विवाद एव॥

प्रतीयते क्वापि न वेदलोके निर्धर्म्मकं वस्तु खपुष्पतुल्यं। प्रतीतिरास्ते यदि तस्य वेदे वेदाः प्रमाणं खलु नो तदा स्यात्। प्रस्तरो यजमानो वै यथात्र यज्ञसाधनं। धर्म्मबाधं तथात्रापि निर्धर्म्मस्तु प्रतीयते॥

'be one. They are substantially different. He is to be 'worshipped by the whole world. Thou art but His slave. 'There can be no designation, nor substantial existence, nor 'definition, where there is no foundation or reason. How 'can Brahma be understood or inferred on the theory of 'Maya? His existence we deduce as the author of the 'universe, for all this appears, on the evidence of inference, 'to have a cause. This earth must surely have an author, 'for, like pots and other things, it is but a production. Mark 'the great difference between the Lord, and men, working 'with axes, choppers, and ploughshares. These are sore 'troubled by the six waves of their passions. They toil, 'and labour, and are exhausted. He effects every thing 'by a mere turn of his brow. How could there be an 'image or reflection of the Infinite and spotless one? How 'could the Veda, either, declare the merit and demerit 'of a non-sentient (reflection), or the reflection itself be 'a subject of pain or pleasure? There may be a re-'flection of a finite substance; how could there be such 'a thing of the Infinite. Ramanuja, the first among 'great men, condemned this theory of an image and 'reflection. That his opinions were not received by 'great men makes them only still dearer. I am some-'times happy, sometimes miserable. He, the [Supreme] 'Spirit, is always happy. Such is the discrimination. 'How then can two distinct substances be identical? 'He is an eternal Light, without anything to obscure 'it—pure, the one superintendent of the world. But the 'animal soul is not so. Thus a thunder-bolt falls on 'the tree of no-distinction. How canst thou, oh slow 'of thought! say, I am He, who has set up this im-'mense sphere of the universe in its fulness? Con-'sider thine own capacities with a pure mind. Can a 'collection of infuriated elephants enter into the stomach

'of a musquito? Whose art thou? Whence art thou 'come? What is the connection of this bondage of the 'world? Ponder these questions in thy mind, give up 'the way of the erring. By the mercy of the Most 'High a little understanding has been committed to thee, 'it is not for thee, oh perverse one, to say, therefore I am 'God. That would be, as if some wicked person, having 'received [from a king], elephants, horses, and infantry, 'were to form the intention of usurping the royal dignity. 'Some sophists, sunk in a sea of false logic, addicted to 'evil ways, labouring to bring about the destruction of 'the world by false statements, themselves deceived and 'deceiving the world, say I am God, and all this uni-'verse is God. Their wicked device is now abundantly 'exposed. To speak of a void of qualities in the ocean 'of qualities! Oh theirs is like the stream of a flock of 'sheep. Having made a separate paraphrase of the 'sútras, they are deceiving the followers of their own doc-'trine. All the qualities of sovereignty and activity are 'eternally God's. He is therefore one endowed with quali-'ties *(guṇi)*, how can He be *nirguṇa*, or devoid of 'qualities? The assertion of the void of qualities is 'mere disputation. A substance without attributes, like 'the sky-flower, is never admitted either in the Veda, or 'or in the world. If the Vedas were to set forth such 'an object, they would no longer be any authority. 'As the stone, or utensils, and the sacrificer are instru-'ments of a sacrifice, so is this theory of no-attribute 'or no-duty an instrument for the obstruction of Dharma 'or virtue.'

"To these extracts I shall only add a few passages from Ramanuja's own philosophical work. With reference to the pantheistic dogma, that individual animal souls are but reflections of the Supreme Spirit, he says; 'Some

'persons[2], betaking themselves to the doctrine of God's 'being the only entity, have come to the conclusion that 'animal souls are but reflections of the one Supreme 'Being. Their happiness, misery, and other conditions

[2] अत्र केचिदद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपयन्त एवैवं समादधते एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिविम्बभूतानां जीवानां सुखित्वदुखित्वादय एकस्यैव मुखस्य प्रतिविम्बानां मणिकृपाणदर्पणादिषूपलभ्यमानानामल्पत्वमहत्त्वमलिनत्वविमलत्वादिवत्तत्तदुपाधिवशाद्व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते। * * * काल्पनिकन्तु भेदमाश्रित्येयं व्यवस्थोच्यते कस्य पुनः कल्पना न तावद्ब्रह्मणस्तस्य परिशुद्धज्ञानात्मनः कल्पनाशून्यत्वात्। नापि जवीनामितरेतराश्रयप्रसङ्गात्। कल्पनाधीनो हि जीवो जीवाश्रयाच कल्पनेति॥

किञ्च अविद्या कल्प्यस्य जीवस्य कल्पकः क इतिनिरूपणीयं न तावदविद्या अचेतनत्वात् नापि जीव आत्माश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् शुक्तिकारजतादिवदविद्याकल्प्यत्वाच्च जीवभावस्य ब्रह्मैव कल्पकमितिचेत् ब्रह्माज्ञानमेवायातं किञ्च ब्रह्माज्ञानानभ्युपगमे किं ब्रह्म जीवान् पश्यति वानवा न पश्यति चेत् ईक्षापूर्विका विचित्रसृष्टिर्नामरूपव्याकरणमित्यादि ब्रह्मणो न स्यात् अथ पश्यति अखण्डैकरसं ब्रह्म नाविद्यामन्तरेण जीवान् पश्यतीति ब्रह्माज्ञानप्रसङ्गः अतएव मायाविद्याविभागवादोपि निरस्तः अज्ञानमन्तरेण हि मायिनोपि ब्रह्मणो जीवदर्शित्वं न स्यात् न च मायावी परानदृष्ट्वा मोहयितुमलं नापि माया मायाविनो दर्शनसाधनं दृष्टेषु परेषु तन्मोहसाधनमात्रत्वात्तस्याः अथ ब्रह्मणो माया तस्य जीवदर्शित्वं कुर्वती जीवमोहनस्य हेतुरिति मन्यसे तर्हि परिशुद्धस्याखण्डैकरसस्वप्रकाशस्य ब्रह्मणः परदर्शनं कुर्वती माया परपर्याया अविद्यैव स्यात् अथमतं विपरीतदर्शनहेतुरविद्या माया तु मिथ्याभूतं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं मिथ्यात्वेन दर्शयन्ती न ब्रह्मणो विपरीतदर्शनहेतुः अतस्तस्य नाविद्यात्वमिति नैवं चन्द्रैकत्वे ज्ञायमाने द्विचन्द्रदर्शनहेतोरप्यविद्यात्वात् यदि च ब्रह्म मिथ्यात्वेनैव स्वव्यतिरिक्तं जानाति न तर्हि तन्मोहयति न ह्यनुन्मत्तो मिथ्यात्वेन ज्ञातान् मोहयितुमीहते॥ * * * अपुरुषार्थेन मोहनेन किं प्रयोजनं क्रीडेति चेत्। अपरिच्छिन्नानन्दस्य किं क्रीडया।

'are owing to their different receptacles, just as the same 'face may appear, variously, small, large, obscure, and 'clear, when reflected from various gems, swords, and 'looking-glasses. * * This difference in condition is '[they say] owing to a fabricated distinction. Now, it 'may be asked, whose fabrication is it? Not surely 'God's, for He is incapable of such fabrication, being 'Himself pure knowledge. Nor can it be the animal 'soul's, for then there would be reciprocal support [i. e., a 'vicious circle]; thus, the soul itself is dependent [for its 'existence] on the fabrication, and the fabrication is owing to the soul.'

"Ramanuja asks again, 'Of the soul, fabricated by 'ignorance, who is the fabricator? This ought to be 'determined. Not surely the ignorance itself, for it is 'inanimate. Nor the soul, for then it would be a case 'of self-fabrication, because [you say] the soul is the object of the fabrication by Ignorance, after the manner 'shell and silver. If you say God is himself the fabricator of the notion of soul, then you introduce ignorance into the Deity And, if you do not introduce 'ignorance into the Divinity, [may I ask] whether God 'looks on souls or not? If he does not look, then [the 'Vedic description of] the creation of varieties of names 'and forms after observation, is falsified. If you say he 'looks [on the fabricated souls] then, since the one integral 'Brahma cannot look on souls without the intervention of 'ignorance, you necessarily talk of his ignorance. Therefore 'the theory of distinction founded on maya and ignorance

परिपूर्णभोगानामेव क्रीडा पुरुषार्थत्वेन लोके दृष्टा इतिचेत् नैवमिहोपपद्यते नह्यपरमार्थतया प्रतिभासमानै र्निष्पन्नया परमार्थभूतेन च तत्प्रतिभासिनानुन्मत्तानां क्रीडारसोनिष्पद्यते ॥

Rámánuja's S'áririka Bháshya.

'is refuted. For even the conjurer (mayi), Brahma, can- 'not look on souls without the intervention of Ignorance. 'Nor can the conjurer delude others without seeing them. 'Nor can a maya itself be the means of observation on 'the part of the mayi, or conjurer. The instrument of its 'delusiveness is observation of others. But you will say 'that the maya of Brahma, bringing about his observation 'of souls, is the cause of the soul's delusion. Then the 'maya, bringing about the observation of others on the 'part of the one integral self-apparent Brahma, is, in other 'words, his ignorance. You may say that ignorance is the 'cause of a wrong observation, but maya, which only 'brings about an observation, on the part of Brahma, of 'all besides him being false, is not the cause of a wrong 'observation, and therefore there is no ignorance in him. 'But you cannot say that when the moon is seen as one, 'it is seen as two, even if there be ignorance in the cause. 'If Brahma saw every thing to be false besides himself, 'he would not think of deluding it again. For none but 'a mad man would study to delude that which he knew 'to be false.'

'Why again,' asks Ramanuja, 'should this useless idle 'delusion be exercised [by God]? If you say, as a sport, '[I ask again] why should a being of unbounded joy 'engage in sport? If you retort that sports are found in 'the world to be engaged in, only by men whose enjoy- 'ments are full, [I reply] this does not hold good here, 'for none but mad men would entertain the sportful sen- 'timent in a case where the objects of sport are admitted 'to be unreal and illusory, and the sporter to be real, and 'himself the projecter of the illusions.'

"Beware then, my dear Sir, of the consequences of playing fast and loose on such questions as these. To say that God has projected an illusion for deluding his

creatures, or that, being essentially *nirguṇa*, or devoid of qualities, He becomes active under the influence of maya, is equally opposed to godliness. You cannot, if you believe Him to be all Truth, allow the possibility of His projecting a deceptive spectacle ; nor can you, if you believe Him to be all knowledge and all power, assent to the theory of His making anything under the influence of *avidyá*, or ignorance, which cannot but be akin to the *mad effort* which S'ankara repudiates[3], and which cannot differ essentially from the intoxication attributed to Indra."

Yogi.—"The right way to look on our doctrine is to contemplate its drift. We say that God alone exists, because He is the only independent reality. We say again that the world is an illusion, because it is transient, impure, and corrupt. We say also, each, He is myself and I am He[4], because, by becoming one with God, we desire to escape the perils of the world, and the lusts of the flesh."

Satyakáma.—"I can have no objection to your use of the most exclusive terms that human language can supply, to express the self-dependent existence of God, as the only eternal essence. You may also adopt the strongest words you can find, to express the vanity of the world, because of its transiency, impurity, and corruptibility. All I contend for is, that you must hold both those ideas with their proper limitations. God is self-existent and eternal. You may emphatically call Him the *sat*, you may say He is *sat* in a sense in which nothing else is *sat*. He is an entity in a sense in which nothing else is an entity—for he is eternal and self-existent. But you must remember

[3] See page 370.

[4] सकारेण वहिर्याति हकारेण विशेत् पुनः । प्राणस्तत्र स एवाह-महंस इति चिन्तयेत् । Yoga S'ástra in S'ridhara swámi's Com. Bhag. Gita.

the proper limitation of the doctrine. God is the eternal *sat*, but if *sat* be taken in its grammatical sense, as the present participle of the verb *as* (to be), then the world is also *sat*, or existent, as a creature, though not eternal, and so, strictly speaking, God is not the only *sat*.

"Nor must you forget when you call the world a vanity, an empty vanity, because of its transience, impurity, and corruptibility, that there is a limitation here too, beyond which you cannot advance a single step without falling into serious errors. Use the strongest words you please, to indicate its transience and impurity, but remember that though transient, it is still existent, and though corrupt, it is capable of purification, and that it is only with a view to that purification that one is bound to study and meditate what is right and true. You must not forget that our notion of divinity, however intuitive, is educed and fashioned from the exhibition of God's power in the world before us. To deny that world is to deny the premises on which that notion is founded. Our ideas of omnipotence and omniscience likewise pre-suppose the existence of many things as products, in esse or in posse, of an efficient power, and as objects of a searching knowledge. Would it not be absurd to talk of all power and all knowledge, if nothing existed, or was to be done or known? To deny the world is therefore to deny the power and wisdom of God.

"And while you may entertain the highest possible notions of the divine existence, and the lowest possible views of the world's entity, you must avoid the strange inconsistency of identifying the two opposite ideas, and teaching that all this, which is no-thing, is the only thing existent. Such opposites, as Ramanuja very properly says, can never be unified, and, if they could be unified, then Brahma might, alternately, be pronounced

to be false, and the universe, to be true[5]! Nor must you encourage frail and corrupt humanity to say, I am God."

Yogi.—"The frail and corrupt humanity says, 'He is myself and I am He,' because it thereby endeavours to detach itself from the Universe. We say to a person 'thou art He,' because we wish him to meditate on his heaven-born prerogative as an immortal spirit, and to rise above the world. The more he rises above the world, the more is he assimilated to the divine nature."

Satyakáma.—"It is no doubt a grand truth that the more a person rises above the world, the more he approaches the divine essence. But here too there is a limitation beyond which one may fall into the greatest impiety under a semblance of godliness. The human soul, though immortal, is still a creature. It may, by rising above the world, approach, but it can never attain, the divinity. The creature can never rise to be the Creator. The highest aspirations may be entertained, and piously entertained; only they must be short of aspiring after the divinity itself.

"You, Sir, who have left your home, and cut asunder all earthly ties,—you have no doubt taken a step which, under further light from heaven, and with the divine blessing, may guide you unto all truth, and lead you to God. You may thus attain a position hereafter which angels may covet for themselves, and I heartily wish you all spiritual success. But perhaps you will allow me to remark that certain ties are bound up with *duties* to society and to those whom God has placed under our

[5] ये तु कार्य्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं कार्य्यस्य मिथ्यात्वाश्रयेण वर्णयन्ति न तेषां कार्य्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं सिध्यति सत्यमिथ्यार्थयोरैक्यानुपपत्तेः । तथा सति ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वं जगतः सत्यत्वं वा स्यात् ॥ Ramanuja's Sar. Bhas.

protection. Such ties cannot be cut asunder with impunity. And I cannot, under any circumstances, say to you, thou art He—without being guilty of treason against God, nor can you accept such assurance without impiety, and without the greatest self-deception, for you are not, and can never become,—though you may attain the highest state which a creature can attain, yet, I repeat, you can never become—God."

Yogi.—"But what state short of the divinity can be free from transience and impurity? If a high place in heaven be all that we are permitted to aspire after, the reward of knowledge can be little better than that of ignorance. Earth with all its faults is not essentially worse than Indra's palace, one of the highest seats in Heaven."

Satyakáma.—"Heaven, my dear Sir, such as the Puráṇas describe, with the corrupt attendants of Indra, is certainly not a place to be desired. But why shall we accept that corrupt description of the Puraṇas? Why may we not look forward to a heaven, which, as the direct manifestation of God's presence, is itself stable and enduring,—the residence of myriads of immortal souls that have obtained deliverance from earthly troubles, and that are now unceasingly contemplating, admiring, and lauding the divine perfections? Our ancestors used the word *suvarga* for heaven, which meant good company. *Swarga* may have been derived from *suvarga*, as *swarṇa* (gold) is from *suvarṇa.* At any rate why may we not believe that there is a heaven answering to the literal meaning of that word—a good company, a holy company, neither transient nor impure—such as shall endure for eternity?"

The Yogi turned toward the Rajah and said, "Your highness will excuse me, if I leave the discussion of these questions in the hands of your Pundits. Satyakáma's

words, and Rámánuja's sentiments, suggest certain considerations on which I would rather exercise my mind in retirement, than carry on a debate in this assembly. Blessings on the Rajah and his household! Salutation to the Brahmins!" So saying he bowed, and left the room.

A few minutes after the Yogi had thus abruptly left the room, the Rajah said, "The Daṇḍi, you must remember, is a practical pantheist. He seeks to carry out in his life, what Śankara discusses in his book. Our philosophical works are written chiefly by controversialists. They give us no insight into the practical man. Such an insight can only be found in the life and conversation of men like this Yogi."

Satyakáma.—"Please your highness, pantheism appears to be the very antagonist of the practical man. It is a sheer impracticability. It is incapable of being carried out in life. I can only wonder, when I hear of a person exhorting his neighbour to follow the discipline of pantheism. Every teacher that addresses his pupil, *Saumya*, (O gentle youth!), every pupil that addresses his master, *Bho Bhagavan* (O Sir), every author that writes, *iti chen-na* (if this be said, I deny it), every commentator that pleads for his author's texts, every argument in reply to a hostile opinion, every warning and every assurance, is a testimony against pantheism, is a practical protest against the dogma that the universe is God, or that whatever is not Brahma is a phantom—against the theory of *adwaita*, (unity). There could be no teaching, no commentary, no controversy, no lecture, no warning, no assurance, if one only being existed in the universe, and nothing else. The very terms *vyávahárika* and *páramárthika*, which were invented in defence of the system, bear testimony against it, by testifying to the existence of the community in which the vyavahára is found.

Here then we see that every thing, in which human knowledge consists, is opposed to the Vedant, and this means that the Vedant is falsified by every description of proof, admissible in human argument. It is opposed to those things which (Śankara himself being judge[6]) are established by all manner of evidence. The Vedant, in fine, is in conflict with fact and argument. The very texts which set forth the spirituality of God by means of negations, which say he is *without parts, without works, without faults, without spot*[7], prove, by implication, the existence of a world in which there are parts, agencies, faults, and spots. Why otherwise the protest against such things being attributed to the Deity? No one makes a protest against Vishṇu Mitra being taken for a barren woman's son.

"The threefold means which Śankara himself dogmatically sets forth in his *A'tmopades'a* are all conclusive evidences against his own doctrine. 'Pondering the 'Guru's words, 'thou art the Supreme Being, endowed "with such and other attributes,' and receiving the text 'of the Vedas, 'I am God,' having thus in three several 'ways, *i. e.*, by the precept of the guru, by the word of 'God, and by his own contemplation, persuaded himself 'I am God,' he became liberated[8].' If there be the least reality in this esoteric description, it militates against the doctrine of one being, for here three parties are mentioned, the Guru, the pupil, and God. If as all our

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6 See page 300.

7 निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनं ।

8 एतैरन्यैश्च विशेषणैर्विशेषितं परं ब्रह्म त्वमसि इति गुरुवाक्यं स्वा-
नुभवन् ब्रह्माहमस्मीति श्रुतिं गृहीत्वा एवं गुरोराज्ञया एवं देव-
वाक्यतः गुरुतः स्वतः त्रिप्रकारेण ब्रह्माहमस्मीति ज्ञात्वा स मुक्तः ॥

philosophers are agreed, and, as Śankara says also in the catechetical tract I have just named, that ignorance, or bondage, consists in thinking that to be the spirit which is not spirit[9], then that very delusion pervades the text, ('this whole world is a spirit,') which that great Vedantist quotes, and on the strength of which he counsels all who have brought themselves under that delusion, *to act as they please*, and assures them that *no one could impose any prohibitory law on them*[10].

"Your highness may have heard of a vulgar notion among the lower orders of our countrymen, that certain princes (yourself among others) are endowed with the privilege of annually committing one or more homicides (the number being supposed to be specified in your patents from the foreign office) without being called to account. Śankaracharya, however, gives, in his charter of Vedantism, unlimited liberty of action, without reckoning. There it appears a far more terrible privilege than what the peasantry think you to be invested with. But we find it is naturally limited by the restrictive rules of admission to the privileged class. And certainly the standard of qualification for matriculating in the Vedantic College is high enough. The first rule of initiation is renouncement of all desire of enjoyment, here or hereafter. In the catechetical lecture, already cited, Śankara tells us how this qualification is obtained. 'By a lucky chance, 'or by some peculiar merit, a man gets through the cere- 'monial acts enjoined in the Vedas, and thereby his mind

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[9] अनात्मन्यात्मधीर्बन्धः ॥ A'tmopades'a.

[10] त्वमभयं प्राप्तः संसारदुःखान्मुक्तोसीति एतत् सर्वं विश्रब्ध यथेच्छं कुरु * * आत्मैवेदं जगत् सर्वं ज्ञातं येन महात्मना। यदृच्छया वर्तमानं तं निषेद्धुं क्षमेत कः ॥ A'tmopades'a.

'is freed from desires.'[1] Another qualification is *faith* or *confidence* in the words of the guru and the Vedas. Now, I contend, if these rules of initiation be truthful, then the doctrine of one being is necessarily falsified, for they pre-suppose the existence of the guru and of all things which are necessary for the performance of the Vedic ritual; and if the rules are themselves illusory, the Vedantic initiation must itself be an illusion, and if the initiation be false, the indoctrination must be false too— for *he only gets knowledge who has got an áchárya* (tutor)[2]. The Vedant will not allow that its grand consummation can be brought about without a qualified tutor. If there be no áchárya, there can be no teaching, and if the indoctrination is a delusion, the conclusion of this spiritual exercise, *i. e.*, *mukti*, must be the grandest of delusions, and the whole system of Vedantism, all its texts and sayings, its precepts and promises, its áchárya and adhikari (qualified pupil) are therefore built, like a house (as Ramanuja suggests[3]) upon an imaginary mathematical line! But is there such a creature as a real Vedantist to be found any where? Is there any man, *can* there be any person, who seriously thinks he is God, and that all else is false? What does he do with his eyes and ears? Does he see any thing? does he hear any thing? does he feel any thing? A Vedantist, if he cannot answer these questions, has no right to say any thing to any body."

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[1] अकस्मात् कथञ्चित् पुण्यवशाद्वा वेदोदितेनेश्वरार्थं कर्मानुष्ठानेनापगतरागादिमनः ॥ Ibid.

[2] आचार्य्यवान् पुरुषो वेद ॥

आचार्य्याद्धैव विद्या विदिता साधिष्ठं गमयति । Chhándogya.

[3] प्रासादनिर्माणादिवदनुपपन्नैकरेखायामवस्तुभूतायां ।

Rámánuja S'ár. Bhás.

Rajah.—" But to put a historical question,—I did not understand before that the Bhágavatas rejected pantheism, as Satyakáma has just shown from Rámánuja, and Gauḍa-purṇánanda."

Satyakáma.—"Please your highness, I did not mean that all the Bhágavatas rejected pantheism. Rámánuja and his followers alone rejected it, but others, e. g., the Rámánandis, accepted its dogmas. Rámánuja himself held some of the tenets connected with pantheism. Only he would not allow that the universe, or the human soul, was God."

Rajah.—"What pantheistic doctrine then *could* he hold !"

Tarkakáma.—" He allowed that at general dissolutions the world was absorbed in the Divinity, but denied that it could be unified with it. Thus, ' Many flavours of trees, ' there are in honey, but separable from it. How other- ' wise could it remove the three-fold disorders ? Souls, ' in like manner, are absorbed in the Lord at the dissolu- ' tion, but are not unified with Him, for they are again ' separated at the creation. As there is a difference be- ' tween rivers and the sea, between sweet and salt waters, ' so is there a difference between God and souls, because ' of their characteristic distinctions. Rivers, when joined ' with the sea, are not altogether unified with it, though ' they do appear inseparable. There is a real difference ' between salt and sweet waters. Men cannot discrimi- ' nate between milk and water, when the two are mixed ' up, but the swan at once makes out the separation be- ' tween milk and water[4]. In the same manner when ' souls are absorbed in the Supreme Lord, Brahma, at

[4] There is a common saying among the Hindus that if a cup of milk be presented to a swan (hansa), it will take the milky substance alone, leaving out the watery.

'the dissolution, the devout, contemplating the Guru's 'words, can make out the difference. Even milk, when 'mixed with milk, and water with water, do not obtain 'unification, merely because they are supposed to be 'unified. Neither do souls, when absorbed in the Su-'preme Being by virtue of meditation, obtain identity 'with Him. So say all pure-minded saints[5].'"

Satyakáma.—"Another objection of Ramanuja was to the following effect. It apparently militated, however, as much against the idea of an eternal succession of worlds, or ages, and against the eternity of individual souls, as against pantheism. 'It is inconsistent,' says he, 'in the 'asserters of unity to speak of tutor and pupil, and to 'say that some are emancipated, others in bondage, for 'since the succession of ages past is infinite, even if you 'allowed a single case of emancipation in each age, all 'souls must have been already emancipated, and none 'left in bondage. If it be said that souls are also in-'finite, hence there are some still in bondage,—what is 'meant by this infinite? Innumerable, will you say?

[5] नानारसा मधुनि भिन्नतया तरूणां सन्ति त्रिदोषहरणां कथमन्यथा स्यात्। जीवास्तथा भगवति प्रलये विलीना नैक्यं गताः खलु यतः पृथगेव दृष्टौ। नदीसमुद्रयोर्भेदः शुद्धोदलवणादयोः। तथा जीवेश्वरौ भिन्नौ विलक्षणगुणान्वितौ॥ नद्यः समुद्रे मिलिताः समन्तान्नैक्यं गता विभिन्नतया न भान्ति क्षारोदशुद्धोदकयोर्विभेदाद्यास्ते तयोर्वास्तव एव भेदः। दुग्धे तोयं मिलितमपरे नैव पश्यन्ति भेदं हंसस्तावत् सपदि कुरुते क्षीरनीरस्य भेदं। एवं जीवा लयमधि परे ब्रह्मणीशे विलीना भक्ता भेदं विदधति गुरोर्वाक्यमासाद्य सद्यः। दुग्धं दुग्धे जलमपिजले मिश्रितं सर्व्वथा तन्नैकीभूतं नियतमुभयोर्मानसस्यैव यस्मात्। एवं जीवाः परमपुरुषे ध्यानयोगाद्विलीना नैक्यं प्राप्ता विमलमतयः सन्त एवं वदन्ति॥ *Tattwa Muk.*

'That cannot be. For although because of its multiplicity, it appears innumerable to persons of little knowledge, it is capable of being numbered by God who is omniscient. To say He cannot number it, would be to say He is not Omniscient. If you say that souls being themselves innumerable, it is no denial of God's Omniscience to say He does not know a number which does not actually exist, I reply that there cannot be a want of number where things are separable. Souls must have a number, since they are separable like grain, mustard, pots, and cloths[6].'

"Ramanuja contends strenuously against the doctrine of unity, and the arbitrary manner in which its advocates alternately pronounce the universe to be no reality and God. He accordingly exhorted men to renounce the theory of Adwaita, or unity of being, and acknowledge that of *Dwaita*[7]."

Tarkakáma.—"And also to devote themselves to the worship of Hari[8]."

Rajah.—"What then is the point of difference between

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[6] अतः स्वपरभागो बद्धमुक्तशिष्याचार्य्यादिव्यवस्थास्यैकस्याविद्याकल्पिताद्वैतवादिनापि बद्धमुक्तव्यावस्था दुरुपवादा अतीतानां कल्पानामानन्त्यादेकैकस्मिन् कल्प एकैकमुक्तावपि सर्वेषां मोक्षसंभवादमुक्तानुपपत्तेः। अनन्तत्वादात्मनाममुक्ताश्च सन्तीतिचेत् किमिदमनन्तत्वं असंख्येयत्वमितिचेत्। न। भूयस्त्वादल्पज्ञैरसंख्येयत्वेपीश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सांख्येया एव तस्याशक्यत्वे सर्वज्ञत्वं न स्यात्। आत्मनां निःसंख्यत्वादीश्वरस्य अविद्यमानसंख्यावेदनाभावो नासार्वज्ञमावहतीति चेत् भिन्नत्वे संख्याविधुरत्वं नोपपद्यते आत्मानः संख्यावन्तो भिन्नत्वात् माषसर्षपघटपटादिवत्! Ramanuja S'àr. Bhàs.

[7] अद्वैताख्यं मतं विहाय झटिति द्वैते प्रवृत्तो भव। Tattwa Muk.

[8] सोऽहं ज्ञानमिदं भ्रमस्तव भज त्वं पादपद्मं हरेः। Ibid.

the Rámánandis and the Rámánujas? I thought they both united in some common point in opposition to the Vedant."

Tarkakáma.—"Your highness is right. All Bhágavatas, Rámánandis as well as Rámánujas, maintain that God subsists in an eternal body which is His essential form. 'It is heard,' say they, 'in the Puráṇas, that all 'this proceeded from the lotus-navel of God. Hence is 'his body proved, for how could there be a navel without 'a body[9].' Ramanuja thus writes in defence of the doctrine of God's having an eternal corporeal form. He answers the objections brought forward by those, who contended that God could not have a corporeal frame without being subject to growth and decay, pleasure and pain, like animal souls. 'The corporeal frame[10] of the

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[9] श्रुतं पुराणे जगदीश्वरस्य नाभ्यम्बुजात् सर्वमिदं बभूव। शरीरसिद्धिस्तत एव यातो नाभिः कथं हन्त विना शरीरं। Tattwa Muktavali.

[10] नहि जीवस्य शरीरधातुसाम्यवैषम्यनिमित्तं सुखदुःखयोर्भोक्तृत्वं सशरीरत्वकृतं अपितु पुण्यपापरूपकर्मकृतं न ह वै सशरीरस्येत्यपि कर्मारब्धदेहविषयं स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत् क्रीडन् रममाण इति कर्मबन्धविनिर्मुक्तस्याविर्भूतस्वरूपस्य सशरीरस्यैवापुरुषार्थगन्धाभावात् अपहतपाप्मनस्तु परमात्मनः स्थूलसूक्ष्मरूपकृत्स्नजगच्छरीरत्वेपि कर्मबन्धगन्धोनास्तीति नतु नामापुरुषार्थगन्धप्रसङ्गः लोकवत् यथा लोके राजशासनानुवर्तिनां च राजानुग्रहनिग्रहकृतसुखदुःखयोगेपि नसशरीरत्वमात्रेण शासके राज्ञ्यपि शासनानुवृत्त्यतिवृत्तिनिमित्तसुखदुःखयोर्भोक्तृत्वप्रसङ्गः यथाह द्राविडभाष्यकारः यथा लोके राजा प्रचुरदन्दशूकघोरेनर्थसङ्कटेपि प्रदेशे वर्तमानो व्यजनाद्यवधूतदेहो दोषैर्न स्पृश्यते अभिप्रेतांश्च लोकान् परिपिपालयिषति भोगांश्च गन्धादीन् नविश्वजनोपभोग्यान् धारयते तथासौ लोकेश्वरो भ्रमत्स्वसामर्थ्यचामरो दोषैर्न-

'animal soul,' says he, 'is not the real cause of the sound 'or unsound state of its physical system, nor of its liability 'to pleasure or pain. The real cause is the virtuous or 'vicious acts committed by itself. That which is said 'in the Veda, 'the corporeal is not free from pleasure 'and pain,' has reference to the body, received in con- 'sequence of previous acts. But the Veda also speaks, 'elsewhere, of the essential corporeal form of the eman- 'cipated soul, free from the bondage of works. 'He "becomes of one form, or of three forms. If he desire "the world of the *fathers*, he wanders there, eating, "sporting, indulging'. Here there is no smell of evil, or 'vanity. And as to the Supreme Being, free from sins, 'although in his gross and subtle forms, the whole universe 'be His body, still there can be no smell of the bondage 'of works in Him, nor again of any evil or vanity. It is 'as in the world,—the liability to pleasure and pain is not 'owing merely to corporealness on the part of subjects, 'who (the king being himself the ruler,) enjoy or suffer 'from his kindness or severity, according as they submit 'or not to his government. Thus says the Draviḍa com- 'mentator. 'As in the world, when there is a terrific "plague of gnats in the country, the king's body, unceas- "ingly fanned by punkhas, is not affected by the evils, "and he can govern his people at pleasure, and enjoy "perfumes and other good things which his subjects can- "not procure, so also the Lord of the universe (God), "with the *chámara* of his own power in motion, is not "affected by evils, but can protect the various worlds, "and command enjoyments, not within the reach of any "others." Here the Ramanandis and Ramanujas stand

स्पृश्यते रक्षते च लोकान् ब्रह्मलोकादीन् भोगांश्चाविश्वजनोपभोग्यान् धारयति। S'ár. Bhás.-

on common ground. But they soon part company. The Ramanandis assert that God is both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa.* Tulasidasa, one of their own popular poets, strongly inveighs against those, who, like the Ramanujas, reject the theory of *nirguṇa,* or void of qualities[1]. And he thus explains how *saguṇa* and *aguṇa* are reconcileable. 'There 'is no difference between the *saguṇa* and *aguṇa.* Thus 'do the Munis, Puráṇas, sages, and Vedas say. He who 'is void of quality and shape, who is invisible and uncreat'ed, the same becomes joined with qualities out of love 'for His devotees. But how can one who is without 'qualities become joined with qualities? Even as water 'and ice and hailstones are not different substances[2].'"

The orderly now came and said that the Kumar (the Raja's son) was coming with two new friends whom he was desirous of presenting to his highness. The prince entered the room, in a minute or two, prostrated himself before his father, introduced his friends, and then remained standing for several minutes. On the Rajah giving the order, he took a seat with the young Baboos that accompanied him. His highness told them that we had been debating on the doctrines of the Vedant, and gave a summary of what had been advanced on both sides of the question. On hearing the summary, one of the Baboos, A'dhunika by name, made the following remark: "I will not allow that the Vedanta is pantheistic in any sense of the term. I will not undertake to decide

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[1] जिनके अगुणन सगुणबिवेका जल्पहिं कल्पितवचन अनेका ॥ Rámáyaṇa.

[2] सगुणहिं अगुणहिं नहिं कछु भेदा। गावहिं मुनिपुराण बुधवेदा ॥ अगुण अरूप अलख अज जोई। भक्त प्रेमबश सगुण सो होई ॥ जो गुणरहित सगुण सो कैसें। जलहिम उपल बिलग नहिं जैसें ॥

Rámáyaṇa.

whether pantheism is right or wrong. If I do so, I may possibly be pronouncing judgment against some of the brightest intellects of the age. But I can boldly say that the Vedanta does not necessarily partake of either material or spiritual pantheism."

Vaiyasika.—"Do you mean to say that Vyása and S'ankara do not inculcate the identity of the world with God."

Adhunika.—"I do not deny that that is the teaching of Vyasa and S'ankáracharya. How could you suppose for a moment I was ignorant of it. But the Vedanta Dars'ana of Vyása is of no higher authority than 'the Nyáya, 'Sánkhya, or any other Dars'ana, or school of Hindu 'philosophy. The Vedantic school of Vyása maintain 'the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the human soul 'with God, and support their opinion by several citations 'from the Vedas. The Nyáya school admits the distinct 'nature of the soul and maintains its position by citations 'from the same Vedas; to jumble up together the Upa- 'nishads, which are parts of the revealed Vedas, and the 'Vedanta Dars'ana of Vyása, the creation of man, as 'things of equal authority, is not proper[3].' I am not an advocate of the Vedanta founded by Vyása. I am for the system contained in the Upanishads, the pure Vedant. Ours is the old system of the Vedas. Vyása's is of yesterday. We wish to return to the old paths, from which Vyása and S'ankaráchárya had diverged so much. Why do you stare? Has not your highness heard of 'the German reformer Luther'[4]? He maintained that the adherents of the Pope had corrupted the simplicity of the Bible, and he sought to return to the primitive religion. Our aim

[3] "Remarks" on a Lecture on Vedantism by Rev. K. M. Banerjea.

[4] The Reformer Newspaper. It was established more than thirty years ago in Calcutta and professed to be based on the principles of True Vedantism.

is similar. We wish to revert to the original system of the Vedas."

"Is it then your aim, asked Satyakáma, to restore the worship of fire, air, and the heavenly bodies?"

"No, that is contained in the Mantras, and other ceremonial parts of our Sástra. Our system is in the Upanishads."

S.—"Are the Upanishads then older compostions than the Mantras?"

"People are accustomed, said A'dhunika, to call the Vedas eternal. I cannot undertake to say the Upanishads are older than the Mantras."

"The Mantras are written in a language which appears older than that of the Upanishads, are they not?" asked Satyakáma.

A.—"As far as the structure of sentences is concerned, I should say so. But this is not a quite conclusive reason against the popular tradition."

"It would be a conclusive reason, said Satyakáma, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. But I am not particularly desirous of discussing that point with you. You must at any rate acknowledge that the Upanishads are not older than the Mantras."

A.—"I never pretended they were."

S.—"What mean you then by the *old* paths, if the Upanishads be not older than the Mantras."

A.—"I mean that our system is that excellent science which includes all knowledge, even the science of Brahma[5], taught by the first of the gods to his son Atharvan, the science that is distinguished by the appellation of *pará*, the eminent."

[5] ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सम्बभूव विश्वस्य कर्त्ता भुवनस्य गोप्ता। स ब्रह्मविद्यां सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठामथर्व्वाय ज्येष्ठपुत्राय प्राह॥ Muṇḍaka.

S.—"Then you acknowledge the mythological pantheon. You say, the first of the gods."

A.—"We acknowledge it so far as to believe that the worship of the sun and fire and other gods, together with the whole allegorical system, was only inculcated for the sake of those whose limited understandings rendered them incapable of comprehending and adoring the Invisible Supreme Being, so that such persons might not remain in a brutified state, destitute of all religious principles.[6]"

S.—"Allegorical instruction, I thought, was intended for the wise. Illiterate people of little judgement require plain teaching. But you seem to think that the vulgar would benefit by idolatrous doctrine. I cannot conceive how idolatrous doctrine or practice can lead to good results. You would not cure high treason by teaching men to render allegiance to a pretender. But to return to our subject. The same Upanishad speaks of an *apara*, or inferior science too, does it not?"

A.—"Yes, the Ṛich, Yajus, Sáman, and Atharvan, with grammar, versification, astronomy, are the inferior science[7]."

S.—"The two must have been simultaneously communicated at the creation, for the Vedas, they say, are eternal."

A.—"God provided two kinds of doctrine for the wise and the unwise."

S.—"Which classes did not exist at the time, for there was only one spirit and nothing else in the beginning."

A.—"But God foreseeing that there would be wise and unwise in the world, might have made provision for the mental improvement of both."

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6 "Vedantic doctrines vindicated."

7 See Note 5; page 274.

S.—"That is to say, breathed out the Upanishads for the one, and the other Vedas for the other."

"It might be so," said A'dhunika."

Satyakáma.—"Was it as a punishment for folly and a reward for wisdom that He gave the two different sorts of books? or was it that the unwise could not comprehend the sublimity of the Upanishads, and therefore were left to grope their way through the other Vedas?"

A.—"They were not fit for the lessons contained in the Upanishads. They could not appreciate the purity of our doctrine, and rather than that they should remain without any guide at all, the Vedas were given to them out of compassion for their weakness. They were allowed to indulge in carnal observances and *mantras* until they should be wiser."

S.—"But the Upanishads, too, contain descriptions, not only of carnal observances, but also of obscenities, still worse than Jayadeva's *battles of love.*"

A.—"There are a few such passages, but we pass them over."

S.—"Not a few passages, but rather a large sprinkling of obscenities in some of them. But waiving the questions which your remark suggests, I will simply ask, is not the following a portion of the excellent knowledge revealed at the beginning, as your Upanishads will have it? 'As a spider projects and receives back (his web), 'as herbs grow in the earth, as from a living person the 'hairs of the head and body, so from the Imperishable is 'the universe produced[8]'."

Adhunika.—"Yes, the Muṇḍaka Upanishad says so, and a sublime conception it is."

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[8] यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः सम्भवन्ति यथा सतः पुरुषात् केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात् सम्भवतीह विश्वम् ॥ Muṇḍaka

Satyakáma.—"It may be a sublime conception, but the transition is easy from the sublime to something very different. Does not the passage savour of the gross pantheism which you said was a corruption of the Vaiyásika Vedant?"

A.—"It does not necessarily involve pantheism."

S.—"No! I do not see how I can derive any sound doctrine from that passage. But what do you think of the celebrated text, 'All this is God.'"

"That, said A'dhunika, should be understood as an 'effusion of fervid devotion, when contemplating the 'omnipresence of the Diety'[9]."

S.—"Whose fervid devotion? I thought you held that the Upanishads, in common with the other Vedas, were revealed by God himself at the creation. It is impossible to conceive that God would make an overstatement of the fact, from any feeling, which, however natural to men, would in Him be unaccountable.

"But, continued Satyakáma, that one passage is not all. The Upanishads abound with texts declaring that God is the one spirit, the substance of which the universe is composed, that the creation is but a multiplication and development of Himself. That the world is to Him what froth is to the sea, the butter to the milk, the web to the spider, the cloth to the yarn. This is systematically taught from beginning to end. The air is God. The food is God. The mind is God. The vital air is God[10]."

Rajah.—"Is it fair to cull such detached texts to serve a particular purpose? You do not surely mean that the Upanishads set up the air or food as God."

Satyakáma.—"The Upanishads, please your highness,

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9 "Remarks &c."

10 नमस्ते वायो त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्म । अन्नं ब्रह्म । प्राणो ब्रह्म । मनो ब्रह्म ॥

cannot be taken as the works of the same author, or even as productions of the same age. With this single exception that each inculcates pantheism of one sort or another, the scope of no two of them can be considered precisely the same. Some of them appear to speculate, much after the fashion of development philosophers, on the physical primeval element of the universe, and whatever is for the moment taken as a first principle, is declared or be Brahma or God. The *Taittiriya*, for instance, gives the following definition of Brahma or God: 'That 'from which these elements are produced, by which, 'being produced, they exist, and into which, at dissolution, 'they are resolved, is Brahma or God.' Giving this definition of Divinity, the Upanishad goes on to show that it is applicable to food, to the vital air, to the mind, to *vijṇána* (knowledge), and to *ánanda* (joy), and repeats, in turns, that the production and final resolution of the universe may be traced to all those five principles[1]. The same Upanishad speaks, elsewhere, of the production of ether 'from that or this Spirit', and from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth herbs, from herbs food, from food *retas*, from *retas* the *purusha* (personal soul), which is pronounced to be *annarasamaya* (all food.) It is then added 'those who

[1] अन्नाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। अन्नेन जातानि जीवन्ति। अन्नं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। * * प्राणाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। प्राणेन जातानि जीवन्ति। प्राणं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। * * मनसो ह्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। मनसा जातानि जीवन्ति। मनः प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। * * विज्ञानाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। विज्ञानेन जातानि जीवन्ति। विज्ञानं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति। * * आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति॥

worship food as God, obtain all food,' and that 'all creatures are produced from food.' The Upanishad proceeds to say that from the soul which is all food, another, the inner spirit, is produced, which is *práṇamaya* (all vital air), thence again, *manomaya* (all mind), thence *vijnana-maya* (all knowledge), thence *ananda-maya* (all joy)[2]. Vyasa and Śankara thought that passages such as these could not be explained except on the pantheistic theory."

"All seemingly pantheistic passages, said Adhunika, must be so interpreted as to be consistent with other texts expressly declaring the unity of God, and His distinction from the world."

S.—"It was in trying to reconcile the texts in question with the unity of God, that Vyasa was led to Pantheism. The other idea of His distinction from the world forced Vyasa's successors to the necessity of denying the reality of that world. If you can interpret the texts to which I have referred, without either identifying the world with God, or denying its reality, you will achieve an exploit which no Vedantist, from Vyasa to Sadananda downwards, had been able to accomplish. But what are the texts, pray, which expressly declare the unity of God, and His distinction from the world?"

[2] तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः। आकाशाद्वायुः। वायोरग्निः। अग्नेरापः। अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। पृथिव्या ओषधयः। ओषधीभ्योऽन्नं। अन्नाद्रेतः। रेतसः पुरुषः। स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः। * * सर्वं वैतेऽन्नमाप्नुवन्ति। येऽन्नं ब्रह्मोपासते। * * तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्नरसमयात्। अन्योऽन्तरात्मा प्राणमयः। तस्माद्वा एतस्मात्प्राणमयात्। अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात्। अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः। तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात्। अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः॥

A.—"As to the unity of God, you have our celebrated formula, which we inscribe on our solemn documents, and with which we conclude our devotions: *Ekamevádwitiyam*—'God is one only without a second.'"

S.—"The word 'God' does not occur in the passage."

A.—"No, but it is understood; you must supply the ellipsis."

"We shall see, said Satyakáma, how the ellipsis is to be supplied; but you, who are so jealous of corrupt criticisms of the Upanishads, ought to be careful how *you* construe your sacred books. Give us the whole passage, where the formula occurs, and we shall then be able intelligently to consider what the ellipsis is."

A.—"This, O gentle (pupil), was even an entity at the beginning, one without a second[3]."

"How then, asked Satyakáma, can you, as a matter of course, interpolate the word 'God' here. The subject is 'this' (idam); is it not?"

A.—"Of course."

S.—"Well; to what does the word *this*, in the neuter gender, generally refer in the language of the Upanishads? Is it not to the visible universe?"

"I cannot say readily, answered Adhunika, to what it generally refers, but I should say there can be no doubt it refers to God *here.*"

"Is not the passage you quoted the solution of a question which had been disputed? Give us the whole paragraph."

A.—"'This, O gentle (pupil), was even existent at the 'beginning, one only without a second. Some say, in-'deed, this was even non-existent at the beginning, one 'only without a second: hence out of a non-existent an 'existent may be begotten. But how, O gentle (pupil),

[3] सत्त्वेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम् । Chhándogya.

'can this be? He said, how out of a non-existent can an 'existent be begotten? This, O gentle (pupil), was even 'an entity at the beginning, one without a second'".[4]

"You will find it difficult, said Satyakáma, to maintain that the word *this* refers to God, throughout the passage without involving pantheism. No one that acknowledged a God would doubt His existence at the beginning. S'ankara's commentary is perfectly intelligible. He understands 'this' to refer to the visible world, and the question to be whether the world was existent or non-existent at the beginning, *i. e.*, before the creation. The Upanishad decides that the Universe was existent in its material cause (God), and was thus one without a second at the beginning,—it being, as the commentator adds, a protest against the Sankhya, which inculcated two eternal principles, Nature and Soul, and against the Vais'eshika, which assumed the eternity of innumerable Atoms. And thus the very text in which your community reposes so much confidence, which is exalted into a formula to express its characteristic doctrine, is inexplicable except in a pantheistic sense. I do not think you will contend for the possibility of considering God as the material cause of the world without countenancing pantheism."

Adhunika.—"But there is a passage, the very first verse in the Aitareya Upanishad, in which the Spirit Himself is called *one.*"

Satyakáma.—"I fear that passsge will give you no better help. It reads thus; 'This was a spirit, even one,

[4] सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाऽद्वितीयं तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायेत कुतस्तु खलु सौम्यैवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति सत्त्वेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं । Chhandogya.

at the beginning[5].' You must remember that *idam* (this) is in the neuter gender, and therefore cannot as an adjective pronoun, belong to *atma* (spirit) in the masculine. *Idam* must be the subject, *atma* the predicate. I am afraid you will find this passage even more pantheistic than the one from the Chhandogya. It directly pronounces the external world to have been, at the beginning, one only spirit, from which it was afterwards evolved in its present form."

A.—"But what say you to the following beautiful passage from the Muṇḍaka; 'Know him, the spirit, to be one. Give up all words contrary to this. This is the bridge of immortality'[6]."

S.—"It is in itself, and as you have translated it, certainly a beautiful passage. But take it in connection with what precedes and what follows, and the beauty will very soon disappear. The preceding clause is, 'In Him are placed the heaven, the earth, the sky, the mind, with all the vital airs[7]' And that which follows your quotation is; 'In whom the arteries are collected like spokes at the nave of a carriage-wheel. He moves inside, becoming variously affected'[8] That *one spirit* of yours is thus identified with the human soul, for that which is variously affected within a person can be nothing else than his soul."

Adhunika.—"You cannot explain away every passage expressive of the unity of God. There are scores of texts

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[5] आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । Aitareya.

[6] तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ अमृतस्यैष सेतुः ॥ Muṇḍaka.

[7] अस्मिन् द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः ॥

[8] अरा इव रथनाभौ संहता यत्र नाड्यः स एषोऽन्तश्चरते बहुधा जायमानः । Muṇḍaka.

in the Śwetaśwatara Upanishad which cannot be interpreted in a pantheistic sense."

Satyakáma.—"I doubt very much whether the Swetaśwatara will give you any substantial help. It contains passages as decidedly pantheistic as any other Upanishad, and if you can light on detached stray passages, declaratory of the unity of God, it will not in any way decide the question between us. Unity is not only not opposed, but is actually necessary, to the idea of pantheism. It is the one God with whom all things visible and invisible are identical, that forms the essence of Pantheism.

"If however the Swetaśwatara bears any testimony against Pantheism, it is in those two celebrated texts which the followers of the Sankhya philosophy are so fond of citing, and in which a duality of principle appears to be inculcated. You cannot derive from it any sound lesson on divinity, not only because two or three texts must in ordinary justice be made to yield to the majority of passages which are indisputably for pantheism, but also because the acknowledgement of two eternal principles will be no less subversive of a pure monotheism than the identification of the world with God could be.

"If your opinions do not preclude a critical examination of the Upanishads, I should say that the Swetaśwatara appears, prima facie, to be of a much-later date than the others. It is, I may say, in some respects, a Sankhya Upanishad, either composed, or corrupted, at a more recent period by the followers of that school. It not only speaks of an uncreated female principle, red, white, and black, producing many creatures connatural with itself, and thus presenting the very picture of the *prakṛiti* of the Sankhya; but it also makes highly honourable mention of Kapila, and sets forth the excellence of the Sankhya

Yoga.[9] 'He who being one resides from generation to 'generation in various forms and in all productions, first 'filled the Ṛishi Kapila His son with knowledge and be- 'held him born'.[10]

"Another proof of the S'wetas'watara being a more recent Upanishad than the others is found in its constant repetition of the names which the followers of S'iva have set apart for their favourite god. Is'ana, Rudra, S'iva, Giris'anta, Giritra Mahes'wara, Bhava may, most of them, it is true, be construed as appellatives, and may not necessarily be proper names; but the coincidence of so many epithets, popularly expressive of the god S'iva, in the same Upanishad, leads to the suspicion that the S'aiva sect had something to do with its composition. The mystic union of Prakṛiti and Purusha, inculcated in the Sankhya philosophy, is the foundation of the mythological legends of S'iva, whose characteristic is the lingum, and of Parviti, the personification of female energy. And this union of S'iva and Parvati is also hinted at in the S'wetas'watara.

"But whatever be your opinion of the origin of that Upanishad, certain it is, it will afford no harbour for any thing like sound theology. It is a compound of Vedant pantheism and of the Sankhya duality. It is difficult to say which ingredient is the worse of the two. The one identifies the world with God. The other sets up an eternal female principle producing the world in connection with the soul *(Purusha)* or the male principle. You cannot get a good monotheistic passage, free, on the one hand from pantheism, and, on the other, from the idea of duality, just mentioned.

[9] तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाधिगम्यं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः ॥

[10] ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्विभर्त्ति जायमानञ्च पश्येत् ॥

"Nor can a few monotheistic passages explain away the vast number that are pantheistic. God may have been, in a few solitary texts, declared to be distinct from the world, and free from the impurity attached to matter, and yet those texts may be perfectly consistent with others in which the world is pronounced to be consubstantial with Him. In order to enunciate Pantheism, one must have a subject, which may exist in mental analysis distinct from that which is its predicate. Two ideas may, at first, be separately conceived, and then pronounced to be identical. When the Upanishad says, 'all this is God,' the subject 'all this' may have been originally presented to the writer's mind as distinct from the predicate 'God,' and then he may have determined that *all this*, which was before and around him, was *God*. Unless you can make out that there is no real identification of the subject and predicate, no real declaration that Brahma is himself the *Prakṛiti*, passages merely expressive of their distinctness can have no force in overruling texts decidedly pantheistic. Then again you must not argue on the supposition that we are agreed as to the divine authority of the Vedas. I am not bound to interpret them in an unnatural way, merely that I may maintain their consistency. You may feel yourself under such a necessity, but until you can demonstrate their divine inspiration by satisfactory evidence, no such necessity can be laid upon *me*. Fair criticism, which is due to all ancient writings, is due to the Vedas and Upanishads too. It is of course opposed to the rules of fair criticism not to consider the end and scope of a writer, or any peculiar idiom which may be observable in his works. It would be unjust and improper hastily to conclude that the works are self-contradictory, or recklessly to interpret texts without taking into account how far they may be be consistent with one another. But you can

not call upon me to submit to unnatural rules of interpretation with the sole object of proving the doctrine of one Upanishad to be consistent with that of any other, so that there may be no theory in the Muṇḍaka contradictory to the lessons of the S'wetás'watara; for you have not yet shown that the Upanishads have all the same paternity. Nor can you require me to surrender my private judgment before you have proved that the Vedas are of divine authority. I conceive I may undertake to say that you have no external proof to bring forward in behalf of such authority."

A'dhunika.—"We do not pretend to bring forward such proofs[1]. There are no historical records in our country. You cannot expect such proofs. But the internal evidence which the *real* doctrines of the Vedas afford ought to satisfy a reasonable inquirer of their divine authority."

Satyakáma.—"That evidence cannot be admitted at least before the Vedas are acquitted of the charge of pantheism, now under consideration. Passages really pantheistic cannot, I say, be overruled by texts, merely setting forth a distinction between God and the world. The pantheism I am charging on the Upanishads does not imply that God and the universe are one in such a sense as that it would be a truism to say, 'All this is God.' That pantheism is inculcated in three different ways: *first*, by teaching that God is the material cause of the world: *Secondly*, by maintaining that the soul and the universe are consubstantial with God; *thirdly* by asserting that

[1] "The Vaids having existed from a time when Indian literature and indeed all "literature, was only (as it were) in a state of germination, it is impossible to prove "the divine origin of these sacred books by any historical testimonies, the value of "which was not understood at the time." *Vaidantic doctrines vindicated.*

he who knows God is absorbed in, and identified with, Him.

"The Upanishads clearly inculcate that God is the material cause (call it substantial, if you prefer it) of the world. That from which a thing is produced and into which it is resolved is called its material cause. The following texts will prove the teaching of your Vedas on this point:

'Brahma is he from whom all these elements are produced, and into which they are resolved[2].'

'As the spider projects its web, as small sparks proceed from fire, so from this Spirit are produced all animals, all worlds, all gods, all creatures[3].'

'As a water bubble, when cast into the water, is resolved into water, so that no one can restore it; whencesoever it be taken, it will be saline; so this great being (in yourself), which has neither end nor limit, will be resolved into the solid aggregate of knowledge (God)[4]."

'This God of all, this omniscient, this in-goer, this origin or womb of all, is the source and resolution of creatures[5].'

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[2] यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते * * यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति तद्ब्रह्म ॥ Taittiriya.

[3] स यथोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनोच्चरेद्यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति ॥ Bṛihad.

[4] स यथा सैन्धवखिल्य उदके प्रास्त उदकमेवानुविलीयेत नहास्योद्ग्रहणायेव स्यात् यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एव । Bṛihad.

[5] एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानां Máṇḍukya.

'This was in the beginning one, even Brahma[6].'

'This was in the beginning a spirit, even one[7].'

'This was in the beginning a spirit like a male person[8].'

'This is the truth, As from a blazing fire consubstan-'tial sparks proceed thousand-fold, so from the Imperish-'able, O gentle pupil, diverse entities are produced, and 'they return into him too[9].'

'He desired, Let me become many—let me be produ-'ced. He conceiving knowledge created all this. Having created it, He got into it[10].'

'He observed, Let me become many, let me be produced[1].'"

A'dhunika.—"The text, 'Let me become many, let me be produced,' is only in accommodation to our ancient conventional *idea* that the father is begotten in the son[2]."

Satyakáma.—"I thought your opinion was that the *Upanishads were given by God at the creation*, before con-

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[6] ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव ॥ [7] आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीदेकएव Brihad.

[8] आत्मवेदमग्र आसीत् पुरुषबिधः ॥ Ibid.

[9] तदेतत्सत्यं यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गाः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सारूपाः तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सोम्य भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापि यन्ति ॥ Mundaka.

[10] सोऽकामयत वहुस्यां प्रजायेयातः स तपोऽतप्यत स तपस्तप्त्वा इदं विश्वमसृजत यदिदं किञ्च तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । Tait.

[1] तदैक्षत वहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति । Chhándogya.

[2] This is the way in which the Neo-Vedantists endeavour to explain away the passage given in Note 1, "The text वहुस्यां प्रजायेय does not mean, as the Revd. "gentleman asserts, that God has been many, and that the objects of the universe "are of the same substance with God. It is a conventional thought peculiar to "ancient Sanscrit writings to consider the Creator himself as born in his creation, "as for example आत्मा वा जायते पुत्रः *Veda.* As a man's self is born in his son, "yet remains distinct from him, so God, having created man and the world, remains "distinct from them." *Remarks* &c.

ventional idioms could be formed. It seems your mind is far from being *saturated* with that belief. I see you involuntarily treat it as an ordinary work, and reason from its style as a 'creation of man.'"

A'dhunika.—"May not an inspired work be characterized by particular idioms?"

Satyakáma.—"If composed by a mortal under divine direction, it may still bear traces of the writer's idiom and style: but if it were revealed at the creation, before idiom and style could be formed, it must be independent of such human peculiarities."

"We do not receive, said A'dhunika, nor do we literally interpret the fable respecting the revelation of the Vedas at the time of the creation."

Satyakáma.—"But the fable is contained in the Vedas themselves. The S'wetás'watara says, that God revealed the Vedas at the creation. How can you receive the Vedas as the word of God if you reject that fable? But as regards the passage under consideration, you cannot prove that the conventional idea you speak of really existed at any time. The father is indeed said to be born in the son; that is because the latter is of the substance of the former. But no writer ever said that the potter was begotten in the jar. On your own confession, then, the text teaches that the world is *consubstantial* with God, —which is the second characteristic of pantheism taught in the Upanishads. That this characteristic is prominently inculcated will be apparent from the following passages:

'This was nonentity in the beginning; then was entity produced. It made itself[3].'

"If the Upanishad is not inculcating the atheistic

[3] असद्वै इदमग्र आसीत् ततो वै सदजायत तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत ॥
Tait.

dogma of Kapila, that nature made itself into the form of the universe, the obvious meaning is that the world is a formation of Brahma, and is consubstantial with Him.

'As the one fire having entered into the world became 'diversified in form, so the one spirit pervading all crea-'tures, inside and outside, becomes many forms. As 'the one air having entered into the world became diver-'sified in form, so the one spirit pervading all creatures, 'inside and outside, becomes various forms[4].'

"The Chhándogya teaches the relation, in which the world stands to God, thus: 'As, O gentle pupil, by means 'of one clod of earth, every earthy form is known, being 'in truth only earth, though called in words a modifi-'cation, and as, O gentle pupil, by means of one magnet 'every magnetized iron becomes known, being in truth 'only iron, though called in words a modification, and 'as by one nail-parer every black iron, is known, being 'in truth only black iron, though called in words a 'modification; so is the doctrine I delivered[5].' Then follows the assertion of one original principle which was multiplied into many. Connect the above passages with

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[4] अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो वभुव एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो वहिश्च वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो वभूव एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो वहिश्च। Kaṭha.

[5] यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं यथा सोम्यैकेन लोहमणिना सर्वं लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं लोहमित्येव सत्यं यथा सोम्यैकेन नखनिकृन्तनेन सर्वं कार्ष्णायसं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारोनामधेयं कृष्णायसमित्येव सत्यं एवं सोम्य स आदेशो भवतीति।

Chhándogya.

the text, 'All this is God,' and the meaning of the Upanishad can no longer admit of doubt. Again,

'Here all these become one[6].'

'This universe is even Purusha (or a male person)[7].'

'All this is Brahma. This spirit is Brahma. This spirit is four footed, [has four quarters[8].]'

"Equally decisive of Pantheism are those passages which declare that the student is unified with God on attaining to the knowledge of Brahma. Nay sometimes he is identified with God even before fulness of knowledge. 'He that knows God becomes God.' 'He is a spirit. Thou art he, O S'wetaketu[9].' This is given as a sort of refrain, and is repeated nine times in the Chhándogya.

'I am Brahma'.[10] 'Whoever knows this, I am 'Brahma, he knows this all. Even the gods are unable 'to prevent his becoming Brahma[1].'

'As flowing rivers are resolved into the sea, losing 'their names and forms, so the learned, freed from name 'and form, get into the heavenly and super-excellent 'Spirit. He who knows that supreme Brahma becomes 'Brahma[2]'.

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6 अत्र ह्येते सर्व्वे एकं भवन्ति । Bṛihad.

7 पुरुष एवेदं विश्वं Muṇḍaka.

8 सर्वं ह्येतद्ब्रह्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोयमात्मा चतुष्पात् । Muṇḍaka.

9 एतदात्म्यमिदं सर्व्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो । Chhándogya.

10 अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति । Bṛihad.

1 य एवं वेदाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्व्वं भवति तस्य ह न देवाश्च नाभूत्या ईशते । Bṛihad.

2 यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यं। स योह्वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति । Muṇḍ.

'The knowers of Brahma, understanding the difference 'here, are resolved into Brahma, being bent on Him and 'freed from birth. He who sees this by true devotion is 'received into the Spirit, even as oil is in sesamum seed, 'butter in curds, water in streams, and fire in the flint[3].'

'Where there is something like duality, there one may 'see the other, one may smell the other, one may hear 'the other, one may honour the other, one may regard 'the other, one may know the other; but where the 'whole of this is one spirit, there whom and by what 'can one smell? whom and by what can one see? whom 'and by what can one hear? whom and by what can one 'honour? whom and by what can one regard? whom 'and by what can one know[4]?' 'That is his excellent 'state in which he thinks, I am all[5].'

"The Bṛihadáraṇyaka again contains the following catechetical lecture:

'Ushasta asked Yájṇawalkya, Declare to me the all-pervading spirit, 'who is manifestly and perceptibly, Brahma.

'Yájnawalkya answered, This thy spirit is all-pervading.

'*U.* Which is that all-pervader, Yájnawalkya?

'*Y.* The same who performs the physical functions of the five vital 'airs. This thy spirit is the all-pervader.

'*U.* This is like an evasive description of the cow or the horse. Tell me which is the all-pervading spirit, manifestly and perceptibly, Brahma.

'*Y.* Your spirit is the all-pervader.

'*U.* Which is that all-pervader, Yájnawalkya?

'*Y.* Look not at him who sees through sight, hear not him who hears 'through the hearing, think not of him who thinks through thinking,

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[3] अत्रान्तरं ब्रह्मविदो विदित्वा लीना ब्रह्मणि तत्परा योनिमुक्ताः। तिलेषु तैलं दधिनीव सर्पिरापः स्रोतःस्वरणीषु चाग्निः एवमात्मनि गृह्यतेऽसौ सत्येनैनं तपसा योऽनुपश्यति । S'wetás'watara.

[4] See note 7 page 381.

[5] सर्वोऽस्मीति मन्यते सोऽस्य परमो लोकः। Bṛihad.

'know not him who knoweth through knowing. This thy spirit is all-'pervader. The rest is subject to decay[6].'

"I need not stop to remark on the meaning of some of these antitheses, on which even eminent commentators are not agreed; but no one dissents from the obvious construction of the identity of the querist with the Supreme Being. Another inquirer is introduced, Kahola, by name, asking precisely the same questions, and he is answered in a similar manner, that his spirit was the all-pervader, 'that is above hunger and thirst, grief, anxiety and death[7].' Eventually Yájnawalkya says to the querist Uddálaka:

'This thy spirit which, remaining in earth, is different from the earth, 'which the earth itself does not know, whose body is the earth, which, 'being within, directs the earth, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit 'which, remaining in water, is different from water, which the water 'itself does not know, whose body is the water, which, being within, 'directs the water, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, 'remaining in fire, is different from fire, which the fire itself does not

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[6] अथ हैनमुषस्तश्चाक्रायणः पप्रच्छ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरस्तं मे व्याचक्ष्व इत्येष त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरः कतमो याज्ञवल्क्य सर्व्वान्तरो यः प्राणेन प्राणिति स त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरो योऽपानेनापानिति स त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरो यो व्यानेन व्यानिति स त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरो य उदानेनोदानिति स त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तर एष त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरः ॥

स होवाचोषस्तश्चाक्रायणो यथा विब्रूयादसौ गौरसावश्व इत्येवमेवैतद्व्यपदिष्टं भवति यदेव साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरस्तं मे व्याचक्ष्वेत्येष त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरः कतमो याज्ञवल्क्य सर्व्वान्तरः।

नदृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न श्रुतेः श्रोतारं शृणुयार्न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः।

एष त आत्मा सर्व्वान्तरोऽतोऽन्यदार्त्तं ॥

[7] योऽशनायापिपासे शोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युमत्येति ॥

'know, whose body is the fire, which, being within, directs the fire, is 'the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, remaining in ether, is 'different from ether, which the ether itself does not know, whose body 'is the ether, which, being within, directs the ether, is the immortal 'In-goer. This thy spirit which, remaining in air, is different from the 'air, which the air itself does not know, whose body is the air, which, being 'within, directs the air, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, 'remaining in heaven, is different from heaven, which the heaven itself does 'not know, whose body is heaven, which, being within, directs the heaven, 'is the immortal In-goer[8].'

"It is not necessary to quote the whole of this long passage in which the querist's spirit (in common, adds the commentator, with that of every other man) is declared to be the immortal In-goer, pervading all things, the sun, the cardinal points, the moon and the stars, the firmament, darkness, light, the vital air, speech, the eye, the ear, the mind, the skin, knowledge, the *retas* itself being expressly included in the list.—The same spirit of the querist, is, in conclusion, pronounced to be 'the seer, though 'unseen, the hearer, though unheard, the thinker, though 'unthought of, the knower, though unknown, there being

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[8] यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ३ ॥

योऽप्सु तिष्ठन्नद्भ्योऽन्तरो यमापो न विदुर्यस्यापः शरीरं योऽपोऽन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्य्याम्यमृतः ॥ ४ ॥ योऽग्नौ तिष्ठन्नग्नेरन्तरो यमग्निर्न वेद यस्याग्निः शरीरं योऽग्निमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ५ ॥ योऽन्तरिक्षे तिष्ठन्नन्तरिक्षादन्तरो यमन्तरिक्षं न वेद यस्यान्तरिक्षं शरीरं योन्तरिक्षमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्य्याम्यमृतः ॥ ६ ॥ यो वायौ तिष्ठन्वायोरन्तरो यं वायुर्न वेद यस्य वायुः शरीरं यो वायुमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्य्याम्यमृतः ॥ ७ ॥ यो दिवि तिष्ठन्दिवोऽन्तरो यं द्यौर्न वेद यस्य द्यौः शरीरं यो दिवमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्य्याम्यमृतः ॥

'no other seer, no other hearer, no other thinker, no other 'knower[9].'

"The preceding passages are so significant that I cannot conceive how any one can doubt their meaning. They indisputably inculcate a compound of material and mystical pantheism. Had there been the least ambiguity in them, I might have understood your anxiety to give them the benefit of the doubt. The texts I have cited are however so pointed, that I am unable to enter into your feelings."

A'dhunika.—"Will you not accord to us the same liberty of interpretation that you claim for yourself. We choose to construe them consistently with pure monotheism. What is the use of telling us we are bad interpreters? What is your object? Is it to convert us to pantheism, or to read us lectures on philology."?

Satyakáma.—"Neither. My object is to enter a protest against assumptions calculated, on the one hand, to pervert historical truths, and, on the other hand, to circulate wrong ideas on the teaching of the Vedas. If you abjure pantheism, while accepting the Upanishads, your renouncement of a gross error must be a subject of congratulation, but your adherence to books, which teach that error and do not contain the true word of God, cannot but be a cause of anxiety."

Here A'dhunika paused for a moment, when the Kumára, finding he could speak without interrupting any party, said to his father, that he had come to ask permission for amusing himself with the *khas* billiard table for half

[9] अदृष्टो द्रष्टाऽश्रुतः श्रोताऽमतोमन्ताऽविज्ञातो विज्ञाता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योतोऽस्ति विज्ञातैष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यम्तोऽन्यदार्त्तं ॥

an hour. "You need not," said his highness, "have waited for permission, my only liquidater of debts to ancestors! You may go into that amusement-room, whenever and with whomsoever you please. I am only too glad to find you have a taste for such manly exercises. But stop for one moment. I wish you to write down what presents are to be made to my learned friends, who attended your sister's wedding-party, and have since been with me from yesterday."

The Kumára pulled out a golden pencil from his pocket and wrote out an order on the Dewan of the Household. The Rajah, without stopping to read the list, ordered it to be taken to the Dewan.

While the Kumára's autograph was on its way to the royal Wardrobe *(Toshakhana)* and the Treasury, we were in pleasant expectation of what was coming, (I may at least confess for myself). Ágamika, however, could not, when the Kumára had left the room with his young friends, suppress his astonishment at the view which Ádhunika had taken of the Vedant. Vaiyásika said, "The Baboo belongs to the new school initiated by Rammohun Roy. But Ádhunika has evidently been absent from the Head-quarters of his own school longer than myself, for, when I was there last, I noticed that the divine authority of the Vedas and Upanishads had been given up as a false idea! The Bráhma-dharma was now inculcated as *sahaja-jnána*, or simple natural theology."

Rajah.—"Is it possible they have changed again? The school commenced with the acknowledgement of all the śástras,—Puránas, Smṛitis, as well as Vedas. At least Rammohun Roy did not avowedly reject any of them, though he did not follow the orthodox interpretation. In his preface to the Iśopanishad he admitted the authority of the whole body of our śástras. His successors set aside

the Smṛiti and the Purâṇas, and adhered to the Vedas alone. And now they have given up the Upanishads too! Why a learned writer claimed consideration for those writings on the very ground of their finding acceptance in Bengal[10]."

Scarcely had his highness finished these words when a number of servants, dressed in diverse colours, entered the room with silver trays, shawls, silks, and gold coins. Each of us received a tray with a pair of costly Cashmere shawls, silk dhooties, and twenty pieces of gold coin. Laden with these gifts we took leave of the Rajah, wishing him a long life of health and prosperity.

[10] 'But the challenger cannot claim the choosing of the ground, and the Missionary who heartily seeks the conversion of these men will seek it vainly if he shirk 'the task, however irksome, of exploring the field where alone the Vedantists of 'modern Bengal will consent to be found. He must try to take accurate account of 'the Upanishads; that is to say, he must not content himself with picking out a few 'of the passages which are most open to ridicule, but he must endeavour candidly to 'understand what it is, in these treatises, that *satisfies* the modern thinkers of Ben-'gal.' *Ballantyne's Christianity contrasted with Hindu philosophy, p.* 51.

DIALOGUE X.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

I told you in my last how we returned home from the Rajah's, laden with presents. We were all happy and cheerful with the single exception of A'gamika, who appeared to be labouring under some inward perturbation. None asked him any questions at the time, but I called the day after, to inquire after his health. "I am quite well," said he,—"physically, but feel rather unhappy at the progress of sceptical sentiments. Even the new class of Vedantists have given up the divine authority of the Upanishads. What is all this leading to? Is it possible for human society to keep together for a single century without the discipline and direction of God's word?"

The good Brahmin was talking after this fashion when Satyakáma came in, also to make friendly enquiries. A'gamika turned to him, and, after some desultory observations on the Vedant controversy, said: "I cannot help complaining, Satyakáma, that you have not been dealing fairly with Vyása and S'ankaráchárya. You have been forcing them to submit to an ordeal against which they have often protested. They do not pretend to base their doctrine on the suggestions of reason. If they had done so, perhaps I might have joined you to a certain extent in finding fault with their deductions. But their appeal is to the Vedas, the

eternal and infallible Vedas, which were co-eval with the creation. As the productions of Brahma's wisdom, they contain truths which it would an act of profaneness to gainsay. For every doctrine contained in the *Uttara Mimánsá*, S'ankarácharya has adduced ample proof from the Vedas. There is, I think, not a single Sutra which is not supported by the unerring texts of the Upanishads. Nay, he has in more than one place plainly expressed his jealousy of argumentations not founded on those records of eternal truth. He has never hesitated to avow that his teaching is regulated by passages breathed out by the Creator. It is only when reason is subservient to the Vedas, and, as a faithful handmaid, assists in enforcing their doctrine, that he allows her room. 'The 'knowledge of Brahma, says he, proceeds from a critical 'consideration of the sense of Vedic texts, not from 'inference and other proofs; and the Vedanta texts 'being recognized as setters forth of the cause of the 'world's production, inference, when it is a proof not 'opposed to those texts, is not excluded from confirming 'their meaning[1].'

"You do not, continued A'gamika, really meet S'ankarácharya, when you use against his system arguments quite irrelevant to his position. How can I, or any body else, submit to your wisdom, when we believe it to be opposed to that of the Omniscient."

Satyakáma.—"But *does* the Veda contain the wisdom of the Omniscient? This question has never yet been discussed. You assume it as already decided in your favour.

[1] वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिर्नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्यायानुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवन्न निवार्य्यते ॥

Com. Vedant I. i. 2.

I do not deny that S'ankarácharya is generally borne out by texts of the Vedas. I say *generally*, because I do not wish absolutely to pronouce judgment, as between him and the leaders of other schools. But you must prove that the Vedas are records of eternal truth, before their texts can be allowed to drown the voice of reason, and stifle the dictates of conscience."

A'gamika.—"Has not S'ankarácharya himself proved that point? 'Nor could such S'ástras, says he, as the Ṛich and 'other Vedas, endowed with the characteristics of omnis-'cience, proceed from any other than the Omniscient'[2]."

Satyakáma.—"Do you call that proof? In Gotama's vocabulary, the reason adduced would be called *Sádhya-sama,* a mere petitio principii. S'ankara assumes that the Vedas contain characteristic marks of omniscience, and thence argues that they proceeded from the Omniscient. The hypothesis is almost identical with the inference. The argument is not a process of logic. It is a mere assertion. Nor must it be forgotten that S'ankara is not, in the above passage, proving the authority of the Vedas. His object is to demonstrate the omniscience of God by asserting that of the Vedas which proceeded from Him. He assumes but does not prove that point."

A'gamika.—"But does not the Veda itself decide the question. 'Being desirous of liberation, I seek Him, the 'manifestation of spiritual understanding, who in the be-'ginning created Brahmá and revealed to him the Vedas[3].'

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[2] नहीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः सम्भवोऽस्ति । Ibid. I. i. 3.

[3] यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै । तं हदेवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये । S'wetás'-watara.

'That which all the Vedas set forth—I declare[4].' 'This Rig-veda was breathed out by that great Being'[5]."

Satyakáma.—"Why do you commence and stop just where S'ankara commenced and stopped when citing those passages? Why do you give the text second-hand? Read out the passages whole and entire from the Upanishads themselves?"

A'gamika.—"As from the fire contained in damp-fuel, 'smoke comes out separate, so, (O Maitreyi) was breathed 'out of the great Being this, namely, the Ṛig-veda, the 'Yajur-veda, the Sáma-veda, the Atharva, Angirasa, the 'Itihása, Puráṇa, Sciences, Upanishads, S'lokes, Sutras, 'After-expositions. All these were breathed out of Him'[6]."

Satyakáma.—"Does not this prove too much for you?"

A'gamika.—"S'ankara has shown that all these stand simply for the Vedas, for in his commentary on the passage he remarks: 'The Veda is not like any other 'work; having issued like a man's breath, without any 'personal exertion'[7]."

"I thought, rejoined Satyakáma, you said a little while ago that the Vedas were productions of the wisdom of Brahma. But it appears now that they issued from the

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[4] सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनंति तपांसि सर्वाणिच यद्वदन्ति। Kaṭha.

[5] अरेऽस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदः। Bṛihadáraṇyaka.

[6] स यथार्द्रैन्धाग्नेरभ्याहितात्पृथग्धूमा विनिश्चरन्त्येवं वा अरेऽस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस इतिहास पुराणं विद्या उपनिषदः श्लोकाः सूत्राण्यनुव्याख्यानानि व्याख्यानान्यस्यैवैतानि सर्वाणि निश्वसितानि। *Bṛihadàraṇyallà.*

[7] तदाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थमिदमुक्तं पुरुषनिश्वासवदप्रयत्नोत्थितत्वात्प्रमाणं वेदोन यथान्योग्रन्थ इति। *S'ankara.*

Omniscient like human breath without any other effort on his part. We cannot then say that they contain his deliberate teaching. He did not intelligently utter them; they escaped Him like smoke from fire. You have no right to say that an involuntary emanation of that kind is the production of his intellect."

A'gamika.—"He is called *prajnána-ghana*, a mass of intelligence. Whatever issues from Him must also partake of the Omniscient."

Satyakáma.—"But the Vedas say that every thing issues from Him. He is not a mass of intelligence only, but 'this spirit, Brahma, is all mind, all vital air, all eye, 'all ear, all earth, all water, all air, all ether, all light, all 'no-light [or darkness,] all desire, all no-desire, all anger, 'all no-anger, all virtue, all vice, all every thing'[8]. Is not this the language of the Upanishad? How can you then trust the Veda to be all knowledge, merely because it escaped him?"

"You are so fond of vilifying the Vedas," said A'gamika, somewhat irritated. "That is your besetting sin. You are such a contemner of the Veda."

"I thought, said Satyakáma, I was speaking guardedly enough by making no observation of my own, and confining myself to the very language of the Veda."

A'gamika.—"You will draw us again into the whole question of the Vedanta. We have had that to our heart's content."

Satyakáma.—"My impression is, you conceded that on the grounds of human reasoning the Vedanta could not

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[8] सवा अयमात्मा ब्रह्म मनोमयः प्राणमयश्चक्षुर्मय श्रोत्रमयः पृथिवीमय आपोमयो वायुमय आकाशमयस्तेजोमयोऽतेजोमयः काममयोऽकाममयः क्रोधमयोऽक्रोधमयो धर्म्ममयोऽधर्म्ममयः सर्व्वमयः । *Brihaddranyaka.*

stand, but that it is supported by the Vedas. We are now surveying that fundamental support. I am anxious to get at your theory of the Veda before proceeding to examine it."

A'gamika.—"Well, hear patiently the proofs we adduce. I have already shown that the S'wetás'watara, Kaṭha, and the Bṛihádaraṇyaka support the authority of the Vedas. The Muṇḍaka does the same. "From Him the Ṛich, Saman, Yajus[9]."

Satyakáma.—"Go on, why do you stop short? Does not the Upanishad specify the whole creation as a procession from him like the Vedas?"

A'gamika.—"It does."

"And who is the 'Him' here?" asked Satyakáma. "What is the antecedent of the *tasmát*?"

"The soul, or Male person, spoken of immediately before."

"That is a Male described as one of like passions with ourselves, becoming a father after the ordinary animal fashion, the description itself not being at all choice in point of decency of language. It is hardly consistent with the reverence due to God to identify Him with such a 'male,' and call him the author of the Vedas on the strength of this passage[10]."

"What is the use of such criticisms?" said A'gamika querulously. "Do you seriously mean that the Upanishads do not uphold the authority of the Vedas."

Satyakáma.—"I think you cannot deny that some of the texts you have quoted actually *disprove* your theory

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[9] तस्मादृचः साम यजूंषि । *Muṇḍaka.*

[10] पुमान् रेतःसिञ्चति योषितायां बह्वी प्रजाः पुरुषात् सम्प्रसूताः तस्मादृचः साम यजूंषि । *Muṇḍaka.*

of Vedic inspiration. But suppose I waived that question for the present, and allowed that the Vedas support the authority of the Vedas. What then? *Not even a dexterous person can ride on his own shoulder*[1]."

A'gamika.—"What do you mean?"

Satyakáma.—"As you are impatient of cross-questioning on the Vedas, you had better ask what Sáyana means by introducing that remark, for it is not mine. The remark means that the Vedas cannot prove their own authority, any more than a man support himself on his own shoulders."

A'gamika.—"I am astonished at your still calling the authority of the Vedas in question. At the marriage assembly you quoted Gotama against Tarkakáma in order to prove that if all evidence were denied there would be an end of discussion. You are now acting against the spirit, if not the letter, of that Sutra of the Nyáya. You are calling in question the authority of that which every body allows is the word of God. Really I feel now the wisdom of Manu's ordinance that those who vilify the Vedas ought to be banished from Society."

Satyakáma.—"You may banish me, if you like; but you must remember, I have not wantonly said any thing against the Vedas. On certain questions of vital importance you contend that the authority of the Veda should be binding on all. You say that it is the repository of infinite wisdom. I ask only for proof. If your point can be established by satisfactory evidence, I cannot fail to be highly edified. Your summary appeal to Manu does not augur well for the strength of your position. Nor is it just to the great interests at stake. The Vedas are now

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[1] नखलु निपुणोऽपि स्वस्कन्धमारोढुं प्रभवेदिति ॥

Sáyana in Max Muller's Rig-Veda.

appealed to as the only support of the Vedantic doctrine, which appears to be much at variance with reason and conscience. Before I can consent to this appeal, I am anxious to examine the authority of our judge. Is the Veda the inspired word of God? Let the question be dispassionately discussed. You can gain nothing by hastily asserting its authority, if it really have none. Nor can I gain any thing by disproving its authority. Before we can once for all surrender our Reason, it is necessary to sift the pretensions of that which challenges implicit obedience.

"Besides, continued Satyakáma, it is somewhat out of place now to decline discussion on the authority of the Vedas, when some of our eminent scholars long ago condescended to cite objections against their genuineness and inspiration, and undertook to answer them. Indeed it is impossible to conceive stronger objections against the authority of a Śástra than those which Jaimini, Sáyana, Gotama, Kaṇáda, and Kapila have themselves cited. If they could but have refuted them with any success, the cause of the Vedas would have been entirely triumphant. You need not be afraid of condescending too much to sceptical cavillers, when such authorities attempted to answer the objections to which I refer. Allow me to bring some of them to your notice. Sáyana notices the following objections as to the authenticity of the Vedas.

1. The four Vedas are named in several texts. Is not that proof[2]? 'No, says he, for those texts being

[2] न तस्यापि वाक्यस्य वेदान्तःपातित्वेनात्माश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् नखलु निपुणोपि स्वस्कंधमारोढुं प्रभवेदिति वेदएव द्विजातीनां निश्श्रेयसकरः पर इत्यादि स्मृतिवाक्यं प्रमाणमितिचेन्न तस्याप्युक्तश्रुतिमूलकत्वेन निराकृतत्त्वात् वेदविषया लोकप्रसिद्धिः सार्वजनीनापि नीलं नभ इत्यादिवद्भ्रान्ता। Ibid.

'contained in the Vedas, their admission would amount 'to a satisfaction with mere self-dependence. Not even a 'dexterous man can support himself on his own shoulders.'

2. But the Smṛiti bears testimony to the Vedas. 'This is 'nothing, because the Smṛiti itself depends on the Vedas.'

3. 'As to the popular opinion in favor of the Vedas, 'though it prevail universally, it may be as erroneous as 'the notion that the sky is blue.' If such objections, added Satyakáma, have been noticed by so many condescending sages, perhaps it may not be beneath your dignity to resolve my doubts."

Ágamika.—"But Sáyana has satisfactorily replied to those objections and disposed of them. You have yourself said you can conceive no stronger objections. You should accordingly declare yourself satisfied."

Satyakáma.—"If Sáyana's reply to those objections were at all satisfactory, I should never have troubled you with my doubts. But he has left the objections quite intact. He says[3], 'with reference to the authenticity of the 'Vedas, proofs as mentioned, founded on the Vedas, on 'Smṛiti, on popular opinion, may be seen. As it is not 'absurd that the sun, moon, and other luminaries should 'have the quality of self-manifestation, though pots, clothes, 'and other substances cannot manifest themselves; so 'there may be, in the extraordinarily powerful Vedas, the 'quality of proving themselves, as they have that of proving other substances, though it may be impossible for 'men to ride on their own shoulders.'

[3] प्रमाणान्यपि यथोक्तानि श्रुतिस्मृतिलोकप्रसिद्धिरूपाणि वेदसद्भावे द्रष्टव्यानि यथाघटपटादिद्रव्याणां स्वप्रकाशत्वाभावेऽपि सूर्य्यचंद्रादीनां स्वप्रकाशत्वमविरुद्धं तथामनुष्यादीनां स्वस्कंधारोहासंभवेऽप्यकुंठितशक्तेर्वेदस्येतरवस्तुप्रतिपादकत्ववत्स्वप्रतिपादकत्वमप्यस्तु ॥

"This, I submit, added Sátyakáma, is no demonstration. The argument comes too late after the entertainment of the objections already mentioned. The entertainment of the objections shows that the proposition was not, in the conception of Sáyana, self-evident; for no sane man would seriously entertain an objection against a self-evident proposition, such as the existence of the sun and moon though a blind man might question it. The blind man would in such a case be simply *nigraha-sthána, i. e.,* not fit to be argued with on that question. But it would be a mockery to think of satisfying a man by an assertion of which he was not capable of judging for himself."

A'gamika.—"But if you were called upon to prove the existence of the sun, what would you say? You would only wonder, would you not? at the question. My feeling is, and I have no doubt Sáyana's also was, the same, at this question on the authority of the Vedas."

Satyakáma.—"It is not for me to contradict you in what you describe as a matter of feeling. But Sayana could not have been possessed with such a feeling: for then he would not have so elaborately cited objections, or tendered replies. Nor does any other sage appear to have partaken of your wonder at the question, for we find Jaimini, Vyása, Gotama, Kaṇáda, Kapila, S'ankaráchárya all undertaking to establish the authority of the Veda, by the refutation of arguments adduced by infidels. They could not therefore have considered it as clear as the sun or moon. If the omniscient wisdom contained in the Vedas were of this self-evidencing description, you could not have staggered at the conclusions of the Vedanta. It is because they were *prima facie* opposed to the dictates of reason and conscience, because they were NOT as clear as the sun or moon, that you appeal to

the positive authority of the Vedas. However brilliant the Vedas may be in other respects, here is the Vedantic doctrine hanging over it as a cloud. Here we have Indra's achievements, as a chief god, enthusiastically celebrated as acts performed under the influence of liquor[4]. Here we have Brahma, declared to be all-vice, no less than all-virtue. Here we have the Creator pronounced to be a sort of conjurer, deliberately deluding rational souls, by the projecting of illusory appearances[5]. Here we have the very author of the Vedas described as an ordinary male, with animal propensities, producing a large offspring. Here we have elaborate lectures on the most obscene subjects, which even profligate men would think it beneath the dignity of human nature to realize in practice[6]. Are we to be silenced by the assertion that the divine authority of such books is as apparent as the sun or moon? If you have any explanations to offer on these revolting descriptions, we may give you the patient hearing due to your learning and character. But if you wish to persuade us that the Vedas are of divine authority, you must prove your position by evidence. You must show by external proofs that they are possessed of such authority, or we must draw the natural inference, to which the offensive descriptions I have just mentioned, would lead us. There is no use therefore in screening them from a critical examination. Jaimini himself never did so. He noticed numerous objections against those works."

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4 See above page 387. Note 6.

5 यस्मान् मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् ॥

6 See the last section but one of the Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad pp. 1077—1089. Bibliotheca Indica Vol. ii No. 18. We cannot make up our minds to reprint such a long obscene passage.

Agamika.—"And has answered them too. Are you not satisfied with his replies?"

Satyakama.—"Satisfied! No, on the contrary, I am confirmed in my doubts."

A.—"How?"

S.—"Jaimini notices an objection to the eternity of the Vedas, founded on their containing names of persons and places. 'From connection with non-eternal objects 'the Mantras are vain'. On this Sutra the commentator remarks 'In the Mantra, what do they in Kikaṭa, 'there is mention made of the country Kikaṭa. So are 'other uneternal objects mentioned, such as the town 'Naichásákha, the king Pramangada. This being the 'case, it follows that the Mantra could not have existed 'before Pramangada[7].' The answer to the objection is obviously inconclusive. It can refer only to those names after which any portions of the Vedas are called. 'The names, says the philosopher, 'from reading'[8]. Different sections were styled after different men who first read them. This does not at all meet the question regarding the names which historically occur in the narratives. Another answer is therefore attempted, but that is a mere reference to a previous Sutra in which a similar objection was noticed. That objection concerned a text wherein mention was made of 'Babara son of Pravahani.' The question was how could the Veda be eternal when non-eternal objects are named in it. Jaimini replies that

[7] अनित्यसंयोगान्मंत्रानर्थक्यमिति किंते कृण्वन्ति कीकटेष्विति मन्त्रे कीकटो नाम जनपद आम्नातः तथानैचाशाखं नाम नगरं प्रमगंदो नामराजेत्येतेषां अनित्या आम्नाताः तथाच सति प्राक् प्रमगंदान्नायं मंत्रोभूतपूर्व इति गम्यते ॥

[8] आख्या प्रवचनादिति । Jaimini quoted in Max Muller's Rig-Veda.

the words may be otherwise interpreted, and the commentator makes out, ingeniously enough, that Právâhaṇi may be tortured to do duty for the 'wind' and Babara may serve as the imitation of its sound[9]. This explanation is not only unsatisfactory; it is something more. It recoils against the Vedas. A sad plight such as this shows how much the philosopher must have been straitened. Is it possible to explain away by this violent artifice all the passages that one can adduce containing narratives concerning men? Is it to be pretended that no persons, places, or human actions are historically named in the Vedas? The very supposition is preposterous. What for instance is the Kaṭhopanishad—but a series of lectures given by Yama to Nuchiketas? Are not Sanatkumára, S'wetaketu, Yájnawalkya, Uddálaka, Gotama, my own namesake, persons of Vedic notoriety? How could the Vedas be composed before the persons mentioned in them were born? The objection recoils with redoubled force after such an ineffectual attempt to refute it. Had Jaimini never undertaken the refutation of objections against the Vedas, my doubts on their divine authority could hardly have been so strong as now they are. When a philosopher of his intelligence is driven to the necessity of *spelling out* a fanciful meaning from a well-known word (Právâhaṇi), the cause must be bad indeed. This subtile interpretation is however impossible with scores of proper names that occur in the Vedas. You cannot volatilize the whole army of Ṛishis celebrated in those writings. Are Indra's exploits against Vitra also to be dissolved into the 'wind'?

[9] नतु तत्रानित्यो बबराख्यः कश्चित्पुरुषो विवक्षितः किंतु बबर इति शब्दानुकृतिः तथा सति बबरेति शब्दं कुर्वन्वायुरभिधीयते सच प्रावाहणिः प्रकर्षेण वहनशीलः एवमन्यत्राप्यूहनीयं ।

Jaimini quoted in Max Muller's Ṛig-veda.

Even Jaimini's shift therefore must fail. You cannot reconcile with your theory of Vedic eternity the existence of historical narratives in the Vedas.

"Again the Vedas themselves refer to times anterior to their own age. How could there be a period before eternity? In the very first *Sukta* of the Ṛig-Veda there is mention made of *old* and *new* Ṛishis. The S'wetas'watara speaks also of former periods of gods and Ṛishis[10]. The *Kena*, or as it is otherwise called the *Talavakára*, similarly speaks of *old* teachers, from whom was derived its mysterious doctrine[1]. The *Is'a*, or *Vájasaneya*, repeats the same idea in two different places, only substituting the word *wise* for *old*[2]. The *Kaṭha* describes the doctrine delivered to Nuchiketas as so subtile that even the gods had doubts about it in *olden* times[3]. The Muṇḍaka says that Atharva *in the days of yore* revealed the science of Brahma to Angir[4]. Again, that Angiras declared it of *old* to Saunaka[5]. The Taittiriya Bráhmaṇa says 'the Vajas'ravases knew this Bráhmaṇa of old[6].' Thus the Vedas themselves testify against your theory of their eternity."

A'gamika.—"Well, but have not Gotama, Kaṇáda, Vy'asa, S'ankarácharya, and Kapila defended the authority of the Vedas. To begin with Vyása and S'ankara:—they explain the anachronisms you complain of by declaring

[10] ये पूर्वं देवा ऋषयश्च तद्विदुः ॥

[1] इति शुश्रुम पूर्वेषां ये नस्तद्व्याचचक्षिरे ॥

[2] इति शुश्रुम धीराणां ये नस्तद्विचचक्षिरे ॥

[3] देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं पुरा नहि सुविज्ञेयमणुरेष धर्म्मः ॥

[4] अथर्वा तां पुरोवाचाङ्गिरे ब्रह्मविद्यां ॥

[5] तदेतत् सत्यमृषिरङ्गिराः पुरोवाच ॥

[6] एतद्वै ब्राह्मणं पुरा वाजश्रवसा विदामक्रन् ॥

that there are *eternal species of gods, men,* and other beings, and that it is 'with the species that words are con-'nected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infi-'nite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. 'But as species are eternal (though individuals begin to 'exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such 'words as *cow,* etc. In the same way it is to be remarked 'that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have 'commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the 'eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] 'words *Vasu,* etc. [which denote those individual gods], 'since species are eternal. And the fact that the gods, 'etc., belong to particular species may be learned from 'this, that we discover their corporeality and other attri-'butes in the hymns and *arthavádas* (explanatory remarks 'in the Vedas), etc[7].' In truth it was by means of the eternal words of the Vedas, as prototypes of things, that the Creator formed the universe. 'Thus the Veda says, 'at (or with) the word *ete (these)* Prajapati created the 'gods; at *asṛigram (they were poured out)* he created 'men; at *indavah (drops of soma)* he created the *pitris;* 'at *tirah pavitram (through the filter)* he created the pla-'nets; at *ās'avah* (*swift*) he created hymns; at *vis'vāni* '*(all)* he created praise; and at the words *abhi saubhagā* '*(for the sake of blessing)* he created the other creatures. 'And in another place it is said 'with his mind he 'produced speech, as *a mate.*' (Brih. Ar. Up. p. 50.) 'By these and other such texts the Veda declares that 'creation was preceded by the word. And when the 'Smṛiti says, 'At first a divine voice, eternal, without 'beginning or end, formed of the Vedas, was uttered 'by Svayambhū, from which all activities [proceeded]'

[7] Dr. Muir's Sanscrit Texts, Part iii, p. 70.

'the expression, *utterance* of the voice, is to be regarded as employed out of deference to the customary 'phraseology, since it is inconceivable that a voice which 'was 'without beginning or end,' could be uttered in the 'same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other 'text. 'In the beginning Maheśvara created from the words 'of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and their 'several modes of action;' and again, 'He created in the 'beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of 'all creatures from the words of the Veda.' And it is a 'matter of common observation to us all, that when any 'one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish, he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, 'and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the 'case of Prajāpati the creator, we conclude that before the 'creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his 'mind, and afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. Thus the Vedic text which says, 'uttering *bhūr*, he created the earth *(bhūmi)*, etc.,' intimates 'that the different worlds, earth and the rest, were manifested, *i. e.*, created from the words *bhūr*, etc., manifested 'in his mind[8].'

"Those eminent expounders of the Veda have also shown that the world being in reality without beginning, there is no absurdity in the supposition of all worldly events being only repetitions of the same things in other ages. There can be no such thing, therefore, as past or future. What is past is also future in reference to the next age in which it will re-appear. What is future is also past in reference to the last age in which it had already occurred once. There is no room for an argument founded on a charge of anachronism.

[8] Ibid. pp.71, 72.

"Gotama has also noticed certain objections preferred by unthinking heretics, complaining of the failure of Vedic promises, of mutually conflicting texts, and of tautologies. He answers them quite effectually by contending that the failure of the promised fruit may be owing to defects in the performance of ceremonies; that the conflicting texts may be reconciled by the supposition that they refer to different times and places, and that tautologies are useful in the inculcation of doctrine.

"This defence is unanswerable. Men ought not to charge on the Vedas the consequences of their own neglect in the performance of ceremonies, nor ought they to be so narrow-minded as not to perceive that differences of time and season may occasion differences of description and injunction: and, instead of murmuring, they ought to be thankful for tautologies, for they may thereby have better chances of understanding the mysteries of truth.

"Kaṇáda too contends for the authority of the Vedas. 'The composition of sentences, says he, in the Vedas is according to reason.' 'In the Bráhmaṇas the occurrence of names is the characteristic (of omniscience.)' How could the Vedas contain the names of all things if they were not inspired? Again 'the rules of alms-giving are also after reason.' Accordingly Kaṇáda begins and ends his work with the declaration of the authority of the Vedas as HIS word[9].

"Kapila, too, notwithstanding his many eccentricities and his denial of the eternity of the Vedas, avows that no

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[9] बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे । ब्राह्मणे सञ्ज्ञाकर्म्मसिद्धिलिङ्गम् । बुद्धिपूर्वो ददातिः । तद्वचनादाम्नायपामाण्यं । तद्वचनादाम्नायप्रामाण्यं ॥

person could have fabricated them; for, of free or bond, none was competent to produce them[10]."

Satyakáma.—"You have produced a formidable array of witnesses in support of the Vedas. Do not think I am wanting in respect for any of them; but you must remember that it is no disrespect to a witness to subject him to a cross-examination. I will do nothing more than test their assertions by that logical touchstone which they have themselves supplied.

"Let us first classify the questions under discussion. They may be considered as fourfold:

1. How can the Vedas be eternal when they not only contain narrations of events that occurred in time, but also speak of periods previous to themselves?

2. What proofs are there of their eternity, or of their inspiration by God?

3. What are the Vedas?

4. What are their own claims?

"In answer to the first question you refer to Vyása and S'ankaráchárya, who maintain that there are eternal *Species* of men and gods, and that when the Vedas speak of names which appeared in time, they refer really to those eternal species, the individual members of which were manifested in the transactions of the world. They also maintain that the universe was created after the words contained in the Vedas. As those words arose in the Creator's mind, he formed the things indicated by them. They likewise contend that the world, being in reality without beginning, is revolving in continued cycles, so that the Vedas are only speaking of past events, namely those which happened in a previous age, when they refer to what appears to be posterior to their production.

[10] न पौरुषेयत्वं तत्कर्तुः पुरुषस्याभावात् । मुक्तामुक्तयोरयोग्यत्वात् ॥

"On this explanation of the difficulty contained in the first question, I have only to make three remarks. *First,* the explanation is founded on a gratuitous hypothesis of the existence of eternal species, for which no proof is offered other than a few sentences of the Vedas. This reason is vitiated by the fault of *self-dependence. Secondly,* assuming the existence of eternal species, and the unceasing revolution of worlds with the same personal manifestations and events, you may still be called upon to account for the singular fact that the Vedas make allusion only to such incidents as happened before a certain definable era, but are totally silent on all affairs that belong to a later date. *Thirdly,* S'ankara quotes the text that the Supreme Being settled 'the names, functions, and conditions of *all creatures* from the *words of the Vedas?*' If the fact were so, the Vedas would be a real *s'abda-kalpa-druma,* or a cyclopædia of every thing conceivable by any body. But the fact is not so, and we may meet the extravagant affirmation with a direct negative. For the Vedas have no terms, no names, for multitudes of things which are either of modern discovery, or were unknown in India in times of yore. If the creation of the universe was after the words of the Vedas suggesting ideas to the Creator's mind, how is it that there is an endless variety of things for which there are no terms in the Vedas, but of the creation of which we have nevertheless ocular evidence?"

A'gamika.—"I do not quite comprehend what you mean."

Satyakáma.—"In the first place the supposition of eternal species is altogether gratuitous. What is the meaning of *species* before the existence of individuals? Or supposing that *ákṛiti* means form, and *vyakti* its manifestation, what is the meaning of a *form* before its

manifestation? Assuming however that such eternal forms are possible, how is it that the Vedas only allude to forms of such things as may have appeared in India down to a certain ascertainable period? Again, the Vedas speak not of names only, as the *vyakti* of the *ákṛiti*, but also of *acts* performed in time. How can the theory of eternal species account for the narration of *events*, in books supposed to have been completed before the creation of the universe? Is there for instance an eternal form of a drunken Indra when he kills Vitra[1], of a sober Indra when awe-stricken, with folded hands, before a more powerful god, and of a profligate Indra in the company of the *Apsarases*[2]? If you refer, in reply, to the theory of an eternal succession of worlds, I must then ask again, how is it there is no mention of any incident of an age posterior—say—to that of Yudhisṭhira. You hear of certain anecdotes of S'wetaketu, of Sanatkumára, of Uddálaka, of Vas'ishṭha; but you never meet with any accounts of Vikramáditya, Kálidása, Ghaṭakarpara, Bháskarácharya, S'ankarácharya, A'disura, Bullalsen;—not to mention characters still nearer to our times. How is it that some old manifestations of forms only are given, but there is profound silence concerning events later than the time of Yudhisṭhira, or transpiring elsewhere than in India?

"If again the whole creation was regulated by the words of the Vedas, how is it that there are multitudes of created things of which there is no intimation to be found

[1] त्रिकद्रुकेष्वपिवत् सुतस्यास्य मदे अहिमिन्द्रोजघान ॥
Max Muller's Ṛig-Veda vol. ii. p. 487.

[2] नारदो नन्दनेऽपश्यत् पुंश्चलीगणमध्यगं। शक्रं सुराधिराजानं तन्मुखासक्तलोचनं ॥ Márkaṇḍeya Puráṇa.

in them? How many plants and animals are there, how many organic and inorganic substances, how many things noticed in the different physical sciences and in natural history, are there, for which we have no term, no name, in the Vedas? Their *s'abdas* are only indicative of some Indian produce of a date anterior to the age of Yudhisṭhira. Why are you obliged to use foreign words when you apply to the sub-assistant surgeon for a little *quinine*, or ask Tarkakáma to decide a question of conscience, as to whether you can take a little *tea*, or *coffee*, as a remedy against cold? And if with our limited knowledge we are acquainted with so many things of which there are no traces in the Vedas, if we who have never travelled beyond the boundaries of our native land know more *s'abdas* than are found in those writings, how much greater still must be the range of things, which men of larger experience must miss in their pages?

"As to the second question of proofs of Vedic inspiration, nothing that Gotama, Kaṇáda, or Kapila has advanced on the subject is worth a moment's consideration. Gotama says that its authority is deduced from the infallible person who (as the commentator adds) made the Vedas[3]. The *Sádhya*, or point to be proved, is, in other words, cited as its own *hetu* or reason! Who would doubt for a moment that the Vedas were of authority, if once convinced of their infallible original? That the very philosopher who discriminated so clearly between true and false reasons, in the explanation of his topics, should himself offer a proof, exactly corresponding to his own definition of the false reason, styled *Sádhyasama*,

[3] मंत्रायुर्वेदवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्। आप्तस्य वेदकर्तुः प्रामाण्यात् यथार्थोपदेशकत्वात् वेदस्य तदुक्तत्वमर्थाल्लब्धं।

leaves little room for doubting that the cause, which drove him to such a departure from his own logical principles, must be piteously weak."

A'gamika.—"Not exactly so, for Gotama says that the infallibility of the Veda is proved like that of Mantras (spells) and the A'yurveda (the medical treatise)."

Satyakáma.—"That only removes the difficulty one step. For what are spells? Nothing! At any rate we cannot connect the Most Holy, that governs according to rule and moral law, with *spells* that profess to be independent of rule, and make no discrimination of right and wrong. None but the vulgar practise them, none but the vulgar repose confidence in them, and certainly none can prove any thing about them. If spells be true, then it must be idle to talk of morals or of religion, then must we surrender reason and conscience to the freaks of the profligate men that deal in those unmeaning things. And as to the medical treatise, I need hardly remind you that the Medical College of Calcutta has served to throw it very much into discredit. I believe few in our days would trust a cholera patient to an adept in the A'yurveda.

"Kaṇáda's pleas for the authority of the Vedas are little better than Gotama's. His assertion in the third and last Sutras is a mere confession of faith. 'The Veda is of authority, because it is His (God's) word'! This reason, almost identical with that which Gotama urged, is likewise *Sádhya-sama,* being scarcely different from the inference. Two other reasons, given by him, resemble the vicious arguments by which he himself exemplifies false reasoning. 'The composition of sentences and 'the rules of alms-giving contained in the Vedas are 'according to reason.' If the premises be admitted, the argument is an antitype of the one, *It has horns,*

therefore it is a cow[4]. Many human compositions are reasonable, though not divine; just as many animals are horned, though not cows. But the premises are by no means certain, if not positively untrue. This very appeal to the authority of the Vedas is caused by the fact of their teaching not being according to reason, and as to the rules of alms-giving which they inculcate, they are based on *class prejudices* rather than on *reason*. Witness the passage cited by Kaṇáda's own commentator, though it is on alms-*taking* rather than alms-*giving*, but the two are treated as one subject by the author. 'On the seventh (day of going without food) he may 'steal S'udra's food: on the tenth, the Vais'ya's: on the 'seventeenth, the Kshetriya's: in peril of life, or for the 'preservation of himself or a relative, the Brahmin's[5].' Excellent instance of reasonable jurisprudence! The above argument for the Vedas rather resembles the other exemplar of false reasoning; *it has horns, therefore it is an horse*[6]!

"There is a fourth reason adduced by Kaṇáda, but that is identical with one of S'ankaráchárya's, already noticed, viz., that the Vedas contain names of all things.

"You have cited Kapila, too, as as a witness for the divine authority of the Veda. How a person that disbelieves the existence of the Deity, can bear testimony to His *word* is a problem which it is impossible to solve. But Kapila's attempt to prove the authority of the Veda

[4] यस्माद्विषाणी तस्माद्गौः ।

[5] शूद्रात्सप्तमे वैश्याद्दशमे क्षत्रियात्सप्तदशे ब्राह्मणात् प्राणसंशये क्षुधापीड़ितमात्मानं कुटुंबं वा रक्षितुं सप्तदिनान्याहारमप्राप्य शूद्रभक्ष्यापहारः कार्य्यः एवं दशदिनान्याहारमप्राप्य क्षत्रियात् प्राणसंशये ब्राह्मणात् भक्ष्यापहरणं न दोषायेत्याहुः ।

[6] यस्माद्विषाणी तस्मादश्वः ।

gives us an insight into a theory which most of the schools held on this point, but which is now little thought of by their followers. They looked upon it as a talisman, —a charm. Kapila grounds the authority of the Veda on the perfect knowledge of its utterers, and on its practical success, as in the *áyur-veda,* or the medical treatise. But he denies the possibility of its having an author of any kind. His reasoning on this point is analogous to that which he used in denying the existence of a Supreme Being. He says it could not be the production of any personal being, because there could be no personal being competent for the task of composing it. A person must either be free or in bondage. A free person *would* not, and one in bondage *could* not, compose it. A free person *would* not, because, (as Vijnána Bhikshu[7] expounds the last sutra cited by yourself) not being subject to a motive, he would not impose on himself the task of composing such a work with its 'thousand ramifications,' and one in bondage could not, because he had not the omniscience necessary for the office. The fact of the first personal being having uttered it, does not constitute it his work; for it is only essays[8] intelligently and elaborately composed, that may be called an author's work. But the Vedas issued from the self-existent by the power of adrishta, like breath, without

[7] जीवन्मुक्तधुरीणो विष्णुर्विशुद्धसत्त्वतया निरतिशयसर्वज्ञोपि वीतरागत्वात् सहस्रशाखवेदनिर्माणायोग्यः। अमुक्तस्त्वसर्वज्ञत्वादेवायोग्य इत्यर्थः॥

[8] यस्मिन्नदृष्टेपि कृतबुद्धिरुपजायते तत् पौरुषेयं॥ San. Sut. v. 50.

न पुरुषोच्चरितमात्रेण पौरुषेयत्वं श्वासप्रश्वासयोः सुषुप्तिकालीनयोः पौरुषेयत्वव्यवहाराभावात् किन्तु बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वेन। वेदास्तु निःश्वासवदेवादृष्टवशादबुद्धिपूर्वका एव स्वयम्भुवः सकाशात् स्वयं भवन्ति॥ Vij-Bhik.

any deliberation on his part. And the self-existent himself is no God on Kapila's theory. The Vedas therefore are destitute of any external authority, and it is only their internal self-evidencing virtue[9], by force of which they challenge our obedience.

"Kapila is not singular in his view of the authority of the Veda. Vyása, Śankaráchárya, Jaimini, Śáyana, and others hold substantially the same opinion. But Kapila disavows the doctrine of its eternity[10]. He calls it a product. And here we have an extraordinary theory of a work, which is neither eternal, nor the composition of any person, divine or human, bond or free.

"But Kapila's theory cannot astound us more than that of a large and influential clsss of the followers of Jaimini, the author of the Purva Mimánsá. Jaimini contends for the paramount authority of the Vedas, and the universal obligation of Dharma, or the sacrificial works enjoined in their texts. Now religious injunctions can only have their authority from the sanction of God's will. To say that there can be a religion without God, is to say there can be a law without a law-giver, or a verdict without a judge. Jaimini however says nothing about a God. We are to be bound by words of which there was no intelligent utterer. Some of his followers have gone the length of denying the possibility of an original utterer, a First cause of the Vedas, ridiculing the idea, as if it were hunting after a rabbit's horn—a sheer impossibility.

"It is the school of Prabhákara that talk in this bold and audacious way. 'An injunction, they say, implies a 'saying that moves to action. Hence is the authority 'of the Veda only in regard to acts. How then do we 'learn about objects, or existent substances? By the

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9 निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतः प्रामाण्यं ॥ 10 न नित्यत्वं वेदानां कार्य्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥

'explanatory remarks and the mantras, (hymns or 'incantations). The Veda does not teach any thing 'liable to contradiction: hence there can be no fear of 'there being any incongruity in it[1].' This implies that the Vedas have nothing to do with existent substances which cannot be established for certain. There are no objective truths taught in them. You have only to follow out their injunctions and perform the established ceremonies. 'What is good? That which leads to 'supreme felicity, such as the performance of the *jyotisht-'oma* and other sacrifices. What is evil? That which 'leads to ruin, such as theft[2].' As to the origin of the Vedas, one is to restrain his curiosity. The doctrine amounts to this that we *can* know of no being that could have composed them. If you talk of deducing the authority of the Veda from an author, the question will recur, and whence the authority of that author? Such authority, again, can only be settled by a text, and hence there will be a vicious circle. The Veda you see; its author you do not see. You have ocular proof of the existence of the Veda. You have no proof of the existence of its author. Nor is there any necessity for speculating about an author, for the un-beginning or eternal tradition of society is quite enough. The following extracts will show how some of the staunchest advocates for the Vedas argued on these points.

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[1] चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्त्तकं वचनमाहुरिति कार्य्यार्थे वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं दर्शयति कार्य्य एव अर्थे वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं। कथं तर्हि भूताद्यर्थावगतिः। मन्त्रार्थवादेषु। * * वेदे पुनर्बाधकज्ञानाभावात् अर्थसंस्पर्शिता शङ्कापि नास्ति॥

[2] पुनरपि प्रश्नपूर्व्वकमिदमुक्तं कोर्थ। योनिश्रेयसाय ज्योतिष्टमादिः। कोनर्थः। यः प्रत्यवायाय श्येनादि॥

‘Persons use language in order to communicate to
‘others something which they know. But that which
‘is not apprehended (on proof) cannot be known, hence
‘a person's words ought to be supported by some other
‘proof. Therefore it is said that a person cannot know
‘any thing without a text (of the Veda). But why
‘should we say ‘without a text,’ when we ought to say
‘‘without some other proof’? And even though the
‘aim [of the assertion] be some act, still ought not texts to
‘have a personal utterer? [No!] Without a text (the
‘utterance could not be proved). * * Thus Dharma is
‘established as derived from age to age without any
‘other proof. How is this established? In consequence of
‘the futility of other proof than traditional instruction,
‘it is impossible to introduce any prompter [of Dharma.]

‘Observation is everywhere a proof with us. A
‘work that is seen is independent of any person's exer-
‘tion, because no person could be proved (as its author).
‘It is dependent when it is not known at the first appli-
‘cation, and is known at another application. If the
‘injunction does not teach (or persuade) at the first
‘hearing, what is the meaning of its being an author's
‘work? If again an author's work may be not of time,
‘that is only establishing an established point, for the
‘meaning of those who speak of the śabda [Veda] as
‘proof is precisely that it is independent of any person's
‘exertion or of any other aid.

‘Now relation is that by which the sense is known
‘when a word is known. * * But is there not another
‘relation than this of a name and its object? That is
‘an unreasonable saying, for even then the relation
‘between the thing to be apprehended and the causer of
‘the apprehension is of the same character as that of the
‘name and its object. But why [the Mimánsaka asks]

'is this objection? 'Because, [the opponent of Jaimini's 'theory replies], as before explained, it (the Veda) has an 'author. Hence we believe that the Vedas were composed 'by some person who had settled the relation of the words 'with their meaning. And thus are they dependent.' 'To this now it is replied. It has been proved, that be-'cause of the relation not being caused by any person, the 'old usage of society is without a beginning. How is 'this? On this question the reply is, because of the want 'of a person to create the relation. The reply is not to 'the purpose. It is. The object is to exclude that which 'is opposed to the no-beginning theory. But why do you 'fear that it is opposed to your theory? Yes, we fear, 'because though it has been proved that the sense of words 'is determined by the un-beginning usage of old, yet if an 'author were allowed, then a beginning must come per force, 'like the vṛiddhi of certain vowels after *a* (in grammar). 'Therefore the idea of an author must be excluded.

'The Veda cannot be proved [to be an author's work] 'by the first kind of inference, because the old usage of 'society is without beginning. It cannot be established 'either by perception, or inference *à priori*.

'Even if it could be shown that the Veda had fallen into 'oblivion, still we could not, without further proof, esta-'blish any other relation. In the case of an existing sub-'stance missing, we could not, without proof, fancy it to 'be a rabbit's horn. Suppose oblivion were established, 'what is the object forgotten? The very thing that we 'desire to demonstrate? Well then, it itself is a proof, 'the oblivion.

'If, [says the opponent of Jaimini] non-perception were 'only possible of existent things, then who can say there 'is no rabbit's horn? But [replies the Mimánsaka] we 'do not adduce oblivion or non-perception as proof, we

'only bring it forward to refute the absurdity of assigning 'a cause to an object established by perception. Because 'there may be a non-perception (or missing) of perceived 'objects, like pots, you cannot for that reason imagine 'the existence of the rabbit's horn. The non-perception 'of a perceived object is dependent on another cause, 'but the non-perception itself is simply the non-perception 'of a non-perception.

'But how is it, [asks the opponent of Jaimini] that 'the author of the relation is not inferable from the non-'understanding of the sense after the first hearing?

'If on the first hearing, [replies the Mimánsaka] the 'sense is not comprehended, what do you get from it of 'an author of the relation? If Devadatta is not found 'at home, what does it prove of his being without?

'But does not conversancy itself presuppose that it is a 'work? How? Thus, that such a one is its utterer. But 'there can be no inconclusiveness in that which is seen. 'We see in the case of boys that the sense of words is 'arrived at by mere practice. Therefore of an object which 'is seen by perception, it is not consistent to speculate 'about an author. This is another reason for excluding 'an instrument [or originator] of the practice. Even if the 'relation [of words with their meaning] were itself [an 'author's] work, its production by gods, who are them-'selves unseen, would be excluded by the impossibility of 'the case. The relation being therefore eternal, it is proved 'to be independent.

'This notion of an effect is owing to the expansion of 'similarity (with the cause). But here dissimilarity being 'perceived, there can be no proof (of a cause). If you say 'there can be no production without dissimilarity, it only 'establishes your inconsistency. By this very reasoning, 'an author, his desire and recollection, are all refuted.

'Pleasure and other feelings being mere material affections can only be described as properties of matter. 'Now one that has no quality or property cannot affect 'that which has.

'Other adepts in Brahma (Vedantists) say that from 'the word author, from remembrance, from desire, they 'find the existence of a spirit different from the material 'body and its organs. Hence they conclude there is an 'existent spirit as author. But [the Mimánsaka asks] is 'he not also described as without work or agency? Thus 'the illustrious commentator [Prabhákara] refutes those 'reasons for taking that to be a spirit [or reality] which is 'no-spirit (or unreal).

'Without a sensuous perception of the spirit itself, 'there cannot be this inference [of a spirit].

'Perception can only be allowed as a proof in the 'establishment of the Supreme [Spirit]. It is useless to 'talk of inference.

'If the adepts in supreme Brahma (Vedantists) come 'to the conclusion that what is perceived is untrue, the 'real is not perceived, then we would simply bid them 'adieu with a bow.

'If there be nothing but knowledge, then knowledge 'itself would be disproved.

'If the spirit is to be known, then the instrument of the 'knowledge and the knower cannot be said to be excluded[3].'

[3] ज्ञातं हि अर्थं परस्मै प्रतिपादयितुं पुरुषाः प्रयुञ्जते वाक्यानि नचाप्रतीतोऽर्थो ज्ञातो भवतीति प्रमाणान्तरसंवादिना पौरुषेयेण वचनेन भवितव्यं तदिदमुक्तं अशक्यं हि तत् पुरुषेण ज्ञातुमृते वचनात् इति ननु अशक्यं हि तत् पुरुषेण ज्ञातुमृते प्रमाणान्तरादिति वक्तव्ये ऋते वचनादिति कोभिप्रायः उच्यते ननुच कार्य्यार्थत्वेपि पौरुषेयतयैव वचसः प्राप्नोतीत्यस्यपरिहारार्थमिदमुच्यते ऋते वचनादिति ॥

"I need not multiply these extracts, but the passages already given show that Kapila was not the only *niris'wara*, or atheistic, teacher among the Brahmins. A large body of the followers of Jaimini openly inculcated the

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अतः पुरुषपरम्परायामपि न प्रमाणान्तरगोचरो धर्म्म इति कथं पुनरिदं सिध्यति पुरुषपरम्परोपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या किमप्युपलम्भकमस्तीति न शक्यते कल्पयितुं ॥

सर्व्वत्र नो दर्शनं प्रमाणमिति दृष्टं हि कार्य्यं पुरुषप्रयत्नानपेक्षं पुरुषानुपलब्धेः सापेक्षश्च प्रथमप्रयोगानवगतेः प्रयोगान्तरे चावगमात् यदि प्रथमः श्रुतो न प्रत्याययति कृतकस्तर्हि कोभिप्रायश्चोदकस्य यदि तावते कृतकः कार्य्यो न सामयिक इत्यभिप्रायः ततः सिद्धं साध्यते पुरुषान्तरप्रत्ययानन्तरानपेक्षता शाब्दं प्रमाणमिति वदतोभिप्रेता ॥

ननु चासौ संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धः तस्मादन्य एवायं सम्बन्ध इति मन्यते तदयुक्तं तत्रापि प्रत्याय्यस्य प्रत्यायकस्यच संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धलक्षणः सम्बन्ध इति सएवायं ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकलक्षणः सम्बन्ध उक्तः ॥

कुत एतत्। कृतक इति पूर्व्वोपवर्णितेनैवाभिप्रायेणोक्तं तस्मान्मन्यामहे केनापि पुरुषेण शब्दानामर्थैः सह सम्बन्धं कृत्वा संव्यवहर्तुं वेदाः प्रणीता इति सापेक्षत्वमुपसंहृतं तदिदानीमुच्यते। अपौरुषेयत्वात् संवन्धस्य सिद्धमिति वृद्धव्यावहारस्यानादितोपन्यासः। किमिदं तर्हि प्रश्नोत्तरं कथमिति पृष्टे पुरुषस्य सम्बन्धुरभावादित्युत्तरमयुक्तं अनादिप्रतिपक्षनिरासायेदमुच्यते कथं पुनरिदं प्रतिपक्षतया शङ्क्यते अनादिनापि वृद्धव्यवहारेण शब्दार्थावगमसिद्धौ यत्र कर्त्तोपलभ्यते अत्रादिमत्त्वैव वलात् प्राप्नोति वृद्धिरादैजिति वत् तस्मात् कर्त्तुरुपलम्भो निराकरणीयः ॥

तत्राद्यं केवलानुमानागमप्रमेयता तावन्न सम्भवति अनादौ वृद्धव्यवहारे प्रत्यर्थिनि। तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षं तत्पूर्व्वकंचागमानुमानं निरसनीयमिति तस्मादुपपन्नमुत्तरं ॥

यद्यपिच विस्मरणमुपपद्यते तथापि न प्रमाणान्तरेण सम्बन्धान्तरं प्रतिपद्येमहि यथा पिद्यमानस्यानुपलम्भो भवतीति नैतावता विना प्रमाणेन शशविषाणं प्रतिपद्येमहि यद्यपिच विस्मरणमुपपद्यते इति किं विषय

same idea. Indeed they went a good many paces beyond the author of the Sánkhya. For they contended that since the existence of a soul, as distinct from physical organization, is not an object of sensuous perception, it could

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मिदं विस्मरणमुपन्यस्तं यदि तावत् साध्यविषयं तदिदमेव प्रमाणं यदुत विस्मरणोपपत्तिः ॥

यदि विद्यमानस्यैवानुपलब्धिः केन वा शक्यते वक्तुं शशविषाणं नास्तीति ॥

नैवेयं प्रमाणतयोपन्यस्यते विस्मृतिरनुपलब्धिर्वा किन्तु उपलब्धस्यार्थस्य कारणदोषनिराकरणायेदमुच्यते यथा घटादेरुपलब्धस्यानुपलब्धिरस्तीति नैतावता शशविषाणस्यास्तित्वं शक्यते वक्तुं उपलब्धिविषयस्यानुपलब्धिः कारणान्तरमपेक्षते अनुपलब्धेः पुनरनुपलब्धेरेवानुपलब्धिः ॥

ननु सम्बन्धस्य कर्ता कथ पुनरसौ नोपपद्यते प्रथम श्रवणेर्थानवगतेः ॥

यदि प्रथमश्रवणेर्थो न प्रतिपद्यते किमायातं सम्बन्धस्य कर्तुरेवं तर्हि यदि गृहे देवदत्तो नोपलभ्यते किमायातं वहिर्भावस्य ॥

ननु च व्युत्पत्तिरपि कार्य्यतामपेक्षते एव। कथं। अयमस्य वाचक इति ॥

नहि दृष्टेनुपपन्नं नाम व्यवहारमात्रादेव हि बालानामवगतिर्दृष्टा तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षदृष्ट एव उपपद्यमानेर्थे न कर्तुः कल्पोनोपपद्यते। इदमपरं व्यवहारानौपयिकं। कृते हि सम्बन्धे अदृश्यमानस्यार्थस्य देवादेः संबन्धकरणं अशक्तिरूपवार्य्येतैव तस्मात् औत्पत्तिकत्वात् सिद्धं अनपेक्षत्वं ॥

अतः सभावसन्ततिहेतकमेवेदं कार्य्यज्ञानं नात्र विसदृशोपलब्धौ प्रमाणमस्तीत्युपसंहृतं। यदि च विसभागादृते नोत्पत्तिः स्यात् अथवस्यैव स्यात् अनयैव युक्त्या कर्तृशब्दार्थ इच्छास्मृतिश्च प्रत्युक्ताः ॥

येपि सुखादय उपन्यस्ताः तेपि भूतविकारहेतुत्वात् भूतगुणा एव शक्यन्ते वक्तुं नह्यगुणो गुणिनं विकर्त्तुमुत्सहते ॥

अथापरे ब्रह्मविदः कर्त्ताभिधानात्स्मृतेरिच्छातश्च महदादिभूतपर्य्यन्ताच्छरीरादतिरिक्तमात्मानमुपलभामह इति प्रतिपन्नाः तस्मात्सिद्ध आत्मा कर्तृभूतः नन्वसौ निष्क्रिय इत्यभ्युपगतं ॥

not be one of Inference, either. Thought and feeling they considered to be affections of our corporeal members. And it was with a view to defend the paramount authority of the Vedas that they were led to this atheism and materialism.

"I cannot say that the principles on which they based their reasoning are peculiar to themselves. All schools of Brahminical philosophers considered the mind, the instrument of thought and feeling, as a sort of material organ, which can only co-exist with the body. But they recognized an *átmá*, or spirit, as the owner or director of the mind and other organs. The school of the Prábhákara Mimánsá appear to deny such a director, and to assign all mental phenomena to the physical organization. And yet they are staunch defenders of the Vedas.

"*Thirdly*, therefore, I ask, what can the Vedas possibly be in the conception of Brahminical philosophers? Not the word of God, not a revelation of His will, such as you justly say is needed for our guidance under bewildering circumstances, but something which, certain of them affirm, mechanically issued from Brahma, like smoke from burning fuel, something which, others declare, was educed from the elements, something which, others again tell us, is

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तस्मादनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिहेतवोऽमी निराकरणीयतयोपन्यस्ता भगवता भाष्यकारेण ॥

स्वयमात्मानं प्रत्यक्षेणानुपलभ्य नेदमनुमानं प्रवर्त्तते ॥

अथ परस्यापि प्रतिपत्तौ प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रमाणमिति मतं अनुमानोपन्यासो निरर्थकः ॥

यदि परंब्रह्मविदामेष निश्चयः यदुपलभ्यते तदसत्यं नोपलभ्यते तत्तत्वमिति नमस्तेभ्यः ॥

यदि विज्ञानादन्यं नास्ति विज्ञानमपास्यतं ।

ज्ञेयत्वे ह्यात्मनो ज्ञानज्ञातृणी न व्यतिरिक्ते शक्यते वक्तुं ॥

Indiácharya Saraswati.

eternal and independent of a cause. But what that thing is, it is impossible to gather from them, unless it be a charm or a talisman. They talk of it as articulate sound, but what is articulate sound without a sounder, an utterer? And they all identify it with the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan. Singularly enough, they know nothing about the date or circumstances of these compositions. It is clear, however, that whatever the eternal sound of the Veda may have been, it could not have been committed to writing without a fresh revelation from God— without the direct inspiration of His Spirit. Such revelation must be impossible on the theory of the atheistical writers I have noticed. And as to those that were theists, they do not pretend to give us any account of such a repeated revelation. They all talk indeed of tradition, but you will admit that tradition cannot be trusted as an infallible guide.

" Again I ask, what are the Vedas? In the Śatapatha Bráhmaṇa, it is said, 'He (Prajapati) brooded &c. over '[*i. e.* infused warmth into] these three worlds. From 'them, thus brooded over, three lights were produced,—fire, 'this which purifies (*i. e. pavana*, or the air), and the sun. 'He brooded over these three lights. From them so 'brooded over, the three Vedas were produced,—the Rig-'veda from fire, the Yajur-veda from air, and the Sama-'veda from the sun. He brooded over these three Vedas. 'From them so brooded over, three seeds [or essences] 'were produced,—*bhŭr* from the Rig-veda, *bhuvah* from 'the Yajur-veda, and *svar* from the Sāma-veda[4].'

" What were these productions? Mere sounds, or writings on paper, or palm leaf? In either case how could they be generated by brooding over fire and the sun? What again is the meaning of the production of *bhur*,

[4] Dr. Muir's Sanscrit Texts.

bhuva, svar by brooding over the Vedas? The Chhán-dogya and Manu speak in a similar way of the origin of the Vedas. (See the passages in Dr. Muir's Sanscrit texts) Kulluka Bhatta, in explanation of the difficulty we have stated, says, 'The same Vedas which [existed] in the 'previous mundane era *(Kalpa)* were preserved in the 'memory of the omniscient Brahma, who was one with 'the supreme spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in 'the beginning of the [present] *Kalpa*, he drew forth from 'fire, air, and the sun: and this dogma which is founded 'upon the Veda is not to be questioned, for the Veda 'says, 'The Rig-veda comes from fire, the Yajur-veda 'from the sun.'

'Another commentator on Manu, Medhātithi, explains 'this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, 'by remark-'ing that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the 'Yajur-veda with one in which air is mentioned[5].'

"Manu adds, 'Prajāpati also milked out of the three 'Vedas the letters *a*, *u*, and *m*, together with the words '*bhūr*, *bhuvah*, and *svar*. The same supreme Prajapati 'also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the '[three] lines of the text called *sāvitrī* [or *gāyatrī*], begin-'ning with the word *tat*. The three great imperishable 'particles *(bhūr, bhuvah, svar)* preceded by *om*, and the '*gāyatrī* of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth 'of Veda [or Brahma][6].'

"What in the name of common sense is the meaning of all this? What is milking of letters or words from Vedas? The explanation of Medhatithi only shows that the difficulty had occurred to him, but it does not at all remove it—for not only is nothing said as to the signification of the extraction of the S'aman from the sun, but the

[5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

explanation about the Ṛich and the Yajush too is very unsatisfactory.

"The S'wetás'watara Upanishad, however, gives a different story of the origin of the Vedas. The Supreme Being is there set forth as its imparter to Brahmá[7], and the Harivans'a says, "For the emancipation of the world, 'Brahmā, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous 'form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the 'heart of Gāyatrī, entering between her eyes. From her 'there was then produced a quadruple being, lustrous as 'Brahmā, indistinct, and eternal, undecaying, devoid of 'bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the attribute of 'of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and 'embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, 'with the Yajush, from his eyes, the Sāma-veda from the 'tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. 'The Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body *(xetra)*. 'Hence they obtain their character of *Vedas*, because 'they *find (vindanti)* that abode. These Vedas then 'create the pre-existent eternal Brahma (sacrifice or cere-'monial,) a being of celestial form, with their own mind-'born qualities[8].'

"In the Rig-veda, again, we have another story, 'In 'the 9th verse of the Purusha Sūkta, the three Vedas 'are said to have been derived from the mystical victim, 'Purusha. 'From that universal sacrifice were produced 'the hymns called Rik and Sāman, the metres, and the 'Yajush[9].'

"The Atharva Veda says, 'From time the Rik verses 'sprang, the Yajush sprang from time.' The Bhagavata 'Purana says, 'From these three letters the divine and 'unborn being created the various letters of the alphabet,

[7] See above p. 329 note 1.   [8] Dr. Muir's Sans. Texts.   [9] Ibid.

'distinguished as inner *(y, r, l, v)*, *ushmas (s', sh, s, h)*, 'vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this '[alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the 'functions of the four classes of priests, [created] from his 'four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred 'syllables and the *omkāra*'[10]. Again, 'There was for- 'merly only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the 'essence of all speech; only one god, Nārāyana; only 'one Agni, and [one] caste. From Purūravas came the 'triple Veda in the beginning of the Tretā age[1].'

"The learned Ṛishis who propounded these theories of the production of the Vedas must have calculated on the permanence of a state of popular ignorance in the country. They could hardly have expected criticism or cross questioning from their readers. For even this *meteoric* origin of their s'ástra is related in a slovenly manner without any regard to consistency. At times we hear of the Gáyatri being the mother of the Veda which was produced from it; at times, again, the Gáyatri appears to be the child of the Vedas, having itself been milked from them!

"Now before we can absolutely submit to the guidance of the Vedas, is it not a solemn duty to ponder these unmeaning, incoherent, and inconsistent descriptions of their nature and origin? I cannot at all gather from any of these descriptions what the substance, called Veda, was at its production, and certainly it could not be eternal, without falsifying some of these accounts."

A'gamika.—"The substance, called Veda, must at first have been *sound*, or words uttered, but not written down."

Satyakáma.—"What can be the meaning of producing words from fire, air, and the sun, or of extracting bhur, bhuvah, svar from words or sounds? Elsewhere, the

[10] Ibid.

[1] Ibid.

Vedas are said to have been breathed out. What is meant by this? Brahmá, or whoever was the producer, emitted the sounds or words at the beginning, for that is what most S'ástras say. Was there any person present to hear those sounds?"

A'gamika.—"There was no person present when the sounds were uttered, but the same words were afterwards written down by the persons to whom they were revealed."

Satyakáma.—"What evidence have you of that? How do you know they were revealed to the writers in question, and not produced from their own imaginations? The story of their original extraction from the elements, even if it could be made intelligible, can have no practical use in determining their authority, because we have no means of knowing any thing beyond what is written, and what we require is evidence of the writers' inspiration.

"But the writers in many instances claim their writings as their own productions, and not as communications of pre-existing sounds. And this leads me to the fourth question, what are the claims set up by the Vedas themselves? The following are but a few among many passages which have been cited by Dr. Muir to show that the Ṛishis claimed their compositions as the products of their own minds:—

"This hymn, conferring wealth, has been *made* to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]."

"Grow, O Agni, by this prayer which we have *made* to thee through [or according to] our power, or our knowledge."

"Thus, o Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas made for thee pure [or beautiful] hymns."

"These, your ancient exploits, o Asvins, our fathers have declared. Let us, who are strong in bold men, *making* a hymn for you, o bountiful gods, utter our offering of praise."

"Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, *fashioned* this new hymn for [thee], Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc.

"Desiring wealth, men have *fashioned* for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman [fabricates] a car, and thus they have disposed (*lit.* fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness."

"This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, *fashioned* by the heart, has been presented by the mind [or, according to Sayana 'let it be received by you with a favourable mind']."

"Thus, o hero, have the Gritsamadas, desiring succour, *fashioned* for thee a hymn, as men make roads." (Sayana explains *vayuna* by "road;" but it generally means knowledge).

"We *generate* a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaisvanara, who promotes our sacred rites."

"I have *generated* a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky; who bestows on us wealth in abundance."

"Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have *generated* prayers."

"The soma cheers not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a priest. To him I *generate* a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our *new* [song]."

"In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nasatyas (Asvins), so do I *send forth* to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride in a chariot which outstripped the enemy's host."

"The devout sage, deeply versed in sacred lore, *sends forth* his hymns to you, o Mitra and Varuna. You mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, since ye fill [prolong?], as it seems, his autumns by your power."

A'gamika.—"I cannot deny the force of your arguments, Satyakama, and yet I am far from being convinced. The result of our conferences hitherto has been to weaken the foundations of human belief, and foster a spirit of universal scepticism. There must be a grave error somewhere in all this. To disprove a certain position is not to find out the truth. And if there be no truth in the texts of the Vedas, or the aphorisms of philosophers, where are we to go in search of it. The characteristic of righteous men is to set forth *Faith*, as the poet says[2], not

[2] बभौच सा तेन सतां मतेन श्रद्धेव साक्षाद्विधिनोपपन्ना।

scepticism. Our studies, speculations, and discussions cannot be considered successful, if they end in the conclusion that there is no truth in the world. Our faculty of reason could never have been granted by the Almighty for *that;* it is doubtless intended to put us in possession of some definite and positive truth, to discover His will in nature and in His word, for it is preposterous to think of discovering His will for all practical purposes *without* His word. Surely He could not have left us in the dark destitute of a revelation of His will. Like yourself I find it difficult to believe that He would be deliberately deluding us by the projection of an illusion. But I cannot on the other hand understand that he would leave us, without an *ágama,* or revelation, to follow our own bewildering reason in things beyond its range, and thus, in another way, consign us to inevitable delusions. Hence my still cleaving to the hope that the Vedas may contain His word notwithstanding all you have said. We must have something on which to repose our faith, or our minds must be tossed to and fro by the waves of doubt and disputation, like a boat without a rudder on stormy waters. I cannot say that our conferences have at all tended to the discovery of that *something.*"

Satyakáma.—"I perfectly agree with you here, A'gamika. You are quite right in saying that belief, not scepticism, is the end of human study, but not belief of *every* kind. Bad as it is to be in a state of doubt, to believe in falsehood is still worse. To get rid of error is a most important step toward the discovery of truth. You will allow that he who removes rubbish in order to secure a good foundation, assists in raising the superstructure, as much as he that puts in layers of bricks. If the foundation of your house be radically bad, so that no supply of props or buttresses will save the

building, you will doubtless be thankful to the man who points out the fact to you, and you wil ladmit that your wisest course then is to dig it up. You dig up, however, only to build anew, and, in doing so, you do not recklessly throw away all the bricks and materials of the old edifice. Whatever is good you retain with pleasure, not only because that is the dictate of economy, but also because a stone that has stood the encroachments of time, uninjured, in a certain locality, has proved its adaptation to that locality, and must be preferable to one untried. Good stones of the old building may be depended upon more confidently than new ones."

Ágamika.—"I do not understand what you mean. You have certainly dug up the foundation by condemning the only revelation of God's will to which we looked for guidance. And as to bricks, I really do not know whether you have left any unbroken."

Satyakáma.—"I have only been condemning the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan. Their condemnation is not synonymous with the rejection of all revelation. A person does not disallow the true coin, merely because he refuses to accept a counterfeit one."

Ágamika.—"But where is your true coin? you are only finding fault with the Veda. We say that God communicated his will in the beginning. You say, No."

Satyakáma.—"I certainly do not say, No, to the idea of a primitive Revelation of God's will. If by talking of the eternal śástra, you only mean that God gave an utterance to His will in the beginning, and if you do not insist on that utterance being recorded in the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan, I am sure we are both of the same opinion."

Ágamika.—"But if the revelation be not on record, of what use would it be?"

Satyakáma.—"You acknowledge that the primitive Revelation was not at the time committed to writing. It could only be transmitted by traditional instruction. It could not under such circumstances be recorded without direct inspiration from God,—in other words without a fresh revelation. You have no evidence to offer in favor of the Ṛich and others being such an after-re velation, and the books themselves purport in some places to be ordinary human compositions.

"I cannot join you in saying that an unwritten revelation is of no use. It serves the immediate object of its utterance, and, notwithstanding the mistakes and errors incident to human tradition, there is some utility in its oral transmission. Gold with alloy may still have some value. But I agree with you so far as to believe that revelation, thus transmitted, becomes mixed up with human errors, and gradually loses its influence. Unless it were recorded under divine inspiration it could not be a trustworthy guide for all ages.

"But that the oral transmission of unwritten revelation is not altogether useless is apparent from the fact that the Brahminical systems, notwithstanding all their errors, have at least one great truth lurking in them all."

Ágamika.—"What truth do you allude to?"

Satyakáma.—"The fact of a primitive Revelation. No case has been made out for the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan, but the fact of a primitive Revelation from the Almighty can admit of little doubt, and the idea, almost universal in India, of an eternal Veda, may be accepted as an evidence of that great fact. The zealous apologist for the Vedas, the author of the Prior Mimánsá, himself suggests some such consideration. His argument is that the Vedas are eternal, for sound is eternal. People may naturally wonder at the confidence with which

this argument is broached. What especial connection, it may be asked, is there between the *Sádhya* and *hetu*, between the thing to be proved and the reason adduced. If the eternity of sound were admitted as a reason for the eternity of words, phrases, and sentences, all words, phrases, and sentences, and consequently all compositions must be eternal. How could a philosopher offer such a poor argument to his readers? How could he rely on its satisfying those who had reasoned so strongly against the Mantras and Bráhmaṇas?

"The mystery can only be explained on the supposition of some distorted tradition existing among the Brahmins of a primitive revelation from God. By s'abda, or sound, as an instrument of true knowledge, they meant the teaching of an infallible author. Those, who, like Jaimini, would not allow that the Vedas had an author, still understood s'abda in the sense of an infallible teaching. When, again, they speak of s'abda as eternal, they suggest the idea that there was an infallible teaching co-eval with the creation of man. This is the only sense in which their language becomes intelligible, and, whether they understood their own minds or not, whether they were conscious of what they were propounding or not, we can find no difficulty in admitting that a great truth is couched in their words. The reason they give for their position is thus expressed: 'It is eternal, for its manifestation was for the benefit of others[3].'

"Jaimini's theory, then, amounts to this, that there was an infallible teaching from the beginning for the benefit of others. This theory we may cordially accept as a testimony to the fact of a Primitive Revelation. We may well take for granted that an infallible teaching

[3] नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥ जैं सूं ॥

was available 'for the benefit of others,' when sentient creatures were called into being. We can have no difficulty in believing that the Almighty made a communication of His will to our first parents when He created them. How dependent human beings are upon external aid for years after their birth, is known to all men. They are quite powerless as infants and children. They necessarily look to their parents and guardians for maintenance and education. But the first man could have had no earthly father to foster him. The inference is accordingly almost inevitable that He, who gave him being, furnished him at the same time with such directions as were necessary for his guidance. That which the first man thus heard from His Maker, was a s'abda, an infallible teaching, intended for the benefit of others, *i. e.*, mankind, and co-eval with the commencement of human society.

"So far I see no reason for differing from Jaimini's aphorism, which certainly a theistic commentator may construe in our sense, whatever the author's own meaning may have been. But then he proceeds to identify that s'abda, or infallible teaching, with the Veda. And, here, the double meaning attached to this word helped to introduce a great error. Veda is by some defined to be *S'abda rás'i*[4], or a collection of words, sounds, or infallible teachings. When Jaimini argued that the Veda is eternal, for sound is eternal, he was probably thinking of this definition. But if the word Veda be synonymous with sound, or infallible teaching, then the argument is a truism. If it signifies a *specific* collection of words, then the argument involves the false reasoning, *it has horns, therefore it is a cow.* Because there was some infallible teaching in the beginning, therefore the Ṛich, Yajush, &c.

[4] वेदशब्देन तु सर्वत्र शब्दराशिर्विवक्षितः ॥ S'ankara on the Máṇḍukya.

are eternal! Assuming, however, that the word Veda stands simply for a collection of words, or infallible teachings, the aphorism, as we have interpreted it, only amounts to the assertiọn of a primitive Revelation, which, as I have already said, is more than probable in itself.

"But, as we know that Jaimini contends for the authority of the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan, the signification of the word Veda must shift from the *general* to the *particular* at same point in the argument. The moment however the word stands for the Ṛich and the other three, Jaimini's argument must be repudiated. Because some infallible teaching existed in the beginning, some collection of sounds was given, it does not follow that the Ṛich, Yajush, and others are eternal. To say that man was created in the beginning may be a truth, but to conclude from thence that Vikramáditya was co-eval with the creation is a gross error. Similarly; to say that some infallible teaching was received in the beginning may be a truth; to conclude from thence that the Ṛich and others were breathed out at that time is an error.

"The assertion of Jaimini, that the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan contain the primitive Revelation is not proved. No one knows when, where, or by whom, those four works were written, and consequently no one can pretend that they are a record of the primeval Sound. On the contrary a critical examination of their contents *disproves* their authority. As to the argument that the Vedas must have proceeded from the divinity because no human author can be shown to have produced it, it is not of much validity. If a stranger, or a man brought up as a foundling, came to you, and no one was able to give you an account of his paternity, you would not surely conclude that he was co-eval with the creation.

"And there is nothing in the general scope of the Vedas to justify the conclusion that they were revealed in the beginning. It is impossible to fancy what edification our first parents could derive from mere praises of the Sun, Moon, and Fire. If historical narratives were entirely excluded, the residuum would be mere invocations of the elements, and a few ceremonial injunctions."

A'gamika.—"But you have not answered my question, where is your true coin?"

Satyakáma.—"The true coin I believe to be the Bible. It has strong external evidences for its being composed under divine inspiration, and its contents are just what might be expected from a work intended for the spiritual instruction of mankind."

A'gamika.—"I have often heard of the Bible, but what I cannot fancy is the confidence with which you speak of the external evidences of the Bible, while you summarily reject those of the Vedas."

Satyakáma.—"You have no external evidences for the Vedas. You have not the slightest idea of the time when, and the persons by whom, the Ṛich, Yajush, Sáman, and Atharvan were composed. There is a complete want of evidence here. As regards the Bible, it is, you must know, divided into two parts, the Old and New Testaments. The former was written by the prophets of the Jews, the latter by the apostles and followers of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind. In both cases we have the evidence of miracles and prophecy; the evidence becoming, in the case of the New Testament, especially strong, because of its being confirmed by collateral and circumstantial proofs. Now to set your face against these evidences, simply because you have no external evidences for the Veda, would not be acting with the manliness of an inquirer after truth."

Ágamika.—"Well, what do you mean by the evidence of prophecy?"

Satyakáma.—"By the evidence of prophecy I mean the exact coincidence of events, as foretold long before their occurrence. There are in the Old and New Testaments, more especially the former, many predictions of events, far beyond the range of human sagacity, which were fulfilled, in some cases many centuries afterwards, exactly as they were uttered. The future condition of many nations of Asia and of Africa were thus accurately predicted long before the events. The circumstances attending the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ were in like manner foretold. Now since no man can obtain an insight into the future, beyond the ordinary range of *anumaṇa*, or guess, by natural sensation or reflection, the inference is inevitable that the writers of the Old and New Testaments obtained such knowledge by divine inspiration.

"To specify one instance of such predictions,—Moses, who lived fifteen hundred years before Christ, foretold the future sufferings of his own nation, which are still being realized in our days. At the time of the prediction, there was no *lakshaṇa*, or sign, from which the prophet might have formed an idea of the calamities he was describing, especially since those calamities were, in some respects, without a parallel in the history of mankind. Consider now a few of those predictions, and the manner in which each was fulfilled.

"The following prophecies are taken from the 28th Chapter of the Book of Deuteronomy, and the statements representing their exact fulfilment, from a valuable work of a learned divine of the last century, Bishop Newton by name:

PROPHECY.

"'The Lord shall bring a nation against thee from far, from the end of 'the earth, *as swift* as the eagle flieth; a nation whose tongue thou shalt 'not understand.'

FULFILMENT.

"This description cannot be applied to any nation with such propriety as to the Romans. They were truly brought *from far, from the end of the earth.* Vespasian and Adrian, the two great conquerors and destroyers of the Jews, both came from commanding here in Britain. The Romans too for the rapidity of their conquests might very well be compared to eagles, and perhaps not without an allusion to the standard of the Roman armies, which was an eagle: and their language was more unknown to the Jews than the Chaldee."

PROPHECY.

'A nation of fierce countenance, which shall not regard the person of 'the old, nor shew favour to the young:

'And he shall eat the fruit of thy cattle, and the fruit of thy land, 'until thou be destroyed: which *also* shall not leave thee *either* corn, 'wine, or oil, *or* the increase of thy kine, or flocks of thy sheep, until, 'he have destroyed thee.'

FULFILMENT

Such also were the Romans: for when Vespasian entered Gadara Josephus saith, that 'he slew all, man by man, the Romans showing 'mercy to no age, out of hatred to the nation, and remembrance of their 'former injuries.' The like slaughter was made at Gamala, 'For no body 'escaped besides two women, and they escaped by concealing themselves 'from the rage of the Romans. For they did not so much as spare 'young children, but every one at that time snatching up many cast them 'down from the citadel.'

PROPHECY.

'And he shall besiege thee in all thy gates, until thy high and fenced 'walls come down, wherein thou trustedst, throughout all thy land: and 'he shall besiege thee in all thy gates throughout all thy land, which 'the LORD thy God hath given thee.'

FULFILMENT.

So likewise the Romans, as we may read in Josephus's history of the Jewish war, demolished several fortified places, before they besieged and destroyed Jerusalem. And the Jews may very well be said to have *trusted in their high and fenced walls,* for they seldom ventured a battle in the open field. They confided in the strength and situation of Jerusalem, as the Jebusites, the former inhabitants of the place, had done before them: insomuch that they are represented saying (Jer. XXI. 13.) *Who shall come down against us? or who shall enter into our habitation?* Jerusalem was indeed a very strong place, and wonderfully fortified both by nature and art according to the description of Tacitus as well as of Josephus: and yet how many times was it taken? It was taken by

Shishak king of Egypt, by Nebuchadnezzar, by Antiochus Epiphanes, by Pompey, by Sosius and Herod, before its final destruction by Titus."

PROPHECY.

'And thou shalt eat the fruit of thine own body, the flesh of thy sons 'and of thy daughters, which the Lord thy God hath given thee, in 'the siege and in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies shall distress 'thee:

'So that the man that is tender among you, and very delicate, his 'eye shall be evil toward his brother, and toward the wife of his bosom, 'and toward the remnant of his children which he shall leave:

'So that he will not give to any of them of the flesh of his children 'whom he shall eat: because he hath nothing left him in the siege and 'in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies shall distress thee in all 'thy gates.

'The tender and delicate woman among you, which would not adven-'ture to set the sole of her foot upon the ground for delicateness and 'tenderness, her eye shall be evil toward the husband of her bosom, and 'toward her son, and toward her daughter,

'And toward her young one that cometh out from between her feet, 'and toward her children which she shall bear: for she shall eat them for 'want of all *things* secretly in the siege and straitness, wherewith thine 'enemy shall distress thee in thy gates.'

FULFILMENT

"And in the last siege of Jerusalem by the Romans there was a most terrible famine in the city, and Josephus hath given so melancholy an account of it, that we cannot read it without shuddering. He saith, particularly, that 'women snatched the food out of the very mouths of their 'husbands and sons of their fathers, and (what is most miserable) 'mothers of their infants:' and in another place he saith, that 'in 'every house, if there appeared any semblance of food, a battle ensued, 'and the dearest friends and relations fought with one another, snatching 'away the miserable provisions of life.'

* * And again it was fulfilled above 1500 years after the time of Moses in the last siege of Jerusalem by Titus, and we read in Josephus particularly of a noble woman's killing and eating her own sucking child. Moses saith, *The tender and delicate woman among you, who would not adventure to set the sole of her foot upon the ground, for delicateness and tenderness:* and there cannot be a more natural and lively description of a woman, who was according to Josephus illustrious for her family and riches. Moses saith, *she shall eat them for want of all things:* and according to Josephus she had been plundered of all her substance and provision by the tyrants and soldiers. Moses saith, that

she should do it *secretly*: and according to Josephus, when she had boiled and eaten half, she covered up the rest, and kept it for another time."

PROPHECY.

'And ye shall be plucked from off the land whither thou goest to poss-'ess it.

'And the LORD shall scatter thee among all people, from the one end 'of the earth even unto the other;

'And among these nations shalt thou find no ease, neither shall the 'sole of thy foot have rest: but the LORD shall give thee there a trem-'bling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind:

'And thy life shall hang in doubt before thee; and thou shalt fear day 'and night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life:

FULFILMENT.

"Now not to mention any other of the calamities and slaughters which they have undergone, there was in the last siege of Jerusalem by Titus an infinite multitude, saith Josephus, who perished by famine, and he computes, that during the whole siege, the number of those who were destroyed by that and by the war amounted to eleven hundred thousand, the people being assembled from all parts to celebrate the passover: and the same author hath given us an account of 1.240.490 destroyed in Jerusalem and other parts of Judea, besides 99.200 made prisoners; as Basnage has reckoned them up from that historian's account. Indeed there is not a nation upon earth, that hath been exposed to so many massacres and persecutions. Their history abounds with them. If God had not given them a promise of a numerous posterity, the whole race would many a time have been extirpated.

They had come out of Egypt triumphant, but now they should return thither as slaves. They had walked through the sea as dry land at their coming out; but now they should be carried thither in ships. They might be carried thither in the ships of the Tyrian or Sidonian merchants, or by the Romans who had a fleet in the Mediterranean: and this was a much safer way of conveying so many prisoners, than sending them by land. It appears from Josephus that in the reigns of the two first Ptolemies many of the Jews were slaves in Egypt. And when Jerusalem was taken by Titus, of the captives who were above 17 years he sent many bound to the works in Egypt; those under 17 were sold: but so little care was taken of these captives, that eleven thousand of them perished for want. And we learn from St. Jerome, that 'after 'their last overthrow by Adrian many thousands of them were sold, and 'those who could not be sold were transported into Egypt, and perished 'by shipwreck or famine, or were massacred by the inhabitants.

They were indeed *plucked from off their own land*, when the ten tribes were carried into captivity by the king of Assyria, and other nations were planted in their stead; and when the two other tribes were carried away captive to Babylon; and when the Romans took away their place and nation; besides other captivities and transportations of the people. Afterwards, when the Emperor Adrian had subdued the rebellious Jews, he published an edict forbidding them upon pain of death to set foot in Jerusalem, or even to approach the country round about it. Tertullian and Jerome say, that they were prohibited from entering into Judea. From that time to this their country hath been in the possession of foreign lords and masters, few of the Jews dwelling in it, and those only of a low servile condition. Benjamin of Tudela in Spain, a celebrated Jew of the twelfth century, travelled into all parts to visit those of his own nation, and to learn an exact state of their affairs: and he hath reported, that Jerusalem was almost entirely abandoned by the Jews.

What people indeed have been scattered so far and wide as they? and where is the nation, which is a stranger to them, or to which they are strangers? They swarm in many parts of the East, are spread through most of the countries of Europe and Afric, and there are several families of them in the West Indies. They circulate through all parts, where trade and money circulate; and are, as I may say, the brokers of the whole world.

They have been so far from finding rest, that they have been banished from city to city, from country to country. In many places they have been banished, and recalled, and banished again. We will only just mention their great banishments in modern times, and from countries very well known. In the latter end of the thirteenth century they were banished from England by Edward I, and were not permitted to return and settle again till Cromwell's time. In the latter end of the fourteenth century they were banished from France (for the seventh time, says Mezeray) by Charles VI; and ever since they have been only tolerated, they have not enjoyed entire liberty, except at Metz where they have a synagogue. In the latter end of the fifteenth century they were banished from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella; and according to Mariana, there were a hundred and seventy thousand families, or as some say eight hundred thousand persons who left the kingdom. Most of them paid dearly to John II for a refuge in Portugal, but within a few years were expelled from thence also by his successor Emanuel. And in our own time, within these few years, they were banished from Prague by the queen of Bohemia."

"That part of the prophecy which related to the dispersion of the Jews all over the world, is being still

fulfilled before us. The fact is itself almost miraculous, and it is a standing evidence of Christian truth. There have been other people, dispossessed of their homes and banished from their country, but they have either been exterminated, or their nationality has been destroyed by amalgamation with strangers. The Jews, however, though long banished from their own country, still live as a separate people, with all their distinctive traditions and peculiar manners of old. They still live, not as emigrants in a new colony of their own, not removed in one body to any particular spot inhabiting it as another Judea, but they live, scattered over the whole world, 'present in all countries and with a home in none, intermixed and yet separated, and neither amalgamated nor 'lost: but like those mountain-streams which are said 'to pass through lakes of another kind of water and 'keep a native quality to repel commixture[5].' There is no land in the world which may now be called Jews' Land, and yet Jews are to be found, aliens, in all lands. They live under all governments, and yet have no government of their own. Such a fact has no parallel in history. It can only be looked upon as a wonder. He that could predict such a wonder, more than fifteen hundred years before the event, could only have done so under the inspiration of the Omniscient."

A'gamika.—"Are you not reasoning after a fashion for which even Gotama's category fails to find the proper terms? The eternity of the Veda, you say, is disproved by its recording events that transpired in time, and yet not only is the antiquity of Moses NOT disproved by his description of events that followed the capture of Jerusalem, but his prophetical authority is thereby actually established!"

[5] Davison on Prophecy.

Satyakáma.—"The Vedas, you must remember, my friend, describe the events alluded to as by-gone facts, as past occurrences. The dialogues between Yama and Nuchiketas, between Yájnawalkya and Maitreyi, between Uddálaka and S'wetaketu are recorded, not as prophecies of the future, but as narrations of the past. Hence we say that the naratives must have been written after the events. Moses, on the other hand, recorded the future sufferings of his countrymen as predictions. His writings existed before the Roman nation, 'of a fierce countenance,' which was, in the divine counsels, finally to inflict those chastisements on the Jews, was yet formed, or had obtained its name. These writings again were already translated into Greek above three hundred years before the destruction of Jerusalem; and the destruction of Jerusalem, as a fact, is recorded by two of the most accurate of ancient historians. The alternative of assigning to Moses a date posterior to the events is not open in this case. It is precluded by the facts of the Septuagint translation and of the corruption of the Jewish language during the captivity. The Jews, you must know, were taken captives to Babylon about six hundred years before the Christian era, and, for seventy years, they remained exiles from their own country. There, by mixing with a strange nation, their language was very much corrupted. The five books of Moses must therefore have been written, at latest, before the captivity, while the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the Jews could not have taken place before the reign of the Emperor Vespasian.

"Judea, you must remember, had been brought under the subjection of the Romans some time before the catastrophe predicted by Moses. Roman historians, who, as Gentiles, could have had no motive in recording any

thing from which a favourable inference might be drawn for the divine inspiration of prophets whom they despised, themselves inform us that one of their generals, Pompey, had forced himself into the temple of Jerusalem more than five hundred years after the captivity, which, as we saw, is the latest possible date that could be assigned to the Pentateuch, and about two hundred years after Moses had been translated into Greek. The temple, then, on the testimony of historians whose honesty was above suspicion, was in existence many hundred years after Moses, and it was destroyed in the reign of Vespasian, when the events gave accurate fulfilment to the predictions of Moses.

"In the above representation of the facts, I have confined myself to the testimony of enemies, and to the very extremes of historical possibilities. I have have taken no account of the evidence which the Jewish writers themselves afford. As those writers again give a consistent account of the age of Moses and the times of his successors, we must consider the actual date of the Pentateuch as established, beyond doubt, by the cumulative evidence of Jews aud Gentiles."

Ágamika.—"Is it certain that Moses lived long before the events described?

Satyakáma.—"I have just told you that Moses lived fifteen hundred years before Christ, and Jerusalem was destroyed seventy years after Christ. The works of Moses, originally written in Hebrew, were translated into Greek two hundred and seventy years before Christ, so that many persons unacquainted with Hebrew had also known, more than three hundred years before the event, what was coming on the Jews."

Ágamika.—"But is there no doubt of the events themselves?"

Satyakáma.—"The events are minutely described by Josephus and Tacitus, one writing in Greek, the other in Latin— the former a Jew, the latter a Roman, and both cautious, accurate, and faithful as historians. And we see with our own eyes the Jewish people dispersed all over the world, and without a country of their own."

A'gamika.—"But there are numerous prophecies in our own Puráṇas. May we not cite them as proofs of their authority? The Rámáyaṇa was written before Ráma was born."

Satyakáma.—"You cannot settle the age or paternity of any of the Puráṇas. How can you urge any thing as to the date of the predictions? The Upanishads say that the Puráṇas were breathed out from Brahma along with the Vedas at the time of the creation. The Puráṇas themselves claim Vyása for their author, and one of them goes the length of saying that it was composed for correcting the errors of the Vedas, while another pretends to be prior in point of time to the Vedas. Thus; 'That 'about which, venerable sage, you have enquired, is all 'known by me, the essence of the Puráṇas, the pre-emi-'nent Brahma-vaivartta, which refutes the errors of the 'Puráṇas and Upapuraṇas and of the Vedas.' 'First of 'all the s'astras, the Purana was uttered by Brahmā. 'Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths[6].'

"Learned critics, again, are forced to assign a much more recent date to all the Itiháses and Puráṇas that are extant in our days. What trust-worthy evidence can you possibly have of any prophecy having been delivered? or even of the facts (supposed to have been predicted), having really occurred? We do not know of any contemporaneous historian that recorded them. Nay the writing of history does not appear to have been

6 Dr. Muir's Sanscrit Texts Part iii.

undertaken by any Brahminical authors, either in prose or poetry. Prose writers have chiefly treated of speculative subjects, and as to poetry, it is a recognized rule in rhetoric that poetry must be *rasátmaka*, or full of striking ideas and sentiments, and that *iti vṛitta*, or a mere narrative, is a defect in poetry.

"As to the Rámáyaṇa, the popular saying about its composition before the events, may be a bold effort of fancy, but it cannot stand the test of historical criticism. Válmiki is said to have been a contemporary of Ráma. Whether that be an authenticated fact or not, is not now the question, but what evidence can be possibly adduced under such a circumstance of his writing the whole epic before the recovery of Sitá, and the conqueror's return to Ayodhiá?"

Ágamika.—"You said that the Bible was attested by miracles as well as prophecies. What have you to say on the question of miracles?"

Satyakáma.—"As prophecy is a sign of divine knowledge, so are miracles proofs of divine power. Numerous miracles of that description were publicly performed by Christ, and they were recorded by men who had ample opportunities for obtaining correct information, and whose honesty as historians has been established by irrefragable proofs.

"Miracles of course require to be authenticated by stronger evidence than ordinary facts. We must have the testimony of contemporaries, and the witnesses must prove their competency and their integrity. Proof of competency is required as a safeguard against mistakes founded on their ignorance, and proof of integrity is necessary to prevent impositions. A learned divine says, 'The strength and validity of every *testimony* must bear 'proportion with the *authority* of the *testifier*; and the

'*authority* of the *testifier* is founded upon his *ability* and 'and *integrity*: his *ability* in the knowledge of that which 'he delivereth and asserteth; his *integrity* in delivering 'and asserting according to the knowledge. For two 'several ways he which relateth or testifieth any thing 'may deceive us; one, by being ignorant of the truth, 'and so upon that ignorance mistaking, he may think 'that to be true which is not so, and consequently deli-'ver that for truth which in itself is false, and so deceive 'himself and us; or if he be not ignorant, yet if he be 'dishonest or unfaithful, that which he knows to be false 'he may propound and assert to be a truth, and so, 'though himself be not deceived, he may deceive us. 'And by each of these ways, for want either of *ability* 'or *integrity* in the *testifier*, whoso grounds his *assent* 'unto any thing as a truth, upon the testimony of ano-'ther, may equally be deceived. But whosoever is so '*able* as certainly to know the truth of that which he 'delivereth, and so *faithful* as to deliver nothing but 'what and as he knoweth, he, as he is not deceived, so 'deceiveth no man[7]."

"Both these characters of credible evidence are prominent in the testimony on which we receive the miracles of Christ. Those who have testified to them were his own disciples, who constantly kept company with him and had every opportunity of knowing the truth of what they declared to others. And their honesty was unimpeachable. In the first place, they had nothing to gain by false testimony. Men are known in the world to pervert facts only from interested motives. No one tells a lie where he has nothing to gain. When we are satisfied that a person is disinterested, we never doubt his testimony. And so from the obvious disinterestedness of the disci-

[7] Pearson on the Creed.

ples of Christ, their testimony is beyond suspicion. In the second place, their honesty was proved by the severest ordeal to which a human witness could possibly be subjected. Judea was at that time under the government of the Romans who, being idolaters, were bitterly opposed to the teaching of Christ. That teaching was also hateful to the Jews who had contracted the strongest prejudices against the Saviour. His disciples had therefore to encounter the severest persecutions both from Jews and Gentiles for their proclaiming the doctrines and miracles of Christ. They were reviled and reproached, imprisoned and beaten, and most of them were finally put to cruel deaths because of their unflinching honesty in declaring what they had seen and heard.

"The miracles, thus attested, were also numerous and stupendous. They could not otherwise have been such satisfactory credentials of divine commission. A single isolated act, however wonderful, might fail as an evidence of religious truth. It might be a deception, or a delusion. But Christ's miracles were both numerous and stupendous. The eye or the ear might have been deceived in a single instance. It could not be so in a multiplicity of instances, or in cases in which persons, born blind, were cured in an instant, or dead men were raised to life.

"The miracles of Christ, again, had nothing in them, militating with our conceptions of God's goodness and majesty. They were exhibitions of the divine benevolence no less than the divine power."

A'gamika.—"But there are numerous miracles recorded in our Itiháses and Puráṇas. Why may we not cite them also as instances of divine power?"

Satyakáma.—"Because of a failure of evidence and because of their militating with our conceptions of the

divine perfection. Where nothing is known as to the age, circumstances, and character of the writers, how can the least confidence be placed in their sayings? The descriptions again are unworthy of the Godhead. The alleged miracles were in many instances performed by the most immoral personations and for improper purposes.

"The Christian miracles are in these respects totally different. The performer, Christ, was in his life a perfect pattern of holiness and moral virtue. It would be literally impossible for the disciples of Christ to have composed such an exemplar of perfection from their own heads.

"And the Bible, thus attested by external evidences, teaches in point of doctrine and precept precisely such things as might be expected from the teaching of God, and throws light on many points on which we were perplexed by doubts and difficulties. The internal evidence thus confirms the external, and leaves no possible room for doubt."

A'gamika.—"What are the points on which the Bible throws light?"

Satyakáma.—"Some of the very points on which we have been conversing for some days of late. As regards the external universe, it tells us, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' thus showing that the Ny'aya, Sánkhya, and Vedant were all right and all wrong. They rightly apprehended the truth, as regarded their opposition to each other's systems. The Vedant was right in its protest against the eternal atoms of the one, and the unintelligent creative prakṛiti of the other; and the Nyáya and Sánkhya were equally right on their part in inveighing against the doctrine of the world's identity with God. But they were all wrong in regard to their positive doctrines—the Nyáya in its theory of eternal atoms, the Sánkhya in that of creative Prakṛiti, and the Vedant in its

denial of a duality of substance. The universe is neither an illusion nor self-formed, but was called into being, out of nothing, by the one only Eternal and Supreme Intelligence, the author of all things in heaven and in earth. All perplexing difficulties are thus cleared.

"As regards the chief end of human existence, again, we learn, that the soul is a created substance but immortal, neither eternal or self-existent, nor again a mere compound of physical organs; born in time but to endure for ever, neither *swayambhu*, nor *anitya* in the sense of perishable. It has neither independent nor *terminable* existence. Being a creature, it can never be promoted to the dignity of the Creator, but it has an eternity *before it*, to look forward to. It may strive to approach Him—it may aspire after communion with Him, but it can never be unified with its Creator. There may be spiritual communion, but not physical identity. Since, however, the human soul is become tainted with sin, it must be cleansed and purified before it can look for that communion. It is impossible there can be any fellowship between the most holy God and impure sinners, before the latter have been redeemed and freed from sin. But the sinner, could not compass his own redemption, and therefore Christ came into the world for the salvation of helpless man.

"Thus, A'gamika, we have a clearing up of those points on which philosophers had so long debated unprofitably. And in the doctrine of Christ's atoning sacrifice for the sins of men, we have an explanation of a point which had certainly often puzzled me, and, I dare say, you too. The followers of Jaimini you know are all most forward in exhorting men to perform the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Veda. The only way to the realms above, they say, is by means of sacrifices. Now it is singular that Jaimini

never talks of God; and, as we have just seen, a large and influential class of Mimánsakas set aside altogether the idea of a Supreme Creator and moral Governor of the universe. Works and worlds, they say, mechanically follow one another in eternal succession. There was no more necessity, in the opinion of the atheistic Mimánsakas, for a Supreme Being to create the universe, than there was, in the opinion of the whole school, for a *purusha*, or personal author, to compose the Vedas, or for an intelligent Governor to direct the distribution of *fruits*. And yet they all say, he that desires heaven must perform sacrifice. I do not know whether the question ever struck you, but I have often asked myself, what could they possibly mean by performing sacrifices, when they did not acknowledge a Supreme Divinity?

"The difficulty is cleared up in the Bible. We there learn that in the inscrutable wisdom of God, there could be no remission of sin apart from sacrifice, that Christ was revealed in the primitive age of the world as the great sacrifice for the sins of men, and that immolation of animals was ordained at an early period as typical of that great sacrifice. On the dispersion of the families of men, the institution must have extended widely over the surface of the globe. But while the ceremonial performance of the rite was kept up, probably every where, its object and intention were gradually forgotten or lost sight of in many countries. The practice, no doubt, came down to our ancestors from their immediate progenitors, but its signification appears to have fallen into oblivion before the formation of our literature. The zeal and assiduity with which it was maintained in our country is accounted for by its transmission from age to age as an immemorial primitive practice, but the inability of our ancestors to give the least intelligent explanation of the rite, and the want of

any information in the oldest of the Vedas on its connexion with the celestial fruits of which it was believed to be invariably productive, are enigmas which can only be understood by the light of Biblical history. Viewed as an institution originally appointed of God to represent the future sacrifice of Christ, and transmitted from father to son in every age as a most important ceremony connected with the eternal happiness of mankind, the external observance of the rite would, we can easily comprehend, be religiously maintained, even though the doctrine typified by it might be forgotten. Without the light which the Biblical account affords, one can find no adequate explanation of the difficulty. Why should the writers of the Vedas tell us abruptly that the only way to the felicity of heaven is the regular observance of certain sacrifices? What again could those advocates for rites and ceremonies possibly mean, who either doubted or actually denied the existence of God, and yet contended for the necessity of offering sacrifices?"

"Oh!" said I, "this is what you meant by the Great Sacrifice for sin of which you spoke the other day. Now I understand your meaning."

Ágamika.—"I have sometimes been perplexed, I must confess, by the zeal with which persons have contended for the importance of sacrificial ceremonies who were perfectly indifferent, if not absolutely opposed, to the very foundation of all religion, the doctrine of a Supreme Being, the creator and moral governor of the world.

"But I have always consoled myself with the idea that even atheists might by a happy inconsistency be animated by the sentiment contained in the following formula of adoration to Vishṇu; 'Obeisance to the sovereign God, 'the benefactor of Brahmins and kine. Obeisance, O 'obeisance! to Kṛishṇa, even Govinda, the benefactor of

'the world. I am sin, my works are sin, my spirit is sin, 'my origin is sin. Save me, O thou lotus-eyed Hari, 'who art the Lord of all sacrifices. None such a sinner 'as myself, none such a destroyer of sin as thyself, taking 'this, O God, into consideration, do what is proper.' Sentiments such as these give some insight into the meaning of our ancient practice of animal sacrifices[8]."

Satyakáma.—"That is however a formula of very recent origin. It was unknown to those who composed the Vedas and enjoined the sacrifices. There are reasons for suspecting that the idea contained in the formula you have quoted is derived from an exterior source."

A'gamika.—"What are those reasons?"

Satyakáma.—"In the first place, the doctrine of Kṛishṇa, as a distinct object of worship, identical with the Supreme Being, appears to be quite modern. Professor Wilson, whom all Brahmins respected for his profound Sanscrit learning and who was never suspected of having ever done the least injustice to our national Śástras, says:

'The whole of this book is dedicated to the biography of Krishna. 'Many of the Puranas omit this subject altogether, or only allude to it 'occasionally. In others, it is equally prominent. The Brahma P. 'gives the story exactly in the same words as our text; which has the 'best right to them may be questioned; but as it is usually met with, 'the Brahma P. is a very heterogeneous compilation. The Hari Vansa 'has a narrative more detailed than that of the text, with additions and 'embellishments of its own. The Brahma Vaivartta throughout celebrates 'the acts of Krishna; and one portion of it, the Krishna Janma Khanda, 'especially describes his boyhood and youth. The incidents are the same 'in general as those in the text, but they are lost amidst interminable

[8] नमो ब्रह्मण्यदेवाय गोब्राह्मणहिताय च। जगद्धिताय कृष्णाय गोविन्दाय नमो नमः॥ पापोऽहं पापकर्म्माहं पापात्मा पापसम्भवः। त्राहि मां पुण्डरीकाक्ष सर्व्वयज्ञेश्वरो हरिः॥ मत्समः पातकी नास्ति त्वत्समो नास्ति पापहा। इति कृत्वा मतिं देव यथा योग्यं तथा कुरु॥

'descriptions of Krishna's sports with the Gopis and with his mistress 'Radha, a person not noticed elsewhere; the whole is in a style indicative 'of a modern origin. The Agni P. and Padma P. (Uttara Khanda) have 'accounts of Krishna, but they are mere summaries, compiled evidently 'from other works. The principal authority for the adventures of Krishna 'is the Bhagavata, the tenth book of which is exclusively devoted to 'him. It is this work which has, no doubt, mainly extended the 'worship of Krishna, as its popularity is evinced by its having been 'translated into all the spoken languages of India professing to have a 'literature. The Prem-sagar, its Hindi version, is well known; but there 'are also translations in Mahratta, Telugu, Tamil, &c. It does not seem 'likely, however, that the Vishnu P. has copied the Bhagavata; for 'although its greater conciseness may sometimes look like abridgment, 'yet the descriptions are generally of a more simple and antiquated 'character. Here, as usual, the Mahabharata is no doubt the earliest 'extant authority; but it is not the earliest, for whilst it omits to narrate 'most of his personal adventures unconnected with his alliance with the 'Pandavas, it often alludes to them, and names repeatedly his capital, 'his wives, and his progeny. It also devotes a section, the Mausala P., 'to the destruction of the Yadavas. The story of Krishna, the prince 'and hero, must have been complete when the Mahabharata was compiled. 'It is doubtful, however, if Krishna the boy, and his adventures at 'Vrindavan, were not subsequent inventions. There are no allusions to 'them in the poem, of an unsuspicious nature. The only ones that I 'have met with are contained in a speech by Sisupala, Sabha P., in which he 'reviles Krishna; but they may easily have been interpolated. There may 'be others scattered through the poem, but I have not observed them.

"As a warrior and prince he is always on the scene; but he is repeat- 'edly called an Ansa, or portion of Vishnu; whilst in a great number of 'places he is identified with Vishnu Náráyana, and is consequently 'all 'things.' This latter is his character, of course, amongst the Vaishna- 'vas, agreeably to the Bhágavata; कृष्णस्तु भगवान् स्वयं । 'Krishna is "the lord (Vishnu) himself.[9]'"

"Professor Wilson is of opinion that the Sri Bhágavata was composed in the twelfth century of the Christian era, or about seven hundred years ago. The worship of Kṛishṇa as identical with the Supreme Being cannot then be much older than that."

[9] Note, Translation of the Vishnu Puràṇa, pp. 491, 492.

Ágamika.—"Surely the *Nárada-pancha-rátra* speaks of Kṛishṇa's sports with the Gopis and with Rádhá, magnifying his glory as the Supreme Brahma. And that work is older than the Śri-Bhágavata."

Satyakáma.—"I have no objection to allow that the Pancha-rátra was prior to the Bhágavata in point of time, notwithstanding its express mention of the Bhágavata in one of its chapters. That mention I think is an interpolation. The Pancha-rátra must have been written before Sankaráchárya, for he not only refers to it by name, but controverts some of its doctrines. I believe it was the Nárada-Pancha-rátra that first invested Kṛishṇa with the dignity of the Supreme Godhead, and celebrated his youthful freaks as something mystically divine. I have my theory of the reasons which led the author of that work to exhibit as adorable what I believe had before been held to be at best only tolerable in a prince and a warrior. But we cannot possibly have any reasons for assigning to the doctrine of 'Kṛishṇa the lord of sacrifices' any date anterior to the Pancha-rátra which was written probably in the eighth or ninth century. The formula which affords you an insight into the doctrine of sacrifices cannot accordingly be of an older date than the eighth or ninth century. Now we have strong evidences for believing that the doctrine of the Great Sacrifice for sin, of which I have been speaking, had been introduced before that period into some parts of India, not far from the scene of the literary labours and theological discussions of the age. It was in the South of India that the Bráhminical genius was in those days most active, as is apparent from the history of Sankaráchárya, Rámánuja, and their respective followers, and it was also in the South of India that large congregations of Christians, calling themselves after the name of St. Thomas, had, for some

centuries before the formation of Vaishṇava sects, been maintaining the doctrine of the Great Sacrifice for sin. It is not at all improbable that some enterprising Brahmins had fallen in with them, and, struck by the doctrine in question, made use of it in giving a more imposing character to their popular god Kṛishṇa."

A'gamika.—"But what is your theory of the reasons which led to the deification of Kṛishṇa in the Pancharátra and the Sri-Bhágavata?"

Satyakáma.—"I do not know whether I can explain myself in a few words, but I will make the attempt. Kṛishṇa, you must remember, is a great character in the Mahábhárata, as the friend of the Páṇḍavas. He must have been admired from the beginning for the abilities he displayed both on the field of battle and in the hall of consultation. He was feared and honoured as an extraordinary person, perhaps a god. But though celebrated as a hero, there is no record of his youthful irregularities being held as adorable. Public morals had not as yet become so low. We need not consider the reproaches which Sis'upála cast on him as an interpolation. There may have been reports of his having, as a boy, led a very dissolute life. Most princes in our country still do the same. But we have no reason for taxing the age of which we are speaking with recounting those irregularities as *divine* acts. If the hero was deified, it was only by throwing the mantle of pious charity over the infirmities of the boy.

"Indeed the Brahmins were so much opposed in those days to the recounting of the foibles of deified persons, that one entire canto of a popular poem was suppressed or expunged because of its containing an indelicate description of a god's dalliance with his own wife. Kálidása who seems to have taken peculiar delight in such descriptions had given a very indecent representation of Siva's uxorious-

ness in the last canto of the Kumára-sambhava, and the horror of the Brahmins at such an impious exposure of a god's infirmities has thrown that canto into utter oblivion.

"The moral constitution of the Brahminical mind must therefore have undergone a radical change when poems like the Nárada-pancha-rátra and S'ri-Bhágavata were composed. These works not only recounted as divine, acts on the part of Kṛishṇa, far worse than those which Kálidása had described of S'iva, but they attached a peculiar religious merit to the constant hearing, uttering, and contemplating of those acts. And these impure descriptions have not only been received with favor, but that which is the more circumstantial of the two, I mean the Sri-Bhágavata, has been classed among the sacred writings, and translated, more or less freely, into most of the vernacular dialects of the country. What can be the cause of this moral revolution in the Brahminical mind? What inducement could there be for selecting, as objects of religious worship, the most ugly traits in a character who had before been conspicuous in the traditions of the country only as a skilful prince and warrior. Above all, what could be the motive for exhibiting such a character as higher than all other gods, and identical with the Supreme Being?"

A'gamika.—"I never thought of this point; but I see that the deification of Bal Kṛishṇa is an event that may require to be accounted for. What do you think was the motive of our ancestors in setting up such an object of worship?"

Satyakáma.—"I have only a *theory* on the subject. I think it will afford an explanation of the moral phenomenon of the change in the Brahminical mind, but since there is a total absence of historical evidence, I cannot propound it as absolutely true. The Pancha-rátra was

written after the overthrow of Buddhism. What was the meaning of that overthrow? Only that its leaders were silenced or expelled. The great body of the people still entertained their veneration for the character of Buddha. They—more especially the Sudras—had found in that personation an object of reverence and adoration, such as had never been supplied to them by the Brahmins. Indeed the Brahmins had denied them the privilege of engaging in religious exercises of any kind, and even punished such acts on their part as were indicative of the least aspiration after celestial blessings[10]. Buddha however had allowed them to participate freely in religious acts and meditations. He had so far emancipated the Sudras. The Brahmins saw, on regaining their supremacy after the fall of the rival school, that it would be impossible to enlist the popular sympathy in their favour without some concessions to the Sudras. They accordingly pitched on the well-known, and perhaps already deified, character of Kṛishṇa, and set it up as an object of universal worship. And in order to make it the more fascinating to the popular mind, and to give that mind a strong impulse in a direction the very opposite of Buddhism, they invested their new god with those infirmities of the flesh from which Sákya Muni is said to have been somewhat unnaturally free. The rude mind of the populace, devoid of education, is easily led in the direction of sensuality, and whereas Buddha had observed rigid chastity in the midst of several thousand damsels resident in his own palace, Kṛishṇa was represented as the very antithesis of Buddha, deliberately going about to seek, seduce, carry off, or procure by other means many thousands of females from different parts of the country. The moral perversion of the Brahminical mind was accordingly brought about by the reaction

10 See above page 45.

against Buddhism. The Brahmins had found no difficulty in adopting the speculative principles of that system, but, as regarded practical devotion, they were desirous of setting up a character the very opposite of Śákya, with a view to wean the popular mind from Buddhism.

"Under the impulse of the reaction in their own minds the Brahmins set up their popular god as the Supreme Brahma, allowing all castes freely to worship him, taking care only to maintain their ministerial importance as *gurus*, or spiritual guides of other classes. Whatever ideas, expressive of the divine majesty, they could themselves imagine, and whatever sentiments, borrowed from other quarters, struck their fancies as suitable for a popular system, they freely received in the construction of their new idol. And thus the very character which had injured so many husbands and stained the purity of so many households, was otherwise described as the Lord of sacrifices, the greatest destroyer of sin, and the deliverer of the world. If a man had only faith in that pre-eminent divinity, he would obtain excellence whatever his caste or race[1]. The Śudras carried the dogma to greater lengths than was intended by the Brahmins. Sects arose afterwards which conferred the dignity of *gurus* on eminent members of their bodies without distinction of caste or colour.

"I need hardly add, Ágamika, that Kṛishṇa, invested with the attributes of a Saviour from sin, presents only the picture (to use the fabulist's illustration) of a jackdaw in peacock's plumes. The picture looks unnatural, and you have no hesitation in saying that the plumage is borrowed.

[1] ब्राह्मणाः क्षत्रियो वैश्यः शूद्रो वा यदि वेतरः। विष्णुभक्तिसमायुक्तो ज्ञेयः सर्वोत्तमश्च सः॥ Káśi Khaṇḍa in Wilson on the Religious Sects of the Hindus.

And yet the fact has some value in it. The jackdaw that borrows the peacock's plumes testifies thereby that the plumes are beautiful. And so the character of Kṛishṇa proves that, in the conception of its framers, human salvation could only proceed from the free grace of Him who was the Lord of sacrifices, 'in whom,' to quote a text from the Bible, 'we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of His grace.'"

A'gamika.—"But I am told that the Christian religion which you are now advocating speaks of a plurality of gods, three gods."

Satyakáma.—"Not three gods, nor a plurality of gods, but a plurality of persons in the unity of the Godhead. This doctrine you can find no great difficulty in acknowledging, (1) because it is inculcated in the Bible which, as we have seen before, is attested by miracles and prophecies, and (2) because the Brahminical śástras themselve bear some confirmatory testimony to its truth."

A'gamika.—"How?"

Satyakáma.—"The Brahminical śástras speak of a triad of divinities, Brahmá, Vishṇu, and S'iva. They speak of it, as *one form and three gods.* They tell us that they are mystically united in One Supreme Being. But the doctrine appears incongruous, and quite out of place in their system. The gods are frequently represented, not as different personal manifestations of the same Godhead ought to be, but as impure characters and antagonistic gods, wrangling and fighting with one another. S'iva fights and punishes Brahmá[2], and Vishṇu humbles S'iva[3].

[2] प्रजानाथं नाथ प्रसभमभिकं स्वां दुहितरं गतं रोहिद्भूतां रिरमयिषु मृष्यस्य वपुषा । धनुष्पाणेर्यातं दिवमपि सपत्राकृतममुं त्रसन्तं तेद्यापि त्यजति न मृगव्याधरभसः ॥

[3] See above p. 270.

The votaries of Vishṇu anathematize those of S'iva[4], and the votaries of S'iva anathematize those of Vishṇu. And all three are, again, pronounced to be transient and perishable[5]. The doctrine represents an idea which is quite foreign to the Brahminical system, and we can only unravel the mystery by supposing it to be a relic of some primitive revelation, of which a distorted tradition had probably reached our ancestors "

A'gamika.—"These appear to be strange and novel views of things, and yet I certainly cannot gainsay them. Well is there any other point on which you can collect evidence from our s'ástras in behalf of Christianity ?"

Satyakáma.—"The doctrine of Christ's incarnation for the redemption of the world, involved in the primitive revelation of a future Saviour, receives some confirmation from detached expressions in several portions of the Brahminical s'ástras. The idea propounded in the Bhagavad-gitá and other works that Vishṇu descends in human form for the relief of the world, whenever it is oppressed with sin and wickedness, is ill in keeping with the acts attributed to his alleged incarnations, of which Kṛishṇa is declared to have been the fullest and most conspicuous. I need not offend your ears by a description of his character. You will admit that from such a character it would be preposterous to expect any relief from sin. The idea was apparently derived by tradition from the primitive revelation of a future Saviour, and it was eagerly entertained owing to the necessities of sinful human nature,

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[4] रजस्तमोगुणोद्रिक्तौ विधीशानौ सुरोत्तमौ । अतौ मया न पूज्यौ तौ विप्राणामृषिसत्तमाः ॥ शुद्धसत्वमयोविष्णुः कल्याणगुणसागरः । नारायणः परं ब्रह्म विप्राणां दैवतं हरिः ॥

Pádma, uttara Khaṇḍa, in Dr. Muir's *Mata Parikshá*, Part 1.

[5] See above p. 212. Note 5.

incapable of helping itself, and panting for reconciliation with God.

" But the ineffectual rites and ceremonies of the Brahminical system and the adoration of its imitation gods and pretended incarnations of Deity, have never succeeded in administering anything like solid or enduring peace and consolation to the human mind. The people want something better, and it was no doubt with a view to the satisfaction of this craving that the transcendental and mystic systems were propounded. How barren they are of anything really good, we have already seen. They labour to tranquillize the soul by simply telling it there is no hope for tranquillity but in the cessation of sentient existence or the destruction of individual consciousness. It is however a mere mockery to speak of happiness without sentient existence or individual consciousness."

Ágamika.—" But what is the great duty and what the chief end inculcated in the Christian religion."

Satyakáma.—" The great duty is devotion to God, through Christ, in consideration of the great sacrifice for sin. 'I beseech you, therefore, brethren, says an 'inspired apostle, by the mercies of God, that ye present 'your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, 'which is your reasonable service. And be not con- 'formed to this world: but be ye transformed by the 'renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that 'good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God.' The chief end of human nature is to escape the evils of this corrupt and deceitful world,—this vanity of vanities, which though not a nullity, can still give no satisfaction, —and to enjoy God, not by identification with Him, nor by absorption in His essence to the destruction of separate individualities, but by communion with His

Holy Spirit, and by being filled with all the fulness of God.

"The philosopher talks of *mukti*, and the Vedantist speaks of unification with God. I do not know whether either of them had any traditionary knowledge of the fact that man was created in the image of God. Not that an essentially formless Being can have a corporeal image, but man was made in the likeness of His Spirit. The Vedantic conception of the human soul being a reflection of the Supreme, like that of the sun or moon in the waters, is not correct, but the human soul is certainly an image, a likeness, and, in that sense of the term, a reflection of the Supreme Spirit. The likeness has been disfigured by the introduction of sin. The reflection partakes of the mirror's impurity, but the chief end of human existence is so to cleanse and polish the mirror of the soul by personal holiness that it may present an unspotted likeness of its God and Saviour, and be fully restored to the image in which it was originally made. The restoration of that image implies perfect release from all those corruptions which the Brahminical philosopher dreaded most, but it does not involve destitution of sentient existence or loss of individual consciousness. Christianity animates us with the hope of positive happiness and glory. Far from involving a destitution of sentient existence or loss of individual consciousness, the ineffable bliss we look for, signifies the full sanctification of our senses, and the unceasing contemplation of the divine perfections without the least abatement of individual consciousness. We do not seek to fall into a state of irreparable insensibility, but we seek for an eternal life of perfect sentiency, that we may live for ever, intelligently and consciously to laud and magnify the goodness and mercy of God. We wish our passions and

affections, not to be destroyed, but to be brought in subjection to God, and to continue as immortal trophies of His omnipotent grace."

A'gamika.—"Many ideas are suggested by what you say. I shall not ask any more questions now. It is so late in the day, and I must first of all think more maturely of what you have already advanced. I shall probably call upon you soon for further information. I certainly feel that if there be truth in the world, it must be found in the Christian Scriptures."

Satyakáma.—"Since there is a God, the author and director of all things, there must also be a corresponding TRUTH. And if we seek it in dependence on Him, we shall no doubt find it, and the truth shall make us free, shall give us real *Mukti.*"

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